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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the influence of second century Gnosticism (Valentinian Gnosticism) on 
modern systems of thought. It contends that such an influence does exists and that Gnosticism, 
although often neglected, is one significant hermeneutical approach to understanding influential 
modern philosophical and theological cultures such as German Idealism and Sophiology. It 
attempts to demonstrate these claims by broadly adhering to a Foucauldian archaeological 
methodology that focuses on the historical development of a particular theological theme: 
Sophiology.    
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Introduction 
 
Gnosticism in Modernity 
This thesis is a study of the theological and philosophical influence of Valentinian Gnosticism 
during the modern period. The contention that a marginalized second-century Christian ‘heresy’, 
such as Gnosticism is typically considered to be, could have exerted any great influence over 
modern systems of thought may appear peculiar within a ‘standard’ discourse concerning the 
history of ideas. Yet even today, philosophers as popular and prolific as Slavoj Zizek appeal to 
ancient Gnostic cosmology to interpret and philosophically represent the insights of modern 
scientific discourses such as quantum physics concerning the origins of the universe.1 The 
argument that Gnostic thought forms pervades modernity has maintained a steady, even if 
peripheral position within theological, philosophical, historical and political discourses, since the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Three figures in particular: Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-
1860), Eric Voegelin (1901-1985), and Cyril O’Regan (b.1952) have strongly insisted on this 
specific reading of modernity, devoting large parts, and in some cases, all of their academic 
careers at attempting to persuade others of its legitimacy. Their reasons and motives are varied, 
but all insist on the significance of the argument itself, which is never doubted. Before 
introducing the specific tasks and aims of this thesis, it would prove prudent to first familiarize 
the reader with the historical context from which these questions have emerged, before going on 
to assess their continuity and divergence with the original contributions of this thesis itself. 
To begin such an account, it is necessary to first take note of the contributions of Ferdinand 
Christian Baur, who in many respects, must be considered the pioneer of this hermeneutical 
approach, influencing nearly all of his modern counterparts. 
                                                             
1 Zizek consistently draws parallels between the Gnostic doctrine of the finite world falling into existence from a 
pre-existent whole to quantum theories such as ‘broken symmetry theory’ where the universe is said to fall into 
existence through the bifurcation of a previously homologous symmetrical state. On this point see: Slavoj Zizek, 
Event: Philosophy in Transit, London, Penguin, pp.33-56; Slavoj Zizek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New 
Foundation of Dialectical Materialism, London, Verso, 2014, pp.389-394;  Slavoj Zizek, Less than Nothing: Hegel 
and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Verso, London, 2012, pp.905-63.     
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F.C. Baur 
Ferdinand Christian Baur was Professor of theology at Tübingen University from 1829 until his 
death in 1860; an eminent historian, biblical exegete and theologian who founded the Tübingen 
School of theology. He has authored significant historical expositions of a variety of New 
Testament texts and produced detailed studies on the history of Christian doctrine. However, he 
remains today a somewhat neglected and forgotten theologian.2 He is discussed here, not so 
much for his contributions to biblical studies or historical theology, but rather, for his unique 
stance in history as a modern and self-proclaimed Gnostic patterned on second- century Christian 
Gnosticism. However, this is not all. In Baur’s fascinating attempts to reconstruct a modern 
Gnostic philosophy and theology, he also draws on contemporaneous sources to himself that he 
interpreted to be modern representatives and incarnations, albeit in a developed form, of second-
century Gnostic speculation. Three highly statured figures in particular are enlisted to Baur’s 
cause: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), 
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). All of whom, according to Baur, should be 
read as modern Gnostics. Therefore, Baur’s significance in this respect is not only that he 
himself is attempting to reproduce and develop ideas inherent in second-century Gnosticism, but, 
furthermore, that he also highlights instances in modern theology and philosophy where this has 
already occurred.  
    Baur’s theological project, as will become clear, is greatly indebted to Hegelian and 
Schellingian philosophy. It receives its greatest exposition in his 1835 Die christliche Gnosis 
oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Christian 
Gnosis or Christian philosophy of religion in its historical development). Baur provides a concise 
and useful summary of the purposes of this endeavor in the beginning of Die christliche Gnosis: 
Eine Geschichte der Religions-philosophie, an welcher es bisher noch immer gefehlt hat, ist 
nach mei, ner Ansicht nicht möglich, ohne daß man auf die Er scheinungen zurükgeht, die die 
alte Gnosis auf ihrem so fruchtbaren Boden erzeugt hat: hat man sich aber einmal dieses 
Standpuncts in seinem ganzen Umfange bemächtigt, und mit dem Begriff der Gnosis auch den 
Begriff der Religions- Philosophie gewonnen, so eröffnet sich von diesem Standpuncte aus 
sogleich auch der Vlik auf eine zusammenhängende Reihe gleichartiger Erscheinungen, in 
                                                             
2 The only major English study on Baur is P.C. Hodgson, The Formation of Historical Theology: A Study of 
Ferdinand Christian Baur, New York, 1966. 
 
 
12 
welchen derselbe Begriff durch den innern Zusammenhang seiner Entwicklungs- Momente sich 
fortbewegt.3    
It appears then that Baur believes that there is a ‘concept’ of Gnosis inherent and first developed 
within second-century Gnosticism that nevertheless transcends this specific historical 
manifestation and further develops and evolves into later systems of thought that can be 
documented, analyzed and traced through historical and structural study. Baur will eventually 
conclude that Hegel’s posthumously published Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion were the 
most developed form of ‘Gnosis.’ Why is Baur concerned with tracing the concept of Gnosis 
through its historical evolution? This is perhaps best answered when conceptualizing Baur’s 
theology as a form of theological Hegelianism as Johannes Zachhuber illustrates:  
Baur’s presentation of his own task in Die christliche Gnosis hints at the presence of Hegelian 
principles in the very methodology of his investigation. As a historical phenomenon, gnosis can 
only be adequately grasped if individual events and facts are understood as moments of a self-
moving (and in this sense, as Baur says at this point, ‘living’) concept. 4  
One can identify in Hegel’s Lectures the movement of the abstract concept of religion, in theistic 
terms, God as a mere abstraction of thought that one sees, according to Hegel, in ‘the Jewish 
God’ or Brahma in Hinduism,5 through its self-determination in consummate religion which 
must:  
Pass through these determinacies in order to attain from them the nature of its concept or to 
objectify its concept in the form of representation. For these determinacies are the moments, the 
becoming of the concept, and their resolution and the return to itself are what constitute the 
concept itself.6 
According to Hegel, ‘it belongs to the nature of the concept, its vitality and becoming, in fact its 
spirituality, that it does not exist at the beginning.’7 Similarly, in the Science of Logic Hegel 
                                                             
3 Ferdiand Christian Baur, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen 
Entwicklung, Tübingen, 1835, p.viii (A history of the philosophy of religion, which until now has been missing, is in 
my view, not possible, without returning to the phenomena engendered by ancient Gnosis on its fertile ground. Once 
one has embraced this point of departure and captured the concept of Gnosis alongside the concept of the philosophy 
of religion, immediately opens up a coherent series of similar phenomena in which the same concept moves forward 
because of the internal relationship of the moments of its development).     
4 Johannes Zachhuber, Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From F.C. Baur to Ernst Troeltsch, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.29-30. 
5 G.W.F Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion I: Introduction and the Concept of Religion, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, p.331. 
6 G.W.F Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion II: Determinate Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2007, p.94. 
7 Ibid. 
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begins with pure being which is akin to pure nothing,8 insofar as both are completely lacking in 
determination, which must then, through the movement of the dialectic, become or determine 
itself concretely before culminating with it becoming conscious of itself as its own process of 
self-determination in absolute knowing;9 so likewise, the concept of religion, or God, passes 
through its own moments of self-determination before finally, after the death of Christ, the 
community of spirit is born, which is now able to grasp and become ‘conscious of the eternal 
history, the eternal movement, which God himself is’10, where the Christian community is ‘itself 
the existing Spirit, the Spirit in its existence, God existing as community.’11  
    One can identify a very similar conception in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, 
where he conceives of history as a progressive revelation of God, which can only culminate in 
the completion of the historical process in which God’s self-consciousness is realized.12 Baur 
perceives Schelling to be an advocate of ancient Gnosticism insofar as his teleological 
conception of God, disclosing himself within history and gradually moving towards his own self-
consciousness, mimics Baur’s own conception of Gnosis.  
    Baur acknowledges himself that both Hegel’s Lectures and Schelling’s System exerted a 
considerable influence over his own theological project,13 although Hegel clearly takes 
precedence here.  
    According to Baur, second-century Gnosticism is the first attempt to grasp and extract the 
single concept of religion existing within its three major proponents: Judaism, Christianity, and 
paganism.14 This is what Gnosis represents to Baur ‘the philosophy of religion in the sense that it 
aims at a philosophical penetration of the history of religion, and thus at achieving a concept of 
                                                             
8 G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic (1812), New York, Prometheus, 1999, p.82. 
9 This point is neatly summarized by Hegel himself at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘The goal, Absolute 
Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves 
and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, regarded from the side of their free 
existence appearing in the form of contingency, is history; but regarded from the side of their comprehended 
organization, is the science of knowing’ (G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p.493). 
10 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion III: The Consummate Religion, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 327 
11 Ibid, p.331 (my emphasis). 
12 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 2001, p.206. 
13 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Briefe, Teil I: Die frühen Briefe (1814-1835) (Ed: Carl Hester), Thorbecke, 1993, 
pp.26-27.  
14 Baur, Die christliche Gnosis, p.19. 
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religion through comparative study of religions.’15 In turn, this concept is considered by Baur to 
be, in its completed form, the absolute religion. Thus, Baur’s entire systematic theology can be 
read as an attempt of the religious concept or Gnosis to grasp itself in its own historical 
development through various manifestations in particular religions, finally acknowledging this as 
its own history of becoming, this awareness is for Baur, the philosophy of religion, and it is why 
Hegel’s lectures, on the same topic, are considered to be its grandest articulation and ‘in the final 
instance…philosophy of religion can consistently only be articulated as a theory of absolute 
Spirit’, or as the progressive self-revelation of God16: 
Daher ist ihr die Religionsgeschichte nicht bloß die Geschichte der göttlichen Offenbarungen, 
sondern diese Offenbarungen sind zugleich der Entwiklungsproceß, in welchem das ewige Wesen 
der Gottheit selbst aus sich herausgeht, sich in einer endlichen Welt manifestirt und sich mit sich 
selbst entzweit , um durch diese Manifestation und Selbstentzweiung zur ewigen Einheit mit sich 
selbst zurükzukehren.17 
One can find nearly identical passages in Hegel’s Lectures,18 where he also, interestingly enough, 
notes its similarities to ancient Gnosticism.19 Despite second-century Gnosticism being the 
archetype of Gnosis and Baur’s own project, it does not represent the completed form of the 
philosophy of religion, as Baur would conceive it, given the docetic tendencies of Gnostic 
Christology. Baur argues that in this case, an inherent dualism remains within the concept of 
religion, whereas in the absolute religion all such dualisms would have been resolved. It is this 
very lacuna, still existing after Baur’s historical study of ancient Gnosticism, which prompts him 
to search for the concept of Gnosis amongst his contemporaries in a more developed form.    
    The first to receive his attention is Schleiermacher, where he devotes an entire section, in his 
Die Christliche Gnosis, to Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre. According to Baur’s rather 
unorthodox reading of Schleiermacher, his theology should be conceived as a philosophy of 
religion that has been dominated by subjectivity. Baur interprets Schleiermacher’s emphasis on 
the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ as a consciousness that has, in itself, had an historical 
                                                             
15 Zachhuber, Theology as Science, p.32. 
16 Ibid, p.33. 
17 Baur, Die christliche Gnosis, p.22 (Therefore, the history of religion is not simply the history of divine 
revelations, but these revelations are at the same time the developing process in which the eternal essence of divinity 
goes outside of itself, manifesting itself in a finite world, dividing itself from itself, so that by this manifestation and 
self-division it may return to its eternal unity with itself).  
18 See, for instance: Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion I, p.307, p.323. 
19 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: III, p.287. 
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development through various stages of universal history, and particularly in the history of 
religion, which culminates in the Christian faith. Baur believes this to be a related project to his 
own systematic theology of Gnosis, which fails to act as its proponent only insofar as it is too 
subjective, only a ‘theory of interior religious experience without the potential to explain the 
relationship between this experience and the historical social and cultural dimensions of 
religion.’20 The latter of which he recognizes in Hegel’s philosophy of religion, where he argues 
that Hegel has successfully defined the concept of religion, beyond Schleiermacher’s 
subjectivity, as ‘das Selbstbewusstsein Gottes oder des absoluten Geistes sei, oder die Idee des 
Geistes, der sich zu sich selbst verhält, die Beziehung des Geistes auf den absoluten Geist, das 
Wissen des göttlichen Geistes von sich.’21 However, as Zachhuber has perceptively pointed out, 
there is a certain inevitability to Baur reaching this conclusion, given the fact that ‘the 
plausibility of this teleology, of course, is partly due to Baur’s own original definition of gnosis, 
which had made its fulfillment in Hegel nearly inevitable – not least because it was (as Baur 
himself confessed) formulated under Hegel’s philosophical influence and guidance.’22 Thus Baur 
is attempting to present the absolute religion as a form of faith perfectly translated into secure 
knowledge. This, of course, is Hegel’s own aim in his philosophy of religion: ‘we should know 
God cognitively, God’s nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all else.’23 
However, although Hegel’s philosophy was meant to complete Baur’s conception of Gnosis, he 
still detects latent problems existing within Hegel’s philosophy of religion, concerning the 
distinction between history as subjectively conceived, and history in its objective reality. For 
Hegel, it is only required that Christ is the God-man for faith or for consciousness, as a passing 
moment in the concept’s road to self-knowledge. However, for Baur, this is not enough, history 
as it is for consciousness and as it is in reality must be synonymous and proved to be so, 
otherwise the latent dualism existing within ancient Gnosticism would have haunted Hegel’s 
philosophy of religion and his own endeavors at this same project. These tensions are never fully 
resolved in Baur’s systematic theology. 
                                                             
20 Zachhuber, Theology as Science, p.42. 
21 Baur, Die christliche Gnosis, pp.672-3 (the self-consciousness of God or of the absolute Spirit, or of the idea of 
the Spirit, in relationship to itself, the relationship of the Spirit to the absolute Spirit, self-knowledge of the divine 
Spirit). 
22 Zachhuber, Theology as Science, p.42. 
23 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: I, p.88. 
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    The end to which this analysis has served is to have documented the first explicit attempt of a 
modern theologian to consciously and deliberately reproduce a Gnostic theology. However, 
perhaps more importantly, it shows that Baur was the first theologian to interpret and 
acknowledge the importance of Gnosticism as a hermeneutical aid to understanding modern 
philosophical and theological movements as significant as Hegelianism. The accuracy and 
perceptiveness of Baur’s claims, along with their methodological appropriateness shall be 
discussed later, however it is simply important to note, at this introductory stage that, at least 
according to Baur, second-century Gnosticism has had a pervasive influence within modernity. 
This contention would inspire a later political philosopher, named Eric Voegelin, to apply this 
analysis to twentieth century politics, which shall now be accounted for.  
 Eric Voegelin  
Voegelin, born in Cologne, established the beginning of his successful academic career teaching 
political theory and sociology at the University of Vienna. Voegelin actively opposed the Nazi 
regime, publishing numerous books and articles between 1933 and 1938 criticizing Nazi politics. 
His political activism forced him to flee Austria after the Anschluß in 1938. He settled in North 
America, where he subsequently attained a teaching post at Louisiana State University in 1942. 
In 1958 he was offered, what was formerly, Max Weber’s (1864-1920) prestigious chair in 
political science in Munich at Ludwig’s- Maximillian University, where he established the 
institute for political science. He returned to North America to teach at Stanford University in 
1969, where he remained until his death. Voegelin is perhaps best known for his five-volume 
magnum opus: Order and History. However, he features here, primarily because, like Baur 
before him, he is considered to be the second most notable figure to contend that ancient 
Gnosticism exercises a significant and fundamental influence over modernity.  
    Voegelin outlines this, his central thesis, in two major works: The New Science of Politics 
(1952) and Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968). Drawing on Baur, and two influential works 
by Hans Jonas (1903-1993) and Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) respectively,24 Voegelin 
argues, in the words of Ellis Sandoz, that: 
                                                             
24 Hans Jonas critically compared ancient Gnosticism to modern existentialism (particularly Martin Heidegger) (see: 
Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston, Beacon Press, 1958, pp.320-40); while Hans Urs von Balthasar explored 
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There is both an historical continuity and an experiential equivalence between the ancient 
movements [Gnosticism] and such modern phenomena as positivism, Marxism, Freudianism, 
existentialism, progressivism, utopianism, revolutionary activism, fascism, communism [and] 
National Socialism.25 
Whilst clearly adopting and extending Baur’s original argument, Voegelin has no intention of 
attempting a positive reconstruction of this ancient Christian ‘heresy.’ To the contrary, he 
perceives his philosophy to be a highly deconstructive enterprise which attempts to expose, 
criticize, and ultimately reverse the prevalence of modern Gnosticism; playing the role of a 
modern Ireneaus, for the simple reason that he believes that much of what is bad in modern 
politics (principally totalitarianism in all of its forms, although especially in its Nazi and 
Communist manifestations) is the result of modernity’s association with ancient Gnosticism.    
    Vogelin outlines a six-fold criteria that he believes underlies both the ‘experiential’ conditions 
of ancient Gnosticism and much of modern philosophy and politics. Firstly, (1) ‘the gnostic is 
dissatisfied with his situation’26 and, furthermore, that (2) ‘the drawbacks of this situation can be 
attributed to the fact that the world is intrinsically poorly organized.’27 Thirdly, (3) that salvation 
from this unsatisfactory world is possible, and (4) within the powers of human activity.28 
Subsequently, (5) ‘from this follows the belief that the order of being will have to be changed in 
an historical process’29 involving human action. And, finally, (6) ‘it becomes the task of the 
gnostic to seek out the prescription for such a change. Knowledge – gnosis – of the method of 
altering being is the central concern of the gnostic…as well as the Gnostic’s readiness to come 
forward as a prophet who will proclaim his knowledge about the salvation of mankind.’30 
Although Voegelin explicitly states that he believes that a ‘direct connection’ between ancient 
Gnosticism and modern Gnosticism does actually exist, he never fully elucidates this point with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the place of ‘Gnosticism’ within German Idealism (see: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Apokalypse der deutschen Seele: I, 
Kerle, 1947).   
25 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Washington, Regnery, 1968, p.xi. 
26 Ibid, p.59. 
27 Ibid, p.60. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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exhaustive historical study; he appears to take it for granted.31 He exerts much of his efforts 
comparing the ‘experiential’ continuities between ancient and modern Gnosticism.  
    The two key terms which Voegelin invokes repetitively throughout his attempts at experiential 
comparisons are ‘immanentization’ and the formulation of a ‘second reality;’32 two Gnostic 
themes that directly contradict Voegelin’s own commitment to his understanding of Augustinian 
Christianity. According to Voegelin, ‘human nature does not find its fulfillment in this world, but 
only in the visio beatifica, in supernatural perfection through grace in death. Since, therefore, 
there is no fulfillment in this world, Christian life on earth takes its special form from the life to 
come in the next.’ 33 However, within the modern Gnostic system, transcendence, both in the 
sense of human fulfillment and divine existence, is rejected and ‘immanentized’, which leaves 
two pivotal conclusions: humanity is divinized in God’s place, and the world is then viewed as 
the domain of human creating; the old unsatisfactory world can be discarded, and those 
alternative ‘second realities’ may be fashioned in its place. Voegelin lists a whole variety of 
thinkers and movements that he believes can be characterized by these Gnostic tendencies: 
Hegel,34 Schelling, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Karl Marx 
(1818-1883) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), to give only a sample.35  
    It is beyond both the scope and the purpose of this analysis to offer a detailed account of each 
of Voegelin’s assessments of individual Gnostic thinkers. However, to illustrate his point, Marx 
can be taken as an example, following Voegelin’s own six-fold criteria. According to Voegelin, 
Marx is a ‘speculative Gnostic’ in the tradition of Hegel. He rejects any transcendent reality in 
favor of a divinized and absolute world. However, the world, as Marx experiences it, is 
incomplete and unsatisfactory. Marx, the one ‘in the know’ or the Gnostic, produces a ‘second 
reality’ an ideal world that should replace the current one; a world in which the communist ideals 
                                                             
31 He states: ‘on the historical continuity of Gnosticism from antiquity to modern times, let it be said here only that 
the connections in the development of gnostic sects from those of the eastern Mediterranean in antiquity through the 
movements of the high Middle Ages up to those of the Western Renaissance and Reformation have been sufficiently 
clarified to permit us to speak of a continuity’ (Ibid, p.59). 
32 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987, p.169. 
33 Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p.61. 
34 Voegelin pays a lot of attention to the ‘Gnostic’ tendencies in Hegel the ‘greatest of speculative Gnostics’ (see 
also Eric Voegelin, Order and History, V: In Search of Order, Rouge, Baton, 1987; Eric Voegelin, ‘On Hegel: A 
Study in Sorcery’, in: Eric Voegelin, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, XII: Published Essays (1966-1985), Rouge, 
Baton, 1990).  
35 Vogelin, The New Science of Politics, p.124. 
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are perfectly realized. As the conceiver of this ‘second reality’, Marx naturally fulfils the role of 
the Gnostic prophet announcing the salvific knowledge of this new world. Any attempt to 
introduce transcendence into Marx’s new world and into the conditions of his thinking that 
permit him to formulate it, is rejected on the grounds that it would be a metaphysical abstraction, 
although Voegelin argues that it is because it would fashion the possibility of criticizing and 
questioning Marx; something that no Gnostic will allow. The opprobrious political consequences 
of this Gnostic trait are highlighted by Voegelin:  
The prohibition of questions is not harmless, for it has attained great social effectiveness among 
men who forbid themselves to ask questions in critical situations. One thinks of the observation 
of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of the extermination camp at Auschwitz. When asked why he 
did not refuse to obey the order to organize the mass executions, he replied: ‘At that time I did 
not indulge in deliberation: I had received the order, and I had to carry it out…I do not believe 
that even one of the thousands of SS leaders could have permitted such a thought to occur to 
him. Something like that was just completely impossible.’ This is very close to the wording of 
Marx’s declaration that for ‘socialist man’ such a question becomes a ‘practical impossibility.’36           
 Therefore, in Voegelin’s analysis, the consequences of Gnostic immanentization and the 
fashioning of ideal ‘second realities’ leads directly to tyrannical and despotic ideologies and 
institutions. This conception of the ‘cause’ of totalitarian ideologies has recently found support in 
the ethics of Alain Badiou’s philosophy.37 
    At times, Voegelin’s thesis can appear somewhat overstated, and the lens with which he views 
modernity can appear somewhat narrow, something that Voegelin acknowledged himself later in 
life.38 Moreover, Vogelin never appears to explicitly consider some of the possible political 
ramifications of his own ‘Augustinian’ alternative to modern Gnosticism. Namely, that one must 
                                                             
36 Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p.18. 
37 More recently, Alain Badiou has offered a similar theory regarding the origin of totalitarian ideologies. Within 
Badiou’s ontology, what exists is an infinity of pure multiples. Within this flux, ‘situations’ come into being which 
determine that a particular set of multiples be related and named e.g. a set of prime numbers. An ‘event’ occurs 
fleetingly within a situation and constructs around its center a new way of being; a new way of relating that is 
constituted by this particular event; for instance, the subject ‘Paul’ after the event of the encounter on the road to 
Damascus. According to Badiou, an event names a void within the situation: ‘we might say that since a situation is 
composed by the knowledges circulating within it, the event names the void inasmuch as it names the not-known of 
the situation. To take a well-known example: Marx is an event for political thought because he designates, under the 
name ‘proletariat’, the central void of early bourgeois societies’ (Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil, London, Verso, 2012, p.69). Totalitarianism emerges when the event is not taken to name the 
void, in which no particular multiple can hold sway, but is understood to designate a substance on which the 
situation can rest. This then gives rise to the belief in the substance being represented by a particular group or race 
and leads to political tyranny. Badiou argues that this was a key factor in the growth of the Nazi party.      
38 Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Rouge, Baton, 1996, pp.66-7. 
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simply accept the legitimacy of the established Christian order, seemingly also without question 
and without the possibility of political change, and trust that its inherent transcendence will save 
the representatives of its power from political totalitarianism. The thought that this established 
order may have already been infiltrated by, and indeed perhaps the product of, or even the design 
constructed to retain, one particular social or political group’s power is never really 
acknowledged. The possibility of some of Voegelin’s own critiques being appropriate to his own 
political vision is never addressed by Voegelin.  
    Nevertheless, Voegelin’s political philosophy has demonstrated the possible significance of 
ancient Christian Gnosticism for understanding modernity; he has drastically extended Baur’s 
original insights to incorporate a reading of an entire period of history through its lens. For 
Voegelin, whether one agrees with his analysis or not, there is no doubt that most of his life’s 
work can be summarized as a call ‘to recognize the essence of modernity as the growth of 
Gnosticism;’39 a powerful statement that should give any interpreter of modern philosophy and 
politics pause for thought, as to the significance of Gnosticism as not necessarily the, as it is for 
Voegelin, but at least a hermeneutical approach to modernity.     
Both Baur and Voegelin provide the inspiration and direction for the next theologian to be 
discussed: Cyril O’Regan, who in many respects can be considered to focus and 
methodologically substantiate the claims of the earlier thinkers. 
Cyril O’Regan 
Cyril O’Regan, acclaimed Hegel scholar and theologian, initially adopts and focuses the 
arguments of Baur and Voegelin to support his hermeneutical approach to reading Hegel, which 
he outlines in his book The Heteredox Hegel (1994). In essence, he accepts and wishes to 
substantiate the core thesis advocated by both Baur and Voegelin, that Hegel is best understood 
when contextualized within a Gnostic framework. However, despite sharing the central argument 
of both thinkers, he evidences serious doubts concerning their methodology, especially the 
broadness of their use of the term ‘Gnosticism.’ He criticizes Voegelin stating that:  
Where Voegelin accuses Hegel of being gnostic, the term seems to denote knowledge, 
knowledge of the reality of God, world, and human being and history and their relation, where 
                                                             
39 Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p.126. 
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knowledge is absolute and divine rather than relative and human. Employed in this way the term 
does not evoke, in any tangible way, Gnosticism as a discernible historical phenomenon of the 
early centuries of the Common Era. More of a relationship is implied when Voegelin suggests 
that gnosis as a superlative form of knowledge carries soteriological freight, for it is clearly a 
characteristic of Gnosticism that it is knowledge rather than ethical behavior, that accounts for 
salvation. But, of course, this characteristic is, in itself, insufficient to distinguish Gnosticism 
from other religious systems.40   
O’Regan argues that Baur, on the other hand, has grounded his use of the term Gnosticism on a 
solid historical platform: 
The case is different in Baur’s magisterial Die christliche Gnosis (1835). Employment of 
‘gnostic’ in that text is tied firmly to the various esoteric systems of the first centuries…When 
Baur speaks, therefore, of Hegelian ontotheology being gnostic, he is using the term in a much 
more determinate way and setting more definitive criteria of employment than that offered by 
Voegelin.41 
However, despite O’Regan’s admiration for Baur’s approach, he still suggests that amendments 
are required which would tightly regulate the application of the term Gnosticism to modern 
systems of thought, grounding this description in meticulous historical and structural study and 
concrete comparisons: 
Methodological amendment of Baur’s use of gnostic with respect to Hegelian ontotheology and 
other modern religious philosophies…would take the form of a selection of a quite specific 
Gnostic system, in this case the Valentinian Gnostic system, and testing whether Hegelian 
theologoumena provoke comparison with Valentinian depictions of the divine realm, creation, 
evil, etc.42 
Thus, O’Regan makes significant adaptations to Baur’s method, and with this, he acknowledges, 
to a much greater and realistic degree, the influence of non-Gnostic systems of thought on 
Hegel’s philosophy, for instance: Lutheranism, Jacob Boehme’s philosophy, mysticism, etc. It is 
important to note that O’Regan is by no means understating the significance of Gnosticism’s 
influence on modernity in contrast to Baur and Voegelin, he is simply contesting that it is one of 
the important hermeneutical approaches to Hegel’s philosophy, as opposed to the only correct 
approach. If there was any doubt of this, O’Regan makes his position emphatically clear that his 
‘working hypothesis, which corroborates and further specifies a thesis advanced as early as 1835, 
                                                             
40 Cyril O’Regan, The Heteredox Hegel, New York, SUNY, 1994, p.19. 
41 Ibid, p.20. 
42 Ibid. 
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is that Hegelian ontotheology does, in fact, repeat or recapitulate depictions that are uniquely 
Valentinian.’43 
    O’Regan highlights several instances where he believes such a connection can be explicitly 
realized. Firstly, both Hegel and the Gnostics assume, contrary to patristic and scholastic 
theology, that God in himself can be known cognitively: ‘Hegel loudly insists that the thesis of 
the non-cognizability of God to have no foundation in Christianity.’44 O’Regan further argues 
that Hegel’s Trinitarian theology is markedly Gnostic in character: 
Almost all of Hegel’s Trinitarian appeals are non-standard; but the appeal to the Gnostics in the 
context of an attempt to justify and re-appropriate the Christian dogma of the Trinity is not only 
non-standard but truly extraordinary, Basilides and…general forms of Valentinian Gnosticism 
appear to be gestured to in Hegel’s evocation. Hegel focuses upon the Abyss as the Propater 
(Forefather) or Proarchia (Pre-beginning) and the generation of Monogenes (First-born). 
Monogenes appears to interest Hegel in a particular way, since Monogenes is the revealer of the 
Forefather, from Hegel’s point of view this appears to establish that, the negative determination 
of the Abyss notwithstanding, the immanent divine reality is a matrix of revelation.45   
O’Regan also suggests that Hegel’s understanding of the doctrine of creation and the fall to be 
synonymous events, further illustrates his conformity to Gnostic creation narratives.46 This 
proposal is more clearly identified in Hegel’s reading of the serpent in the Genesis narrative. 
O’Regan argues that: 
The real hermeneutical precedent for the positive reading of knowledge, even in its fallen 
situation, and the accompanying strange affirmation of the serpent, is to be found in Gnosticism. 
Knowledge may be a pathogenic agent insofar as it alienates, yet it is also the soteriological 
agent par excellence, and the serpent, for Hegel, is clearly in the service of knowledge and is 
instrumental in revealing its possession to the not yet fully self-conscious spiritual beings. 
Moreover, Hegel is also more nearly Gnostic in the consistency with which he interprets the 
serpent image.47 
These are just a few of the examples that O’Regan explores. At this early stage, his thesis is 
consigned to reading aspects of Hegelian philosophy as Gnostic. However, in his later 
publications he attempts to extend this thesis, arguing that large tenets of modernity could also 
perhaps be read as being deeply influenced by Gnosticism, he suggests figures in literature, such 
                                                             
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, p.30. 
45 Ibid, p.134. 
46 Ibid, p.143. 
47 Ibid, p.163. 
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as William Blake (1757-1827), and in modern theology, like Jürgen Moltmann (b.1926) and Paul 
Tillich (1886-1965). However, these suggestions, to date, have not been substantiated by the 
scholarly publications that O’Regan had initially envisaged.  
     
    In Gnostic Return in Modernity (2001) O’Regan outlines his methodological adaptations to 
Baur’s genealogy. As has already been noted, O’Regan criticised Baur’s proposals for 
evidencing several methodological flaws. Most importantly, Baur failed to adopt a concrete 
‘criteriology,’ within his genealogy, for identifying Gnostic discourses which, like the 
conveniently invented term ‘Hinduism’ can be so broad that they become hermeneutically 
vacuous. Thus, Baur failed to produce a method for tightly regulating and defining his use of the 
term ‘Gnosticism;’ which is demonstrated in the fact that he would often conflate it with other 
narratives such as Neoplatonism.48 Therefore, his genealogy would often be based on loose 
associations with very little demonstrative evidence to support his case. O’Regan, in identifying 
the limitations of Baur’s approach, but also praising his insights, develops his own methodology 
for genealogical excavation. One of his most significant alterations occurs with his production of 
a concrete ‘criteriology’ for the term Gnosticism, which he accomplishes through his 
identification of a regulative ‘depth narrative grammar’ which he suggests underlies every 
discourse. A narrative grammar is fundamentally a set of regulative norms and primary points 
that are fundamental to a specific discourse; underpinning and directing it and allowing us to 
identify it as discourse…x. O’Regan argues, in the wake of Noam Chomsky and Hans Jonas, that 
one can identify and distinguish between a discourse’s ‘depth grammar’ and its ‘surface 
grammar.’49 If we take O’Regan’s own example, in the instance of Valentinian Gnosticism, he 
claims that one is able to identify a prevalent depth grammar which is committed to, just to name 
several examples, a creatio ex Deo, an a-historical cosmic fall within the divine itself, an 
opprobrious acknowledgement of finitude as an accidental product of the fall, and an 
eschatological return of the fallen divine principle back within the divine Pleroma. These 
positions, according to O’Regan, are regulative and fundamental to the Valentinian discourse 
insofar as they dictate the direction of the entire narrative. One could not remove the depth 
                                                             
48 Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic Return in Modernity, New York, New York State University Press, 2001, pp.4-5. 
49 See: Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (third edition), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.78-93; Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion,  pp.320-40; Cyril 
O’Regan, Gnostic Return in Modernity, p.61. 
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grammar without irrevocably transforming the discourse into something novel. In contrast, the 
surface grammar is not fundamental and regulative to the discourse; it can vary, develop, and 
transform without affecting the narrative as a whole or forcing one to identify it as a new 
discourse. In the above example, the surface grammar does change frequently, as Irenaeus’ (130-
202) account of Valentinian Gnosticism demonstrates: for instance, some contended that Bythus’ 
original creative agency was solely produced by himself having both male and female generative 
potentiality. While others argued that he created in collaboration with his feminine counterpart 
Sige.50 Furthermore, according to Irenaeus, certain followers attribute the salvation or restoration 
of the degenerate Aeon, Sophia, solely to Bythus’ power: Horos, while still others argued that 
part of her was expelled from the Pleroma and recaptured by Jesus.51 In both instances, due to the 
underling depth grammar of the discourse, Irenaeus maintains that both are Valentinian 
narratives, despite the variation of the surface grammar which, at times, can be quite significant.  
      Due to the compounded simplicity of every depth narrative grammar, there is a danger of 
O’Regan merely repeating Buar’s mistake in his hermeneutical broadness; after all, other 
discourses, such as Neoplatonism for instance, could also, perhaps, be identified by the 
conventions outlined in the Valentinian depth narrative grammar. However, in recognising these 
inherent dangers, O’Regan suggests that before a depth grammar can be definitively applied to 
another discourse, one must demonstrate its hermeneutical superiority. In O’Regan’s case, he 
outlines why his proposed Valentinian depth narrative grammar must be identified with 
Valentinian systems of thought and not, say, Neoplatonic, Apocalyptic, or Kabbalistic ones.     
    The only instance where O’Regan puts his rigorously constructed methodology to work in 
actual analysis is in his study of Jacob Boehme’s (1575-1624) relationship to Gnosticism in 
Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Boehme’s Haunted Narrative (2002). Here, O’Regan argues that 
Boehme is instrumental in introducing Gnostic speculation into modern systems of thought. He 
has more recently offered further interpretations of Hegel in his The Anatomy of 
Misremembering (2014).  
    The above analyses have attempted to introduce the reader to the historical context of the 
central questions that this thesis wishes to explore and how they have been developed and 
handled in the past. It is now necessary to demonstrate how this thesis intends to explore these 
                                                             
50 Irenaeus, ‘Against Heresies I:I’, in: Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and Arthur Coxe (eds and trans), The 
Ante-Nicene Fathers I, London, Cosimo, 2007, pp.309-568, p.316. 
51 Ibid, p.317. 
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questions, in what context, using which method to purport the investigation and to outline its 
uniqueness while still being situated within this historical context.    
     
Outline of Scope  
This thesis shares the major contention of all of the above thinkers insofar as each has argued 
that Gnosticism, as a hermeneutical approach to modern philosophical, theological, and political 
discourses, remains a significant aspect of their interpretation. However, having acknowledged 
that fact, it differs quite markedly in its approach and its scope. It proposes to study the influence 
of Valentinian Gnosticism on modern systems of thought by analyzing and excavating the 
history of a specific contemporary theological discourse; namely, that of Sophiology (theologies 
that utilize the biblical figure of Wisdom).   
    The thesis shall attempt to ascertain the extent to which Valentinian Gnosticism has distinctly 
influenced and informed this current theological discourse. Sophiology, as a central theme within 
systematic theology, first rose to prominence within the theological writings of three major 20th 
century Russian theologians: Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), Pavel Florensky (1882-1937), and 
Sergius Bulgakov (1871-1944). It has been selected by this thesis as a modern theological 
discussion to be engaged with in relation to its connection to ancient Christian Gnosticism for 
three reasons. Firstly, as Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has pointed out, an analytical project of 
this sort must ‘never lose sight of the reference of a concrete example that may serve as a testing 
ground for the analysis.’52 This thesis does not attempt to critically engage with theories and 
ideas abstracted from their historical realities; it seeks to analyze and critically evaluate a specific 
and concrete theological theme as it has been made manifest in its historical context, so as to 
assess whether a very tangible embodiment of Valentinian Gnosticism within modern systems of 
thought can be documented.  
    The question then to be answered is why has Sophiology been selected as this concrete 
example? As shall be shown below, Sophiology, from its birth within systematic theology, has 
been followed by a recurrent suspicion from ecclesiastical hierarchs and theological 
commentators that its major contentions have been sourced from Gnosticism as opposed to 
Christian ‘orthodoxy’ as its proponents have claimed. Although these accusations have been 
                                                             
52 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works: Ethics I, London, Penguin, 1997, p.7. 
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fairly well voiced, there has never been a comprehensive investigation into the importance of 
Gnostic thought for Sophiology, or indeed into whether it does in fact exist. Thus, the topic 
presents itself as a largely fertile area for an investigation of this nature. However, despite its 
obvious significance for offering a concrete example for an investigation into the influence of 
Valentinian Gnosticism on modern systems of thought, what may be considered to be its wider 
significance? In response, one could simply point to its current prevalent and influential status as 
a theological theme existing within contemporary British systematic theology and, moreover, its 
capacity to engage, from a theological perspective, with discourses such as contemporary 
cosmology and ecology. It would appear beneficial at this point to offer a brief interlude, giving 
an account of the development of Sophiology and its popularity within modern British 
systematic theology to substantiate the claim of its significance, before setting out the specific 
questions this thesis wishes to pose to this tradition, and how it will go about doing so.    
    The figure of Wisdom’s route into existing theological debates has been far from 
straightforward. Although Wisdom was once the first port of call for early Christians engaged in 
theological speculation, this pattern had slowly declined from about the 4th Century. Its absence 
from Western theological thought is notable; some of the most influential and discussed Western 
theologians of the last century: Karl Barth, Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), Karl Rahner (1904-
1984), Hans Urs Von Balthasar (1905-1988), Jürgen Moltmann (b. 1926), Wolfhart Pannenberg 
(b.1928) and Eberhard Jüngel (b.1934), for instance, scarcely engage with the figure of Wisdom 
at all, other than to note its role in previous thinkers,53 or to acknowledge it as an attribute of God 
among others.54 This trend did not extend to Eastern theology, where the figure of Wisdom has 
enjoyed a substantial amount of attention. However, that being said, its reception within Eastern 
religious thought has always been marked with tentativeness and caution. This can be seen in 
Solovyov, Florensky and Bulgakov’s native reception.  
    Vladimir Solovyov’s Sophiology was liberally accused and thought of as heretical both, on 
account of its association with Gnosticism, and his willingness to synthesise occult theories with 
                                                             
53 See: Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: a Theological Aesthetic, III – Studies in Lay Styles, 
Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1986, pp.279-353. 
54 See: Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II,I: The Doctrine of God (trans: G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance), 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1957. 
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his own unique mystical experiences.55 And, almost on the grounds of ‘guilt by association’, the 
same connotations followed Florensky and Bulgakov’s Sophiological speculations, despite the 
respective theologies of all three, although related, differing quite substantially from one another. 
Bulgakov’s own Sophiology was accused of heresy in 1935 in the synod of Karlsbad by 
Metropolitan (later Patriarch) Sergius of Moscow. The accusations prompted, albeit rather 
reluctantly given his fondness for Bulgakov, his Bishop, Evlogii, to investigate the charges. The 
investigation, taken up by a group which included several of Bulgakov’s closest students - 
Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958) and Georgii Florovsky (1893-1979) being the most distinguished 
– both of whom felt that Bulgakov’s theology was too deeply influenced by German philosophy 
and betrayed the ‘Neo-Patristic Synthesis’56 which was driving their investigations at the time. 
They believed that they were combatting pantheism and Gnosticism when rejecting Bulgakov’s 
Sophiological speculation.57 Their criticism led to the Russian Orthodox Church’s rejection of 
Bulgakov’s Sophiology in the same year.58 Andrew Louth typifies the current attitude of 
Orthodox circles when, after describing Sophiology, comments: ‘perhaps the reader is beginning 
to murmur ‘Gnosticism’ – and how rightly.’59 He even states explicitly that: ‘it is still the case 
that in…Orthodox circles, Sophiology is largely rejected.’60 Elizabeth Theokritoff further 
substantiates this claim: 
                                                             
55 Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, 2009, Ithaca, Cornell, 
p.102. 
56 The ‘Neo-Patristic Syntheis’ was a popular twentieth century Orthodox movement that was deeply indebted to the 
theology of Gregory of Palamas (1296-1359), specifically his distinction between the divine Essence and God’s 
Energies (see: Gregory Palamas, The Triads (trans: Nicholas Gendle), Paulist Press, 1988). His thought is still 
incredibly popular today amongst many Orthodox theologians (for instance, see: John D. Zizoulas, Lectures in 
Christian Dogmatics, London, Continuum, 2008, p.70; Christos Yannaras, Person and Eros (trans: Norman 
Russell), Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2008).  
57 See: Vladimir Lossky, Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, New York, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974, 
p.112; Rowan Williams, Sergei Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1999, 
p.173; Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2000, p.488. For a typical 
Orthodox (Neo-Patristic synthesis) response to Russian Sophiology, see: Vladimir Lossky’s classic extended 
pamphlet: Vladimir Lossky, Spor o Sofii (Спор о Софии), Изд-во Свято-Владимирского Братства, 1996; Georges 
Florovsky, Ways of Russian Theology II, Vaduz, 1987, p.251. Both thinkers criticize Sophiology for a variety of 
reasons, but predominantly for its willingness to philosophize from ‘outside of the Orthodox tradition.’ However, at 
least in the case of Lossky, as Rowan Williams has argued, the Neo-Patristic synthesis was itself not immune to 
influences from ‘external’ philosophical sources (e.g. the influence of Jean-Paul Satre on Lossky), see: Rowan 
Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, London, SCM Press, 2007, pp.1-25. 
58 For a detailed account of these events see the collection of essays in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quaterly, 49:1,2, 
2005. 
59 Andrew Louth, ‘Wisdom and the Russians: the Sophiology of Fr. Sergei Bulgakov’, in: Stephen Barton (ed), 
Where Shall Wisdom be Found?, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1999, pp.169-185, p.171. 
60 Andrew Louth, ‘Sergei Bulgakov and the Task of Theology’, in: Irish Theological Quarterly74:3 2009, pp.243-
257, p.245. 
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For many Orthodox theologians, the suspicion remains that Sophiological thought is in many 
ways closer to Gnosticism…than to Orthodox Christianity. It does not seem truly to take 
seriously the reality of a universe created out of nothing, a wholly new existence radically ‘other’ 
than God. Sophiological thought certainly draws on the Church Fathers, but to a degree it also 
unravels the Fathers’ synthesis, revisiting Gnostic and Neoplatonic systems of intermediaries 
between the divine and the created.61   
  
These concerns have also been recently shared by Cyril O’Regan, Paul Gavrilyuk, Mikhail 
Sergeev, and Regula Zwahlen, amongst others.62 
Historically speaking, the reception of Sophiology within British theology has proven to be 
markedly more sympathetic and receptive;63 most notably, by figures as significant as Donald 
MacKinnon (1913-1994) (who had put the French translation of the Lamb of God – one of 
Bulgakov’s most significant works - on the Cambridge reading list for graduate courses in 
theology from as early as the late Sixties)64 and Rowan Williams;65 who from the latter’s 
                                                             
61 Elizabeth Theokritoff, ‘Creator and creation,’ in: Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.63-78, 
p.68. 
62Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic Return in Modernity, 2001, p.36; Paul Gavrilyuk, ‘The Reception of Dionysius in 
Twentieth-Century Eastern Orthodoxy’, in Sarah Coakley and Charles Stang (eds), Re-Thinking Dionysius the 
Areopagite, Oxford, Blackwell, 2009, pp.177-95; Mikhail Sergeev, Sophiology in Russian Orthodoxy, Lampeter, 
Edwin Mellen, 2006; Zwahlen claims that Sophia is essentially a portion of divinity in its relation to created 
existence – God ‘outside of himself’ as it were: ‘Bulgakov’s Sophia stellt nun einen bestimmten ‘Aspekt’ der 
gottlichen ousia dar, der einem zusammenhang mit der schöpfung steht’ (Regula Zwahlen, Das Revolutionäre 
Ebenbild Gottes: Anthropologien der Menschenwürde  bei Nikolas Berdjaev und Sergej Bulgakov, Berlin, Lit 
Verlag, 2010, p.275); see also: Aron Dunlap, Counting Four: Assessing the Quaternity of C.G. Jung in the Light of 
Lacan and Sophiology, UMI, 2008, pp.193-233. 
63 However, this was not the case initially. Canon John Douglas, General Secretary of the Church of England 
Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the council of the Anglican Church’s Russian clergy and Church aid 
fund (which gave substantial financial backing to Bulgakov’s theological institute in Paris) was worried about the 
Orthodox response to Bulgakov’s theology and his teachings and requested the opinions of B.J. Kidd (then warden 
of Keble College, Oxford: 1920-1939) and N.P. Williams (Lady Margaret Professor of Christ Church Oxford in 
1927). Brandon Gallaher notes that: ‘Kidd wrote to Douglas that his opinion was worth little on the subject…since 
he was not at home “in the vagaries of oriental speculation; it all seems so weird and mystifying,” and said that 
Bulgakov did not seem to deny the creeds at any point although much of his thinking was reminiscent of  
Gnosticism and the “irresponsible speculation” of Origen’ (see: Brandon Gallaher and Irina Kukota, ‘Protopresbyter 
Sergii Bulgakov: Hypostasis and Hypostaticity: Scholia to the Unfading Light,’ in: St. Vladimir’s Theological 
Quaterly 49:1-2 (2005), pp.5-46, pp.8-10). Williams drew similar conclusions: ‘Bulgakov had always seemed to 
him when they met to discuss theology an “ultra-conservative” although his “language about Sophia certainly seems 
very wild and semi-Gnostic in sound”’ (Ibid, p.11). For Bulgakov’s ecumenical involvement with the Anglican 
Church and his time within the ‘Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius’ see: Brandon Gallaher, ‘Bulgakov’s 
Ecumenical Thought’, in: Sobornost 24:1 (2002) pp.24-55; Brandon Gallaher, ‘Bulgakov and Intercommunion’, in: 
Sobornost 24:2(2002), pp.9-28.   
64 See: Rowan Williams, Sergei Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1999, 
p.14. 
65 See: Donald Mackinnon, Explorations in Theology, London, SCM, 1979, p.26; Rowan Williams, Sergei 
Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology; Rowan Williams, ‘Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness: the 
Wisdom of Finite Existence’, 2005, cited at: http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2106/creation-
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contributions on the subject, one can detect a clear rise in interest in the Russian thinkers 
(especially Bulgakov) even amongst Western based Orthodox Christians.66 
    However, the first major theological and philosophical engagement with the theme of 
Sophiology to occur within Britain, is undoubtedly evidenced in the work of John Milbank who,   
in 2009, produced his Sophiological reflections – Sophiology and Theurgy: A New Theological 
Horizon, which he had begun developing as early as 2005 - published in Adrian Pabst’s and Paul 
Schneider’s Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy. It is here that 
Milbank lucidly expands the work of Solovyov, Florensky, and Bulgakov, incorporating their 
positions within his own theology and philosophy and the larger task of Radical Orthodoxy 
itself. Notably, Milbank utilizes Sophiology as a theological basis for engaging with 
contemporary scientific discourses such as evolutionary biology and cosmology. Milbank 
emphatically highlights the importance of Sophiology, as a theological theme, both for his own 
work and for the wider theological community. He sates, for instance that Sophiology must be 
considered a ‘new theological horizon,’ he refers to the Russian theologians above as ‘the 
Russian masters,’ and even claims that it is ‘the most significant theology of the two preceding 
centuries.’67 A detailed account of Milbank’s Sophiology and its context within his own theology 
shall be offered at a later stage, for now it suffices to note, by way of introduction, that 
Sophiology plays a central role in Milbank’s own theology, thus highlighting its relevance for 
contemporary theology. Although Milbank may be accredited with the responsibility of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
creativity-and-creatureliness-the-wisdom-of-finite-existence, last cited:13/02/2012; Rowan Williams, On Christian 
Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, pp.63-79; Rowan Williams, A Margin of Silence: The Holy Spirit in Russian 
Orthodox Theology, Éditions de Lys Vert, 2008.  
66 See, for instance: Andrew Louth, ‘Sergei Bulgakov and the Task of Theology’, p.250; David Bentley Hart, In the 
Aftermath: Provocations and Laments, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009, p.123; Paul Valliere, Modern 
Russian Theology; see also Randall Poole’s, Paul Valliere’s, and Steven Cassedy’s essays in: G.M. Hamburg and 
Randall Poole (eds), A History of Russian Philosophy 1830-1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defence of Human 
Dignity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; for the classic studies, see, for instance: V.V. Zenkovsky, A 
History of Russian Philosophy II, London, Routledge, 1953, pp.469-532, 873-917; N.O. Lossky, History of Russian 
Philosophy, Michigan, International Universities Press, 1951; Leo Zander, God and the World (Bog I Mir in two 
volumes), Paris, 1948; N. Zernov, The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century, New York, Harper 
& Row, 1963.  
67 John Milbank, ‘Sophiology and Theurgy: the New Theological Horizon’, in Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider 
(eds), Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, 
Surrey, Ashgate, 2009, pp.45-86, p.45. 
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introducing Sophiology to mainstream British theology as David Dunn notes,68 he is not its only 
advocate and pioneer.  
    William Desmond, the Hegel scholar and philosopher, has drawn comparisons between his 
‘metaxological philosophy’ and Sophiology.69 Willis Jenkins has sought to utilize Sophiology in 
an ecological/green theology that emphasises God’s relationship to nature.70 Jenkins suggests 
that Sophiology has the potential of providing a theological foundation to engaging with nature 
in a productive and healing manner. Paul M. Collins has been influenced by Sophiology in his 
understanding of deification.71 Angel F. Mendez Montoya has also sought to adopt Sophiology in 
her understanding of the presence of God in the act of eating.72 Adrian Pabst has recently 
outlined the significance of Sophiology for Radical Orthodox theologians: 
The idea and reality of relationality and participatory being is always already part of a wider 
economy that encompasses donation, excess, deification (theosis), and theurgy – as articulated in 
the works of Russian Sophiology, nouvelle théologie and Radical Orthodoxy.73  
 
Furthermore, most recently Michael Martin has outlined a Sophiology based on the insights of 
Bulgakov and Milbank among others, in order to propose an imaginative synthesis between 
science and theology, one that upholds a unity between the rational and the mystical.74 
Moreover, one can clearly detect a general rise in interest in Sophiology in the West, with recent 
works by Rowan Williams, Aiden Nichols, Andrew Louth, and David Bentley Hart testifying to 
this shift.75  
                                                             
68 David Dunn, ‘Radical Sophiology: Father. Sergej Bulgakov and John Milbank on Augustine,’ in: Studies in 
Eastern European Thought 64:3-4 (Nov 2012), pp.227-249, p.228.  
69 See: William Desmond, Is There a Sabbath for Thought: Between Religion and Philosophy, New York, Fordham, 
2005, p.18. 
70 See: Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p.112. 
71 See: Paul M. Collins, Partaking in Divine Nature: Deification and Communion, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2010, 
p.79. 
72 See: Angel F. Mendez Montoya, The Theology of Food: The Eucharist and Eating, Oxford, Blackwell, 2009, 
Chapter 3. 
73 Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: the creation of hierarchy, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.390. 
74 See: Michael Martin, The Submerged Reality: Sophiology and the Turn to a Poetic Metaphysics, Angelico Press, 
2015. 
75 Rowan Williams, ‘Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness: the Wisdom of Finite Existence’; Rowan Williams, A 
Margin of Silence; even more recently, Aidan Nichols, Wisdom from Above: a Primer in the Theology of Fr. Sergei 
Bulgakov, Gracewing, 2005; and amongst the Orthodox theologians: Andrew Louth, ‘Sergei Bulgakov and the Task 
of Theology,’p.250; David Bentley Hart, In the Aftermath, p.123. Louth even includes an individual section devoted 
to Sophiology within his latest Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology (see: Andrew Louth, Introducing Eastern 
Orthodox Theology, London, SPCK, 2013, pp.43-46). 
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More recently, the Protestant theologian Paul Fiddes, has produced a truly monumental work 
engaging with the theme of Wisdom: Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and 
Christian Doctrine in a Late-Modern Context (2013).76 Fiddes engages with the biblical Wisdom 
texts and modern theologies constructed out of these (including Solovyov, Florensky, and 
Bulgakov), and attempts to put them into conversation with contemporary philosophical, cultural 
and scientific discourses, to the end of constructing a theology that offers a fresh perspective of 
the modern experience of the self and the world; one that is truly shaped by modern scientific 
discourses and ecological concerns.  
     This concise overview of the significance of Sophiology within contemporary British 
theology, and, furthermore, how it has been used to engage with modern scientific and 
environmental discourses should highlight its wider importance and relevance both within the 
boundaries of theological study and beyond them.    
     Based on this brief survey, one could easily be given the impression that Sophiology emerges 
within British theological thought as an entirely positive discourse. However, this is not the case. 
More recently, the Eastern Orthodox theologian Brandon Gallaher, repeating past reproaches, 
has criticized the current appropriation of Russian Sophiology by some theologians on the 
grounds that it simply repeats many of the ‘fallacies’ that the twentieth century Russian 
theologians made. He particularly takes issue with John Milbank, arguing that he evidences a 
clear indebtedness to ancient Gnosticism. Gallaher states that, when founding a theology on the 
problem of mediation between God and the world, Milbank invariably begins with the ‘Gnostic 
problem of the differentiation of the one and the many whose “solution” is found in a primordial 
impossible “mediation” or an “ontological bridge” between the one and the many.’77 Gallaher 
suggests that, like the Gnostics before him, Milbank struggles to account for genuine finite 
otherness within such a high doctrine of participation. In his attempt to stress the ontological 
compatibility of God and creation (where the boundaries of finitude: death, intellectual 
limitation, etc. are considered to be unnatural to original created reality and a product of the fall) 
finitude almost appears to be accidental, which requires another aspect of Gnostic mythology, as 
Gallaher further explains: Sophiology ‘inevitably seems to identify the Fall with some sought of 
                                                             
76 I owe a debt of gratitude to Oliver Davies for drawing my attention to this work and the significant role it could 
play within the thesis. 
77 Brandon Gallaher, ‘Graced Creatureliness: Ontological Tension in the Uncreated/Created Distinction in the 
Sophiologies of Solov’ev, Bulgakov and Milbank’, in Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 47:1-2, 2006, 
pp.163-190, p.176. 
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catastrophe in the absolute since it requires for Sophia a myth to narrate her duality as divine and 
creaturely.’78 Gallaher’s suspicions of the themes alleged to underlie Milbank’s Sophiology have 
also been shared recently by Sung II Yoo who has highlighted similar concerns, especially 
regarding Milbank’s tendency to conflate created being with the divine esse (which he 
characterises as an ‘ontological monism’) within his Sophiology.79 Similarly, Michael Scott 
Horton again calls into question the reality of finite existence within Milbank’s ontology of 
participation; accusing him of advocating being in a shared univocal capacity between Creator 
and creature which climaxes in Milbank’s Sophiology where: ‘the creator-creature distinction is 
blurred.’80 
    Therefore, these critical observations undoubtedly draw attention to the fact that the initial 
suspicions that haunted the Russian theologians that utilized the figure of Wisdom, have 
followed Sophiology to its contemporary manifestation in British theology. 
     Both in its contemporaneous and historical forms, criticism of Sophiology as a Gnostic 
discourse has always been the product of its origins as a theological discourse. Sophiology, as 
conceived in twentieth century Russia, was inseparable from the major philosophical background 
of that time, namely, German Idealism.81 In fact, it might be more accurate to suggest that 
Sophiology alone was not considered to be a Gnostic thought form, but rather, German Idealism 
was, and on the basis that Sophiology was so deeply entwined with this philosophical culture, it 
was accused of embodying Gnostic themes itself. This brings us back to the scholarship of Baur, 
Voegelin, and O’Regan, and further highlights a key continuity between their arguments and the 
argument of this thesis. Any study of Valentinian Gnosticism’s influence on contemporary 
Sophiology must first take account of Valentinian Gnosticism’s influence on classic German 
philosophy, and then in this case, Russian Sophiology, which is so central to informing its 
manifestation in contemporary British theology. 
 
    As already noted, the argument that Gnostic religious thought had emerged within the modern 
period by way of post-Kantian philosophy was strongly insisted upon by all three of the major 
                                                             
78 Ibid, p.177. 
79 See: Sung ll Yoo, Christology in a Postmodern Context: John Milbank’s Sacrifice and Gift, Proquest, 2011.   
80 See: Michael Scott Horton, Covenant and Salvation: Union with Christ, Kentucky, John Knox, 2007, p.207. 
81 See: Rowan Williams, Sergei Bulgakov, p.19. See also: Aristotle Papanikolaou, ‘Personhood and its Exponents in 
Twentieth Century Orthodox Theology,’ in: Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.232-246, p.232. 
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‘Gnostic return’ theorists that were discussed above.82 There positions are seemingly confirmed 
by those Eastern theologians that once rejected Sophiology on these grounds and by the 
contemporary critics of Sophiology.  
    As already claimed, this thesis broadly shares the rudimental claims of Baur, Voegelin, and 
O’Regan, that Gnosticism is one of many significant hermeneutical approaches to modern 
systems of ideas, and that its genesis within these religious, philosophical, and political ideas of 
the modern period can be seen within post-Kantian philosophy. Although the scope of these 
fundamental suggestions has been finely filtered within the approach of this thesis, in its attempt 
to analyse and explore the influence of Valentinian Gnosticism on modern systems of thought, 
focusing on the specific theological theme of Sophiology, this analysis will still need to account 
for Gnosticism’s route into these contemporary discourses. Thus it will be essential to consider 
the Gnostic influence on German Idealism and Russian Sophiology before analysing its presence 
or absence in contemporary British theology in the guise of Sophiology.  
    Thus, to briefly recapitulate, the central tasks of this thesis have been outlined, namely, to 
assess the influence of Valentinian Gnosticism on modern systems of thought, by taking the 
theological theme of Sophiology as its concrete example. Justification for using this particular 
theological theme as the example has been offered, as well as its wider significance for the 
scholarly community, both within the theological community and beyond. It was further noted 
that in order to properly test this thesis it would be necessary to take account of Gnosticism’s 
influence on German Idealism and Russian Sophiology, as both inform the current discourse of 
Sophiology to such a large extent. In the brief survey that was conducted on Sophiology’s place 
                                                             
82 See: Ferdinand Christian Baur Die Christliche Gnosis; Johann Eduard Erdmann, Natur oder Schöpfung:eine 
Frage an die Naturphilosophie und Religionsphilosophie, Leipzig, 1848, p.12; Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 
pp.320-40; Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism. For more literature on its broader influence on German 
Idealism and Romanticism see: Peter Koslowski, The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historicism, 
Berlin, Springer, 2005, p.34; Marc Maesschalk, L’anthropologie politique et religieuse de Schelling, Paris, Peeters, 
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Germany’, in: Athanasios Moulakis (ed), The Promise of History: Essays in Political Philosophy, Berlin, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1985, pp.51-69, p.65; Holgor Zaborowski, ‘Fall and Freedom: a Comparison of Fichte’s and Saint Paul’s 
Understanding of Original Sin’, in: Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds), After Jena: New Essays on Fichte’s 
Later Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 2008, pp.162-183. 
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within contemporary British theology, it was clear that, although it held a prevalent influence 
over a variety of scholars, two in particular, namely John Milbank and Paul Fiddes, could be 
considered to have developed the theme of Sophiology to the greatest extent; interestingly 
enough, both offer quite different utilizations of this theme, and will therefore be taken as the 
representatives of contemporary British Sophiology in the critical assessment of the extent to 
which Valentinian Gnosticism can be identified within these discourses.  
It now remains to demonstrate how this thesis will go about achieving its purpose.  
 
Outline of Method 
Perhaps the most developed methodology for studying the influence of ancient Gnostic thought 
forms on modern discourses would be that proposed by Cyril O’Regan. As already discussed, 
there is no greater influence on O’Regan’s work than that derived from his reading of Baur. 
Despite his admiration of the latter, O’Regan maintains that in order to take his insights further, 
one is forced to modify his original methodological approach. According to O’Regan, Baur’s use 
and application of the term Gnosticism for describing nineteenth century philosophy and 
theology was notably undisciplined. Baur seemingly had no strict criteria by which he could 
compare ancient Gnosticism to modern discourses, for his understanding of Gnosticism was 
simply too broad for it to carry any hermeneutical weight. He further criticises Voegelin on these 
same grounds. 
    In response to these shortcomings, O’Regan devotes much of his early scholarship trying to 
develop a methodology for his central argument; as already seen above, he outlines this work in 
his Gnostic Return in Modernity. Here O’Regan proposes, what is fundamentally a structuralist 
approach to history and narrative. According to O’Regan, every narrative has both a surface and 
a depth meaning (grammar). The surface meaning is historically tangible and pliable. However, 
the depth narrative grammar transcends the fluctuations of its ephemeral counterpart. O’Regan 
develops a depth narrative grammar for Valentinian theology (those tenets that he believes are 
utterly regulative to the discourse of Valentinism and without which would simply cease to be as 
such). Having outlined these fundamental tenets, O’Regan believes he is then in a position to 
critically evaluate and compare other discourses that conform to this depth narrative grammar, 
despite often drastic discontinuities in their ‘surface arrangement.’ Based on this methodological 
model O’Regan compares the depth narrative grammar of Valentinian Gnosticism to positions 
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which he identifies in Jacob Boehme and Hegel, for instance and suggests that these can be 
categorised as Gnostic discourses.  
     Although this is undoubtedly the most developed methodology proposed to address some of 
the short-comings in Baur and Voegelin’s work, it will not be adopted within this thesis.  
    Firstly, in order to adopt O’Regan’s method, one must seemingly accept the essential 
difference between the categories of depth and surface within narrative and history, and uphold a 
transcendental substance or subject underpinning the same. Whilst such a position can 
undoubtedly be argued for, it seems to fail to critically engage with the significant post-
structuralist critique of this position found in thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze for 
instance. Furthermore, even if one accepts that such a transcendental substance untouched by 
history could exist outside or beneath its historical manifestation in narrative and history, 
narrative comparisons alone are unable to facilitate archaeology of thought. Put simply, the 
narrative approach would not be in a position to offer broad avenues of comparison or engage 
with the historical realities (including political, social etc.) that create and foster such 
comparisons.  
    Furthermore, the narrative method appears to be thoroughly bound to O’Regan’s own 
deconstructive reading of ‘Gnostic return’ as a negative phenomenon. O’Regan states himself 
that he is playing the role of a modern Irenaeus. This tone and register will not be adopted within 
this thesis.83  
    As demonstrated above, this thesis shall seek to evaluate whether a tangible current of 
Valentinian thought does indeed appear in modern philosophical and theological discourses, as 
assessed through the theme of Sophiology. However, often such currents of thought are never 
clearly defined, least of all by those proposing them. Gnosticism’s influence on modernity 
sometimes simply appears under the veil of a Christian influence, as indeed it does within 
Russian and contemporary British Sophiology. Thus, when the figure of Wisdom is being 
utilized by theologians such as Bulgakov or Milbank, it is often claimed that it is sourced from 
the biblical figure of Sophia. Taking this fact into account, any methodological approach to the 
central questions of this thesis will need to propose a way of distinguishing between the biblical 
figure of Wisdom and the Gnostic adaptation of Sophia, before being in a position to definitively 
assess its role in Russian and British Sophiology. As shall be outlined shortly, these distinctions 
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will be comprehensively defined in the first two chapters, which shall evaluate the role of 
Wisdom in the relevant biblical literature and in the corresponding Gnostic sources.84 However, 
for now it will be of benefit to offer several preliminary definitions to distinguish between 
traditional Christianity and Valentinian Gnosticism that will be later substantiated in the first two 
chapters. Firstly, in contradiction to Valentinian Gnosticism, traditional Christianity has always 
insisted on the historical concreteness of the incarnation, it is not a metaphysical occurrence. 
Secondly, following on from this commitment, traditional Christianity resists myth, unlike 
Valentinian Gnosticism, which is founded on grand mythical narrations. Finally, Valentinian 
Gnosticism affirms that originary knowledge is redemptive or perfecting, unlike traditional 
Christianity, which rejects this point. 
Therefore, in addressing its major questions, this thesis will attempt to document and critically 
evaluate Wisdom’s historical journey into its modern appearance in contemporary theological 
discussions. It shall engage with alternative ways in which the same figure of Wisdom has been 
utilized, both historically and contemporarily, within theology, and those thought systems which 
have conditioned these manifestations. In order to do this, it shall take note of the historical, 
social and political dimensions and climates that have created these alternative approaches. It 
will not simply compare transcendental narrative structures, but historical, social and political 
conditions that produce such ‘structures.’ Simply put, the methodology that appears to be best 
positioned to facilitate the sort of comparisons and analyses that this thesis wishes to propose, 
would be Foucault’s archaeological method. In what follows, a brief outline and interpretation of 
this method and how it will be utilized within this thesis shall be suggested.    
 
Foucauldian Analysis: Facilitating Archaeology of Thought  
Certain malevolent people say that he is the new representative of a structural technology or 
technocracy. Others, mistaking their insults for wit, claim that he is a supporter of Hitler, or at 
least that he offends the rights of man (they will not forgive him for having proclaimed the 
‘death of man’). Some say that he is a shammer who cannot back himself up with reference to 
the sacred texts, and who seldom quotes the great philosophers. Others, though, claim that 
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something radically new has appeared in philosophy, and that this work is as beautiful as those it 
challenges. It celebrates the dawn of a new age.85    
A concise portrait of the meandering hermeneutical legacy left in the wake of Michel Foucault’s 
philosophy as summarized by his friend, Gilles Deleuze. Is it possible to identify a central theme 
or core purpose underlying Foucault’s methodological approach? Does such a question already 
transgress this core purpose; if it does indeed exist? ‘Book-length answers to this question 
abound.’86 Angèle Kremer-Marietti once suggested that the key to understanding Foucault’s 
philosophical-historical method was to interpret it under the metaphor of an anatomic gaze.87 
‘The ‘archaeological’ historian dissects many discourses and practices, denying himself the 
mirage of the global understanding of by-gone cultural totalities once perused by neo-idealists 
philosopher-historians.’88 However, in stark contrast, Pamela Major-Poetzl has argued that 
Foucault must be compared to a modern physicist imposing structure onto a vast discourse of 
disorder.89 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow somewhat share this characterization, suggesting 
that Foucault’s archaeological method is ‘quasi-structuralist,’ while the genealogical flavor of his 
later work is markedly post-structuralist.90 Whereas Merquior suggests that there is no great 
chasm between Foucault the archaeologist and Foucault the genealogist.91 Foucault’s relationship 
to structuralism is a highly contested issue. At times he appears to endorse it, commenting on the 
purpose of his The Birth of the Clinic, he states: ‘it is a structural study that sets out to 
disentangle the conditions of its history from the density of discourse, as do others of my 
works.’92 Yet in The Order of Things, Foucault emphatically denies these connections, affirming 
that: ‘In France, certain half-witted ‘commentators’ persist in labelling me a ‘structuralist.’ I 
have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or 
key terms that characterize structural analysis.’93 Annie Guédez would appear to share the latter 
summary, going so far as to conflate Foucault’s archaeological method with the notoriously anti-
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86 J.G. Merquior, Foucault, London, Fontana, 1991, p.141. 
87 Angèle Kremer-Marietti, Foucault et l’archéologie du savoir, Paris, Seg-hers, 1974. 
88 J.G. Merquior, Foucault, p.141. 
89 Pamela Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History, 
North Carolina, University of  North Carolina Press, 2011. 
90 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
91 J.G. Merquior, Foucault, p.142. 
92 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, London, Routledge, 1989, 
p.xxii. 
93 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London, Routledge, 1989, XV. 
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structuralist thought of Georges Gurvitch and Henri Lefebvre on the grounds that it upholds an 
anti-positivist stance.94  
    Others have attempted to understand Foucault’s method by conceptualizing it as a neo-
Nietzschean enterprise. Charles Lemert and Garth Gillian have argued that this Nietzschean 
influence had been introduced to Foucault through Georges Bataille.95Alan Sheridan also 
confirms the significance of Friedrich Nietzsche for Foucault’s philosophy.96 Merquior states 
that: ‘Foucault’s work…is arguably the prime instance of neo-Nietzscheanism in contemporary 
Western thought.’97 The significance of the theme of the ‘will to power’ in Foucauldian analysis 
would appear to confirm these characterizations.98 
    Furthermore, Mark Olssen has described Foucauldian thought as a form of ‘post-structuralist 
Marxism.’99 Barry Smart somewhat shares this reading, claiming that Foucauldian analysis is 
born out of the disrepute of Marxism.100 
    Foucault himself, albeit under the pseudonym of ‘Maurice Florence,’ describes his 
methodology as being a form of Kantianism. He states: ‘If Foucault is indeed perfectly at home 
in the philosophical tradition, it is in the critical tradition of Kant.’101 Margaret McLaren notes 
that: ‘it is not so much the question of truth or falsity that animates Foucault’s explorations, but 
the conditions under which questions of truth and falsity emerge. In this sense, Foucault’s project 
is Kantian.’102 Moreover, in Foucault’s essay What is Enlightenment? He praises Kant’s ability to 
interrogate the present.103 In a similar vein, Foucault has described himself as being an ‘historian 
of the present.’ 
                                                             
94 Annie Guédez, Foucault, Paris, Editions Universitaires, 1972; J.G. Merquior, Foucault, p.142.  
95 Charles Lemert and Garth Gillian, Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1982. On Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche see: Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, London, 
Continuum, 2004.   
96 See: Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, London, Tavistock, 1980.  
97 J.G. Merquior, Foucault, p.143. 
98 Most distinctly outlined in his works on sexuality and the penal system.  
99 Mark Olssen, Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education, Westport, Bergin and Garvey, 1999, p.6. 
100 Barry Smart, Foucault, Marxism and Critique, London, Routledge, 1983. 
101 Margaret McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, New York, SUNY, p.44. 
102 Ibid, p.44 
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    Foucault has also characterized himself as a philosophical sceptic. Once asked by an 
interviewer: ‘insofar as you don’t affirm any universal truth but raise paradoxes in thought and 
make of philosophy a permanent question are you a sceptic?’ To which Foucault responds with a 
resounding ‘Absolutely!’104 
     One can also clearly identify traits and approaches within Foucauldian analysis that point to a 
broader philosophical and historical context. For instance, Foucault’s commitment to 
philosophizing through a careful consideration of history would indicate a relationship to Hegel. 
Stuart Barnett claims that the crux of Foucault’s thought could be found in a particular reading of 
Hegelian philosophy.105 One can also detect a desire in Foucault to liberate his method from 
being constrained by the perspective of the subject.106 Perhaps this is to be understood as an anti-
phenomenologist (anti-Husserlian) stance, as well as an anti-psychoanalytical one, or just 
another expression of his commitment to Nietzsche. 
    The sheer breadth of Foucault’s influence cannot be emphasized enough. Foucauldian analysis 
has penetrated disciplines as diverse as psychology,107 education,108 social work,109 feminism,110 
Queer Theory111 and has left scarcely any of the social sciences untouched.  
    The above can therefore serve to orientate the reader within some of the diverse ontological 
and epistemological surroundings of Foucauldian analysis. It remains to offer a detailed outline 
of what such analysis involves and how and why one would seek to apply it within this particular 
study.  
                                                             
104 Quoted in: Margaret McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, p.44. 
105 Stuart Barnett, Hegel after Derrida, London, Routledge, 1998, p.44. 
106 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, London, Routledge, 2002, p.18. 
107 See: Derek Hook, Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power, Palgrave, 2010.  
108 See, for instance: Gail Jardine, Foucault and Education, New York, Peter Lang, 2005; Stephen Ball (ed), 
Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge, London, Routledge, 1990; Michael Peters and Tina Besley 
(eds), Why Foucault? New Directions in Educational Research, New York, Peter Lang, 2007. 
109 Adrienne Chambon, Allan Irving and Laura Epstein (eds), Reading Foucault for Social Work, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1999.  
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instance:  Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body, London, Routledge, 1991; Caroline 
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    Although clear vestiges of the archaeological method can be detected within Foucault’s three 
major early monographs: Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of 
Things, it is not until The Archaeology of Knowledge that Foucault gives a clear rendition, in his 
own words, of his methodological approach. 
    Foucault’s determination to remove the subject from historical analysis leads him to dismiss 
many of the conventional approaches of the history of ideas, which he believes was ‘secretly, but 
entirely related to the synthetic activity of the subject’112; leading him to formulate entirely new 
avenues of historical inquiry. Within the history of thought: 
One tries to rediscover beyond the statements themselves the intention of the speaking subject, 
his conscious activity, what he meant, or, again, the unconscious activity that took place, despite 
himself, in what he said or in the almost imperceptible fracture of his actual words; in any case 
we must reconstitute another discourse, rediscover the silent murmuring, the inexhaustible 
speech that animates from within the voice that one hears, re-establish the tiny, invisible text that 
runs between and sometimes collides with them. The analysis of thought is always allegorical in 
relation to the discourse it employs…The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in quite a 
different way; we must grasp the statement in the exact specifity of its occurrence; determine its 
conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that 
may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes. We do not seek 
below what is manifest the half silent murmur of another discourse; we must show why it could 
not be other than it was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst 
of others and in relation to them, a place that no other could occupy. The question proper to such 
an analysis might be formulated in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from 
what is said and nowhere else.113        
Within this form of analysis one is able to identify broad webs of various relations between 
differing discourses, something that Deleuze describes as a dispersed family, which echoes 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance.114  Foucault describes this as ‘the unities of 
discourse:’ 
                                                             
112 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.15. 
113 Ibid, pp.30-31 (my emphasis). 
114 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p.17. Wittgenstein gives the following example to illustrate his point: ‘We are inclined 
to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification 
for applying the general term ‘game’ to the various games; whereas games form a family the members of which 
have family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way 
of walking; and these likeness overlap. The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular 
instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea 
that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties; e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all 
beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by 
anything that is beautiful (Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, Blackwell, 1958, p.17).  
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Relations between groups of statements thus established (even if these groups do not concern the 
same, or even adjacent, fields; even if they do not possess the same formal level; even if they are 
not the locus of assignable exchanges); relations between statements and groups of statements 
and events of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political).115 
 One sees this, for instance, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault is able to identify diverse 
interrelated power themes at play within seemingly unrelated discourses. He notes:  
Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labor, its authorities 
of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions 
of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty? Is it surprising that prisons 
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?116 
    In order to analyze and identify the unities of discourse, Foucault suggests that one must look 
to uncover the discursive formations of a given group of discourses: ‘the unity of a discourse is 
based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which 
various objects emerge and are continually transformed.’117 This ‘space’ can be understood as a 
regulative interplay of factors that produce related statements or unities of discourses:  
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, 
whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a 
regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations, we will say, for 
the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation.118 
Thus, if a discursive formation is the condition in which these patterns can be identified between 
statements and discourses, then the conventions which ‘govern’ them can be entitled the rules of 
formation.119 
    Rules of formation within a discourse produce objects for that discourse. For instance, 
Foucault suggests that the rules of formation within a discourse on madness produce objects such 
as the vagabond or the pauper, which must then be analyzed ‘by relating them to the body of 
rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their 
historical appearance.’120 Therefore, in Madness and Civilization the objects: the vagabond and 
                                                             
115 Ibid, p.32. 
116 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, London, Penguin, pp.227-28. Gilles Deleuze 
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the pauper would be analyzed by evaluating the conditions which produced them as objects, 
namely, the concept of unproductivity;  existing within a given set of expected economic and 
social conventions, the pauper – as unproductive – had no place which led to his confinement.121 
    Foucault further outlines, what he describes as, the formation of the enunciative modalities 
existing within a discourse. By which he appears to mean the conditioned role from which a 
discourse is spoken, the conventions that accord this role with such authority. Rather than 
investigating a history conditioned by a psychological or transcendental subject, Foucault seeks 
to assess the historical circumstances that make the existence of such a role possible. For 
instance, ‘medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value efficacy, even their 
therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be 
dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them.’122 Moreover, 
one must also investigate the ‘institutional sites’ which create such a role. In the Will to 
Knowledge, Foucault outlines the discursive formation of the role of confession and how it, in 
turn, forms the enunciative modalities or subjects such as the priest, the doctor, the teacher, etc.:  
The scientia sexualis that emerged in the nineteenth century kept as its nucleus the singular ritual 
of obligatory and exhaustive confession, which in the Christian West was the first technique for 
producing the truth of sex. Beginning in the sixteenth century, this rite gradually detached itself 
from the sacrament of penance, and via the guidance of souls and the direction of 
conscience…emigrated toward pedagogy, relationships between adults and children, family 
relations, medicine, and psychiatry.123    
    Foucault notes that within this interplay of relations, concepts are formed and rules governing 
those concepts within the respective discursive formation. It is precisely the conditions in which 
they emerge that Foucault seeks to analyze: 
What properly belongs to a discursive formation and what makes it possible to delimit the group 
of concepts, disparate as they may be, that are specific to it, is the way in which these different 
elements are related to one another; the way in which, for example. The ordering of descriptions 
or accounts is linked to the techniques of rewriting; the way in which the field of memory is 
linked to the forms of hierarchy and subordination that govern the statements of a text…It is this 
group of relations that constitutes a system of conceptual formation.124 
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Thus it is important to note that concepts do not govern discourse, according to Foucault, but, 
rather, the rules and interplays of various relations within a discourse govern the formation of 
concepts. This approach is therefore markedly ‘de-objectified’ as well as being ‘de-subjectified.’ 
    Foucault further discusses the significance of the formation of strategies within a discursive 
formation. By which he implies the existence of certain themes that regulate the subjects’ 
interaction within a given field; the horizon or lens by which discourses are engaged with. 
Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living beings give rise to 
certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation, 
which form, according to their degree of coherence, rigor, and stability, themes or theories…I 
shall call these themes and theories ‘strategies.’125   
An example of the formation and function of strategies can be seen in the dominant organizing 
gaze of ‘the table.’ The table is a ‘kind of knowledge [involving] the allotting of the sign to all 
that our representation can present us with.’126 This instance of organizing representations with 
definitive tables of categorized signs governs and compares a variety of discourses: 
It is in this area that we encounter natural history – the science of the characters that articulate 
the continuity and the tangle of nature. It is also in this area that we encounter the theory of 
money and the theory of value – the science of the signs that authorize exchange and permit the 
establishment of equivalences between men’s needs or desires. Lastly, it is also in this region 
that we find general grammar – the science of the signs by means of which men group together 
their individual perceptions and pattern the continuous flow of their thoughts. Despite their 
differences, these three domains existed in the Classical age only in so far as the fundamental 
area of the ordered table was established between the calculation of equalities and the genesis of 
representations.127 
    Therefore, Foucault’s archaeological method can be described as an analysis of the various 
interplays and rules that regulate a unity of discourse: 
We set out with an observation: with a unity of a discourse like that of clinical medicine, or 
political economy, or Natural History, we are dealing with a dispersion of elements. This 
dispersion itself – with its gaps, its discontinuities its entanglements, its incompatibilities, its 
replacements, and its substitutions – can be described in its uniqueness if one is able to determine 
the specific rules in accordance with which its objects, statements, concepts, and theoretical 
options have been formed: if there really is a unity, it does not lie in the visible, horizontal 
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coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well anterior to their formation, in the system that 
makes possible and governs that formation.128  
Thus, it is essential to note that the archaeological method operates within a certain space 
existing in the discourse, a space where a given statement correlates within a web of diverse 
relations that regulate and produce its formation: 
A statement is not confronted…by a correlate – or the absence of a correlate – as a proposition 
has (or has not) a referent…It is linked rather to a ‘referential’ that is made up not of ‘things’, 
‘facts’, realities, or ‘beings’, but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are 
named, designated or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it. 
The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the 
authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are 
brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and 
delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition.129 
This strategy liberates historical analysis from the constraints of a given subject or author of the 
statement. Instead, one can analyze the discourse which contains subjects: ‘a group of statements 
that belong to a single system of formation; thus I shall be able to speak of clinical discourse, the 
discourse of natural history, psychiatric discourse.’130 
Archaeology is therefore not interested in deliberately normalizing modalities of power by 
affirming the truth or falsity of a given statement within a discourse, but, rather, in analyzing the 
conditions which form the criteria of truth and falsity existing within a given discourse. 
Foucault offers the analogy of a tree of derivation when describing archaeology: 
Archaeology – and this is one of its principal themes – may thus constitute the tree of derivation 
of a discourse…it will place at the root, as governing statements, those that concern the 
definition of observable structures and the field of possible objects, those that prescribe the forms 
of description and the perceptual codes that it can use, those that reveal the most general 
possibilities of characterization, and thus open up a whole domain of concepts to be constructed, 
and, lastly, those that, while constituting a strategic choice, leave room for the greatest number of 
subsequent options. And it will find, at the end of the branches, or at various places in the whole, 
a burgeoning of ‘discoveries’ (like that of fossil series), conceptual transformations (like the new 
definition of the genus), the emergence of new notions (like that of mammals or organism), 
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technical improvements (principles for organizing collections, methods of classification and 
nomenclature).131 
Furthermore, archaeology implies five distinct tasks adopted when analyzing a distinctive 
discourse, which Foucault suggests can be conceptualized as follows: the first is concerned to 
demonstrate ‘how quite different discursive elements may be formed on the basis of similar 
rules.’132 These are described as archaeological isomorphisms. The second seeks ‘to show to 
what extent these rules do or do not apply in the same way’;133 whether they are constructed 
using the same model or order. This task is described by Foucault as an attempt to define the 
archaeological model of each formation. The third is to demonstrate how varying concepts may 
occupy a similar position within an alien domain of discourse. Thus, for example, in The Use of 
Pleasure, Foucault demonstrates how sexual pleasures were problematized within a series of 
quite distinct discourses such as medicine, philosophy, economics, etc.134 The fourth is related to 
the third and is an attempt to articulate the archaeological shifts within unities of discourse, thus 
to note how a single notion may be identical within two distinct archaeological fields. And lastly, 
to highlight archaeological correlations. 
    Despite these categories, the four major avenues in which archaeological analysis operates are 
the rules of discursive formation, the formation of concepts, the formation of enunciative 
modalities, and the formation of strategies. However, it is important to note that the 
archaeological method does not attempt to impose a super structure onto discourse, some 
totalizing view. Although, neither should it be understood as a ‘Rhizomatic’ or ‘Schizo-
analytical’ enterprise in the Deleuzian sense135; rather, it documents the correlations, unities and 
                                                             
131 Ibid, p.164. 
132 Ibid, p.178. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality:2, London, Penguin, 1992. 
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differences that emerge within the space of the regulations or rules of formation of the discourse 
itself.  
    It is not a task that can ever be completed, as new layers and further insights can always be 
extracted. Neither does it analyze discourses by imposing on it a strict analytical or ‘scientific’ 
framework that utilizes the categories outlined above without flexibility. In all of Foucault’s 
major monographs both prior and posterior to The Archaeology of Knowledge one is not met 
with the strict application of these definitions and categories when analyzing discourse, it should 
rather be conceived as an outline of a host of possibilities to explore when interpreting a 
particular discourse.  
    Within this thesis, Foucault’s archaeological method shall be employed to investigate whether 
or not Valentinian Gnosticism can be documented to have exerted a significant influence on the 
modern theological discourse of Sophiology. In order to do this, it will first be necessary to 
establish the rules of discursive formation for ‘traditional’ Christian/biblical renditions of 
Sophiology, looking especially to establish how the biblical concept of Sophia is generated, and, 
what this looks like as a concept enshrined within an authoritative tradition. The same strategy 
shall then be adopted for the analysis of the Valentinian Gnostic conception of Sophia, before 
critically comparing these two traditions and establishing their distinct rules of formation and 
their respective concepts and strategies. This shall be proposed in the first two chapters of the 
thesis. In the first chapter, close critical analysis of the respective biblical wisdom texts 
(including Old Testament, Apocryphal, and New Testament sources) utilizing the above 
approach, shall be offered before doing the same for the Valentinian wisdom texts. 
    Having established the archaeology of the two wisdom traditions, a detailed analysis of post-
Kantian Idealism shall ensue. In Foucauldian terms, German Idealism, following Baur, Voegelin 
and O’Regan, will preliminarily be considered as the rules of formation for the respective 
wisdom traditions emergence within Russian and British theology. Put simply, German idealism, 
as the condition or background which encourages the production of Valentinian Sophiology in 
Russian and British theology, will be critically assessed as to how this becomes possible. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
differences, multiplicities, assemblages etc. in a manner that asserts the primacy of difference, which although is not 
unrelated to archaeology, cannot be considered to be synonymous with it (on Schizo-analyisis see: Gilles Dleuze and 
Felix Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia I: Anti-Oedipus, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, pp.313-435; and on the 
Rhizome see: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia II: A Thousand Plateaus, pp.1-29).               
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order to establish these rules of formation, chapter three shall document the rise of certain 
philosophical and theological questions emerging in the wake of Kantian philosophy, focusing 
on Friedrich Heinz Jacobi’s interpretation of Kant, how this effects Reinhold’s philosophical 
system and its critics, before analysing Fichte’s philosophical proposals, noting the emergence of 
a specific set of philosophical and theological problems that have strong parallels to the 
philosophical and theological problems on which Gnostic theology is governed.  
    In chapter four, the immediate inheritor of these philosophical conundrums shall be analysed, 
along with his highly developed attempts at resolving these issues, where Gnostic mythology is 
drawn upon in order to confront these same problems. Chapter four shall therefore focus on the 
philosophy of Schelling, with specific interest in the formation of the conditions that generate 
theological appeals to Gnosticism, and how these theological proposals ultimately take shape. 
    Chapter five shall investigate the impact of these rules of formation for Sophiology within 20th 
century Russian theology. A detailed critical engagement with Vladimir Solovyov and Sergius 
Bulgakov’s ‘wisdom writings’ shall be offered, in an attempt to trace Valentinian Gnostic themes 
and biblical influences on their respective Sophiologies, especially those mediated by German 
Idealism. Here the hermeneutical scholarship of chapters one and two shall be drawn upon to 
facilitate this archaeology. Moving towards a conclusion as to whether there is a predominant 
Gnostic presence within Russian Sophiology, and the form or concept that this produces.  
    In chapter six, we shall discuss the two prevalent theological adoptions of the figure of 
Wisdom in contemporary British theology, by John Milbank and Paul Fiddes respectively. In the 
case of both theologians, close critical analysis of their portrayals of Wisdom shall be explored, 
attempting to detect the tangible presence of Gnostic thought forms, mediated through Russian 
and German thought, or, and, the dominating presence of traditional Christian renditions of the 
biblical figure of Wisdom. If Gnostic tendencies are discovered, attempts will be made to 
contour alternatives, before concluding the thesis.  
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Chapter I  
Towards an Archaeology of the Biblical Figure of Wisdom  
 As Gordon Fee has proposed,136 there are fundamentally three key texts within the Old 
Testament and the Apocryphal wisdom literature that are suggested to have provided the 
foundation for New Testament wisdom theology. These are: Proverbs 8:22-31, Sirach 1:4-22, 
24, and Wisdom 6:1-10:21. Before assessing just how these texts are utilised theologically by the 
early Christians, we first need to establish how the conventions and regulations that govern the 
Old Testament and the Apocryphal portrayals of Wisdom themselves were first formed and the 
respective concepts that these entail; attempting to explore whether one can identify an 
authoritative Hebraic concept of Wisdom, distinct from pagan traditions. This chapter will 
therefore attempt to address the archaeological questions concerning the identity, origins, and 
theological functions of the figure of Wisdom within the relevant Old Testament and Apocryphal 
texts, and what has conditioned them, before exploring the process of their adoption by the early 
Christians. Is the wisdom speculation of Proverbs 8:22-31 an Egyptian or Mesopotamian import, 
is it compatible with the established enunciative field of Jewish monotheism, is Wisdom an 
hypostasised being, and so forth? Similarly, do the Apocryphal wisdom texts represent 
developed versions of the Wisdom figure in Proverbs 8, or are they clearly disjointed traditions, 
how far have they been influenced by Greek philosophical thought, to what extent do socio-
political issues effect its portrayal? These, along with several other issues, demonstrate the 
difficulties surrounding the task at hand, as well as highlighting the need for an archaeological 
approach. Having explored these and other related topics, I shall hope to propose an archaeology 
of Old Testament and Apocryphal Wisdom theology that would be inherited by the early 
Christians, before going on to discuss the Christian appropriation of this theme itself, moving 
towards defining a biblical concept of wisdom.  
Proverbs 8:22-31. 
                                                             
136 See: Gordon Fee, ‘Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View’, in: J.I. Packer and S.K. Soderlund (eds), 
The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honour of Bruce K. Waltke, Michigan, Harper, 2000, pp.251-80, p.252.  
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An Archaeological Exegesis 
Tremper Longman notes that a typical ancient Near Eastern autobiography begins with a self-
introduction followed by a list of accomplishments. In relation to Wisdom’s self-portrayal, we 
have the former in 8:12-21 and the latter in 8:22-31.137 It is precisely the ‘list of 
accomplishments’ that presents the reader with the most hermeneutical difficulties. For instance, 
Verse 22:      
והי ה יִנָנָק תיִשֵׁר וֹכְּרַד םֶדֶק ויָלָעְפִמ זאֵָמ  
  ‘YHWH created me at the beginning of his ways before his acts of old.’  
The ontological status of Wisdom initially depends on the way that one interprets the Hebrew 
verb הנק. Typically, it is often used to indicate acquisition; something which has been 
obtained, gained, or possessed;138 as when Eve acquires a son, who is named Cain, incidentally, 
after the same verb, with the help of the LORD (Gen 4:1). If Bruce Vawter is correct in claiming 
that this verb must always be translated as ‘to acquire,’139 then this would seem to suggest that 
the figure of Wisdom is uncreated and co-eternal with YHWH himself. However, Michael Fox 
has argued that: ‘one way something can be acquired is by creation…English ‘acquire’ implies 
that the object was already in existence, but this is not the case with הנק’.140 In support of 
Fox’s thesis, there are more than several instances where the same verb implies ‘to create’; in 
Genesis 14:19, YHWH blesses Abram and refers to himself as the maker of heaven and earth 
(not acquirer!), and in Deuteronomy 32:6 there is an admonishment that states: ‘is not he your 
father, who created you (הנק), who made (השׁע) you and established you.’ Notice that הנק 
is synonymised with השׁע in this instance, further suggesting that it can denote creation under 
certain circumstances and not acquisition. Having noted these points, it would seem that verse 22 
is upholding that Wisdom is created. Therefore, the figure of Wisdom is not ontologically 
                                                             
137 Tremper Longman, Proverbs, Michigan, Baker, 2006, p.203. 
138 See: Francis Brown, The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (thirteenth ed), Massachusetts, 
Hendrickson, 2010, p.888. 
139Bruce Vawter, ‘Yahweh: Lord of the heavens and the earth,’ in: Catholic Biblical Quarterly 48.3 (July 1986), 
461-467.  
140 Michael Fox, Proverbs 1-9, New York, Double Play, 2000, p.279. 
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synonymous with God himself; Wisdom has a ‘beginning.’ However, when we go on to consider 
the peculiar nature of this beginning, more hermeneutical difficulties arise.  
    Verse 23 confirms that Wisdom was ‘woven/shaped/formed’ (ךסנ/ךכס) ‘from the 
beginning, before the earth ( שֹׁארֵמ יֵמְדַקִּמ ץֶראָ ).’ Following this opening statement, 
as Ronald Murphy notes, we then get a ‘plethora of expressions to designate antiquity’, with the 
intention of ‘proving’ the initial claim that ‘Wisdom was there before anything else.’141 In verse 
24, which is clearly supposed to echo Genesis 1:2, we are told that Wisdom is ‘brought forth’ 
(לוֹה/לִה) when there were no depths (תוֹֹמהְת); the only thing, along with the wasteland 
and the void (וּהוֹת/וּהוֹב), that appears to ‘be’ prior to God’s creative activity. In Verse 27, 
Wisdom announces its presence when God established the heavens and when he ‘marked out the 
horizon on the face of the deep.’ In a similar vein, verse 29 refers to Wisdom’s presence when 
God established the limitations of the sea; echoing Genesis 1:9 and, perhaps, the typical ancient 
Near Eastern creation myth which presupposed some watery chaos that would be overcome by 
the Creator.142 What is clear at this point is that, although Wisdom was created, it was not created 
with creation per se; it ‘pre-exists’ the creation of the world. Therefore, the list of things that 
Wisdom is said to precede, is implemented as a rhetorical and poetical tool that can confirm that 
it was in being when nothing else was; as R.J. Clifford puts it: this list ‘portrays precreation 
chaos or nothingness concretely, i.e., by listing specific cosmic elements not in existence rather 
than the abstract concept of nothingness.’143  
Ronald Murphy draws attention to the opening of Verse 30 which begins:  
הֶיְהֶאָו ְֹצֶא ֹןמאָ  
 ‘I was beside him as an architect/artist/craftsman/master worker’. 
He argues that there is an interesting correlation between the הֶיְהֶאָו of this verse and the two 
that famously occur in Exodus 3:14, where Moses asks for God’s name and he responds with the 
                                                             
141 Ronald Murphy, Proverbs, Thomas Nelson, 1998, p.52. 
142 See: Longman, Proverbs, p.205. 
143 R.J. Clifford, Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible, Washington, Catholic Biblical 
Association of America, 1994, p.183. 
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statement ‘I AM.’ Murphy states that: ‘there can be hardly any doubt that verse 30 alludes to that 
passage [Exd 3:14].’144 On the basis of the earlier argument that suggested that Wisdom was 
‘created’, we should refrain from concluding that this allusion is indicative of Wisdom’s 
identification with YHWH himself, it is more likely to indicate that Wisdom participated in the 
divine prerogative of creation, as suggested byֹןמאָ and thus meriting the intimate allusion to 
YHWH himself. Longman suggests that ֹןמאָ has functional implications which are informative 
of Wisdom’s pre-existent presence before God; he argues that ‘Wisdom was not only present but 
also involved in creation as a guiding force.’145 Longman is essentially correct in affirming that 
the ֹןמאָ is informative of Wisdom’s function before the Creator; however, ‘guiding force’ does 
appear to be something of an asserted assumption that reads too much out of one verb. It seems 
that, at most, we can tentatively affirm that Wisdom is ‘creative’ and is engaged in some sought 
of creativity before God. The root ןמא suggests some notion of confirmation or support. We 
can see this in Ruth 4:16 where it is adapted to mean ‘nurse’ or ‘foster-mother,’ and similarly in 
2 Kings 18:16, it is used to describe the pillars or supports of the door. Such a reading would also 
make most sense in light of Proverbs 3:19 where YHWH is said to ‘establish the earth in 
Wisdom.’ With this in mind, perhaps one can speculate that Wisdom’s creativity is something 
which is supportive or utilised in God’s creative activity.  
Verse 30 also states that: 
ַהֶיְהֶאָו םיִעֻשֲׁעַשׁ ֹםי׀ֹםי תֶקֶחַשְׂמ ויָנָפְל לָכְבּ תֵע   
‘And I was his object of delight/desire from day to day, dancing/playing before him all the time.’  
There are certainly jubilant connotations surrounding Wisdom’s presence before God, it is 
delightful to him and Wisdom appears to reciprocate this joy in a playful manner. O. Keel has 
argued that this notion of ‘playing before God’ is related to the figures which cartwheel before 
the Egyptian procession of divinities as illustrated in Egyptian iconography.146 Whilst, there may 
be some evidence for ancient Near Eastern influences on the text, this thesis seems somewhat 
                                                             
144 Ronald Murphy, Proverbs, Thomas Nelson, 1998, p.45. 
145 Longman, Proverbs, p.207. 
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over stretched, it is by no means an obvious reading and seems highly speculative. Verse 31 
states that, not only does Wisdom perform this ‘role’ before God, but also does the same before 
the created world; delighting in humanity ( יֵנְבּ םָדאָ ). Gerhard Von Rad and R.B.Y. Scott 
argue that Wisdom is something which functions immanently within the human sphere and its 
world, and that interpreters should distance themselves from the position that emphasises its role 
in creation, as this can lead to misapprehensions.147 However, although Wisdom is created, the 
text seems to be at pains to suggest that it is not created with the rest of creation; Wisdom is 
clearly before the divine creative act par excellence, which implies that it is intimately related to 
God and must be interpreted in light of this intimacy, and not exclusively by its relationship to 
creation. Therefore, it appears that we can tentatively conclude from verses 30 -31, with 
Longman, that Wisdom is mediatory.148 It is difficult to say just how so. However, there is no 
doubt that Wisdom’s presence is communicated ‘between’ God and creation, related to both 
simultaneously. Murphy has recently suggested that the text may be deliberately ambiguous; it is 
meant to convey a mysterious relationship.149 
The Figure of Wisdom under Biblical Authority (its Enunciative Field) 
Stuart Weeks has noted that: ‘it has become quite common to assert that Wisdom in Proverbs 8: 
1-9 is conceived of as a goddess figure, or more generally, that Proverbs 8 reflects a wider belief 
in the existence of a goddess Wisdom.’150 Scholars such as Alice Sinnott and J.D.G. Dunn have 
argued that ‘religious monotheism was the milieu in which the personification texts were 
produced and treasured’151, and for this reason, if Wisdom is an hypostatic being or attribute 
independent of God, then this could not have come from Hebraic thought. However, despite this 
point, Judith Hadley, amongst others,152 has attempted to argue that the Wisdom figure of 
Proverbs 8 is intimately related to the primitive goddess worship of Asherah and Astarte in Israel 
                                                             
147 Gerhard Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, London, SCM, 1972, p.148; R.B.Y. Scott, ‘Wisdom in Creation: the Amon 
of Proverbs 8:3’, VT 10 1960, pp.213-223. 
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150 Stuart Weeks, An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2010, p.41. 
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Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, London, 
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and Judah. She suggests that the Hebrew texts slowly ‘de-deify’ the goddesses to the point of, 
either, their absence or their association with foreign idolatry. Against this background, she 
argues that the Wisdom figure in Proverbs 8 is something of a ‘literary compensation for the 
eradication of the worship of these goddesses [Asherah and Astarte].’153 However, given that 
Hadley notes, according to her own thesis, that all of the references to these goddesses within 
Hebrew scripture before Proverbs 8 had focused on removing any remnants of associating 
Asherah or Astarte with divinity, it would seem almost remarkable that there would be a sudden 
demand for a reconceptualised manifestation of their divinity to compensate for their loss, when 
they would have already been so opprobriously conceived by this point. Furthermore, it seems 
difficult to believe that if there had been a conscious process throughout Hebrew scripture to de-
deify the goddesses, why would Proverbs have included such an easily misinterpreted portrayal 
of Wisdom which would risk jeopardising this process of de-deification? For these reasons it 
would seem unlikely that Wisdom is related to early Hebrew goddess worship.  
    Scholars such as Bernhard Lang have argued that the Lady Wisdom of Proverbs is best 
understood in relation to her other ancient Near Eastern parallels.154 The four that are most 
persistently suggested are the Egyptian goddesses Ma’at and Isis and the Mesopotamian 
goddesses Mami and Siduri. There are undoubtedly aspects apparent within the identities and 
roles of these figures which are comparable to the presentation of Wisdom in Proverbs 8. For 
instance, Sinnott notes that Ma’at has an independent existence, which some scholars have 
suggested parallels Wisdom.155 Ma’at is said to have existed from antiquity; she existed before 
creation and during its manifestation. She is even said to have a role in the creative process and 
is intimately associated with the Creator.156  Similarly, like Wisdom, Isis was said to have had a 
particular tenderness and warmth towards humanity, she had creative powers, and was known for 
her cunning.157 In the Mesopotamian traditions, the Atrahasis talks of the mother goddess Mami 
who ‘with the help of the wise god Ea, created men out of clay mixed with the blood of a slain 
                                                             
153 Judith Hadley, ‘Chasing Shadows? The quest for the historical goddess’, in: J.A. Emerton (ed), Congress Volume, 
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god called Ilawela.’158 She is also introduced as the wise Mami on several occasions.159 Saduri 
also appears to occupy some sought of advisory role in relation to Gilgamesh.160 Sinnott notes 
that the evidence for any direct link between these traditions and the figure of Wisdom remains 
elusive and inconclusive.161 However, there are several arguments that would indicate that this is 
not the case. Firstly, all of the proposed ancient Near Eastern figures were worshipped as 
goddesses; as individual deities existing apart from the Creator. As Dunn has argued, there is no 
parallel to this phenomenon within the Judaism of this period in relation to Wisdom. His primary 
argument of why this did not occur was because Wisdom was not considered to be an 
independent hypostasised attribute or divine being in the same way that these goddesses were. 
He argues that Wisdom is the product of ‘vivid personification’162 which is paralleled in the 
Hebrew cannon on numerous occasions, which would include God’s right arm (Ps, 45:4), 
righteousness and peace (Ps, 85:10), God’s faithfulness (Ps, 57:3), and so forth. And, that unless 
one is willing to claim that God’s right arm is an independent hypostasis, then one should not 
attempt to attribute this definition to the figure of Wisdom either.163 When one takes an even 
closer look at the proposed commonalities, one struggles even to identify clear literary patterns 
between the texts. Ma’at, for instance, is ‘never personified in Egyptian wisdom books…she is 
never portrayed as speaking in the first person.’164 It would seem then that these suggestions do 
not sufficiently account for the development and use of the Wisdom figure within the Hebrew 
canon. At best, as R.N. Whybray and Sinnott have noted,165 they are merely indicative of a 
shared ancient Near Eastern worldview of creation, that foreign creation myths would have been 
known by the Hebrews, and that they could have creatively engaged with some of these myths; 
where the language of which, however, within Jewish monotheism, would have had very 
different connotations to the way in which it would have been understood in the other ancient 
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Near Eastern traditions.166 However, they do not suggest that Wisdom is a substitute or a Hebrew 
response to her neighbouring deities, or that these myths informed the identity and the 
theological functions which Wisdom performed, they appear to be used uniquely in the Hebrew 
canon.167      
     One of the unique and incomparable aspects of Hebraic Wisdom is its lack of hypostatic 
independence from the Creator. Dunn has already noted that Wisdom is the product of ‘vivid 
personification;’ however, it would appear that, contrary to R. Marcus and G. Von Rad 
respectively, it is neither a personification of an attribute of God nor of cosmic harmony (if the 
latter is thought to be something immanent to creation which is independent of God’s salvific 
acts in history) .168 Firstly, it is unlikely that the Hebrews would have thought of concrete 
‘attributes’ as something to be conceived independently of the Creator and neither would they 
have considered cosmic harmony to be inherent in the world independently of God’s saving and 
redemptive presence among them. It seems that the best description of the theological functions 
which Wisdom is performing is described by Dunn, which is worth quoting at length: 
Wisdom…was a way of asserting God’s nearness, his involvement with his world, his concern 
for his people. All these words provided expressions of God’s immanence, his active concern in 
creation, revelation and redemption, while at the same time protecting his holy transcendence 
and wholly otherness…The language may be the language of wider speculation of the time, but 
within Jewish monotheism and Hebraic literary idiom Wisdom never really becomes more than a 
personification…of a function of Yahweh.169          
Therefore, it would seem that one can identify, within the Proverbs text, a Hebraic concept of 
Wisdom that is governed by biblical authority, and that Wisdom performs theological functions, 
despite bearing some semblances to other ancient Near Eastern parallels, which are compatible 
with Jewish monotheism. Before addressing the historical and social question as to what would 
have necessitated a distinctly Hebraic formation of such a figure, we shall first recapitulate the 
Hebraic concept of Wisdom and its rules of formation.   
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in Israel, Pennsylvania, Trinity Press, 1972, Pp.144-76. 
169 Dunn, Christology in the Making, p.176. 
 
 
56 
    The fundamental conventions which seem indispensable and entirely regulative in respect to 
the figure of Wisdom’s identity and role within Proverbs 8 are as follows:  
i) Wisdom is distinct from God; it is created and has a beginning of sorts. 
ii) Wisdom’s distinctness from God is not indicative of it being an independent hypostasis or 
deity alongside the Creator. 
iii) Wisdom’s created origins are mysterious and unknowable, as it pre-existed the creation of the 
cosmos and is not to be construed as coming into being with the creative act par excellence. 
iv) Wisdom is creative and is creative in the presence of God. 
v)  Wisdom is the delight of God and reciprocates this with playful joy. 
vi) Wisdom performs this same role before the created world and delights in humanity. 
vii) Wisdom occupies a mediatory position ‘between’ God and creation; it is in the presence of 
both simultaneously. 
 Wisdom’s theological functions (those rules which formed Wisdom as a concept) can be 
constructed as a form of creative mediation: 
i) Wisdom communicates God’s presence to the world and the world’s presence to God; Wisdom 
paradoxically affirms God’s immanence whilst upholding his transcendence; revealing and 
concealing him simultaneously. 
ii) Wisdom is a personified relationship between God and creation that is established ‘prior’ to 
the creation of the world.  
iii) Wisdom is both created and uncreated in her mediatory role; God’s relationship to creation 
must have ontologically preceded the same, although it must have also had an actualisation and 
hence a ‘beginning’ in relation to the actualisation of created reality.  
iv) Given that such a relationship pre-supposes creation; one could also say that it is creative in 
itself in so far as God’s desire and love for creation would have brought it into being. 
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Having outlined the concept of Hebraic Wisdom in Proverbs 8 and the theological functions 
which led to its formation in this particular way, the social, political and historical context of this 
particular concept shall now be investigated. 
The Socio-Political context of Wisdom’s formation in Proverbs 8. 
Sinnott has recently argued that the Wisdom figure of Proverbs 1-9 was constructed sometime 
after 587 BCE in the exilic or post-exilic period of Jewish history.170 There are several reasons 
for proposing such a period, Proverbs 1-9 bares close similarities to the Priestly account in 
Genesis; public places, in which Wisdom appears, are never named, which could be suggestive 
of either their insignificance or their location within a foreign land; and the prophetic motifs and 
styles apparent in Wisdom’s speeches are common to the exilic and post-exilic period.171 
Scholars who have interpreted Wisdom as a literary or theological device have tended to opt for 
this position, as such an environment best explains why such a figure would have needed to have 
been invented.172 However, scholars who have emphasised Wisdom as a product of various 
ancient Near Eastern influences have inclined to propose a much earlier date. However, as it 
appeared, from the above analysis that the Hebraic figure of Wisdom is best understood as a 
theological reflection on God’s mysterious relationship to creation and not as a foreign import, it 
would appear most fitting to explore the possible contexts which would have occasioned the 
need to produce this theological figure. The most commonly suggested background is an exilic 
or post-exilic period, which seems most likely to have required such a theology. 
     The Deuteronomic and Deuteronnomistic literature bares testimony to an established pre-
exilic Hebrew theology; much of which was centred on national and geographical exclusiveness. 
For instance, YHWH had established a covenant with Israel as a nation (Exod, 19:5-6), he had 
inaugurated the Davidic monarchy (2 Sam, 7:1-15), and had associated his presence among his 
people with the Temple in Jerusalem. As Sinnott rightly concludes, all of these factors 
presupposed the national distinctiveness and autonomy of the Hebrews within their own 
exclusive geography.173 Needless to say, in the event of an exile, all of the above positions would 
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have had to have been radically reconceived if a Hebrew identity was to survive. For, such a 
context would render much pre-exilic theology groundless; there would be a legitimate danger of 
losing Jewish religious identity through assimilation into foreign cultures. It is at this point that 
the figure of Wisdom and its theological functions begin to make most sense.  
    R.E. Clements has noted that these new contextual demands could ‘most readily be met by the 
wisdom tradition, which had ancient roots in Israelite life, and yet did not appeal for the authority 
and truth of its teachings to a unique revelation bestowed on Israel as a nation at the decisive 
moment of its origin.’174 The emphasis on Wisdom’s ability to communicate YHWH’s presence, 
whilst upholding his transcendence, from the very moment of creation, means that Hebrew 
religious identity is not dependent on a particular geographical, national, or cultic circumstance; 
it transcends these without subverting the Hebrew identity. Its creation theology also envisages a 
new way of interacting with neighbouring cultures and theologies; Wisdom is present in all of 
creation. And, whilst this does not create the possibility of affirming a religious pluralism, it 
does legitimise the creative engagement with foreign cultures. This appears to be a very 
significant point. Even at this stage of Wisdom’s development as a theological concept, one of its 
rules of formation appear to necessitate creative engagement with the diverse riches of 
alternative cultures, in which one finds oneself inhabiting. The political, social and cultural 
ramifications of this point seem fairly extensive. Although these issues will continue to be 
explored throughout the thesis, one can note here that engrained within the very formation of the 
concept of Hebraic Wisdom is the theological justification of engaging with the world, both 
socially and intellectually with contemporaneous systems of thought, including philosophy, 
politics, religious ideas, and cosmological ones. For the Jewish community discussed here, 
Wisdom is able to affirm YHWH’s presence in the midst of an alien environment, uphold Jewish 
monotheism, offer a theodicy in face of these adversities,175 and present itself as an alternative 
which will ‘guard you from the strange woman and the harlot’ (Prov, 7:5) 
( ְָרָמְשִׁל הָשִּׁאֵמ הרז הָיִּרְכָנִּמ ); or uphold Hebraic identity in the face of the 
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attractive alternatives apparent in the foreign environment now inhabited.176 But, most crucially, 
offer the Hebrews a way of coping theologically, religiously, and culturally, with the 
circumstances that they now found themselves in. 177  
    Therefore, we have offered an exegesis of Proverbs 8:22-31 and established some of the 
fundamental themes concerning Wisdom’s identity and its theological functions. We then 
compared these to other ancient Near Eastern parallels that were suggested to have informed and 
even occasioned its production, before concluding that these were not capable of explaining the 
origins or identity of the unique concept of the Hebraic Wisdom figure. Finally, we explored the 
socio-political context which contributed to this particular concept of Wisdom. We shall now 
explore the apocryphal appropriations of this concept of Hebraic Wisdom, beginning with Ben 
Sirach; repeating the same exegetical process as before, while continuing to add to the 
archaeological analysis of Proverbs 8:22-31, noting any fundamental developments that need to 
be added to the current concept of Hebraic Wisdom.   
The Wisdom of Sirach 1:4-22, 24: An Archaeological Exegesis.    
  
Jesus ben Eleazar ben Sirach, the grandson of Sirach, identifies himself as the translator (from 
Hebrew to Greek) of his grandfather’s great work. Ronald Murphy claims that there is ‘universal 
agreement that Ben Sirach was actively engaged in his teaching and writing in the first part of 
the second century B.C.E.’178 The work bares no indication of the turbulence that ensued in 
Palestine with Antiochus IV Epiphanes’ rise to power in 175 B.C.E. which subsequently 
occasioned the Maccabean revolt and the desecration of the Temple in 167 B.C.E. Therefore, 
somewhere around 180 B.C.E. is typically suggested to be the likely date for the work. Sirach 
mentions ‘Simon the high priest’ (50:1-24), who is identified as Simeon II who held the priestly 
office from 219 -196 B.C.E. and describes his cultic performances as if he were an eye witness to 
the events themselves; giving further evidence to suggest that the dating is correct.179 The work is 
assumed to have been produced in Jerusalem and Sirach is likely to have been from a high social 
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class. The two most significant chapters, with respect to the sapiential concerns at hand, are 1 
and 24, to which we shall now explore.            
     Echoing Proverbs 8:22, Sirach affirms, in 1:4-9, that Wisdom was created before everything 
else by the Lord (προτέρα πάντων έκτισται σοφία…κυριος αύτος έκτισεν αύτήν), and that 
creation itself is infused with its presence; Wisdom has been ‘poured out over all his works’ 
(έξέχεεν αύτήν έπί πάντα τά έργα αύτου). Some scholars, such as R. Pautrel, have attempted 
to argue that Sirach’s Wisdom figure is related to Stoic conceptions of the Logos; an all 
pervading principle or element that is infused in worldly reality, directing and governing its 
movements. However, while some of Sirach’s references to Wisdom’s cosmic functions may 
resemble certain Hellenistic traits, there is no evidence that would suggest that he is consciously 
adopting such principles at the expense of his Hebrew affiliations; as Ben Witherington notes: 
‘Ben Sirach uses this material [Stoicism] in the service of his own form of Jewish monotheism, 
however; he does not simply take over Stoic thought without alteration.’180 Furthermore, as 
Karen Jobes has noted, Sirach says nothing here which could not be considered as a direct 
adoption of themes latent in Proverbs 8.181 However, having noted this, while there are 
undoubtedly overt allusions to the Wisdom figure of Proverbs 8, Sirach’s Wisdom appears to be 
more passively involved with the creative act; it looks to be more at the disposal of God, rather 
than actively present before him.  
    In verse 14, it states that: ‘the fear of the lord (φοβείσθαι τόν κύριον) is the beginning of 
wisdom; she is created with the faithful in the womb.’ Not only is Sirach identifying Wisdom 
concretely with a specific theme, he also, in verse 15, goes on to affirm that she has established 
an eternal foundation with humanity (μετά άνθρώπων θεμελιον αίώνος); abiding faithfully 
with their descendants. The significance and novelty of these positions are grounded in, what 
E.P. Sanders considers to be, their ‘incarnational overtones.’ This is the beginning of the figure 
of Wisdom being portrayed as something which is no longer abstract in a general doctrine of 
creation, but as ‘embodied’ concretely in both themes and history.182 The ‘fear of the Lord’ is the 
most prominent theme associated with Wisdom at this stage, it is emphasised four times in the 
first chapter alone, the first having already been mentioned, and the following three include its 
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association with: wisdom itself (v.16), the ‘crown of wisdom’ (στέφανος σοφίας v.18), and the 
‘root of wisdom’ (ρίζα σοφίας v.20). James Crenshaw suggests that this specific identification, 
the first of three others, is indicative of a theme running throughout the entire work which is 
‘sprinkled with explicit references and recognisable allusions to biblical persons and events.’183     
     
    In, what is often named, the ‘Wisdom hymn’ of chapter 24, this trend, of identifying the 
sapiential figure concretely, is given even more substance. Sirach has Wisdom announce that she 
has ‘come forth from the mouth of the most high and like mist covers the earth (ώς όμιχλη 
κατεκάλυψα γην 14:3). Murphy suggests that he may be alluding to the Spirit or breath (חזּר) 
of God that hovers along the water in Gen 1:2.184 This reference is the closest Sirach comes to 
personifying Wisdom as a creative force working before God in a manner reminiscent of 
Proverbs 8. However, it is only an allusion, and elsewhere Sirach clearly portrays Wisdom as 
being absorbed into the creative and salvific actions of God himself. In verse 4, Wisdom declares 
that she has dwelt in the highest heavens and that her throne was in a pillar of cloud (ό θρόνος 
μου έν στύλω νεφελης). This appears to be a direct reference to the pillar of cloud in Exodus 
13:21, which is the means by which YHWH has chosen to accompany his sojourning people; it 
is indicative of embodied divine presence in salvation history. Wisdom is said to disclose this 
biographical information from the ‘assembly of the most high’ (24:2) which Murphy argues 
indicates that she is among the ‘heavenly court.’185 Furthermore, she goes on to state, in verses 5-
7, that she has ‘compassed the vault of heaven, traversed the depths of the abyss (βαθει 
άβύσσων) – which refers to the pre-creation chaos of Genesis 1:1 - and over all the earth and 
every people and nation she has looked for a dwelling place. That is, until, she is commanded by 
the Creator, in verse 8, who chooses a dwelling place for her tabernacle, he says: ‘pitch your 
tabernacle in Jacob’ (έν Ιακωβ κατασκηνωσον). Sirach has developed this ‘incarnational’ 
theme which is now, not only associated with the fear of the Lord or an abstract notion of 
humanity, but, more specifically and historically, with the people of Israel themselves. 
Interestingly, John the fourth Evangelist uses this same language of ‘pitching a tabernacle’ to 
denote incarnational themes in his prologue (1:14), he states that ‘the Word became flesh and 
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tabernacled among us’ (έσκηνωσεν έν ήμίν). Before briefly pausing to affirm Wisdom’s pre-
existence as a creature before the ages in verse 9, Sophia describes her specific roles amongst the 
people of Israel. She states in verse 10 that she ministers before God in the holy tent and that she 
has been established in Zion. John Collins notes that ‘the passage is remarkable for its cultic 
emphasis. Wisdom finds expression in the cult of the Jerusalem temple.’186 Λειτουργεω (to 
minister) is a description of Wisdom’s function in the holy tent; it is typically associated with the 
performance of a public office.187 There can be no doubt that Wisdom is specifically embodied, 
not only in the fear of the Lord or the people of Israel, but in the priestly and cultic services 
associated with the Jerusalem temple. C. Fletcher-Louis has claimed that Sirach is identifying the 
Wisdom figure with the ‘Torah actualised in the Jerusalem temple cult and priesthood.188 He 
goes on to argue that one should read this manifestation of Wisdom’s embodiment alongside 
Sirach’s hymn in chapter 50 in praise of Simon ben Onias. Following the suggestions of C.T.R. 
Hayward, Fletcher-Louis claims that there is not merely a poetical parallel to be drawn from the 
comparison between these two respective chapters, but more potently, he argues that: ‘in some 
way Simon in his cultic office embodies divine Wisdom.’189 He suggests that this reading 
provides the most coherent explanation of 24:10, where Wisdom is described as ‘ministering 
before the face of God in the holy tent (σκηνή άγιά): ‘how can Wisdom have ministered as a 
priest in God’s wilderness sanctuary? If Aaron and his sons embody Wisdom, then clearly she 
did so in the form of the human priesthood,’ and not only in the human priesthood, but in 
specific human individuals such as Simon.190 Whilst Sirach undoubtedly identifies the figure of 
Wisdom with the priestly office of the Jerusalem temple itself, it is difficult to conclude from the 
texts themselves that he intended to suggest that Simon himself was Wisdom embodied or en-
fleshed. There is no compelling evidence that would indicate that the stylistic similarities of 
chapters 24 and 50 are anything more than poetical parallels. And, Wisdom ministering in the 
holy tent can also be explained on the basis of Sirach’s general identification of the sapiential 
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figure with the cultic practices themselves and not necessarily in one specific individual. The 
reading of Sirach’s identification of Wisdom with the cultic performances of the priestly office 
which are associated more broadly with the enactment of the law, rather than any one individual, 
make most sense in light of verses 11-12 and 23; the former claims that Wisdom has been given 
a resting place in, the more generic, ‘beloved city’ (πόλει ήγαπημένη) whilst, Jerusalem has 
become her ‘domain’ (εξουσια). And, as a result of which, she has taken root (ερριζωσα) in the 
Lord’s inheritance.  
    While the latter, verse 23, announces that: 
 
Ταύτα παντα βιβλος διαθήκης θεού ύψίστου, νομον όν ένετείλατο ήμίν Μωυσης 
κληρονομίαν συναγωγαίς Ιακωβ. 
 
‘All this is the book of the covenant of God most high, the law that Moses commanded to us as 
an inheritance of the congregations of Jacob.’ 
 
It would therefore appear more reasonable to conclude that Sirach’s identification of Wisdom 
with the priestly office is merely an extension of his culminating thesis: that Wisdom is 
ultimately embodied in the Law of Moses itself.191 
    However, despite Sirach’s specific identifications of concrete and embodied Wisdom in the 
themes and history outlined above, this does not detract from the ultimate mystery of the 
sophianic figure and her functions. He is emphatically clear on this point. Just as she was not 
fully known by the first person, neither will she be fathomed by the last (28); as those who eat 
and drink of her will always hunger and thirst for more (21). But, if it is fair to say that an 
ultimate mystery encompasses her identity and function, there can be no doubt about the material 
and spiritual benefits which she bestows on those who are affiliated with her (13-17), illustrated 
by a host of comparisons drawn from Palestinian life: tall cedars, fruitful olive trees and so forth, 
all designed to represent blessings.192         
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    We have already noted that suggested contexts for Sirach’s figure of Wisdom have included 
Hellenistic philosophy. However, the general scholarly consensus is in line with these comments 
made by Crenshaw: ‘Sirach’s teachings…demonstrate a readiness to borrow Greek expressions 
and ideas, so long as they were subjected to a thorough Hebraizing.’193 All of the concepts that 
have been suggested to imply Hellenistic borrowings on Sirach’s behalf can just as easily be 
explained by his dependence on Proverbs. While Wisdom is infused into created reality as a 
governing force, a position which is not uncommon to Proverbs, she is also identified with 
unmistakable Hebraic themes such as the Law of Moses. At best, such suggestions can be 
indicative, as similar suggestions were in Proverbs, of neighbouring traditions being engaged 
with, adapted, and subordinated to the authors’ specific concerns, which is a clear feature of the 
Wisdom tradition.  
    Crenshaw has suggested that Sirach’s Wisdom has marked parallels in the contemporary 
Egyptian wisdom literature of his time; outlining several comprehensive stylistic examples.194 
However, as we have already seen in Proverbs, stylistic semblances can be indicative of a shared 
world view and that the author could have been familiar with the relevant literature, but this 
cannot imply that such conceptions can explain the origins of the specific ideas and concepts 
apparent in the sapiential text itself. J.T.H. Sanders has demonstrated that such parallels are more 
likely to be suggestive of the fact that Egyptian and Israelite Wisdom developed along similar 
lines, without necessarily pointing to a deliberate adoption of any specific theme by either one of 
the respective parties.195 Murphy and Witherington have argued that the similarities are most 
likely coincidental given the fact that there is ‘no evidence that it [the Demotic material] was 
ever translated into Hebrew or Greek in Ben Sira’s age’196, meaning he would not have had 
access to the material.  
    Therefore, it would appear that the formation of Sirach’s Wisdom can best be understood by 
his dependence on Proverbs, coupled with his own creative developments designed to meet the 
theological needs of his socio-political surroundings. Jobes puts it excellently when she exclaims 
that: ‘the personification of Wisdom-Sophia in Sirach is so similar to Proverbs 8 in structure, 
theme, and even wording that it is most likely a deliberate development of the wisdom motif 
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found there.’197 We shall now briefly recapitulate just precisely how Sirach adapts the Wisdom 
figure of Proverbs 8 and what his creative engagement adds to the Hebraic concept of Wisdom 
outlined so far. In Foucauldian terms, we shall note the archaeological shifts and correlations 
within this unity of discourse. 
    The fundamental and regulative principles apparent in Sirach’s sapiential theology are 
primarily developed from the concept which we identified in Proverbs 8. The first four points are 
in continuity with this same narrative and can be considered to be archaeological correlations.  
 
i) Wisdom is created by YHWH. 
ii) Her creation is not synonymous with the creation par excellence; she was ‘before the ages,’ 
although not as an independent entity distinct from the Creator. 
iii) She manifests the immanent presence of God. 
iv) She is mediatory; she comprises a relationship between God and the world that was 
established at the foundation of creation. 
 
The archaeological shifts or Sirach’s unique contribution to Wisdom’s identity as a Hebraic 
concept and her theological functions are as follows: 
 
i) This same Wisdom is a relationship established by God between himself and creation that now 
has a concrete and embodied historical reality. She is identified with the more generic ‘fear of 
the Lord’ and Humanity per se, as well as the more specific ‘people of Israel’, the priestly 
enactment of the Mosaic Law and the Law of Moses itself. 
 
ii) If Proverbs established Wisdom as a personified relationship on the grounds of a creation 
theology, then Sirach identifies this relationship within history itself in the covenantal 
relationships that God has established with his chosen people. However, these are established 
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from the act of creation itself. It establishes a correlation between creation theology and God’s 
presence ‘within’ history. 
 
iii) The historical embodiment of this relationship does not detract from its unfathomable nature; 
it is still ultimately a mystery. 
 
In conclusion, Wisdom, as an abstract personified relationship, has been given a concrete identity 
within history. She has the same origin as outlined in Proverbs 8, and she performs the same 
tasks of communicating divine presence in an established mediatory relationship; only now, she 
has been shrouded in ‘incarnational overtones’ where she communicates divine presence in 
personal historical acts, whilst upholding the transcendence and mystery of the creator.   
    We shall now explore the socio-political setting or the formational context in which this 
concept has come into existence.  
 
The Socio-Political Rules of Formation for Sirach’s Wisdom Theology 
As we have already noted, Sirach would have most likely produced his work roughly around a 
decade before the turbulent events that occasioned the Maccabean revolt. However, even before 
this specific powerful cultural clash between Judaism and Hellenism, there would have already, 
undoubtedly, been tangible tensions between the respective traditions. Sinnott points out that: 
‘Jews were dealt with as outsiders in Hellenised Alexandrian society, and such treatment 
undermined their confidence in the power of their own traditions. Their God also seemed unable, 
or unwilling to save them from ridicule, and persecution.’198 Needless to say, such circumstances 
would have severely tested the substance of Jewish identity, and there would have been a real 
temptation to explore the culture, philosophy, and religions associated with Hellenism, as 
potential alternatives to Judaism. These circumstances of Judaism being threatened by alien 
cultures and traditions bares stark similarities to the social and historical setting that necessitated 
the wisdom theology of Proverbs; it is, therefore, not surprising that Sirach re-appropriates this 
theology in order to meet the similar demands of his own environment. Martin Hengel notes that: 
‘there is an inner logic in this development in Jewish wisdom speculation, but we should ask 
whether a movement in this direction would have developed at all if it had not been furthered by 
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the necessity to ward off foreign influences…the decisive motive force [is] in the controversy 
with Hellenism.’199    
    Sirach addresses many of the topical questions of his period, the nature of wisdom, the 
meaning of life, ethics, and so forth. However, he is at pains to present Judaism as an attractive 
tradition that resists the crude Hellenistic caricatures that often depicted it. Throughout the entire 
book, Sirach is constantly grounding wisdom in biblical motifs and in unmistakably Hebraic 
themes. The culmination of this process results in his identification of wisdom with the Jewish 
Law itself. In doing so, he is able to affirm that the Jewish Law, and the traditions associated 
with it, is a divine gift from God, something which one cannot obtain by human effort. He 
affirms that it is indicative of divine presence, and that it guarantees tangible benefits to those 
who adhere by it. But, most importantly of all, all of this is a property of Jewish culture and not 
Hellenism. Sirach presents Judaism as being superior to Hellenistic wisdom in an attempt, very 
much like that which was presented in Proverbs, to protect Jewish identity when it is threatened 
by foreign cultures. Wisdom needed to be embodied and even incarnated in Israel’s history, 
customs, and law in a concrete manner in order to be able to appeal to an exclusive intimacy with 
the very thing that was so coveted by the surrounding cultures. However, this process still 
inaugurated creative engagement with this surrounding culture, even if the ultimate purpose was 
to claim these foreign ideas for Judaism itself.  
    Therefore, having explored the figure of Wisdom in Sirach and noted archaeological shifts and 
correlations to the current concept of Hebraic Wisdom, we shall now explore the next major 
adoption of Jewish sapiential theology: the Wisdom of Solomon.  
 
The Wisdom of Solomon 6:1-10:21: An Archaeological Exegesis 
There is little if anything that can be ascertained about the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, 
other than the fact that it could not have been Solomon himself. The work is clearly dependent 
on the Greek translation of the Hebrew bible (Septuagint) which suggests that it could not have 
been composed before 200 B.C.E.200 The most likely date is generally considered to be around 
the latter half of the first century B.C.E. Given pseudo-Solomon’s familiarity with Greek ideas, 
coupled with his acquaintance with Egyptian culture (chapters 11-19), it is permissible to suggest 
                                                             
199 Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic 
Period, Wipf & Stock, 2003, pp.157-62. 
200Murphy, The Tree of Life, p.83.  
 
 
68 
that the work could have been composed in Alexandria. It was originally composed in Greek and 
is generally considered to be written by one Jewish author.201 
    Verses 1-12 of chapter 6 issue admonishments to use power wisely or face terrible 
eschatological consequences. The rhetoric itself suggests that it was composed for rulers and 
kings but, as Murphy notes, the author has ‘his own Jewish sisters and brothers in mind, and he 
wants to strengthen them in their traditions.’202  
    Verses 12-25 attach strong aesthetical motifs to the figure of wisdom; emphasising her as 
something to be desired. For instance, she is described as being ‘radiant’ or ‘bright’ (λαμπρά) 
and as ‘unfading’ (άμάραντός). These aesthetical connotations remain prevalent throughout 
every description of the figure.  
    Whilst she is to be sought, she herself also seeks out those who are worthy of her (14-16). This 
suggestion, that Wisdom works synergistically with humanity, responding and acting through 
those who desire her, appears peculiar to pseudo-Solomon. Whereas, in Sirach the beginning of 
Wisdom was the ‘fear of the Lord’, for pseudo-Solomon, her beginning is synonymous with the 
‘true desire for instruction’ (άληθεστάτη παιδείας έπιθυμία, v. 17). And, if one is to love her, 
then they must keep her laws (18), and by keeping her laws one participates in indestructibility 
(άφθαρσίας v.18); and if one obtains incorruption then, by it, they are brought near to God (19). 
For the first time in the sapiential literature, Wisdom is identified with eschatological promises 
of immortality and her role as a ‘relationship’, initially established in Proverbs 8 through 
creation, and in Sirach within history, is now, in pseudo-Solomon, one in being after material 
death.  The influences of Hellenism have long been documented in various aspects of pseudo-
Solomon’s work, and this notion of indestructibility or immortality is no exception. At first 
glance, it may appear that this is simply a direct borrowing from Hellenistic philosophy however, 
following closer inspection; such similarities are not as prevalent as one may have initially 
thought. It is important to note that immortality in Hellenistic thought is markedly 
anthropological; put simply, immortality is a natural property of the human soul. However, for 
pseudo-Solomon, immortality is necessarily an exclusive property of God and not of humanity; it 
is bestowed as a gift to humanity as a necessary ontological condition of the ‘friendship’ or 
relationship that he has established between himself and creation. James Reese puts it excellently 
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when he states that: ‘the sage does not look upon immortality as a metaphysical entity. For him it 
is not the inherent indestructibility of the soul, as Platonic tradition conceived it, but rather a state 
of eternal, blessed communion with God and his saints.’203 What is explicitly clear in pseudo-
Solomon’s understanding of immortality is that it is something to strive and hope towards; an 
end that the author is attempting to encourage in his readers.  
    In chapter 7, the themes concerning Wisdom as something given by God (7), as well as 
engendering ‘friendship’ with him (14), are continued. One significant development that occurs 
within this chapter is the identification of Wisdom as a Spirit (πνεύμα σοφιας v.7). 
Interestingly, the Stoics would often designate the world-soul under the simple guise of spirit.204 
However, here it appears to be the embryonic genesis of his later thesis that Wisdom is 
synonymous with God’s own Holy Spirit, which shall be discussed shortly. Continuing the 
theme developed by Sirach, pseudo-Solomon upholds Wisdom’s subordination to God; she is 
‘guided’ (όδηγεω) by him (15).  
    So far, there have been fundamentally two significant archaeological shifts in the concept of 
Wisdom: the promise that Wisdom fashions an eschatological relationship (friendship) with God 
through immortality, and that she is identified as a Spirit. However, in the latter part of chapter 7, 
original developments appear thick and fast. Firstly, in v.22, pseudo-Solomon, injecting a whole 
new meaning into Wisdom’s creativity, states plainly that she is ‘the framer of everything’ 
(πάντων τεχνίτις). Before there is even chance to reflect on what has just been asserted, the 
author immediately launches into an extensive list of qualities that are embodied in Wisdom’s 
spirit (22). Of the most interesting attributes, she is designated, in v.23, as ‘all-powerful’ 
(παντοδυναμον) and ‘all-surveying’ (πανεπίσκοπον). Sophia appears to be beginning to be 
attributed with, what one might consider to be, typical divine qualities.  
    In v.24 she is claimed to ‘extend through and pervade everything by her pureness’ (δίηκει δέ 
καί χωρεί διά πάντων διά τήν καθαρότητα). One may initially be forgiven for jumping to the 
conclusion that this passage has been notably influenced by Stoic philosophy; wisdom being 
something akin to the ‘world-soul’. After all, there are some stark parallels, not only here, but 
also in so far as Wisdom is portrayed as a pervading entity on account of her purity, she passes 
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into (descends) into worthy beings, and she is also a governing figure, all themes common to 
Stoic thought.205 However, although Keimpe Algra has noted that Stoics were not unaccustomed 
to using dualistic language to describe, what was ultimately, their monistic deity as something 
‘above’ the material world; this should not be understood to imply any notion of real 
transcendence: ‘any form of transcendent reality is rejected.’206 It appears to be undeniable that 
pseudo-Solomon does conceive of God to be ontologically transcending the sapiential figure; 
Wisdom as an immanent presence is not God, God transcends her. Taking this point into 
consideration, if pseudo-Solomon is engaging with Stoic thought, he is doing so without 
compromising his Jewish faith; utilising it as a linguistic vehicle to convey Hebraic ideas in a 
Hellenistic culture.    
    Wisdom is also posited to be the ‘breath of the power of God’ (άτμίς207 γάρ έστιν της τόυ 
θεού δυναμεως) as well as a pure emanation (άπορροια) of the glory of the Almighty (25). 
Verse 26 goes on to claim that Wisdom is an ‘effulgence’ (άπαύγασμα) of ‘eternal light’ and a 
‘spotless mirror’ (έσοπτρον άκηλίδωτον) of God’s workings. Here, pseudo-Solomon appears 
to be moving, quite clearly, towards the adoption of hypostatic language in describing Wisdom, 
which is given even more emphasis when he extends the metaphor of reflection, and portrays 
Wisdom as an ‘image (είκών) of God’s goodness.’  
    Verse 27 claims that Wisdom is one but that she can do all possible things (πάντα δύναται); 
and ‘remaining within herself, she ‘makes all things new’ (πάντα καινίζει); passing over 
(μεταβαίνουσα) into every generation to ‘hallowed souls’ and making them ‘friends and 
prophets of God.’ As in Sirach before him, pseudo-Solomon is situating Wisdom within 
historical circumstances and having her draw people into a ‘friendship’ with God, one that 
cannot be overcome by evil (30).  
    Chapter 8 continues the theme of Wisdom as an all-pervading providential presence: ‘she 
stretches (διατείνει) robustly from boundary (περατος) to boundary and she manages/orders 
(διοικεί) all things properly (1). He then attempts to build upon his earlier articulations of 
Wisdom’s relationship to God, he affirms that she ‘lives with God’ (3), she ‘informs his works’ 
(άίρετίς των εργων αύτού v.4), and, even more forcibly, she is the cause/doer (έργαζομένης) 
and fashioner/designer (τεχνίτις) of everything (5-6). As we have seen already, pseudo-Solomon 
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bares no thought to ascribing divine attributes to the figure of Wisdom, and now, moving some 
way beyond the creativity assigned to the sapiential figure in Proverbs 8 and Sirach 1 and 24, he 
appears to attribute the act of creation itself to Wisdom. 
    He goes on to strongly emphasise Wisdom’s role in mediating between God and creation. She 
shares an intimacy with both and is, therefore, able to communicate each to the other, for she 
herself embodies both in her very being. Just as before, her mediation is successful through her 
impartation of immortality and friendship with God. V. 13 states that ‘out of her (Wisdom) I 
shall gain immortality (έξω δί αύτην αθανασίαν); and, similarly, in v.17 kinship (συγγενεία) 
with Wisdom ensures immortality. Towards the end of chapter 8, pseudo-Solomon once again 
affirms Wisdom’s subordination to God; human acquisition of the figure depends entirely on 
God graciously giving her as a gift (χάρις v.21).  
    Chapter 9 is rich in hyperbolic description of Wisdom’s attributes, glorious origins and highly 
articulated theological functions; but, most notable of all, is pseudo-Solomon’s willingness to 
adopt Hellenistic philosophy. If there were hints of Stoicism in earlier chapters, then there is an 
abundance of positions that would explicitly suggest Hellenistic borrowings here. Firstly, he 
claims that the world was created through God’s Word (ό ποιήσας τά πάντα έν λόγω v.1). 
Whereas, Wisdom is said to have a very specific role in the creation of humanity; she has 
fashioned them herself (κατασκευάσας άνθρωπον v.2). Wisdom is said to ‘sit by God’s throne 
(4) and, just as in Proverbs and Sirach, pseudo-Solomon claims that Wisdom was present with 
God before and during the creation itself, which implies that she has an intimate knowledge of 
the way that creation works (9). For this reason, she is able to teach humanity the ways of God, 
and pseudo-Solomon entreats God to send her from his throne of glory in the holy heavens for 
this purpose (10). She appears to be omniscient: for he claims that she ‘knows’ (οίδε) and 
‘comprehends’ (συνίει) everything (11). She is to be juxtaposed to earthly wisdom; for, without 
divine Wisdom, the former is futile and destined to come to nothing. Interestingly, the reason 
that earthly wisdom is ultimately worthless, according to pseudo-Solomon, is because the soul is 
weighed down by the destructible body which it inhabits (φθαρτόν γάρ σώμα βαρύνει ψυχήν 
v.15), and the ‘earthly tent’ (γεώδες σκήνος v.15) hinders the thinking mind. There is an 
undeniable emphasis on a Greek soul or mind/body dualism, with the former being valued to the 
detriment of the latter. Verse 17 appears to state that, without Wisdom being sent to humanity, 
there is no way of knowing God’s ways; she communicates and mediates knowledge of God’s 
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purpose. Furthermore, she is seemingly synonymised with God’s Holy Spirit (άγιόν σου 
πνεύμα). Ben Witherington and Joseph Blenkinsopp have noted that this particular notion has 
close affinities with Philo of Alexandria, who makes the same affiliation.208 However, whilst 
some scholars have utilised these parallels to suggest a similar dating to the respective writings, 
as Sinnott has noted, pseudo-Solomon ‘appears to be unacquainted [at least directly] with the 
writings of Philo’209 themselves.  
    The latter passages of chapter 10 begin to shed some light on the author’s reasons for 
appealing to hypostatic language and divine attributes when portraying the figure of Wisdom; 
ultimately, they appear to be introduced for the purpose of the culminating thesis concerned with 
soteriology; Wisdom is salvific (σοφία έσωθησαν v.18). He illustrates how Wisdom has been 
soteriologically present within Hebrew history; he notes some events of great significance, such 
as: Adam’s restitution (10:1), the deluge and Noah’s rescue (10:4), and the deliverance of 
Exodus 10:15-21), each time emphasising that it was Wisdom who was delivering and drawing 
the Hebrews to God.  
    Gordon Fee has attempted to argue that pseudo-Solomon’s portrayal of Sophia is characterised 
by a certain passivity; a divine attribute merely ‘present’ although not creatively and 
soteriologically active before and within creation: ‘he [pseudo-Solomon] sees Wisdom as only 
present at creation, not as it’s divine agent.’210 However, it seems that if Fee’s thesis is to work, it 
is going to depend on one fundamental hermeneutical decision; that is, within his proposal, 
Wisdom must appear to be nothing more than a personified attribute; a sort of surrogate for 
speaking about God’s actions. This is seemingly the only possible way that Fee could read the 
type of passivity into the sapiential figure which would render her as a poetical substitution for 
God’s activity. However, firstly, the meticulous precision in which pseudo-Solomon inserts 
Wisdom to perform specific theological functions within his narrative with such grandiose and 
unmistakably hypostatic language, seems to suggest that she is not merely a surrogate for divine 
activity; there is no other parallel to this within the rest of the sapiential literature for a start, and 
given how overtly hypostatic his sophianic figure appears to be, many scholars have even 
attempted to suggest that he must have borrowed these conventions from Egyptian goddess 
                                                             
208 Joseph Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering of Life in Israel and Early Judaism, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.149; Witherington III, Jesus the Sage, pp.100-1. 
209 Sinnott, The Personification of Wisdom, p.143.  
210Gordon Fee, ‘Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View’, in: J.I. Packer and S.K. Soderlund (eds), The Way 
of Wisdom: Essays in Honour of Bruce K. Waltke, Michigan, Harper, 2000, pp.251-80, p.264.  
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mythology. One need not necessarily agree with this thesis in order to recognise the importance 
of it being occasioned. For, this very enterprise itself seems to suggest that pseudo-Solomon is 
not presenting his audience with a simple and unambitious surrogate for God’s activity, the 
hypostatic language latent within the text and the scholarly reception of the same betrays Fee’s 
proposal; and seem to render it somewhat hard pressed.  
   As we have just noted, although his concern with soteriology is one explanation for Wisdom’s 
appearance as a quasi-divine being in her own right, there are several others which we need to 
assess. The most typical suggestion, one that has hounded the sapiential literature throughout, is 
that it has been sourced from Egyptian mythology. We shall now explore several of these 
positions before outlining the various archaeological shifts and correlations to the Hebraic 
concept of Wisdom which we started with.         
 
Rules of Formation: Cultural Influences 
As we have already noted, Hellenistic culture is clearly prevalent throughout pseudo-Solomon’s 
presentation of the figure of Sophia. However, as we concluded earlier, although he almost 
certainly engages with the topical philosophical schools of his time, even using them to convey 
his own positions, it is very difficult to suggest that he has simply taken his understanding of 
God’s Wisdom from these various schools. There were irreconcilable differences, in those 
instances where the author was appealing to Greek thought, between his own positions and the 
positions as they would have been understood by the Greeks themselves. On close inspection, his 
appeal to immortality, all-pervading and all-governing entities, and even his mind-body dualism, 
were not simply imported without filtration; in each instance he appears to have situated these 
ideas within his prevalent Hebraism. Therefore, we can suggest that pseudo-Solomon had a clear 
tendency to express his Hebraic ideas through the Hellenistic culture where he and his audience 
were situated, but, that this tendency does not warrant the conclusion that his portrayal of 
Wisdom was simply imported from these cultures, there is too much refinement in what is 
adopted to argue for this point. However, despite these arguments, one cannot escape the fact, as 
James Crenshaw has pointed out, that ‘Wisdom goes beyond personification to hypostasis; she 
becomes a manifestation of God to human beings, an emanation of divine attributes.’211 We are 
able to note, from our earlier expositions, that such a move never occurs in either Proverbs or 
                                                             
211 James Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, p.176. 
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Ben Sirach. This fact has led several scholars to the suggestion that pseudo-Solomon has been 
highly influenced (even to the point of enculturation) by the Hellenistic appropriation of the 
goddess Isis.212 We shall now explore some of these claims.  
    There are, undoubtedly, stark stylistic and theological similarities between the sapiential figure 
in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Hellenistic portrayals of Isis. For instance, Isis is said to 
traverse the world and the heavenly host and ‘direct the world of men’213 (compare with Wis 8:1, 
9:11). Isis is ‘all-powerful’: ‘whatever I please, this too shall come to an end’214 (compare with 
Wis 7:27). She is ‘one’215 (compare with Wis 7:27) and she is ‘immortal’216 (see: Wis 8:13-17). 
These are just some of the many similarities that are overtly apparent217; commonalities that have 
scholars such as Kloppenborg stating that the ‘similarity with Isis is here inescapable.’218 
However, for all the similarities that can be drawn between pseudo- Solomon’s portrayal of 
Sophia and the Isis aretalogies, as Sinnott argues: ‘this proves no more than that this text is an 
imitation of the hymn style generally and not necessarily in the form of an aretalogy.’219 
Significantly, where we would expect, if pseudo-Solomon was utilising Isis as a theological 
model, to find clear parallels between the two figures in the most significant constitutional 
aspects of their identities, we find none. For instance, as Witherington points out: ‘Sophia is 
neither identified with God, nor is she said to be the mother of a divine being such as Horus.’220 
If pseudo-Solomon was deliberately formulating his figure of Sophia with Isis as his model, 
surely we would expect them to, put crudely, ‘look more alike’ at the absolutely regulative and 
foundational points of their identities. Whilst, he liberally adopts hypostatic language when 
attributing divine qualities to Sophia, there is never any doubt that she is not God and that she is 
subordinate to him. She is given by God as a gift which constitutes a relationship between 
humanity and divinity. What we are left with, as in the instances before now, is that ‘the author 
of Wisdom possibly adopted, modified and adapted some patterns from Isis texts.’221 However, 
                                                             
212 See: A. Di Lella, ‘Conservative and Progressive Theology’, in: CBQ 2; 1966, PP.135-54. 
213 deTraci Regula, The Mysteries of Isis, Llewellyn, 2001, p.71; Marvin Meyer (ed), The Ancient Mysteries: a 
Sourcebook of Ancient Texts, Harper Collins, 1987, p.172. 
214Ibid. 
215Ibid.. 
216 Ibid. 
217 For an extensive comparison see: Sinnott, The Personification of Wisdom, p.145. 
218J.P. Kloppenborg, ‘Isis and Sophia in the Book of Wisdom’, in: HTR 75 1982, pp.57-84, p.67.  
219Sinnott, The Personification of Wisdom, p.147.  
220 Witherington III, Jesus the Sage, p.108. 
221Sinnott, The Personification of Wisdom, p.148.  
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when we pose the question as to whether Isis was constitutive in pseudo-Solomon’s production 
of his sapiential figure, we are perhaps best to answer, along with Sinnott, that ‘while parallels 
between Wisdom and Isis are possible, they do not constitute identification; careful scrutiny 
reveals their shallowness.’222 
    Therefore, we are able to conclude that, whilst there are close similarities between the 
sapiential figure that we encounter in the Wisdom of Solomon and Hellenistic philosophy as well 
as the Hellenistic appropriation of the Isis figure, these do not dictate the theological function or 
identification of Wisdom. Pseudo-Solomon is dependent on the earlier sapiential literature, as 
much as he is independent of them, in his willingness to engage with Hellenistic culture and 
express his Hebraic ideas in new and vibrant ways. What is certain is that, as Helmer Ringgren 
has noted, ‘it is apparent that the author’s [pseudo-Solomon] doctrine of wisdom is no carefully 
prepared and non-contradictory philosophic doctrine. Wisdom has an obscure position between 
personal being and principle. She is both, and she is neither the one nor the other.’223 We shall 
now elucidate the significant archaeological shifts and correlations to the concept of Hebraic 
Wisdom. 
      
Whilst there are undoubtedly strong similarities between pseudo-Solomon, Proverbs 8 and 
Sirach 1 and 24, there are also notable and significant extensions, adaptations, and developments 
of some of their fundamental themes.  
 
i) There are strong aesthetical themes attached to Wisdom: she is beautiful and naturally 
desirable; she seeks out those who desire her, for whom she makes herself readily accessible, 
working synergistically through the desire of those that seek her. 
 
ii) The beginning of Wisdom, not here the fear of the Lord as it was for Sirach, is the true desire 
for instruction and teaching; when one follows her ways she engenders an eschatological 
relationship (friendship) between that person and God which is constituted by immortality. 
 
                                                             
222Ibid, p.149.  
223 Helmer Ringgren, Word and Wisdom: studies in the hypostatisation of divine qualities and functions in the 
ancient near east, Lund, Ohlssons, 1947, p.119. 
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iii) She appears to go through a process of hypostatic deification. All of the ontological themes, 
apparent in Proverbs 8 and Sirach 1 and 24, are extended and hyperbolised. She is the fashioner 
of all things; and especially of humanity. She is assigned unmistakable divine attributes such as 
omniscience and omnipotence; as well as being an emanation of God’s glory and an image of his 
goodness: something hypostatically distinguishable from God himself. 
 
iv) She is subordinate to God and she is given by him as a gift. 
 
v) She is identified as God’s ‘Holy Spirit.’ 
 
vi) She is salvific; acting throughout Hebraic history, summoning Israel into an endless 
friendship with God. 
 
Although these aspects of the concept of Wisdom appear to have shifted greatly from the original 
concept that we identified, Wisdom’s theological functions, which are formative in the 
development of the concept itself are fundamentally unchanged, even if extended.  
 
i) Wisdom is still, fundamentally, a personified relationship between God and creation. Only 
now, this relationship has been incorporated into eschatology and has extended the ‘incarnational 
overtones’ of this relationship, introduced by Sirach, to include hypostatic possibilities. 
 
ii) The historical embodiment of this relationship has now been transformed into one that is 
ultimately salvific. Wisdom saves within history by her eschatological promises of immortality 
and friendship with God. 
 
iii) Wisdom’s role within creation, providence and salvation has been firmly established and the 
relationship which she embodies enacts all of those things; as relationship she participates, and in 
some respects, inaugurates creation, in so far as God’s loving desire for the cosmos is creative in 
itself; the relationship is preservative – it tends and guides creation towards God’s good ends; 
and it is also ultimately salvific, as it penetrates the cosmos and draws created reality into an 
eternal relationship with God. 
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The Socio-Political Rules of Formation. 
The Wisdom of Solomon is a work that truly reflects its historical and sociological settings. It 
was produced from the heart of the Jewish diaspora, heavily immersed in Hellenistic and 
Egyptian culture. Like Sirach before him, pseudo-Solomon had undoubtedly set himself the task 
of attempting to preserve Jewish identity, which found itself in the midst of the thriving 
philosophical, religious, and cultural surroundings of Hellenism. Put simply, he needed to justify 
the diaspora and theologically interpret the new circumstances that the Hebrews inhabited; where 
was YHWH in all of this, if he has not been faithful to us why should we be faithful to him?  
    In order to achieve the goal which he had set himself, he needed to present Jewish Wisdom as 
something aesthetically more desirable and beneficial than Hellenistic wisdom. He persistently 
utilises Greek and Egyptian ideas when portraying his sapiential figure, in the hope of 
highlighting their similarities as well as their surpassing differences, with the intention of 
suggesting that Jewish Wisdom can match Hellenistic and Egyptian wisdom on nearly every 
front and even surpass them. By noting how closely Jewish Wisdom resembled her surrounding 
foreign rivals, pseudo-Solomon was able to legitimise Jewish engagement with foreign culture – 
he himself embodies it in the work itself – and also proposes that they have been absorbed and 
surpassed by Jewish Wisdom itself; whom he calls upon to act as a guide for confused and 
culturally alienated Hebrews. So where is YHWH in all of this? He is actively present through 
Wisdom in delivering and saving Israel, as he always has been throughout, and in the most 
significant occasions of, their history. The soteriological motifs affirm Jewish identity and affirm 
God’s saving presence in the environment in which they found themselves. The marriage of 
historical soteriology with eschatology appears to give hope to Jews who would have perhaps 
found it difficult to conceive of any sort of material deliverance in the circumstances which they 
inhabited and transferred this to an ultimate communion with God in immortality which could 
only be achieved by following the ways of Wisdom historically, which would have meant 
nothing more than faithfully upholding their Jewish heritage.     
      Having discussed in some detail the three major ‘Hebraic’ texts in which the concept of 
Jewish Wisdom was formed, we are now in a position to provide a current Hebraic concept of 
Wisdom, taking into consideration the archaeological findings of the above analysis. 
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The Concept of Hebraic Wisdom and its Rules of Formation 
The Concept of Wisdom, which the early Christian community went onto adopt and develop in 
their Christological proposals, shall be proposed on the basis of the archaeological study above, 
it will focus on how the sapiential figure functions theologically, what conditions the concept.  
    Wisdom mediates between God and the world in so far as she is a relationship between the 
Creator and his creation, as well as an historical relationship with Israel through embodied and 
tangible covenants and themes; and also one that extends after physical death through the 
impartation of immortality. Although it takes different manifestations, the relationship is one and 
the same, the embodied relationship manifested in the law is one that has been initiated by God 
since creation itself; similarly, the eschatological relationship in pseudo-Solomon is an extension 
and ‘end’ of the relationship brought forth in the act of creation. Therefore, the relationship, in its 
different guises, is typically personified as playing some sought of part in the creation of the 
cosmos; the relationship must have ‘preceded’ God’s creative act as his desire for creation, and 
must have even been creative itself in so far as God’s desire for the world brought it into being, 
and, yet, also it was simultaneously created, as it was actualised in time by the tangible presence 
of that which it was to relate to. Furthermore, the relationship is personified as providentially 
guiding creation, and eventually Israel, within history itself, and salvificly drawing them into an 
eschatological communion with God.  
    The need for personification (which moves towards hypostatic language in the Wisdom of 
Solomon) occurs because one has to be able to distinguish the relationship from God himself, the 
relationship is not divine. However, at the same time, it can never be conceived apart from God 
and is thus mysteriously inseparable from God himself; so Wisdom is properly said to participate 
in divine attributes and to pre-exist creation, as well as to participate in providence and salvation. 
However, just as fundamental to this relationship is creation, humanity, and Israel itself. Thus, 
she is simultaneously inseparable from created reality and can therefore be conceived as a 
creature manifesting finite attributes.  
      The relationship embodies both divinity and creatureliness simultaneously. Given the high 
doctrine of creation latent within the sapiential tradition, there is a certain amount of flexibility 
within the relationship. For, as everything is related to the Creator, from the very act of creation 
itself, all culture embodies ‘imprints’ of that origin. Therefore, Israel is permitted to engage with 
other cultures and utilise ideas without this compromising their exclusivity. However, whilst this 
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is the case, it is also true that she is intimately and somewhat exclusively related to a particular 
history through her embodiment in Israel’s history itself. There is a specific correlation between 
creation theology, soteriology, and eschatology in the sapiential tradition itself.  
    Therefore, one can properly state that Wisdom is a creative theological invention, which is 
grounded in Hebraic thought, although communicated through and in relation to other cultural 
parallels. She was occasioned by a very specific set of historical and sociological contexts. It 
would appear then, that one can speak of a Hebraic concept of sapiential theology as constructed 
within the Old Testament and the Apocryphal texts. Let us now explore how this concept is 
transformed and further developed through a variety of rules of formation within the New 
Testament. 
 
An Archaeology of Jewish Sapiential Theology as Appropriated by the New Testament 
Writers  
 J.M.C. Scott remarked that: ‘there can be little doubt that one of the earliest significant images 
used by the Christian Church to help define the relationship of Jesus to God was the Jewish 
figure of Wisdom.’224 There is, perhaps, no greater confirmation of this position to be found 
within the New Testament than in the Pauline corpus; most significantly: 1 Corinthians 8:6 and 
Colossians 1:15-20.225 And amongst the Gospel writers, John stands out as the sapiential 
theologian par excellance. Whilst, there is evidence to support the suggestion that the Jewish 
wisdom tradition was utilised by some of the Synoptic Evangelists – especially Matthew226 – 
their engagement appears far less extensive and less sophisticated in comparison to their 
                                                             
224 J.M.C. Scott, Sophia and the Johanine Jesus, Sheffield, JSOT, 1992, p.83.   
225 We can detect further instances of sapiential thought influencing ‘Pauline’ Christology: Hebrews 1:3 and scholars 
such as Ben Witherington and Jerome Murphy O’Connor have also argued that the ‘Incarnational/Kenotic 
Christology’ of Philippians 2:6-11 has been influenced by the Wisdom tradition; see: Witherington III, Jesus the 
Sage, p.263; J. Murphy O’Connor, ‘Christological Anthropology in Phil, 2:6-11’, RB 83, 1976, pp.25-50. However, 
in both instances the theological positions outlined in these texts are also embodied in the two which we have 
selected above. 
226 See: See: M. Jack Suggs, Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew’s Gospel, Harvard, 1970; Celia Deutsch, 
Hidden Wisdom and the Easy Yoke: Wisdom, Torah, and Discipleship in Matthew11:25-30; Witherington III, Jesus 
the Sage, pp.341-368; Rudolf Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition (trans: J. Marsh), Oxford, Blackwell, 
1972; J.M. Robinson, ‘Jesus as Sophos and Sophia: Wisdom Tradition in the Gospels, in: R.L. Wilken (ed), Aspects 
of Wisdom in Judaism and Early Christianity, Notre Dame, 1975, pp.1-16; F. Brunett, The Testament of Jesus-
Sophia: A Redaction Critical Study of the Eschatological Discourse in Matthew, Washington, University Press of 
America, 1979; W.P. Davies and D.C. Alison, Matthew, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1988; and for recent critiques of 
these positions see: Simon Gathercole, The Pre-existent Son: Recovering the Christologies of Matthew, Mark and 
Luke, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2006, pp.193-210.  
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Johannine counterpart;227 which shall therefore function as the Gospel text of our analysis. 
Beginning then with Paul. 
    
Paul’s Wisdom Christology: Corinthians 8:6. 
Whilst Scholars such as J.G. Dunn have suggested that Paul’s conceptual and linguistic allusions 
to the figure of Wisdom in 8:6 must be read in light of his ‘identification’ of Wisdom with Christ 
in 1 Cor 1-2;228 it would appear that Fee is quite correct to claim that, given the context of the 
scenario, ‘wisdom,’ in this instance, is simply designating rationality with no intention of 
alluding to the Hebraic figure of Wisdom.229 It is for this reason that our exegesis begins at 8:6, 
without reference to Paul’s earlier discussion of ‘wisdom.’  
    When addressing the issues surrounding Christians eating meat offered to idols, Paul affirms 
that they know that there are ‘no idols in the world’ (8:4) and that there is but one God. Noting 
that the world acknowledges many gods and many lords, Paul affirms, treating us to ‘an 
extraordinary Christological moment, where he offers a deliberate Christian restatement of the 
Shema,’230 that contrary to these conventions: 
 
ήμίν εἷς θεός ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τά πάντα και ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ἰσοῦς Χριστός, 
δἰ οὗ τα πάντα καί ἡμεῖς δἰ αὐτοῦ (8:6).231  
 
Although, many scholars have insisted that the Hebraic figure of Wisdom lies behind the logic of 
Paul’s Christian restatement of the Shema, it has been something of a contentious issue.232 After 
                                                             
227 Raymond Brown puts it excellently when he states that: ‘in the Synoptics, Jesus’ teaching shows a certain 
continuity with the ethical and moral teachings of the sages of the Wisdom literature; in John, Jesus is personified 
Wisdom’ (Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John I-XII, London, Anchor, 1966, p. CXXV). 
228 See: James. D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: a new testament inquiry into the origins of the doctrine of 
the incarnation, London, SCM, 1980, p.182. 
229 See: Gordon Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study, Massachusetts, Hendrickson, 2007, 
pp.106-107; also: Richard Hays, ‘Wisdom According to Paul’, in: Stephen Barton (ed), Where Shall Wisdom be 
Found?, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1999, pp.111-125. 
230Fee, Pauline Christology, p.89. 
231‘To us [there is] one God – the Father – from whom all things come and we are for him, and one lord – Jesus 
Christ – through whom all things come and we through him.’ 
232 Those scholars who suggest that Lady Wisdom is influencing Paul’s Christology at this point include, for 
instance: C.K. Barrett, A Commnetary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, London, Adam and Charles Black, 
1968, p.193; James. D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: a new testament inquiry into the origins of the doctrine 
of the incarnation, London, SCM, 1980, p.182; James D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, Edinburgh, 
T&T Clark, 1998, p.35; Richard Horsley, ‘Background in the Confessional Formula of 1 Cor 8:6’, in: ZNW 69 
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all, there is no explicit reference to Wisdom within the text itself – as already noted, 8:6 cannot 
be read in collaboration with chapters 1-2 - which has led many scholars to the conclusion that it 
is simply not the background to these Christological statements at all.233   
    Firstly, it is essential to highlight that we can be certain that Paul’s restatement of the Shema, 
to incorporate Jesus within it, seems to occasion no challenge to his strict adherence to Jewish 
monotheism.234 It would appear then, that the question of how Paul is able to affirm such a high 
Christology without engendering tensions within his own monotheistic convictions is the key to 
determining what lies at the base of these affirmations. Let us first take the argument that does 
not appeal to the sapiential tradition, championed by scholars such as Gordon Fee, A. Van Roon, 
and Richard Bauckham.235 The argument can be conveniently summed up by Fee who claims 
that: 
The Father has created all things through the agency of the Son, who as the one Lord is also – 
and now Paul’s second point is being established – the agent of their redemption (‘and we 
through him’). The whole passage therefore, typically for Paul, encloses the work of the Son 
within that of the Father; that is, the two διά phrases regarding the one Lord’s role as agent of 
creation and redemption are (logically) framed by the ἐκ and εἰς phrases regarding the Father as 
the ultimate source and goal or purpose of all things – both creation and redemption.236    
 
Just as the Father created the cosmos, so he has redeemed it and, by reversal, just as Christ has 
redeemed (participated in the Father’s divine activity) us, so too must he have been active in 
creation. Fee is then bold to conclude that, from their common activity, ‘this interchange in 
prepositions in itself indicates full identity of Christ with God.’237 Therefore, by synonymising 
Christ with the Father, Jesus would inherently receive the attributes appropriate to full 
identification with divinity: pre-existence, a role in creation, and redemption; and, furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1978), P.132; N.T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology, Edinburgh, T & 
T Clark, 1991, p.130.    
233 See: Neil Richardson, Paul’s language about God, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1994, p.296-304; 
Gordon Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study, Massachusetts, Hendrickson, 2007, p.93.  
234 Fee, Pauline Christology, p.90. 
235 See: Gordon Fee, ‘Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View’, in: J.I. Packer and S.K. Soderlund (eds), 
The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honour of Bruce K. Waltke, Michigan, Harper, 2000, pp.251-80; Gordon Fee, 
Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study, Massachusetts, Hendrickson, 2007,  pp.594-618; Richard 
Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament, Cambridge, William B. Eerdmans, 
1999, pp.37-41; A. Van Roon, ‘The Relation Between Christ and the Wisdom of God According to Paul,’ in: Novum 
Testamentum 16 (1974), pp.207-239.     
236 Fee, Pauline Christology, pp.90-1. 
237 Ibid, p.92. 
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this same identification would explain why Paul’s monotheism (as a good Sabellian in this 
portrait) is not affronted by his adaptation of the Shema to include Christ. 
    As logically straightforward as this thesis appears to be, it is not without its difficulties. 
Firstly, as Barrett has noted, the assumption that Paul has simply absorbed Christ into a 
synonymous identity with the Father appears ungrounded and against the general conventions of 
the larger Pauline corpus.238 For instance, despite the contested Rom 9:5 in the undisputable 
epistles and Titus 2:13 in the pastorals, the consistent rule is that Paul reserves θεός exclusively 
for the Father, and he does this deliberately to denote distinction. Furthermore, such a move 
depends on two rather tenuous presuppositions. Firstly, one cannot identify Christ with the 
Father on the grounds of the Κύριος title alone. Undoubtedly, it was the Greek surrogate for 
YHWH in the LXX; but, as Barrett notes, crucially, ‘it was also used in a variety of other senses; 
for example, it might be no more than ‘Sir’, used as a polite form of address. It is always 
important to note the context in which Lord is used. Here [8:6] it evidently stands in close 
relation, but is not identical, with God.’239 Secondly, although Barrett concedes that the Father 
and the Son are not distinguished by their modes of operation (both share in the act of creation 
and redemption) they are, however, crucially distinguished by the ‘prepositions from [ἐκ] and to 
[εἰς] of the one [Father], through [διά] of the other [Son].’240 We can conclude from the 
distinction of the prepositions - against Fee, and with Anthony Thiselton - that Christ is the 
‘means’ by which the Father’s will is accomplished as mediator, in his messianic role; the 
presuppositions are not interchangeable, they are specific to the Father and the Son 
respectively.241  If one accepts these arguments on this issue, it now becomes very difficult 
indeed to account for Paul’s incorporation of Christ within the activity of God the Father, as a 
distinguishable agent in himself, without unhinging his strict adherence to his monotheistic 
foundation. Scholars of the stature of C.K. Barrett, James D G. Dunn, Roy Ciampa, Brian 
Rosner, N.T. Wright, and Richard Horsley, all seem to suggest that the Jewish Wisdom tradition 
is the best explanation for resolving these tensions and understanding Paul’s Christological 
                                                             
238 C.K. Barrett, A Commnetary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, London, Adam and Charles Black, 1968, 
p.193. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241Anthony Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Cambridge, William B. Eerdmans, 2000, p.636.  
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affirmations.242 As we have already seen, the attributes which Paul wishes to ascribe to Christ, 
were already latent within the Old Testament and the Apocryphal presentations of Wisdom: she 
had a ‘role’ within the act of creation and was thus pre-existent; she was present within salvation 
history, and was salvific herself - participating in YHWH’s activity; furthermore, she could be 
distinguished from YHWH without the dissolution of Jewish monotheism, and she was 
fundamentally mediatory. All of these aspects seem entirely in concord with Paul’s Christology 
to the extent that it becomes permissible to suggest that this would have likely been his 
conceptual model for his restatement of the Shema. We need not go so far as Dunn does in 
suggesting that he would have expected his readers to recognise his allusions to Wisdom or, that 
they are dependent on his references from 1:18-2:5;243 or even, that he is consciously restating 
the Jewish Wisdom tradition without theological adaptation. We are merely proposing that it is 
best understood as Paul’s conceptual model for incorporating the new requirements, occasioned 
by his belief in Jesus as God’s Messiah, into his Christian re-conception of Jewish monotheism. 
Although, Fee has attempted to argue that Wisdom was neither an agent in creation, redemption, 
or mediation – in an attempt to question the reality of Paul’s Wisdom Christology – we have 
already concluded that this is not the case in our first chapter and there is no need to rehearse 
these arguments.244   
 
    Some scholars, such as Hans Conzelmann, have suggested a Stoic background for Paul’s 
Christological affirmations; noting similarities, for instance, between Paul and Marcus Aurelius 
and Seneca.245 However, despite some linguistic similarities (not identical utterances), the 
conceptual positions expressed by these formulas are markedly different and do not appear to 
have informed Paul’s Christology in this case. 
    Having discussed our first Pauline wisdom text, we shall now explore our second in 
Colossians 1:15-20. 
                                                             
242 See: Barrett, A Commnetary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, p.193; Dunn, Christology in the Making, 
p.182; James D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1998, p.35; Richard Horsley, 
‘Background in the Confessional Formula of 1 Cor 8:6’, in: ZNW 69 (1978), P.132; N.T. Wright, The Climax of the 
Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1991, p.130; Roy Ciampa and Brian 
Rosner, The Pillar New Testament Commentary: The First Letter to the Corinthians, Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2010, p.384.   
243 Dunn, Christology in the Making, p.182. 
244 See:Fee, Pauline Christology, pp.606-619.  
245 See: Meditations 4:23 and Epistula 65:8; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle 
to the Corinthians, Fortress Press, 1975, p.144. 
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Colossians 1:15-20. 
 
Colossians 1:15-20 is almost universally considered to be an elaboration of an early Christian 
‘hymn.’246 C.F.D. Moule once stated that: ‘if one were compelled to select the single most 
striking aspect of the letter to the Christians at Colossae, the choice would probably fall upon its 
description, in verses few but almost intolerably weighty, of Christ and of his position in relation 
to the universe and the Church.’247 The Christology latent within the hymn appears to be 
necessitated through the ‘Judaizing’ and, perhaps even Gnostic tendencies (especially apparent in 
Paul’s concern with invisible cosmic forces) evident within the Colossian community and Paul’s 
attempt to refute them. Thus, Paul is eager to clarify Christ’s position in relation to God the 
Father and the cosmic forces in the heavens and on the earth. As Fee has noted, this same hymn 
appears to be – whether deliberate or not – an elaboration of the Christology found in 1 Cor 
8:6.248 The various discussions concerning the authenticity of this epistle are of no relevance 
here. Firstly, that the epistle is an authentic expression of New Testament Christology is not 
disputed. Secondly, those who contest the sapiential origins of the Christological positions, 
outlined in the hymn, do so without reference to the debates concerning the authorship of the 
epistle.       
    The hymn itself consists of:  
 
15 ὃς έστιν είκών τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως,  
16 ὅτι ἐν αὐτᾦ ἐκτίσθη τά πάντα ἐν τοῖς ορανοῖς καί ἐπί τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὁρατά καί τὰ 
ἀόρατα, εἲτε θρόνοι εἲτε κυριότητες εἲτε ἀρχαὶ εἲτε ἐξουσία τὰ πάντα δἰ αὐτοῦ καί εἰς 
αὐτὸν ἔκτισται 
17 καί αὐτός ἐστιν πρό πάντων καί τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτᾦ συνέστηκεν, 
18 καί αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλή τοῦ σώματος, τῆς ἐκκλησίας ὃς ἐστιν ἀρχη, πρωτότοκος ἐκ 
τῶν νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτός πρωτεύων, 
19 ὅτι ἐν αὐτᾦ εὐδόκσεν πᾶν τό πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι  
                                                             
246 See: John Barclay, Colossians and Philemon, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1997, p.56.  
247 C.F.D. Moule, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958, 
p.3.  
248Fee, Pauline Christology, p.299.  
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20 καί δἰ αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τά πάντα εἰς αὐτὸν εἰρηνοποιήσας διά τοῦ αἲματος τοῦ 
σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, δἰ αὐτοῦ εἲτε τὰ ἐπί τῆς γῆς εἲτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.249 
  
   J.B. Lightfoot, the great eighteenth century biblical scholar, once noted that 1:15 is comprised 
of a twofold formula where the ‘person of Christ is described first in relation more especially to 
Deity…and secondly in relation more especially to created things.’250 As related to God the 
Father, Christ is said to be the ‘image of the invisible God.’ Frederick Bruce argues that ‘No 
reader of the Old Testament Scriptures, on reading the words now before us [1:15] could fail to 
be reminded of the statement in Gen 1:26-27 that God created man in his own image.’251 One of 
the most significant arguments against reading Paul’s Christological affirmations as an 
expansion of the wisdom tradition is, according to Fee, the ability to locate Paul’s cosmic 
Christology entirely within his ‘Son of God Christology, in which he uses biblical images from 
Genesis.’252 Fee’s point essentially argues that Paul is presenting Christ as the ‘new Adam’ who 
is the ‘true image-bearer of God’, which is confirmed by the initiation of the second strophe that 
upholds that Jesus is the beginning of the new creation.253 However, if Paul’s Christology can be 
comprehended exclusively through his ‘new Adam’ and ‘Son of God’ Christology, then one 
must be able to demonstrate that the language of ‘image’ is categorically dependent on its 
association with Genesis 1:27. Eduard Lohse has argued against this contention stating that: 
‘even though the term ‘image’ suggests Gen 1:27, it is out of the question to interpret it as a 
direct reference to the biblical account of creation.’254 He believes that when considering that the 
image is said to be of the ‘invisible’ God ‘the Hellenistic understanding of this term is to be 
                                                             
249 ‘Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; 
that in him it was created, everything; in the heavens and on the earth – the visible and the invisible – whether 
thrones, lordships, rulers, or powers, everything were created through him and for him 
and he is before everything and everything, in him, is consisted. 
he is the head of the body – the Church – who is the beginning, the first born out of the dead, in order that he may 
hold the first place in everything; 
that in him he was pleased that all the fullness should dwell, 
and through him, to reconcile all things to him – by making peace by the blood of his cross – whether on earth or in 
the heavens.’ 
250 J.B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, London, Macmillan, 1879, p.144. 
251 Frederick Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, Philemon, and the Ephesians, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 
1984, p.58. 
252Fee, Pauline Christology, p.325.  
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assumed.’255 Jerry Sumney has lent support for Lohse’s argument on account that ‘invisibility,’ 
as an attribute of God, does not appear to be a product of the Hebrew faith but, rather, a 
Hellenistic affirmation of transcendence.256 Furthermore, David Garland has argued that the 
possibility of affirming the reality of an image of an invisible deity can only occur if ‘image’ is 
understood in the Hellenistic sense: ‘in Greek philosophy…the image has a share in the reality 
that it reveals,’ and that without assuming this context, the proposition would make little sense.257 
Similarly, Eduard Schweizer claims that when one takes the ‘image’ language in correlation with 
Christ participating in the creative act, Christ must be ‘designated ‘image of God here in a sense 
different from 3:10 which speaks of the new person in Christ who is being renewed ‘after the 
image’ of the creator.’258  If we assume that Paul is using ‘image’ in its Hellenistic context – and 
there are good reasons for doing so - then the only Jewish parallel to this convention is found in 
the Apocryphal presentation of Wisdom. And, when considering how closely paralleled Paul’s 
portrayal of Christ is with the figure of Wisdom in these texts, it is more than permissible to 
propose such a context as constituting the background of his Christological affirmations.  
     Wisdom is described by Pseudo-Solomon in 7:26 as being the image of God’s goodness 
(εἰκών τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ).259 Fee states emphatically that this portrayal does not ‘come 
close to what Paul says in Col 1:15 of God’s Son.’260 Whilst an image of God’s goodness and an 
image of the invisible God are not conceptually synonymous, the parallels are still overt; 
something which Fee refuses to acknowledge on the grounds that it is not related to the Hebraic 
use of image in Genesis 1:27. However, to rule out these parallels on the a priori contention that 
Paul’s Christology must be read in light of Genesis 1:27, seems somewhat arbitrary, especially 
considering that the hymn itself appears to point to a Hellenistic adoption of the ‘image’ 
language. Furthermore, these similarities gain even more momentum when we consider how 
Paul has chosen to express Christ’s relationship to creation. We are told that Jesus is the 
‘firstborn of all creation.’ As we saw above, such a designation is so fundamental to the figure of 
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256 Jerry Sumney, Colossians, Westminster, John Knox, 2008, pp.63-4. 
257 David Garland, Colossians and Philemon, Michigan, Zondervan, 1998, p.87. 
258 Eduard Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, London, SPCK, 1982, p.66. 
259 Other examples, which parallel this convention, from Hellenistic Judaism would include Philo of Alexandria who 
claims that Wisdom is the image of God (Leg. All. 1:43). 
260 Fee, Pauline Christology, p.325.   
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Wisdom in the Jewish sapiential tradition: Prov 8:22, Sir 1:4, 24:9. Although, Fee has recently 
argued that:  
 
πρωτότοκος occurs nowhere in the entire wisdom tradition…the texts brought forward Prov 
8:22, 25, not only have quite different words in the Septuagint, but also their point…is something 
considerably different from Paul’s use of πρωτότοκος here, where Christ as Son holds the rights 
of primogeniture with regard to every created thing, since they were all created in him and 
through him and for him.261   
 
However, although Fee is right to note some linguistic differences between the texts (although 
προτέρα and πρωτότοκος are certainly not synonymous, in these contexts both seem to point to 
cosmic priority), to suggest that the only ‘proof’ of Paul utilising the wisdom tradition would be 
an exact linguistic replica appears unreasonable and seems to incredulously rule out the 
possibility of Paul creatively engaging with Hebraic themes in a manner that is so typical of 
Pauline theology. Ralph Martin appears to hint at this tension in Fee’s arguments when he states 
that: ‘there is a virtual by-passing of Paul’s use and adaptation of the traditions he received.’262 
Conceptually, the positions are almost inseparable; in each instance cosmic pre-existence is 
designed to affirm the superiority of Wisdom and Christ respectively above all other creatures, 
on the ground that they participate in the creative act, or the creation is engendered through them 
respectively.263   
    1:16 affirms the triplex formula of creation occurring in, through, and for Christ. The first two 
positions have clear precedents in the Hebraic wisdom writings. Prov 3:19 states that the earth 
was created in Wisdom (הָמְכָחְב); Philo affirms that it is by the means of mother Wisdom that 
the universe came into being (μητρὸς δὲ σοφίας, δἰ ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν).264 Although 
there is no explicit reference to creation being made for Wisdom, there is a sense in which 
creation was created for the purposes of participating in the relationship that God had established 
in Wisdom.  
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    Many scholars also note the strong parallels between Paul’s triplex formula and Stoic 
philosophy.265 For instance, Marcus Aurelius states: ‘O nature, everything is from you, in you, 
and for you’ (ὦ φύσις, ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοί πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα Meditations 4:19).266 
Interestingly, as we noted above, Wisdom – especially in pseudo-Solomon - when expressed 
with very similar all-pervading connotations, was also thought to have been borrowing its 
vocabulary from Stoic philosophy. It is perhaps not out of the question to suggest that Paul has 
inherited these traits from Hellenistic Judaism more broadly. Whichever way around, it appears 
that Christ is performing the same mediatory role in the act of creation, salvation, and 
eschatology, as Wisdom does. As Lohse notes, the unity of these three fundamental themes are 
only held together in Hebraic thought by the myth of Wisdom; a role which Paul is now 
attributing to the person of Christ.267 
    1:17 appears to be something of a synthesis between the positions expressed in verses 15 and 
16; emphasising the fundamental point about Christ’s pre-existence and his lordship over 
creation, as well as his all-pervading presence; again maintaining, in typical sapiential fashion, 
that Christ was prior to all created reality. 
    In 1:18, Paul creatively adapts the sapiential tendencies so to include Christ’s redemptive act. 
Christ is not only the ‘firstborn’ of creation; he is also the ‘beginning’ and ‘firstborn’ from the 
dead, and that this is the case, so that in ‘all things’ Christ may have pre-eminence; that is, not 
only is he ontologically prior to all created reality in respect to their origin, he also has this same 
distinction within the economy of redemption as the head or beginning of the ‘new creation’ 
which, as in the first, is accomplished in and through Christ.268  
    In 1:19 Paul seemingly affirms a confession of an incarnation. Depending, of course, on how 
one interprets the ambiguous πλήρωμα,269 it is generally taken in correlation with 2:9 and 
considered to be an articulation of the incarnation.270 Wisdom’s embodiment within history and 
the economy of salvation was well documented in the Hebraic concept of Wisdom, and it would 
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appear that we find an expression of it here. Only now Paul has located redemption in the very 
person of Jesus Christ, as Margaret MacDonald notes: ‘the Christ hymn of Colossians 1:15-20 
anchors traditions about divine Wisdom firmly in history by stressing the relationship between 
the death of Christ and the reconciliation of the universe, and by highlighting the indwelling of 
Christ in the Church.’271 Scholars such as Seyoon Kim, Eckhard Schnabel, M. Bockmuehl, and 
C.M. Pate have all argued, in their unique ways, that Paul’s development of the theme of 
incarnation is dependent on Jewish speculation about the Torah as embodied Wisdom. With 
Torah conceived as embodied Wisdom, and Paul’s emphasis on the fact that Christ has replaced 
the Law, it was only natural, according to the scholars above, that Christ would inherit the 
functions of Wisdom that had been previously associated with her exclusively.272     
    Finally, 1:20 affirms that Christ’s soteriological mediation – bringing the Father and creation 
together in himself – is achieved through the ‘peace’ and reconciliation’ wrought through the 
blood of his cross.  
     
    Therefore, having explored Paul’s cosmic Christology apparent in his adoption of this early 
Christian hymn, it would appear that it is best understood as an appropriation of the Jewish 
wisdom tradition and therefore as a Wisdom Christology. Although Fee had argued that there 
was little evidence to support Paul’s dependency on the wisdom tradition, it appears that, with 
our myriad of examples, this contention is simply not sustainable. Paul’s high Christology 
seemed to parallel conventions within the wisdom tradition so closely on a theological, 
conceptual, and (although to a lesser extent) linguistic level, that they could simply not be 
ignored. The similarities are so apparent that scholars such as Mary Rose D’Angelo have even 
been led to suggest that this early Christian hymn was in fact first formulated as a hymn to 
Sophia and later adapted to Christ.273 We need not agree with her proposal to appreciate the 
circumstances that substantiate such a claim.  
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    It is important to note that in emphasising Paul’s ‘wisdom Christology’ we are not suggesting 
that he has passively restated the rudiments of the wisdom tradition and merely swapped Sophia 
for Christ. The portrait we have of Paul the theologian seems to suggest a dynamic synthesiser of 
Jewish ideas and themes adapted to his experience of the risen Christ and what this then means 
for his faith and theology. Much of his theological writing is an attempt to come to terms with 
and articulate the risen Lord. And Wisdom is not his only means of exercising this vocation – it 
is not, and does not have to be, an either or scenario – as Marianne Thompson highlights: Paul 
may have had both a ‘new Adam’ Christology and the sapiential tradition in the back of his 
mind, when utilising this early hymn.274 Martin Hengel also emphasises this point concerning the 
non-exclusivity of Paul’s use of the wisdom tradition: ‘it was natural that the exalted Son of God 
also attracted to himself the functions of Jewish Wisdom as a mediator in creation and 
salvation.’275 
    Let us now briefly recapitulate the Pauline concept of Hebraic Wisdom and its theological 
rules of formation. 
 
I) There is one Lord Jesus Christ who is related to God the Father and Creation in a mediatory 
capacity.  
 
His relationship to God the Father can be constructed as follows: 
a) Christ as instrument of the Father’s activity in Creation. The cosmos is created by the Father 
through the Son and for the Father (1cor 8:6) and also for the Son (Col 1:16) in so far as he is for 
the Father. Not only is creation made through the Son but it is also held together in him, to the 
extent that everything is inherently related to him from the origin of their creation.    
b) Christ is the instrument of the Father’s activity in his economy (‘we through him’ 1 Cor 8:6); 
Christ is the means by which the Father inaugurates the ‘new creation’ through his resurrection 
(‘first born out of the dead’ Col 1:18).  
c) Christ is described as being the image of the ‘invisible God’ (Col 1:15). Christ, in his capacity 
to mediate the Father’s activity, also participates in his Being (although he is not synonymous 
with the Father: it is not an early formulation of what we might now consider to be ‘modalism’). 
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He is distinguished from the Father without such a distinction compromising his participation in 
the divine Being. Christ is also the historical embodiment (as image) of the ‘fullness’ of divinity.  
 
His relationship to the cosmos can be formulated thus: 
a) He has ontological precedence (‘firstborn of all creation’ Col 1:15, 17) over creation in two 
instances: firstly, he pre-exists the cosmos due to his instrumental role in its creation; secondly, 
he is the ‘firstborn of the dead’ Col 1:18 and is the means by which we are eschatologically 
invited into communion with God by participating in his resurrection; itself, conditioned by the 
peace and reconciliation wrought through his blood and sacrifice on the cross. 
 
II) Christ’s mediation between God the Father and the cosmos extends through its creation, its 
salvation, and its end; all things occur through, and are held together in, Christ himself.  
 
III) Christ’s historical person is also a universal relationship between God the Father and the 
cosmos. We are for the Father in all things in so far as we are for Christ and are graciously 
invited to participate in his relationship to the Father; achieved through the triplex mediation in 
creation, salvation and eschatology; although, Paul’s order can be formulated as salvation then 
eschatology then posthumously (through theological reflection) pre-existence and therefore 
creation.  
We shall briefly explore the archaeological shifts and correlations between the Hebraic concept 
of Wisdom and the Pauline adoption of this same tradition. 
Wisdom and Christ both perform the same theological function of mediation between God and 
creation in three identical instances. Wisdom and Christ both pre-exist finite reality, to the extent 
in which they both perform some sort of mediatory role in the act of creation itself. Wisdom’s 
creativity is more ambiguous than, and not as explicit as, Christ’s - but this does not warrant the 
identification of a ‘new’ function. Wisdom, as a communication of divine presence, is embodied 
within history (Torah in Sirach, and she is said to be salvificly involved throughout Hebrew 
history by pseudo-Solomon) with the purposes of inaugurating a relationship between Israel and 
God. Christ is the historical and now hypostatic embodiment of divinity and actualises our 
redemption (through the cross and the resurrection; not the law) initiating a ‘new’ relationship 
 
 
92 
between the Father and creation through Christ’s acts which permit our participation in his 
relationship to the Father.  
    Within the Hebraic concept of Wisdom, the theological order is: participation in the act of 
creation (pre-existence), embodied presence within history (salvation), and eschatological 
invitation, through the impartation of immortality, to commune with God after death. For Paul, 
the order is slightly different: encounter with the resurrected Christ (soteriology and eschatology) 
re-conceived appreciation of the cross as the means by which we are permitted to participate in 
the resurrection (strictly soteriology), then an acknowledgement of Christ embodying divinity 
(the requirements for participating in the divine economy) and then an extension to creation 
theology. Not only are Christ’s functions identical to Wisdom’s but this tradition would have 
also provided Paul with the conceptual framework to affirm all of these positions.  
     We shall now explore the Wisdom’s position within our Gospel text.                         
 
Johannine Wisdom Christology. 
Raymond Brown once commented on the uniqueness of John’s Christology and subsequently 
concluded that: ‘the Evangelist has capitalised on an identification of Jesus with personified 
divine Wisdom as described in the Old Testament.’276 If Brown’s suggestion is correct, then we 
may confidently conclude that the fourth Evangelist provides us with the most theologically 
sophisticated wisdom Christology to emerge out of the New Testament texts. While many have 
proposed numerous stylistic similarities277 between John’s Christ and the figure of Wisdom, as 
well as Pneumatological parallels between Sophia and the Holy Spirit, our assessment of John’s 
Christology shall be confined to the positions articulated within his Prologue; predominantly 
because it is here that the Evangelist offers the fullest expression (and summary) of his high 
Christology. Given the centrality of the Logos within John’s Prologue, we will have to attempt 
an archaeological investigation into this theme; as this would seem to be the key to determining 
whether the Prologue is an articulation of wisdom Christology or not. After outlining the rules of 
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formation for the concept of the Logos in John 1-18, we shall then explore the conceptual 
contexts for John’s Word, with specific reference to the Hebraic wisdom tradition.             
 
John’s Prologue: An Archaeological exegesis of the Logos 
Donald Arthur Carson has noted that ‘the Prologue is a foyer to the rest of the Fourth Gospel, 
simultaneously drawing the reader in and introducing the major themes.’278 Given how closely 
the Gospel proper is related to the Prologue, it is permissible to conclude that they are written by 
the same author; although, some have contested this view in light of certain peculiarities.279 
Many scholars have suggested that the Prologue is the product of an early hymn or poem (either 
Christian or non-Christian) reworked by John to meet his theological needs280 – typically 
considered to consist of four strophes and a large chiasm281 - however, some scholars reject this 
categorisation as the Prologue does not appear to reflect the typical conventions of Greek poetry; 
neither are such scholars convinced by the suggestion that the ‘poetical’ occurrences are based 
on Hebrew or Aramaic conventions. In such instances, the designation ‘rhythmical prose’ is 
preferred. Whether the literary basis of the Prologue was original or borrowed, as Carson argues: 
it has ‘been so thoroughly re-worked and woven into a fabric of fresh design that there are no 
unambiguous seams.’282 Put simply, even if the Prologue were not original to John, he has 
absorbed it into his own idiom to such a great extent that it is difficult to remove it from this 
context.     
     The Prologue initiates by patterning for itself the Ἐν ἀρχῇ of Genesis in the LXX. However, 
rather than narrating the origins of creation, the Evangelist is describing the ‘genesis’ of the 
Word with specific emphasis on his relationship to God. We are told that the Word was with God 
in the beginning and, even more profoundly, that the Word was God. There is a pivotal 
grammatical disputation in v.1 that directly effects the way in which the Evangelist’s intentions 
are interpreted. Some scholars, such as Charles Harold Dodd,283 have suggested that there is an 
ontological distinction to be made between the God and god within John 1:1 and, that the Word 
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is described as the latter at the expense of not being the former. The argument hinges on the 
absence of the definitive article before θεός. Firstly, we are told that ὁ λόγος ἦν πρός τόν θεόν 
but, it is then stated, in apparent contrast, that: καί θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος. As Brown elucidates, some 
have suggested that the distinction can be explained away on the basis that, generally speaking, 
predicate nouns tend to be anarthrous; however, Brown also notes that ‘such a rule does not 
necessarily hold for a statement of identity’284 which is what appears to be meant in John 1:1. 
Although, even with these points considered, it would surely appear unreasonable to suggest that 
John has deliberately omitted the article to highlight an ontological inferiority of the Word in 
respect to the God, given that Jesus (who is the Word) is identified with the God on several other 
occasions within the Gospel (e.g. the ‘I AM sayings’ and Thomas’ affirmation of Jesus being – 
literally – ‘the Lord of me and the God of me;’ the article included in John 20:28). If such a 
distinction were deliberately inserted to denote ontological inferiority then, surely, such a crucial 
distinction would have been upheld, and not contradicted, within the rest of the Gospel. 
Therefore, it would seem that we are able to acknowledge a monumental development in New 
Testament Christology: the Word is fully designated as being the God.   
   Lending support to this conclusion, John then states plainly, in v.3 that the Word is 
instrumental in the creation of the world: ‘In him everything came to be and apart from him 
nothing that is has become.’ 
    John informs us, in v.5, that the ‘light shines’ in the darkness and we are forewarned – as John 
writes with hindsight - that the light was not overtook (κατέλαβεν) by darkness.  
    From vv.6-9, we are told of the role of John the Baptist, who has come to witness to the light 
but is not himself the light. 
    We then encounter, in v.9: Ἦν τό φῶς τό ἀληθινόν, ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἂνθρωπον, 
ἐρχόμενον [participle] εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Some would take the ‘Word’ as the antecedent to this 
sentence and thus read it to imply that ‘he (the Word) was the true light, which enlightens every 
man.’ However, as Brown points out, if this is the case, then the participle ‘coming’ looks 
markedly out of place and has to be supplemented with another ‘he was.’285 It would appear then 
that it would make more sense to propose that John is claiming that there is a true light, which is 
the light of every man, coming into the world. However, scholars such as J. Ramsey Michaels 
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choose to read the participle in relation to the phrase that immediately precedes it; giving us: ‘the 
light was true that illumines every human being coming into the world. The precedent for 
reading it in this way is that ‘all who come into the world’ is an idiomatic phrase encountered 
frequently in the rabbinic literature286 to denote ‘everyone.’ However, ‘coming into the world’ is 
typically reserved for Jesus in John and not a generic description of all people (e.g. John 3:19) 
and when taken in collaboration with the Evangelist’s insistence that John the Baptist is not the 
light, we can clearly see the logic of the contrast: the true light (Jesus) is coming into the 
world.287     
    John’s next use of ἦν, in v.10, refers back to the ‘Word’ and he reaffirms the position outlined 
in v.3 that the world has come into being through the agency of the Word, but despite this the 
world failed to recognise him (1:10-11). 
   In v.12, more of the Word’s theological functions are outlined. It is claimed that he gives 
power (εξουσίαν) to those who receive him and believe in his name to become children of God 
(τέκνα θεοῦ). From the conditional clause apparent within the sentence, we are able to note that 
this gift must be received in order for it to take effect; it presupposes a synergy between the 
Word’s actions and the receptiveness of those acted on. One can draw a parallel here with the 
functions of Wisdom in Wisdom 6:14-16. She requires the desire (willingness and acceptance) of 
individuals for her in order to work through them. Although, μονογενής is used exclusively of 
the Word to articulate his relationship to the Father as only Son, in contrast to τέκνα θεοῦ for 
those who come to believe in his name, there is a sense in which the latter presupposes the 
former; it is because of the Word’s relationship to the Father that he is able to give power to 
those who believe in him to partake in his own relationship; making them children of God. 
    V.13 claims that this gift (becoming children of God) is removed from the conventions of 
physical birth (neither through blood, nor the act of procreation, or at the discretion of any one 
person) and entirely dependent on God; as well as indicating the spiritual nature of this birth (we 
are reminded of Jesus’ conversation with Nicodemus in 3:1-21). 
    An explicit reference to the Word’s incarnation is the centre piece of v.14: ‘The Word became 
flesh and tabernacled among us.’ Not only has John pioneered an explicit identification of the 
Word with God, but he has also proposed that this same Word has dwelt with us, hypostatically, 
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in our very own humanity. The Evangelist upholds that he and his circle had witnessed this 
event: ‘we have seen his glory.’ The visible Δόξαν of the Logos complements John’s testimony 
to the incarnation. The Glory of the Lord, in the Old Testament (e.g. Exd 24:17), is always 
indicative of YHWH’s immanent divine presence among his sojourning people; therefore, this 
glory now belongs to the Word (as God enfleshed) and this is what the disciples have born 
testimony to. Scholars such as Andreas Köstenberger and Paul Hoskins have also argued that 
John is emphasising the Word as the fullest expression and completion of the conventions 
surrounding Jewish temple worship; Jesus is now where the divine glory tabernacles amongst 
humanity.288 It is, therefore, the Word, as μονογενής, that is able to reveal the Father’s glory, 
who is ‘Πλήρης χάριτος καί ἀληθίας.’ 
    After acknowledging John the Baptist’s role in bearing witness to the Word, in v.16, we are 
told that from the fullness of the Word we have received ‘grace for (ἀντὶ) grace.’ This statement 
is somewhat problematic. Ἀντὶ usually designates replacement (e.g. ‘instead of’). However, 
some commentators have preferred to interpret it with its accumulative connotation, thus 
translating it as ‘grace upon grace.’289 Although, it must be noted that ἀντὶ does not typically 
denote accumulation,290 and the ‘grace for grace’ interpretation makes more sense in light of 
what follows in v.17. For, if we were to read the preposition as denoting accumulation then we 
would have to read the Pauline antinomy between Law and grace into John’s statement in v.17 
and thus create an oppositional contrast between the two; although typical of Pauline theology, 
this does not seem to be a convention common to John’s, who generally holds Moses in high 
regard (e.g. 1:45 and 3:14). However, if we were to accept the initial translation of ‘grace for 
grace’ then the Law is considered to be an instance of grace (in accordance with Johanine 
theology) that has been extended to include the ‘supreme example of enduring love shown in 
Jesus.’291 
    V.18 opens by declaring, in typical Hebraic fashion, that no one has ever seen God. John then 
inserts quite a dramatic ‘however’ in so far as God is now being revealed. Some textual difficulty 
does obscure the precise definition of the one doing the revealing:  μονογενής θεός is 
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problematic as it is recorded differently in various Greek manuscripts; sometimes υἱος is 
introduced after the μονογενής and at other times it is simply μονογενής alone. However, the 
first reading is well represented in the most reliable manuscripts (Bodmer papyri)292 and fits more 
readily into the theological functions of the Word in earlier parts of the Prologue, as we shall see. 
Thus, it would read ‘God the only Son, being in the bosom of the Father, that one (ἐκεῖνος) 
discloses him.’ The ‘him’ is inserted, although it is grammatically required293 and not an 
intrusion into the text. And the verb ἐξηγέομαι usually means to ‘lead out’294 however, 
according to Walter Bauer, it is never understood in this sense in all of the early Christian 
literature; it is more readily seen as indicating an unfolding or a disclosure.295 Thus, it is because 
the Word was God, the same Word who is incarnate in the flesh among us as the unique Son of 
the Father and expounder of his glory (divine presence), that he is able to disclose the Father who 
has been seen by no one, except by that one who was with him in the beginning: the Word. 
Having outlined the theological functions that John ascribes to the Logos, we shall now explore 
the rules of its formation as a concept. 
 
The Rules of Formation for the Logos 
In Brown’s excellent appendix on the origins of the Prologue’s use of the ‘Word’, in his Anchor 
commentary on the fourth Gospel, he maintains that there are, fundamentally, two prevalent 
contexts which have been suggested as ‘backgrounds’ to the Johnaine  Logos. Firstly, there is the 
strictly Greek background (to be distinguished from Hellenised Judaism); secondly, the Semitic 
context (both Hellenised and non-Hellenised Judaism). To assess the extent to which John’s 
Logos Christology is an archaeological shift of the concept of Hebraic wisdom, it will be 
necessary to critically evaluate the suggested cultural, religious, philosophical and theological 
contexts for John’s proposal. Beginning then with the Greek context. 
    Adolf Von Harnack once stated that John’s Prologue evidenced the reality of ‘acute 
Hellenization.’296 As far as we can tell, Heraclitus appears to be the first philosopher to introduce 
the notion of the Logos into Greek thought. Diogenes Laertius states that Heraclitus ‘flourished 
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around the 69th Olympiad [early fifth century B.C.E)’297 in Ephesus (the traditional site for the 
composition of John’s Gospel). Heraclitus’ works are only comprised of fragments collected 
from various quotes from other ancient sources, these, as well as respective commentaries on his 
positions by other philosophers, are the sole means we have of ascertaining the content of his 
philosophy. Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors 7:132-33) claimed to be quoting 
Heraclitus from a work he produced called ‘On Nature’, where he states that ‘all things happen 
according to the Word’; Empiricus further notes that this Word is something akin to a substance 
which humans partake of in order to act and reflect on what they do.298 It appears to be a stable 
and enduring counterpart to his philosophy of change and motion. W.K.C. Guthrie notes that, on 
occasions, the Word can also be synonymised with the fundamental principle of ‘fire’ (fire as the 
source and substance of all reality) in Heraclitian thought. Both seem to point to its function as a 
common standard by which reality is understood and judged.299 Fire and the Word are also 
sometimes described as being eternal; as an everlasting law or rationale to the cosmos.300 
However, there is very little indication that the Word, for Heraclitus, could be considered 
hypostatically as it is for John, neither is the Word a cosmic substance or world in which all 
things participate in within Johannine theology. To put it simply, there appears to be no 
conceptual tie between the two whatsoever; so it would seem that there is some truth in J. 
Burnet’s rather emphatic conclusion that ‘the Johannine doctrine of the λογος has nothing to do 
with Heraclitus.’301         
    Stoic philosophy has also been suggested as an informative factor in John’s adoption of the 
Word. Anthony Arthur Long has argued that the Stoics consciously adopted the Heraclitean 
Logos as an unchanging eternal substance underpinning the flux of finite experience: ‘the 
universe is a world determined by law, by immanent Logos.’302 As a general rule, Stoic 
philosophy rejected metaphysical universals on the grounds that nothing real could correspond to 
them; all that is, is in perceived and immediate reality. The Stoic’s intention was not to find 
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metaphysical explanations for finite reality (as this was already inherent within reality itself) but 
to describe the world according to its one common, all-pervading principle: its inherent logic, 
reason; its Logos. Long provides an excellent summary of the Stoic’s philosophy of nature when 
stating that it is: 
An attempt to provide a rational explanation for all things in terms of the intelligent activity of a 
single entity which is co-extensive with the universe. The history of the universe is one thing, 
which can be signified by many different names…uncreated and imperishable nature, God, 
Pneuma, or universal Logos.303 
 
    It does not appear to be necessary to offer a full scale exposition of the intricacies inherent 
within Stoic philosophy in order to become immediately aware of its distinctions from the Logos 
of the Prologue. John’s Word can by no means be characterised by an all-pervading pantheistic 
principle. For John, the Logos comes into the world and is incarnate – hypostatically – in Jesus 
of Nazareth. Such a suggestion, as encountered by the Stoic, of the possibility of the Logos 
becoming incarnate in one person, rather than infusing all things simultaneously, would appear 
absurd; even though the Logos could be considered to be specifically present within individuals, 
this would not resemble anything like a unique incarnation. Furthermore, Diogenes Laertius 
insisted that the Logos must not be considered anthropomorphically, let alone hypostatically.304 
For the Stoics, the Logos is more of a cosmic principle or force as opposed to a personal 
enfleshed revelation of God. Therefore, it would appear that, conceptually, there is very little in 
common between the Word of the fourth Gospel and its manifestation in Stoic thought that 
would suggest that John has specifically utilised this model to inform his Prologue. 
     Charles Harold Dodd and, more recently, Craig Evans have argued that the Hermetic 
literature, especially the Poimandres, had a significant influence on the Johannine articulation of 
the Word.305 Within the Poimandres, the Logos is first introduced as one aspect of the creation 
process outlined in the dialogue itself. We are told that there are two primordial components: 
light and darkness/watery substance. The water smoked like fire and wailed. From the light a 
‘holy Word’ came upon the watery substance and released the fire that was trapped within it and 
it leapt to the ‘height above’ (ἂνω εἴς ὕψος). The fire’s upward surge was followed by spirit and 
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air; earth and water were subsequently left behind and mingled together forming the world.306 
Poimandres then announces that he was the primordial light, which is mind and god (τό φῶς 
ἐκεῖνο, εφη, ἐγώ Νοῦς ὁ σός θεός) and that, out of the light (Mind) the bright Word, who is 
the son of God, emerges. Furthermore, he states that: that which in us sees and hears is the Word 
of the lord and that mind is the father God (τό ἐν σοί βλέπον καί ακοῦον, λόγος κυρίου, ὁ δέ 
νοῦς πατηρ θεός).307 At first glance, it would appear quite permissible to acknowledge some 
significant similarities between the Poimandres and the Prologue; however, when assessed 
carefully, the superficiality of these parallels are quickly exposed. Interestingly, there is the 
common imagery of light and darkness and the Word coming from the father god, as his son; 
both combining together to produce life. Nevertheless, in Poimandres there is a clear emphasis 
on the subordination of the Logos to the father god, and no identity between the two, as there is 
for John. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Logos pre-existed creation as it 
does for John. It would appear that the Logos is brought into being in the creative act itself or is 
even a product of it. Peter Phillips contends that ‘the intertextual resonance between Poimandres 
and the Prologue is because both works have a common fascination with the Jewish creation 
story…rather than that they share a belief in the same divine being known as Logos.’308 Given 
the lack of conceptual similarity between the two texts, it would appear reasonable to affirm 
Phillips’ conclusion.  
    Other sources such as ‘pre-Christian Gnosticism’ were once championed amongst certain 
scholars when discussing the origins of the Prologue and the theological functions of the 
Word.309 However, given that Rudolf Bultmann’s thesis of a ‘gnostic redeemer myth’ is 
generally rejected today (as no significant proof of such a Gnosticism existing has ever been 
provided) and that the authentic Gnostic - Nag Hammadi - texts which do utilise the Logos are 
notably later than John’s Gospel, as well as differing at crucial points where similarity might 
have been expected,310 it is sufficient to leave these suggestions to one side. Similarly, the 
Mandean liturgies (also suggested by Bultmann as a background to the Prologue) face parallel 
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chronological difficulties as well as conceptual weaknesses in comparisons with John and shall 
therefore not be pursued any further.311     
   Although Philo of Alexandria is typically categorised under Hellenised Judaism and would 
thus be expected to feature in the Semitic contexts, it appears more natural here to consider him 
within our Greek category which he bears closer resemblances to, in this instance, than anything 
strictly Semitic. Philo’s adoption of the Word is another suggested context argued to have 
influenced John. This thesis has been upheld most famously by Charles Harold Dodd in his 
classic ‘The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel’ (1953) and more recently by Thomas Tobin.312 
As before, given that both John and Philo adopt the term Logos, we will need to assess the 
conceptual similarities to determine whether Dodd’s and Tobin’s theses are ultimately 
convincing. As Dodd has highlighted, there are extensive points of stylistic and presentational 
commonalities to be acknowledged between the respective authors, we shall briefly assess the 
most prominent parallels. 
     According to Philo, ‘before’ the material creation God had intellectual images of the cosmos 
(just as a King would produce an intellectual plan for the building of a city before it was actually 
produced) which he then utilised, when fashioning material reality, as an intellectual archetype 
(νοητόν κόσμον) which he goes on to identify as God’s Word (θεοῦ λογον); which is said to 
exist in both the mind of God (as archetype) and within the creation itself.313 Dodd argues that 
this parallels John’s less metaphysically elaborate ‘in the beginning was the Word’ (John 1:1).314 
However, this ‘affinity’ seems rather tenuous, as Philo is elaborating a sophisticated 
metaphysical doctrine of creation through divine ideas or forms which is denoted under the 
generic title of the Word; where John is clearly not attempting a metaphysics of creation, he is 
merely stating that the Word was in the beginning; there is nothing to suggest that what John 
means by ‘the Word’ is anything conceptually close to Philo’s utilisation of the same phrase to 
articulate Platonic forms.  
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    Philo, when discussing the nature of time, claims that the tangible world is a younger son of 
God, while the elder son – the intelligible world – ‘remained in his own keeping.’315 Dodd 
suggests that this corresponds to John’s affirmation of the Word being with God in the 
beginning. However, despite some similarity, the context in which Philo proposes this scheme 
would seem markedly removed from anything that John had in mind. 
     In De Somniis I, Philo claims that the definitive article in front of θεός designates the one true 
God, while θεός without the article indicates God’s Word e.g. something quasi-divine yet which 
is not ontologically identical with God himself.316 Dodd appears to be one of the scholars who 
argue that John has implemented a similar distinction – as he omitted the article when he 
designated the Word as God – between God per se and G[g]od the Word. However, we have 
already demonstrated, in our exegesis, that this was unlikely to be the case. Therefore, in light of 
our previous arguments, Dodd’s comparison does in fact point in the other direction to quite a 
definitive distinction between the Word in John and Philo.  
    When Philo is discussing the generation of the universe he states that: ‘ὄργανον δὲ λόγον 
θεοῦ δἰ οὗ κατεσκευάσθη’317 which, as Dodd rightly notes, is remarkably close to John’s claim 
that all things have come into existence through the Word. However, these motifs also occur in 
the Apocryphal wisdom literature, which many have suggested is a common source for Philo and 
John, which would account for such similarities without assuming mutual dependence. 
    John insists that the Word has power to make people ‘sons of God;’ similarly (or at least as 
Dodd claims), Philo suggests that we may become sons of the Word –if we are not worthy to be 
sons of the one God.318 For Philo, becoming a son of the Word is practically a contingency 
measure, and he does not claim that in being a son of the Word we are endowed with the right to 
become sons of God (this is precisely why he introduces the Word as an intermediary in the first 
place). Therefore, it appears that, contrary to Dodd’s suggestion, this – again – points to a 
notable distinction between Philo and John, rather than a similarity.  
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    Finally, Dodd suggests that John’s insistence that no one has seen God (the Father) unless it is 
through his Word, as the only begotten Son, who resides in his bosom and reveals him, is 
paralleled in Philo’s De Confusione Linguarum 97. However, this suggestion is somewhat 
misleading, as a close look at Philo’s proposal reveals a rather different position to that which we 
find in John. Just as in the ‘sons of God’ example, Philo is, again, using the Word as an 
intermediary contingency measure. Firstly, he assumes that one is able to see God: ‘for it well 
befits those who have entered into comradeship with knowledge to desire to see the Existent (the 
God) if they may.’319 This is somewhat contradicted by John who explicitly states that ‘no one 
has seen God’ (John1:18). Furthermore, Philo claims that if one cannot see God then they should 
try ‘to see at any rate his image, the most holy Word,’ which would suggest that it is clearly a 
compromise formula. He also goes on to claim that if we cannot see his Word then we should 
comprehend him through the world. For John, no one can see God but the Word, and it is for this 
reason that the Word is the only means by which one can hope to see God. John’s route to God 
through the Word is no ‘back up plan’ as it is for Philo, but the only legitimate and possible route 
open to humanity. 
    Having assessed some of the major points that Dodd has proposed in order to support his 
conclusion that ‘the substance of a Logos-doctrine similar to that of Philo is present all through 
the Gospel, and that the use of the actual term λογος in the Prologue, in a sense corresponding to 
that doctrine…falls readily into place,’320 we have concluded that this is simply not the case. 
Many of the parallels, when read closely, bore no conceptual resemblance to John’s positions 
and, in fact, suggested the opposite conclusion; that they were markedly distinguishable and even 
incompatible. It would appear reasonable to suggest that some of the stylistic similarities could 
be explained if it were shown that both authors were dependent on a shared source, such as the 
wisdom tradition which we shall explore shortly. 
     Craig Evans notes that the Jewish liturgical tradition could have influenced the Johannine 
Prologue.321 He states that the Targumic (Aramaic translations of scripture) word memra 
(meaning Word) as a specific example. Memra, like John’s Logos, appears to be something of an 
intermediary between God and creation. However, many of the positions that are utterly 
                                                             
319 De Confusione Linguarum 97, in: Jeffrey Henderson (ed) Philo IV (LOEB), Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 2005, pp.62-63. 
320Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.279. 
321 Craig Evans, Word and Glory: On The Exegetical and Theological Bckground of John’s Prologue, London, 
Continuum, 1993, p.120.  
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regulative to John’s articulation of the Word are missing from the Targumic portrayal of Memra; 
specifically, its non-hypostatic nature and its non-identity with God.322 Some have also suggested 
that Jewish speculation on the Law may have influenced John’s portrayal of the Word within his 
Prologue.323 However, as we have already seen, speculation on the Law is inseparable from, and 
an integral part of, the wisdom tradition and will therefore be considered a part of the concept of 
Hebraic wisdom. 
      The clear allusions to Genesis, apparent from the initiation of the Prologue, have led 
scholars, such as Leon Morris, to claim that its ‘atmosphere is unmistakably Hebraic.’324 If it 
were part of John’s intentions to allude to Genesis, and it would be unreasonable to suggest that 
it were not, then it is no surprise that we are able to detect strong theological parallels between 
John’s Logos and its Hebrew equivalent רָוָד; which is a dynamic ‘effective agent for 
accomplishing the divine will.’325 God speaks the world into being in Genesis; it confronts 
prophets and administers the divine will (Isa 55:11), and is generally given a dynamic energy of 
its own accord.326 It is reasonable to conclude, in the event of John’s deliberate allusion to 
Genesis and some notable conceptual correspondence, that the Hebraic categorisation of the 
Word has been utilised by John in his expression of the Logos. However, as in the case with the 
Targumic Memra,  רָוָד  would not have been considered hypostatically; in order to account for 
some of the more specific aspects of the Logos’ theological functions we have to look to another 
Semitic theme: the Jewish wisdom tradition. 
    Brown has claimed that ‘in the Old Testament presentation of Wisdom, there are good 
parallels for almost every detail of the Prologue’s description of the Word.’327 Immediately, from 
the initiation of the Prologue, the pre-existence of the Word is affirmed. Similarly, this is also a 
unique prerogative of Wisdom’s being. In Sira 24:3, Wisdom announces that: ἐγώ ἀπὸ 
στόματος ὑψίστου ἐξῆλθον (perhaps, indicating allusions to a spoken word), he also affirms 
that Wisdom is from the Lord and has been with him from eternity (Sir 1:1); similarly, Wisdom 
                                                             
322 See: John O’Grady, ‘The Prologue and Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John’, in: Tom Thatcher (ed), What We Have 
Heard From the Beginning: The Past, Present and Future of Johannine Studies, Texas, Baylor University, 2007, 
pp.215-28,  p.221; Martin McNamara, Targum and New Testament, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2011, p.439. 
323Brown, The Gospel According to John I-XII, p.523.  
324 Leon Morris, The Gospel According to John, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 1995, p.104. 
325Ibid. 
326 See: Robert Morgan and John Barton, Biblical Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.159-60; 
Thorlief Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, London, SCM, 1970, p.64. 
327Brown, The Gospel According to John I-XII, p.523. 
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9:10 declares that Wisdom dwells by God’s ‘throne of glory’ in the highest heavens. Both clearly 
correspond to John’s insistence that the Word originates with God in his pre-existence. Although 
we have determined above that Wisdom must be considered to be divine ‘in a sense’, however it 
is quite clear that John goes beyond the conventions outlined in the Hebraic Wisdom tradition in 
so far as he explicitly identifies God with the Word, which never occurs in that tradition.   
    The Word as the instrument of Creation (John 1:3) is integral to both John and the sapiential 
tradition respectively. Wisdom 8:5-6 claims that Sophia is the τεχνίτις of everything and 
Proverbs 8:30 states that she was an ֹןמאָ in the presence of God.  
     
    John’s imagery of light and life have strong parallels in the wisdom tradition. Wisdom 7:22 
affirms that Sophia is an ‘effulgence of eternal light’ and Proverbs 8:35: ‘he who finds me finds 
life.’ Although, some have suggested that John’s appeal to light and darkness is better explained 
in relation to their portrayal amongst the Qumran community; although, more recently, many 
scholars have distanced themselves from this position, instead suggesting that such similarities 
are far less extensive then first imagined.328 
     Significantly, there is even a linguistic parallel in the μονογενές title attributed to the Word 
(John 1:14) and Sophia (Wis 7:22) respectively. However, it should be noted that there is a 
significant conceptual difference between the two; in the case of Sophia it is affirming her 
uniqueness as opposed to an only begotten Son in the instance of the Word.  
    Further linguistic commonalities occur in their shared incarnational theme. Sirach 24:8 states 
that έν Ιακωβ κατασκηνωσον, and in John 1:14 we have: έσκηνωσεν έν ήμίν. For Sirach, 
Wisdom is embodied in the Law, whereas John is affirming that it is the flesh that receives the 
divine glory of the Word.  
   In Wisdom 8:21 Sophia is intimately associated with χάρις, although she appears to be given 
as a gift as opposed to the giver herself, as the Word appears to be in John. She is also portrayed 
as a ‘pure emanation of the glory (δόξης) of the Almighty’ (Wis 7:25); she reveals and manifests 
the glory of God as the Word does in John 1:14.    
                                                             
328 See, for instance: Richard Bauckham, The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology 
in the Gospel of John, Michigan, Baker, 2007, pp.125-137; George J. Brooke, ‘Luke, John, and the Dead Sea 
Scrolls’, in: Mary L. Coloe and Tom Thatcher (eds), John, Qumran, and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Atlanta, Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2011, pp.69-93, pp.77‐80.  
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     Sirach 15:7 claims that some were foolish and rejected Wisdom in a similar vein to the Word 
being rejected by his own John 1:11. 
     Having outlined the parallels between John’s Logos and the Hebraic Wisdom tradition on a 
theological, linguistic, and conceptual level, it seems somewhat apparent that the conventions 
underlying this tradition appear to be an integral part of Johannine Christology to the extent in 
which it would seem more than permissible to suggest that it is the most persuasive and emphatic 
of the proposals concerning the background of the Word of the Prologue.  
    We shall now outline the archaeological correlations and shifts for John’s Wisdom 
Christology noting substantial developments from the Hebraic concept of Wisdom and Pauline 
Wisdom Christology. 
 
i) Christ is identified as participating in the divinity of the God; although there is hypostatic 
distinction between the Father and the only Son this does not indicate ontological distinction as 
the Word is equated with God and he is thus pre-existent. 
ii) Christ is the instrument of Creation; everything is created through him and in him it holds 
together. 
iii) Christ is equated with eternal life and he has the power to bestow the status of ‘children of 
God’ on those who receive him; he gifts us participation in his relationship to the Father. 
However, a synergy is presupposed between God and creature in order for this to occur; Christ 
must be received.  
iv) The ‘only Son’ was tangibly incarnate in the flesh.  
v) Christ acts as revelatory mediator between the Father and creation: No one has seen God, but 
in seeing the only Son the Father is disclosed because the Son has participated in the life of the 
Father from the beginning and his existence is communicated through Christ’s incarnate 
existence.      
 
Unlike the positions outlined in the Hebraic wisdom tradition and in Paul, John appears to be the 
first to fully acknowledge the divinity of Christ/Wisdom as being equal to that of the Father. 
Although there is still a distinction, this is now purely hypostatic. Christ, therefore, naturally had 
a share in the divine prerogatives of creation and salvation. John’s monotheism appears to be 
upheld in one sense, in so far as he draws no ontological distinction between the ‘only Son’ and 
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the Father (moving beyond Paul), yet he still draws a hypostatic distinction with no metaphysical 
explanation of how this holds together. His affirmation of Christ’s involvement in the divine 
economy (creation, salvation and the eschaton) is in concordance with Paul and the Hebraic 
Wisdom tradition. So too is the theme of incarnation common to Paul and Jewish Wisdom. 
However, in John’s case the resonance is slightly more potent in so far as his affirmation of the 
incarnation is taken in coordination with his radical statements about Christ’s divinity. John also 
upholds Christ in his mediatory position of revealing the Father. Although, Christ as mediator of 
the Father’s activity and being is radicalised in so far as the mediation occurs because the 
mediator is in ontological continuity with the Father; the Son is able to reveal the Father because 
he is all that the Father is also.  
    From these observations we are able to note that the rudiments of Hebraic wisdom and Pauline 
wisdom Christology are included within John’s presentation of the Word. However, these 
regulative points have also been extended to unequivocally identify Christ with God – thus 
radicalising the nature of the relationship that Christ embodies in this paradox of mediation – but 
the fundamental points are still quite apparent.  
      
The Concept of the Biblical Figure of Wisdom 
In this detailed archaeological investigation into the biblical figure of Wisdom, it has been the 
aim to be in a position following the analysis to propose a concept of the ‘biblical figure of 
Wisdom’ that has grown out of these texts and their accompanying archaeology. The concept 
presented below is the product of a variety of different factors that have intermingled, including 
complex theological and philosophical purposes, socio-political and historical climates, and 
diverse cultural influences and pressures, to present a concept of Wisdom existing within the 
authoritative enunciative field of the Bible. The reason we have worked extensively with the 
texts and their history to excavate this concept, is because it is necessary for the critical analysis 
of later systems of thought that appeal to this tradition to found their own Sophiological 
proposals, that we have something to measure these claims by and to be in a position to assess 
the extent to which it is this tradition or indeed a Gnostic one that informs and regulates 
contemporary Sophiology. Here is the Biblical concept of Wisdom developed through the above 
analysis.   
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i) Biblical Wisdom theology is inherently Christological: 
The figure of Wisdom must be situated within a Christological context in accordance with the 
figure’s identification with Christ. As we have seen, Hebraic Wisdom has been utilised as a 
conceptual template for exploring Jesus’ relationship to the Father and creation in its ontological 
and economical modes. Within biblical Wisdom theology, ontology is always informed by 
historical soteriology; it is Wisdom’s participation in the divine economy of salvation through 
Christ (the resurrection – as an eschatological and soteriological act – followed by a reconceived 
understanding of the nature of Christ’s death as sacrificial) that demands Wisdom’s ontological 
identification with the Father (as anticipated by Paul and completed by John). The nature of 
Wisdom’s relationship to the Father, comprised of ontological identification, requires an 
expansion of Wisdom’s economy to include activity that ‘predates’ the figure’s tangible 
historical presence (e.g. the act of creation) and assimilation into all other divine prerogatives. 
The incarnation is thus the affirmation of Wisdom’s divinity, as well as the necessary ontological 
presupposition of Wisdom’s participation in the divine activity.      
ii) Biblical Wisdom theology functions as a form of Christological Mediation:  
 Wisdom’s mediatory functions, initially revealed in soteriology, although subsequently extended 
to include every aspect of the divine economy (for instance, creation), are the necessary product 
of the ontological identification of Wisdom with the Father. Thus, Wisdom’s soteriological 
mediation of divine activity also presupposes ontological mediation in so far as the creation is 
gifted participation in Christ’s relationship with the Father. The incarnation therefore marks an 
historical   commicatio idiomatum; Wisdom participates in our humanity and we participate in 
Wisdom’s divinity. Hence, in accordance with Hebraic Wisdom, Wisdom embodies both divinity 
and humanity; upholding both in harmonious communication. However, this relationship 
presupposes its foundation in the act of creation itself. 
iv) Biblical Wisdom theology presupposes ecumenical, religious, cultural, socio-political 
dialogue between various traditions embodied in a shared geography.  
The nature of the relationship existing between Creator and creation from its genesis in Wisdom 
presupposes that all finite reality (except that which is deemed to be sinful) must be related to 
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God in some capacity. Thus, biblical wisdom theology is inherently related to and engaged with 
other cultures and traditions, even if these are then interpreted through a specific cultural gaze.                   
Summative Remarks 
The archaeological analysis above has sought to explore the concept of Hebraic Wisdom and 
those rules of formation that produced it, before it was adopted and developed by the New 
Testament writers, noting any archaeological shifts that occurred along the way. It has 
culminated with the proposed biblical concept of Wisdom that will function as a hermeneutical 
aid when engaging with later Sophiological discourses that appeal to this tradition as the source 
and authority from which they write. We shall now explore the archaeology of the Gnostic 
Sophia, noting its shifts and correlations with this biblical tradition, and whether it can properly 
be conceived to exist within a different authoritative space, within a properly Gnostic tradition.   
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Chapter II 
 
Towards an Archaeology of the Valentinian Sophia 
In the previous chapter, an archaeological account of the biblical figure of Wisdom was proposed 
in order to equip the thesis for the critical evaluation of later wisdom theologies that appeal to 
this same biblical tradition as the source of their authority. It is the current task of this chapter to 
embark on a similar archaeological analysis of the Wisdom figure as it appears in Valentinian 
discourses, before critically comparing its positions to those discovered in the biblical tradition 
outlined in the previous chapter, noting crucial distinctions and any significant continuities. The 
purpose of this analysis is to provide the thesis with an alternative hermeneutical lens for 
engaging with later wisdom discourses that may be more closely related to Valentinan thought 
than indeed traditional biblical wisdom theology. Before discussing the Valentinian Gnostic 
figure of Wisdom, it is first necessary to provide a preliminary discussion of how the term 
Gnosticism is understood and utilized within this chapter. 
What is Gnosticism?     
The study of ‘Gnosticism’ is a notoriously complex field of investigation; for even the most 
basic of questions - such as: ‘what is it?’ – can be riddled with hermeneutical difficulties. 
Traditionally, as Hans Jonas informs us, the term itself has functioned as a ‘collective heading 
for a manifoldness of sectarian doctrines appearing within and around Christianity during its 
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critical first centuries.’329 The title ‘γνωστικός’ first rose to prominence when Irenaeus of Lyons 
(c.130-202) adopted it (with the ironic addition of ‘falsely so called’) 330 within his Adversus 
Haereses to categorise various forms of ‘heretical’ theological speculation and religious practice 
that had proven popular in his time. However, there is evidence to suggest that the title was also 
claimed by certain ‘sectarian’ groups themselves.331  Some scholars, following Irenaeus, 
continue to support the argument that ‘Gnosticism’ can function quite legitimately as a 
hermeneutical category, on the grounds that there are various premises and positions that are 
common to the groups that are said to be identifiable within it.332 However, more recently, other 
scholars have challenged this contention, arguing instead that it comprises an ‘artificial scholarly 
invention’ which is ultimately vacuous (something akin to the colonial invention of the term 
‘Hinduism’);333 while others, yet still, propose something of a via media between this 
dichotomy.334 Although it is important to acknowledge – as with all ‘unities of discourse’ - that 
there are, undoubtedly, certain inadequacies and shortcomings surrounding the broadness of the 
genus ‘Gnosticism,’ there are, however, such a specific set of occurrences of a variety of 
particular underlying themes - which appear to be unique when considered against the 
background of other ancient Hellenistic and Oriental traditions (e.g. the rejection of the creator 
God for a higher divine transcendent reality)335 - which would seem to permit, perhaps even 
require, a cautious application of the term to certain systems of thought. 
    Although some have queried the appropriateness of applying this categorisation of Gnosticism 
to Valentinism itself,336 it still appears to function quite legitimately as a descriptive tool, 
                                                             
329 Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, p.32. 
330 See: Irenaeus, ‘Adversus Haereses II: I’ (from henceforth this shall be abbreviated to AH). 
331 See: M.L. Peel, ‘Gnostic Eschatology and the New Testament,’ in: Nov T 12 (1970), pp.141-165; Alastair Logan, 
Gnostic Truth and Christian Heresy: A Study in the History of Gnosticism, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2004, p.6. 
332 See, for instance: Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Giovanni Filoramo, A History of Gnosticism, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1990; and, Simone Pétrement, A Separate God: The Origins and Teachings of Gnosticism, New York, Harper, 1990; 
and, Bart Ehrman, Lost Christianities, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.122-27. 
333 See: Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism?, Massachusetts, Harvard, 2003, p.6; Michael Allen Williams, Re-
Thinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, New Jersey, Princeton, 1996; Arthur 
Versluis discusses Gnosticism, as a category, in light of power analysis: Arthur Versluis, The New Inquisitions: 
Heretic-Hunting and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Totalitarianism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 
pp.69-85.  
334 See, for instance: David Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity, Massachusetts, 
Harvard, 2010, p.5. 
335 For an analysis of other common themes see: Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, 
pp.42-47. 
336 See, for instance, Christoph Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis: 
mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1992. 
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especially when taking into consideration the speculative similarities that it shares with other 
traditions which have typically been described as being Gnostic.337  
    Valentinus himself (the founder of the ‘school’) was reportedly born in Egypt and educated in 
Alexandria; but later teaching in Rome roughly between 135 and 160 A.D.338 It has been 
recorded that Valentinus had a variety of followers who also went on to establish ‘schools’ of 
their own; the most significant of those would include: Heracleon (c. late second century), 
Theodotus (c. second century), Ptolemaeus (c. second century), and Marcus ‘the magician’ (c. 
second century). While some Valentinian groups broke away from the Church to start their own 
unique and specialised communities with various idiosyncratic practices (Irenaeus has much to 
say about their ‘decadent’ rituals);339 others seemed to have remained within the Church, even 
fashioning successful careers for themselves; climbing the ecclesiastical ranks at Rome, for 
instance.340  
    This diversity that existed on the surface of the various Valentinian traditions appears to have 
been a distinguishing feature of the tradition itself; innovating new myths and philosophies even 
became an integral part of their corporate life; even when their various formulations would often 
jeopardise the coherency of their other proposals. However, despite this complicated multiplicity, 
there is usually agreement concerning the most fundamental aspects of the Valentinian narrative, 
which in turn legitimises the working category of ‘Valentinism.’341      
                                                             
337 See, particularly the ‘Sethian’ influenced texts: On the Origin of the World (NHC II:V, XII:II) and The 
Hypostasis of the Archons (NHC II:IV). 
338 Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p.178. 
339 See: AH, I, XIII:IV  
340 Florinus for example. See: Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus (trans: Michael Steinhauser), Minneapolis, 
Fortress, 2003, p.313. 
341 The origins of the speculative ideas and myths commonly characterised as Valentinian are hotly debated. Some 
have argued that they have been sourced from ancient Egyptian, Persian, Syrian, or Mesopotamian religion; see, for 
instance: C.J. Bleeker, ‘The Egyptian Background of Gnosticism,’ in: Colloquio di Messina (13-18 April 1966), Le 
Origini Dello Gnosticismo, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1977, pp.229-238; L. Kakosy, ‘Gnosis und ägyptische Religion,’ in: 
ibid, pp.238-251; K. Rudolph, ‘Zum Problem: Mesopatamien und Gnostizismus,’ in: ibid, pp.302-307; Gerard van 
Groningen, First Century Gnosticism, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1967, pp.9-15; Alastair Logan, Gnostic Truth and Christian 
Heresy, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1996, chap II; K. Rudolph, Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1983, pp.275-294. While others have suggested that there is a common Greco-Roman 
origin to be identified; see: B.A. Pearson, Ancient Gnosticism: Traditions and Literature, Minneapolis, Fortress, 
2007; Wilhelm Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, Göttingen, Hubert, 1973.  But, more recently, many have 
argued that their roots are more readily explained by appealing to Jewish or Christian sources; see, especially: 
Pheme Perkins, Gnosticism and the New Testament, Minneapolis, Fortress, 1993, pp.20-29; Carl B. Smith, No 
Longer the Jews: The Search for Gnostic Origins, Massachusetts, Henrickson, 2004; Alastair Logan, The Gnostics: 
Identifying an Early Christian Cult, New York, Continuum, 2006; Simone Pétrement, A Separate God: The Origins 
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   Until the monumental discovery, made last century, of the ancient texts comprising the Nag 
Hammadi library,342 every account of Valentinian theology and tradition had been obtained 
solely from the polemic of the Church Fathers. The earliest known work of this kind was the 
Syntagma of Justin Martyr (c.165); however, the contents of which have now been lost and 
attempts to reconstruct them have been all but abandoned.343 In the absence of this work, 
Irenaeus of Lyons’ prodigious Adversus Haereses (c.140-200) remains the most detailed and 
significant source of information on Valentinian speculation. It consists of five books (originally 
composed in Greek, but the Latin translation is the only complete version that remains) the first 
of which is the most important; offering a comprehensive account of Valentinism. Irenaeus 
composed his magnum opus after a friend, desiring to learn more about this new ‘religion,’ 
requested his thoughts on the new school. Irenaeus responded with a detailed exposition of the 
various strands of Valentinian philosophy with the ultimate intention of refuting their positions. 
He reports that he is as competent as any in carrying out this task given the fact that he had first-
hand knowledge of Valentinus’ schools and was even familiar with their theological writings.344  
    Hippolytus of Rome’s Refutatio Omnium Haeresium (Philosophoumena) (c. post 222) is 
perhaps the second most important of the herisological reports. His monumental work (originally 
composed in Greek) attempted to trace all heretical thought back to pagan philosophy. Although 
his authorship has been questioned,345 the importance of the work is measured by its preservation 
of original Valentinian fragments. Furthermore, despite knowing Irenaeus’ account, he does not 
appear to use it as his primary source for describing Valentinism, thus he provides us with his 
own independent description which can be utilised to compare with the one that Irenaeus 
supplies.346 Similarly, Clement’s Excerpts of Theodotus (chapters XLII – LXV c. 140-215) have 
preserved some valuable original material. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Teachings of Gnosticism, New York, Harper, 1990, and: Attilio Mastrocinque, From Jewish Magic to 
Gnosticism, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2005. 
342 For a detailed account of the nature of this discovery see: Marvin Meyer, The Gnostic Discoveries, New York, 
Harper, 2005, pp.13-33.  
343 Justin mentions the work himself in I Apol VI; an attempt to reconstruct the work was made by Pierre Prigent; 
see: Pierre Pringent, Justin et l’Ancien Testament, Paris, Librairie Lecoffre, 1964. 
344 Giovanni Filoramo, A History of Gnosticism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990, p.3. 
345 See: P. Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, Paris, 1947.  
346 Ismo Dunderberg claims that Hippolytus drew on ‘another source of information, usually designated as 
“System/Version B”’ (Ismo Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of 
Valentinus, New York, Columbia, 2008, p.9. However, there is evidence to suggest that Irenaeus was also familiar 
with System/Version B. 
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    Further herisological reports on Valentinism can be sourced from Tertullian (c. 150-225). 
However, whilst we know that he would have been familiar with some important primary 
materials (e.g. Alexander’s collection of Valentinus’ Psalms), he chose – in the words of Ismo 
Dunderberg – to ‘slavishly follow Irenaeus in writing his treatise Against Valentinians.’347 This 
has resulted in him leaving very little in the way of original sources that we can draw from. 
However, fortunately this is not the case with Epiphanius of Salamis (c. 315); who, in his 
Panarion, despite also being greatly indebted to Irenaeus, gives us access to two primary 
sources, which he quotes at length: Ptolemaeus’ Letter to Flora and the Letter of Instruction. 
Similarly, Origen of Alexandria (c.184-254) preserved some fragments of Heracleon’s 
commentaries on the Gospels in his own Commentary on John.   
    However, in the advent of the discovery of the Nag Hammadi codices, we now have access to 
a range of material that is considered original to various Valentinian authors. Perhaps, the three 
most significant works for the purposes at hand– in so far as they give us an authentic mode of 
measuring the accuracy of the various systems reported by Irenaeus and others – are The Gospel 
of Truth (NHC I: III; XII: II),348 The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I:V),349 and A Valentinian 
Exposition (NHC XI:II).350 In light of these texts, some have questioned the accuracy of the 
herisological accounts.351 However, in other cases to the contrary, they have been used to 
confirm, by scholars such as Niclas Förster and Francois Sagnard,352 what Giovanni Filoramo 
has called, ‘the substantial reliability of Irenaeus.’353 In agreement with these scholars, it would 
appear fair to support the conclusion that the descriptive accounts that Irenaeus provides of the 
Valentinian traditions seem, on large, to correspond, fairly substantially, with the positions that 
we encounter in the Valentinian texts of the Nag Hammadi library. Although the genealogical 
trees established by the Church Fathers, within their respective assessments, are clearly proposed 
                                                             
347 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, p.10. 
348 NHC is an abbreviation of Nag Hammadi codices. The Gospel of Truth shall be abbreviated to GT. 
349 From henceforth, to be referred to as TT. 
350 To be abbreviated to VE. Other texts considered to be Valentinian include: The Treatise on the Resurrection 
(NHC I:IV), The Gospel of Phillip (NHC II:III), The First Apocalypse of James (NHC V:III), and The Interpretation 
of Knowledge (NHC XI:I). 
351 For instance, Thomas Ferguson states that: ‘Irenaeus is no longer considered an inept editor of other people’s 
work’ (Thomas Ferguson, ‘The Rule of Truth and Irenaean Rehetoric in Book 1 of Against Heresies,’ in: Vigiliae 
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352 See, for instance: Niclas Förster, Marcus Magus: Kult, Lehre und Gemeindeleben einer valentinianischen 
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in order to discredit the belief systems which they were describing, and are rightly categorised as 
‘arbitrary ideological constructions,’354 there is no evidence, from the Nag Hammadi texts at 
least, that would suggest that this bias has distorted, in any significant way, the accounts of the 
systems themselves. Therefore, in light of this conclusion, the Adversus Haereses shall function 
as our principle source for accounting for Valentinism; a source that shall be examined and 
tested against the other herisological reports as well as the relevant texts from the Nag Hammadi 
codices.              
    Therefore, we shall now attempt to provide an archaeological account of Valentinian wisdom 
theology which will equip us for the investigations of later systems of thought that shall follow in 
the thesis.   
    The principle task of this chapter is not to address the wider issues concerning the study of 
Gnosticism (the debates surrounding origins, histories, and the mutual relationships between the 
various Gnostic systems), but much more specifically, to assess the theological, philosophical, 
and mythological functions that Sophia performs within the rudimentary Valentinian narrative 
and how these emerge within this particular discourse. Thus, the archaeology must not only 
account for the concept within an authoritative enunciative field (Valentinian Gnosticism), but its 
rules of formation, how this particular concept, under this particular authority, emerges and what 
causes this to be the case.  Let us first look at the narrative itself, following its development and 
portrayal.  
Sophia as Announced within the Gnostic Narrative 
Irenaeus opens his account of the Valentininan cosmological drama by asserting that ‘they 
maintain that in the invisible heights there exists a certain perfect, pre-existent aeon’355 who is 
called Proarche (Προαρχὴν), Propator (Προπάτορα), or Bythus (Βυθὸν), and whose nature is 
comprised of radical transcendence and incomprehensibility. Hippolytus states that this 
‘originating cause of the universe is a Monad, unbegotten, imperishable, incomprehensible, 
                                                             
354 Ibid. 
 
355 AH I,I:I. Aeon (αἰών) appears to have been produced from the words ἀεί ὤν (ever-being) which in its 
Valentinian context means something along the lines of ‘an emanation from the divine substance, subsisting 
coordinately and co-eternally with the deity, the Pleroma still remaining one’ (Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, 
and Arthur Cleveland (eds), The Ante-Nicene Fathers I, New York, Cosimo, 2007, p.316).    
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inconceivable, productive, and a cause of the generation of all existent things.’356 Typically, 
Bythus is characterised by masculinity contrary to his female counterpart Ennoia (Ἒννοιαν), 
Charis (Χάριν) or, Sige (Σιγὴν) who exists alongside him. Together they are said to initiate the 
creative process through sexual conjunction.357 However, there appears to have been much 
dispute over the nature of this initial process of begetting. Some of the Valentinians rejected this 
primary duality, opting instead for Bythus’ original sole self-dependency in the creative act; both 
scenarios are reported, although there seems to be greater support for the latter option, of at least, 
the primacy of Bythus.358 Irenaeus then reports that Bythus had determined to inaugurate the 
creative process by depositing his seed (containing the origins of all being) into Ennoia who 
subsequently became impregnated and birthed Nous (Νοῦν), Monogenes (Μονογενῆ) Father 
(Πατέρα), or Beginning of all beings (Ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων) as well as his female consort Aletheia 
(Ἀλἡθεια).359 Nous is claimed to be ‘similar and equal to him who had produced him, and was 
alone capable of comprehending his Father’s greatness.’360  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
356Hippolytus, ‘Refutation of All Heresies VI:XXIV,’ in: Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers VI:I, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1990, p.225 (from henceforth to be abbreviated to RH). Hippolytus’ reports 
are supported by three prominent Valentinian texts: GT XVII:X claims that the Father is ‘incomprehensible’ and 
‘superior to every thought’; similarly, TT LI:X claims that the Father is a ‘single One;’ and VE XXII: XXV  affirms 
that the Father is an ‘ineffable One’ (see: James Robinson (ed), The Nag Hammadi Library, New York, Harper, 
1990, p.40, p.60, p.482).       
357 AH I,I:I 
358 See, for instance: RH VI:XXIV, p.225; Epiphanius of Salamis, Panarion I:II, in: Frank Williams, The Panarion of 
Epiphanius of Salamis Book 1 (Sects 1-46), Leiden, Hotei Publishing, 2009, p.170; GT XVIII: V, p.40; TT LI: X, 
p.60; VE XXII:V, p.282. 
359 Epiphanius of Salamis reports a different account to Irenaeus and gives greater precedence to the role that Ennoia 
plays in sexually seducing Bythus and exciting his desire for her. He states that: ‘wishing to break eternal bonds, the 
imperishable [Ennoia]…softened the majesty to a desire for his repose. And by coupling with him she showed forth 
the Father’ (Epiphanius of Salamis, Panarion I:II, in: Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis Book 
1 (Sects 1-46), Leiden, Hotei Publishing, 2009, p.170). The TT (LIII:XXXV, p.61) is closer to Irenaeus’ account in so 
far that it refuses to acknowledge any ‘co-worker’ with Bythus. 
360 AH I,I:I 
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These initial two dyads comprise the first tetrad:   
                                                             
 Figure 1. 
                            Masculine                                                                                      Feminine 
 Proarche/Propator/Bythus/Beginning of all beings         Conjunction      Ennoia/Charis/Sige                      
 
 
                                                                     
                                               Nous/Monogenes/Father                          Aletheia 
 
Then Nous, having realised the purpose of his existence (to begin to fashion the entire Pleroma), 
conjoined with Aletheia who gave birth to the dyad of Logos (Λόγον) and Zoe (Ζωὴν); both of 
whom then further consorted to produce Anthropos (Ἄνθρωπον) and Ecclesia (Εχχλησίαν); 
giving us the first begotten primary Ogdoad:                                    
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Figure 2. 
      Masculine                                                                                                                Feminine 
 Proarche/Propator/Bythus/Beginning of all beings         Conjunction      Ennoia/Charis/Sige                      
 
 
                                                                     
                                              Nous/Monogenes/Father     Conjunction       Aletheia 
    
 
 
                                                                           Logos      Conjunction      Zoe  
 
 
                          
                                                                Anthropos                                    Ecclesia 
 
Then, in an effort to glorify the Father, Logos and Zoe produced a further ten aeons; giving us 
eighteen in total.361 However, the crux of the Valentinian drama, namely Sophia’s personal 
biography, does not occur on this side of the genealogy, which plays no specific role in the rest 
                                                             
361 For the sake of completion, the ten aeons that Irenaeus names are: Bythius (Βύθιος) and Mixis (Μὶξις), Ageratos 
(Ἀγήρατος) and Henosis (Ἕνωσις), Autophyes (Αὐτοφυὴς) and Hedone (Ἡδονὴ), Acinetos (Ἀχίνητος) and Syncrasis 
(Σύγχρασις), and Monogenes (Μονογενὴς) and Macaria (Μαχαρία) (AH I:I). Hippolytus reports the same account 
(RH IV:XXV). Although, Epiphanius offers a different genealogy; see: Epiphanius of Salamis, Panarion I:II, in: 
Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis Book 1 (Sects 1-46), Leiden, Hotei Publishing, 2009, p.171.   
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of the myth; therefore, we shall move on directly to the progenitive activity of Anthropos and 
Ecclesia.  It is claimed that Anthropos and Ecclesia produced a further twelve aeons:362      
 
Figure 3.                                                    
                                       Anthropos    Conjunction     Ecclesia 
 
 
 
 
Paracletus    Pistis                                                                                     Patricos  Elpis   
 
 
                 Metricos          Agape                                          Ainos           Synesis        
 
 
                                       Ecclesiasticus    Macariotes                                                                     
 
 
                                                                      Thelotes       Sophia           
 
With this diagram, we have now accounted for the standard thirty aeons of the Valentinian 
Pleroma.363 Amongst all of them, Nous held precedence in so far as he was the only aeon that 
                                                             
362 Again this genealogy is supported by Hippolytus RH VI:XXV. The order of the aeons: ‘Παράχλτος χαὶ Πίστις, 
Πατριχὸς χαὶ Ἐλπὶς, Μητριχὸς χαὶ Ἀγάπη, Ἀείνους χαὶ Σύνεσις, Ἐχχλησιαστιχός χαὶ Μαχαριότης, Θελητὸς χαὶ 
Σοφία.’   
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was capable of contemplating Bythus; to all the others he was said to be incomprehensible and 
invisible.364  
    It is noted that Nous desired to mediate his knowledge of Bythus to the other aeons, and would 
have done so if it were not for Ennoia/Sige who restrained him in accordance with the will of 
Bythus. However, this would appear to have been in vain as, although all of the aeons secretly 
longed to contemplate their originator, Sophia, the youngest aeon, ‘suffered passion apart from 
the embrace of her consort Thelotes’365 and sought to contemplate the primary transcendent 
cause. This passion supposedly commenced in all of the aeons connected to Nous and Aletheia 
and infectiously spread to the base of the Pleroma until it manifested itself in Sophia. Although it 
was under the pretence of affection, Sophia was overwhelmed with her desire for Bythus and 
recklessly sought to contemplate him after the manner of Nous.366 What she attempted was 
impossible and her failure caused her an ‘extreme agony of mind;’ but her desire was insatiable 
and she continued to explore the depths of the originator, and would have been absorbed into 
Bythus at the expense of her own existence if it were not for Horos367 (to be discussed below) 
who brings her back to her proper place within the Pleroma, where she is subsequently 
convinced of the incomprehensibility of the originator and then sets aside her initial passion, 
having realised its impossibility.368  
    Almost immediately we are able to note some drastic discrepancies between the biblical 
concept of Wisdom and the Valentinian presentation that we have here. Firstly, within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
363 Although they vary significantly, Bythus is sometimes excluded from the number. However, in the VE XXX:XX, 
p.484 there is some evidence to suggest a similar genealogical construction centered on a primary triacontad. There 
is also clear evidence in this same text which demonstrates that Valentinians took numerology very seriously; 
counting further emanations to take the aeons up to three hundred and sixty so as to reflect the number of days in a 
year. Irenaeus reports there being a similar significance attributed to the number thirty; which is linked with the 
proposed life span of Jesus (AH I,I:III).   
364 See: GT XXII:XXVII, p.43. 
365 AH I II:II. 
366 TT LXXV:XV, p.72. 
367 Horos is the power of Bythus. It does not appear to be a self-subsisting aeon at this point, but a designated limit 
that marks out a boundary to the other aeons to protect them from being absorbed into the total unity of Bythus. 
However, later it is suggested that Bythus produces Horos without conjunction in response to Sophia’s disobedience. 
Jonas suggests that they were probably two different figures that were later conflated in to one (Hans Jonas, The 
Gnostic Religion, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, p.184). 
368 Whilst the Excerpts of Theodotus XXXI:III report a similar account to that given by Irenaeus, Hippolytus claims 
that Sophia wanted to imitate the originator’s productivity by begetting without conjunction and was ignorant of her 
inability to do so (see: RH VI:XXV). The TT LXXVII-LXXX, p.73-74, acknowledges a similar basic narrative 
although it is less elaborate and the Logos has the role of Sophia. However, the VE supports Irenaeus’ outline, with 
Sophia playing the same basic role in the narrative. 
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biblical account, wisdom theology was utilized to make theological and philosophical sense of a 
concrete event or encounter with God, be it through the Mosaic Law, or for the early Christians, 
Jesus of Nazareth. Even in Proverbs 8 Wisdom’s theological role is to make sense of God’s 
presence in the world and poetically and imaginatively convey this encounter of the Jewish 
people. However, within this narrative, we find ourselves within the realms of a mythological 
metaphysics. Wisdom is portrayed here as an individualised deity, playing a dramatic role within 
a larger myth of agonistic interchanges between a series of gods, that have produced themselves 
through sexual conjunction.   
    The ‘events’ that this narrative has portrayed so far have occurred entirely within the Pleroma 
itself. However, the resulting passions will inaugurate a series of events that will produce a 
reality outside of this initial totality.    
The Fall of Sophia 
Both Irenaeus and Hippolytus report that Sophia’s passion brought forth some sort of 
‘amorphous substance.’369 They suggest that the formlessness of the substance produced by 
Sophia was a result of her passion being ‘unfertilised’ by her male counterpart. Within 
Valentinian speculation, although perhaps under the influence of Platonic cosmology,370 the 
masculine aeons provide form and content to the mass which is produced by the purely receptive 
female aeons.  
    Sophia, having beheld the outcome of her passion, began ‘weeping and bewailing’ in despair 
and in fear that she may lose her own existence on account of her unwanted production. In her 
distress she turned, in supplication, to Bythus while the other aeons also interceded for her. 
Irenaeus then claims that ‘the Father [Bythus] afterwards produced, in his own image, by means 
of Monogenes [Nous]…Horos [Ὁρον] without conjunction.’371 Horos is also termed Stauros 
(Σταυρὸν), Lytrotes (Λυτρωτὴν), Carpistes (Καρπιστὴν), Horothetes (Ὁροθέτην) or, Metagoges 
(Μεταγωγέα). The primary function of Horos, in this instance, is to expel the amorphous 
                                                             
369 See: AH I, II:III; RH VI:XXVI; and the TT  reports a very similar occurrence: ‘things which came into being from 
the arrogant thought…[which are] copies, shadows and phantasms lacking’ (TT LXXVIII:XXX, p.74).  
370 See, for instance, Plato’s third ontological category in the Timaeus the passive ‘wherein,’ in which something 
becomes, he likens to the female recipient of masculine form (Plato, Timaeus (LOEB), Cambridge, Harvard, 1929, 
p.118).  
371 AH I, II:IV, p.318. Hippolytus does not reproduce this account and misses out the production of Horos entirely. 
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substance from Sophia.372 The formless substance is taken away from her, along with the 
passions that occasioned its appearance, and she is restored in to the harmony of the Pleroma 
after the separation has occurred. Her illegitimate child is something of an ontological mutation; 
for we are told that it has inherited some of the spiritual qualities of its mother, yet it is still 
formless.373   
    It is then claimed that Nous produced (Hippolytus reports that this was in conjunction with 
Aletheia) a further conjugal dyad: Christ (Χριστόν)374 and the Holy Spirit (Πνεῦµα ἃγιον) with 
the view to ‘fortifying and strengthening the Pleroma.’375 The specific role of Christ is to teach 
the other aeons of their inability to fully comprehend the depths of their fashioner and to be 
content with the knowledge of him that Nous mediates to them. The Holy Spirit is then said to 
have revealed the equality of the aeons to each respectively, whereby a peaceful and contented 
rest ensued within the Pleroma. Thenceforward, collectively praising Bythus in response to this 
re-established harmony, they each brought forth a gift to reflect the highest quality of their 
natures, and joining them together, they produced ‘a being of most perfect beauty, the very star 
of the Pleroma, the perfect fruit, namely Jesus,’ who is also called Saviour, Christ, Paraclete, 
and Logos. 376 His generation was also accompanied by an angelic host that were to act as his 
guardians.   
    However, Sophia’s amorphous substance, which is referred to as Achamoth (Ἀχαµὼθ),377 
began to become ‘violently excited in those places of darkness and vacuity.’378 Christ (not Jesus 
the ‘fruit of the Pleroma’) moved by compassion, descended beyond the boundary marked by 
Horos and imparted form to her and withdrew back again.379 From Christ’s descent she had 
become aware of her Pleromic origins and desired to return ‘home’ but was denied by Horos at 
                                                             
372 Hippolytus has this role performed by Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
373 On this mutated mediatory nature of ‘fallen Sophia’ and its relationship to similar narratives see: M. Tardieu, 
Trois Mythes Gnostiques, Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1974, p.57; Otfried Hofius, Der Vorhang vor dem Thron 
Gottes, Tübingen, Siebeck, 1972, pp.28-48; G.C. Stead, ‘The Valentinian Myth of Sophia’, JTS 20 (1969), pp.75-
104.   
374 This aeon should not be confused with Jesus of Nazareth; he has yet to feature in the myth. 
375 AH I, II:V, p.318. 
376 AH I, II:VI, P.318. Hippolytus reports a near identical account (RH VI:XXVII, p.231); both are somewhat 
confirmed by TT LXXXV:XXV. 
377 Thought to be a play on the Hebrew word for Wisdom: הָמְכָח; on the etymology of this name see: Carsten Colpe, 
‘Gnosis I’, RGG II, pp.1648-1642.  
378 AH I, IV:I, p.320. 
379 A parallel account of this descent (albeit in a much vaguer form) can be identified in the VE XXXII, P.485.  
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the boundary which he had marked out. Having had her desire thwarted, she falls into three 
primary passions: grief (λύπην), fear (φόβον), and perplexity (ἀπορίαν) – all of which are related 
to the cardinal Valentinian sin: ignorance (ἀγνοία).380 The final passion is said to be her desire, 
excited by Christ, to return back to the Pleroma. Both Irenaeus and Hippolytus report that these 
primary passions are the substances from which finite reality (in all its dimensions) were formed. 
Thus, from her desire to repent and return to the Pleroma the relatively positive aspects of life 
‘outside’ of the Pleroma were formed namely, souls and the Demiurge (Δηµιουργὸν). From her 
negative passions came material substances in all their varieties.381  
    Once Achamoth had passed through this variety of passions, she appealed to Christ to return to 
her once again. However, not wanting to descend outside of the Pleroma for a second time, he 
sent the Paraclete (Jesus ‘the fruit of the Pleroma’) with his army of bodyguards, his angels, to 
aid Achamoth. It is said that he imparted further form to her (intelligent form) and ostracised her 
passions from her and condensed them (rather than destroying them382) into ‘unorganised matter’ 
to which he imparted ‘corporeal structures’ which were of a twofold nature: evil (born out of her 
‘negative passions) and a lesser evil (resulting from her repentance and desire for the 
Pleroma).383  
    Having been set free from her passions she then gazed upon Jesus and, being moved into an 
ecstasy, spontaneously produced further beings after her own image and after the images of 
Jesus’ angels.  This threefold division provides the basic Valentinian ontology, which is 
comprised of the three forms: matter (from the negative passions),384 animal (from her 
repentance and longing to return to the Pleroma), and spiritual (which was brought forth in her 
ecstasy). Being unable to give form to the spiritual mode of being, she turned her attention to the 
animal substance producing the ‘creator’ of this world: ‘Father (Πατέρα), Metropator 
(Μητροπάτορα), Apator (Απάτορα), or Demiurge. He is said to be ruler of all the things which 
                                                             
380 Where the fall of Sophia that occurred within the Pleroma was the product of unsuitable desire in ignorance; 
Achamoth is said to be opposed to the very notion of knowledge.  
381 Accounts of which substances came from which passions vary greatly, it does not appear essential to the overall  
narrative to relate them here in their entirety; if one wants a fuller overview see: AH I, IV:II-V; RH VI:XXVII; 
Francois Sagnard, La Gnose Valentinienne et le Tèmoignage de Saint Ireneè, Paris, Vrin, 1947. 
382Apparently, the passions have taken root in this instance and cannot simply be destroyed. 
383 Thus, Jesus is said by some to be the true creator of the cosmos given this pivotal role in its becoming. 
384However, the devil and all demonic and wicked beings are said to derive their existence from Achamoth’s 
negative passions; bizarrely, the devil is said to have knowledge of the Pleroma (where the Demiurge does not) 
because he is of a spiritual nature.   
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are of the same animal nature as himself (a substance which various Valentinians claim to belong 
to the right hand or the psychic) and also of the substance produced by Achamoth’s negative 
passions (which is sometimes called left-handed).385  
    The Demiurge was compelled by his mother Achamoth to continue the creative process, who 
desired to produce images of the various aeons (or some suggest that Jesus desired to through 
Achamoth’s instrumentality) without the Demiurge realising that this was the case. Thus, it is 
reported that the Demiurge is the Father and God of everything outside of the Pleroma.’386 In an 
attempt to intuitively or subconsciously mimic the structure of the Pleroma, he reportedly also 
fashioned seven heavens – at the top of which he dwelt – and Achamoth dwells in a heaven 
above him; in an intermediate habitation mediating between existence outside of the Pleroma and 
existence inside of it. This eightfold structure gives us another primary ‘Ogdoad.’ It is also 
reported that death and corruption are introduced into the fabric of finite existence through the 
Demiurge’s creative activity.387  
    The Demiurge then created humanity by forming them from ‘an invisible substance consisting 
of fusible and fluid matter’ which he then breathed in to; giving them an animal nature after the 
image and likeness of his own form.388 However, we are also told that Achamoth, manipulating 
the Demiurge’s ignorance, secretly created spiritual beings – inspired by the forms of the angelic 
host that had accompanied Jesus – by depositing her production within the Demiurge, which he 
then inadvertently infused with animal souls.389 Irenaeus claims that these secret spiritual beings 
were referred to as the Ecclesia as an ‘exemplum’ of the Ecclesia that dwells in the Pleroma.  
    From these accounts we can get a sense of the typical Valentinian anthropology: the threefold 
human composition including a material body, an animal soul (from the Demiurge) and a 
spiritual seed (secretly deposited by Achamoth).390 The materialistic and animalistic aspects of 
the human constitution are conceived together as a type of temporary ‘womb’ carrying the 
                                                             
385 ‘Those of the representation are called “the Right Ones” and “Psychic” and “the Fiery Ones” and “the Middle 
Ones.” Those who belong to the arrogant thought…are called “the Left,” “Hylic,” “the Dark Ones,” and “the Last”’ 
(TT XCVIII:XV-XX, p.84). 
386 AH I, V:II, p.322. 
387 AH I, V:IV, p.323. 
388 AH I, V:V, p.323. 
389 The material body is conceived as a sought of temporary ‘womb’ carrying this spiritual capacity.  
390 AH I, V:VI, p.323. 
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spiritual component of the human person that is nurtured and grows towards a state of perfection 
until it is ready to be harvested.  
    From these observations, the extent to which the Valentinian figure of Sophia diverges from 
its biblical counterpart becomes stark. Within the biblical concept of Wisdom and its theology, 
there was a clear insistence on God’s free and purposeful creation of the world. Wisdom’s role 
within the creation of the world could either be understood as a poetic description of God’s 
creative activity, or at its most developed, a creative or instrumental force at the service of God. 
Within the Valentinian narrative, there is no purposeful creation, there is no free creative act and 
there is no positive role played by Wisdom. What one can identify instead is that the production 
of the world could more appropriately be considered as a falling away from an ideal state of 
existence. Wisdom’s role within this falling away is significant; she is portrayed to be its cause. 
Therefore, in contradiction to the biblical concept of Wisdom, Sophia here performs an entirely 
negative theological function.  
    As in the biblical presentation of the Wisdom figure, Sophia (in her fallen state) does still 
convey the divine presence of the Pleroma. However, this appears to be by an accident as 
opposed to being an intentional product of the divine creation. Within biblical Wisdom theology, 
there is a clear allusion to, and creative engagement with the creation narrative as presented in 
Genesis. Within the Valentinian narrative, the Genesis account is parodied; the figure of the 
Demiurge (the false God of this world) is said to be the cause of animal nature. Wisdom 
communicates divine presence through her duping of the Demiurge, in which she smuggles 
divine ‘sparks’ into a portion of humankind at their creation. What is clear from these 
observations is the fact that Valentinian Wisdom theology is entirely ahistorical; it is grounded in 
myth and an elaborate and imaginative cosmological metaphysics. If biblical wisdom theology 
grounded creative engagement with the world and its various cultures (in so far as every aspect 
of creation is related to Wisdom in some form), the Gnostic theology of wisdom supports the 
existence of an elite (those carrying the divine sparks), those outside of this ontology could 
seemingly have nothing positive to offer the Gnostic theologian.  
    We shall now explore the next major stage of this sapiential narrative – Valentinian 
eschatology.  
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Achamoth’s Return to the Pleroma: Valentinian Eschatology.  
Irenaeus records that when these spiritual fragments have attained perfection, Achamoth is 
permitted re-entry into the Pleroma where she is subsequently conjoined with Jesus to form the 
last Pleromic dyad: the bride and the bridegroom. Achamoth’s return is accompanied by the 
universal liberation of the spiritual seeds from their material bodies: ‘the spiritual seed, again 
being divested of their animal souls, and becoming intelligent spirits [πνεύµατα νοερἀ/spiritus 
intellectuales], shall…enter in within the Pleroma, and be bestowed as brides on those angels 
who wait upon the Saviour [Jesus].’391 Some reports suggest that the fate of the Demiurge and 
those righteous people, which had not attained to perfection, will pass into the previous 
intermediary habitation of Achamoth, where there is some knowledge of the Pleroma. But, 
typically, it is suggested that all material and animal existence is utterly destroyed by a 
consuming fire which itself eventually burns out and ceases to exist.392  
    One theory, noted by Irenaeus, as to how this eschatological process is inaugurated (how the 
spiritual seeds come to reach maturity) is that the Demiurge produced a Christ (the historical 
Jesus of the Gospels) after his own animal nature. However, when being baptised by John the 
Baptist, the Jesus of the Pleroma descended upon the animal Christ in the form of a dove. The 
historical Jesus was therefore comprised of four principle components: the material, the animal, 
the spiritual seed, and the spirit of Jesus (the fruit of the Pleroma). However, when the historical 
Jesus was brought before Pilate, the Jesus of the Pleroma departed from him and his animal 
nature endured suffering and crucifixion whilst his spiritual components were not affected.393 
The Jesus of the Pleroma was said to have disclosed the truth and knowledge about the Pleroma, 
through his ‘incarnation,’ to the Demiurge and to those inhabited by the spiritual seed; 
encouraging them to grow towards perfection and to return to their Pleromic source.    
    We have already seen that within the biblical wisdom narrative, eschatology was envisaged as 
a supernatural fulfilment of creation. Within the Wisdom of Solomon this took the form of the 
                                                             
391 AH I, VII:I, P.325. The VE (XXXIX:XXX-XL, p.487) reports Sophia’s restitution but with much less detail and 
elaboration. There is a similar case with the TT (CXXII-CXXX, pp.96-100) although there is significant 
development in detail. 
392 There are some references to animals (those of an animal nature) not being admitted within the Pleroma in 
Valentinian texts; see: The Gospel of Phillip VXXIX: V-XI, p.156.  
393 Although the logic of Valentinian Christology would seem to suggest a commitment to docetism; the various 
references to Christ’s historical sufferings are not qualified with docetic positions as we might have expected. See, 
for instance; GT XVIII:XX, p.41.  
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soul’s rewarded immortality, and for the New Testament writers this was participation in Christ’s 
divine redemptive economy. In every instance, there was candid insistence on the priority of 
divine grace when it came to salvation and eschatology. However, from the Valentinian narrative 
we have discerned that correct knowledge is the only proprietor of salvation. Those who are able 
to discover their true ontological identities as aspects of a fallen deity are those that find 
salvation. Within this framework, the work of the individual is crucial, salvation cannot be 
obtained without human effort, and it is something humanly achievable through right 
understanding.  
    Within the biblical wisdom tradition, Wisdom, conceived as Christ, was understood to be 
concretely and historically incarnate within a human individual. At first glance, Wisdom as 
Christ appears to be playing a similar role within the Gnostic account. However, it is clearly 
evidenced that this Christ is not historically incarnate in any real sense, he simply gives the 
impression that he is, in an overt docetic Christology. This can be detected from the fact that the 
divine being inhabiting Jesus ascends to the Pleroma before his death. Christ’s death and 
resurrection have no significance, as they evidently do for the New Testament wisdom 
theologians, Paul and John. Within the Gnostic narrative, it was only necessary that Christ passes 
on true knowledge to his disciples, from which they must then cultivate their own salvation.    
   Furthermore, the biblical wisdom tradition affirms that, although Wisdom can be manifested 
within one culture, or tradition, and indeed even within one individual, this never appears to 
detract from the fact that Wisdom is present in the whole of creation as well, due to sapiential 
creation theology. Therefore, every culture, religion, and person must in some sense be related to 
Wisdom and present themselves as something to be engaged with, even if this does not imply 
that they must ultimately be adopted. This, to some, may be considered a theologically 
uncomfortable idea, especially when it requires wisdom to be discerned within the most alien 
and, perhaps even challenging of ideologies. However, what can be concluded from the Gnostic 
wisdom tradition is the extent to which this engagement is barred from the very beginning. There 
is no creation theology within this narrative. The world is inherently problematic; its very 
existence was an accident of deviant behaviour within the divine Pleroma. Salvation occurs 
through the impartation of correct knowledge from a select elite of Gnostic hierarchs. This is not 
a theology of engagement with the world, but a theology which supports the power of the few 
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who have insight. It is therefore no surprise that those who fashioned this mythology also have a 
significant political and social stake in upholding its existence. However, that being 
acknowledged, Kurt Rudolph notes that: ‘there was no “Gnostic” church or normative theology, 
no Gnostic rule of faith nor any dogma of exclusive importance. No limits were set to free 
representation and theological speculation so far as they lay within the frame of the Gnostic view 
of the world.’394 Thus, a certain amount of liberality could be ascribed to the Gnostic 
communities as long as they strictly adhered to the overarching framework.   
Although very little is known about the sociological and political dynamics of individual Gnostic 
communities, there is scholarly agreement on the importance of elitism and the charismatic 
authority of the leader, in regulating the activity of the community. Gnostic wisdom theology 
clearly purports the ideological insistence on there being a chosen group of people ontologically 
superior to others from their very formation. Perhaps, this is the core Gnostic idea that later led 
Voegelin to draw comparisons between this system of ideas and twentieth century Nazi politics.  
    Having given an account of the basic Valentinian cosmological myth and noting Sophia’s role 
within it, we shall now move on to identifying and evaluating the specific philosophical and 
theological presuppositions and positions that generate this complicated and diverse mythology, 
its discursive rules of formation, before attempting to demonstrate that these same positions form 
a unity of discourse in contrast to the biblical concept of Wisdom, that we will call Valentinian 
wisdom theology. 
The Rules of Formation for the Concept of Valentinian Wisdom Theology 
It would appear that it is possible to identify that the most fundamental theological and 
philosophical commitment of the Valentinians is to an original ontological monism; all existence 
is contained within, and is merely various modifications of one all-encompassing pantheistic 
divinity. This founding presupposition also reflexively posits their first philosophical problem, 
which is twofold in nature: if an original ontological monism is upheld then why and how is there 
otherness; or, put simply, what accounts for the possibility of the fractured plurality of finite 
existence (time, space, limitation, etc.) which presents itself as so radically opposed to any 
monistic totality. The Valentinians therefore find themselves in an incredibly peculiar situation; 
                                                             
394 Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, p.53. 
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for their most basic conviction is immediately contradicted by the reality which they themselves 
inhabit. Thus, it would appear that we can note that the very notion of creation, finitude and 
otherness is inherently problematic within the Valentinian system. This awkward fact then gives 
rise to the unique Valentinian (although perhaps Gnostic more broadly) phenomenon of 
existential alienation. Valentinians are intuitively aware of their infinite origins and long to 
return ‘home;’ which is necessarily accompanied by a desire for the negation of finite limitation 
and historical existence. Thus, the question as to why there is finitude and otherness is answered 
with the negative rejection of its intrinsic value: although it is the case, it should not be. 
Furthermore, these specific ontological presuppositions are also accompanied by some 
foundational eschatological premises. Namely, that the Valentinian’s ‘alienated existence’ (the 
one contradicting the monistic totality) will itself be contradicted and absorbed back into the 
totality, which will represent the consummation of history (e.g. its negation in its identification 
with the primal unity).  
    From these brief observations it becomes quite clear how the response to the ‘why question’ 
immediately leads to the specific myths that we encountered above as an imaginative response to 
the accompanying ‘how question.’  
    Therefore, the Valentinian myths, when conceived as explanations responding to the 
philosophical problems that have been generated by their foundational presuppositions, can be 
conveniently divided into two parts: the cosmological narrative - that responds to the origins of 
finite existence and otherness - and the soteriological and eschatological narrative, which seeks 
to account for the negation of finite otherness.    
The crux of the myth is centred on the figure of Sophia, whose role within the narrative is to 
explain that which is the case (finite reality), but which should never have been the case. 
Sophia’s unnatural desire, although apparently initiating higher up in the aeonic chain, appears to 
be the result of ignorance. This introduces disharmony into the Pleroma – a sort of counter force 
that must be extradited for the primal harmony to resume. This extradition duplicates Sophia’s 
existence into one that remains within the Pleroma and another that is expelled outside of it. 
Sophia’s exile narrates a primal unity that was disrupted by an alien force that has produced 
otherness and finite existence outside of the totality. It is important to note that the plurality to 
have emerged accidentally out of the original unity is still ontologically bound up with the 
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wholeness of the Pleroma; finite history is, essentially, a parody of the infinite totality, which 
itself contains alienated ‘aspects’ of that original unity within its new mode of existence. Thus, 
the Pleroma cannot simply remain unaffected by this anomaly; it must negate the negation of 
itself in order to recapture the initial harmony that it once possessed. Thus, Valentinian thought 
harbours the paradox of its disdain for history alongside its inestimable value in so far as it is 
bound to the Pleroma. This leads us on to the soteriological and eschatological dynamics of the 
myth. 
     The aeon Christ descends from the Pleroma with the intention of inaugurating the process that 
will eventually lead to her return. Christ’s appearance excites an intuitive awareness of fallen 
Sophia’s original wholeness and unity within the Pleroma and, subsequently, a desire to correct 
her mutated existence. The process of ‘creation,’ that begins after Christ’s descent, offers further 
elucidation on how the average Valentinian conceives of his/her ontological status. 
    Achamoth’s manipulation of the Demiurge’s creativity produces three essential 
anthropological components, which are comprised of the material, the animal, and the ‘spiritual 
seeds.’ The spiritual component, deposited by Achamoth, is directly related to the Pleroma and, 
in a sense, is an aspect of it. This ‘seed’ is what is ultimately destined to be reabsorbed back into 
the monistic unity, while everything else which constitutes the human person shall either be 
destroyed or left outside of it. We are then left with the question as to how this will take place. 
    The ‘incarnation’ of the historical Jesus of Nazareth, who was initially sent by the Demiurge 
and was composed of the threefold substances just mentioned, was transformed during his 
baptism when the Pleromic Jesus descended down on him. Thus, the standard Valentinian 
Christology upholds a fourfold division within Christ; including the three basic anthropological 
substances as well as an additional spiritual constituent: the Pleromic Jesus. The role of this 
messiah is to impart knowledge of the truth (the true ontological status of those carrying the 
spiritual seed) and to grow the seeds until they reach fruition and are ready to be harvested 
(return to the fullness of the Pleroma and negate finite existence).  
    Having briefly discussed the rules of formation for the concept of Valentinian Wisdom 
theology, focussing on the philosophical and theological problems that produced such a concept, 
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and having already noted its sociological and political significance for establishing an elite 
hierarchy, we shall now outline the concept itself. 
The Concept of Valentinian Wisdom Theology 
Cosmological dimension     
i) Within the Valentinian narrative, Sophia functions as an explanation for existence outside of 
the Pleroma; put simply, she responds theologically to the cardinal Valentinian problem; why 
and how is there finitude and otherness. Her function is, in one way or another, to narrate the 
dissolution of the primal monistic unity; which subsequently results in the duplication of her 
being; Sophia within the Pleroma and a ‘fallen’ external Sophia.  
    It is important to note that many have attempted to draw parallels between Valentinian 
theology and Neoplatonic philosophy,395 despite Plotinus’ (204-270) famous protestations to the 
contrary.396 However, there appears to be a fundamental disparity between both systems at this 
embryonic stage in the narrative, which O’Regan highlights excellently: ‘classical 
Neoplatonism’s vision of the One as unitive source…diffuses itself for no other reason than 
perfection’s tendency to communicate itself…the One is sufficiently without the shadow of 
deficiency.’397 And it is for this reason that the Neoplatonic narrative requires a circular plot; 
because there can be no higher state of perfection that the One does not already possess. This 
appears to be contradicted by Valentinian cosmology that upholds the paradoxical position that it 
was precisely a lack of perfection (ignorance) that resulted in a loss of perfection: the original 
totality.           
ii) The ontological duality of Sophia is no purposeful or harmoniously constructed relationship 
between divinity and ‘created’ existence; but, is instead, comprised by radical ontological 
opposition and competition. This ‘clashing of opposites’ occurs on two fronts; firstly, on the 
                                                             
395 See, for instance: Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (trans: Robert Wallace), Cambridge, 
MIT, 1985, pp.125-229; Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth (trans: Robert Wallace), Cambridge, MIT, 1990; John 
Dillon, ‘Pleroma and Noetic Cosmos: A Comparative Study,’ in: Richard Wallis (ed), Neoplatonism and 
Gnosticism, New York, State University of New York, 1992, pp.99-110. 
396 See, Plotinus’, under Porphry’s numbering system, Ennead II, Tractate IX; and for a detailed discussion of it, see: 
Christos Evangeliou, Plotinus’s Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphry’s Against the Christians,’ in: Richard Wallis 
(ed), Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, New York, State University of New York, 1992, pp.111-128. 
397 Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic Return in Modernity, New York, State University of New York, 2001, p.79 (my 
emphasis). 
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fideistic front, finitude contradicts the Valentinian belief in an infinite monistic first principle, 
and secondly, on a logical level, given that being is predicated univocally of the Pleromic Sophia 
and fallen Sophia respectively. Therefore, this initial cosmological narrative, as well as Sophia’s 
first theological function, must be negated in order to affirm the truth of the first Valentinian 
theological presupposition and to restore logical harmony.  
    This mutually intertwining relationship is perhaps best outlined in the role of the spiritual 
seeds, deposited into the Demiurge’s animal creation yet bound to their heavenly mother, come 
to the fullest realisation of their existence only in the destruction of their material and finite 
home. It follows necessarily then that finitude and that which has caused it must be conceived 
opprobriously (hence, Sophia’s participation in the divine economy is always accompanied by 
the myth of the Demiurge to affirm its accidental nature). This leads us to the soteriological and 
eschatological elements of the narrative. 
Soteriology and Eschatology 
i) Valentinian soteriology and eschatology appears to be governed by the necessity of the 
narrative ending in the dissolution of finite existence (represented by Sophia’s fallen existence) 
in its re-absorption back into the Pleromic whole. Thus, given that fallen Sophia has already 
implanted aspects of her own Pleromic nature into the animal creation, these then function as the 
potentiality for recognising, intuitively, Jesus of the Pleroma when he descends in his 
‘incarnation’ to impart knowledge of the Pleroma and of the spiritual seeds. This occurs by 
exciting a desire for the Pleroma and dissatisfaction with their current mode of existence 
(existential alienation) accompanied by the means of removing these tensions by moving towards 
an eschatological solution.   
ii) Sophia’s eschatological role within the Valentinian narrative results in the dissolution of the 
duplicity of her existence. The fallen Sophia is re-absorbed back into the fullness of the monistic 
Pleroma, at the expense of otherness and finitude. There is, therefore, a synthetic restitution of 
the ontological and logical difficulties integral to Valentinian wisdom theology.    
General tenets  
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It is worth briefly outlining some of the important regulative positions that appear to be inherent 
to the concept of Valentinian sapiential thought.  
i) Narrative flexibility, as we have already seen, plays a major part in the Valentinian responses 
to the philosophical problems that their founding religious positions lead to. The mythological 
explanations can vary to greater or lesser extents when responding to the principle why and how 
questions that we looked at, but in every instance these responses are informed and regulated by 
these same questions.     
ii) Myth making has been a characteristic of many philosophical schools, ancient and modern, 
usually employed, as was the case with Plato for instance, to illustrate a philosophical point; a 
pedagogic tool. However, whilst there are some traces of this phenomenon occurring in the 
Valentinian myths, their legitimacy is also grounded in their first theological principle. Given the 
fact that finitude has broken away from an original whole, and even still retains aspects of it 
within itself, the Valentinians can think of themselves as being privy to knowledge that would 
allude others. Their myths, therefore, can make theological and philosophical sense because they 
already have a ‘prior experience’ of that which they are describing, given their Pleromic origins. 
In theological language, within Valentinian theology, cataphatic expressions do not need to be 
qualified by apophatic denials as they would have to be in Christian orthodoxy, precisely 
because they have internal access to the Pleroma.  
iii) Valentinian Gnosticism does not uphold the possibility of a historical incarnation of divinity. 
Given the fact that matter is not something purposefully created, divinity can have no part in it.  
iv) Salvation occurs through originary knowledge. The purpose of the Valentinian ‘incarnation’ 
is for the messiah to reveal salvific knowledge to its adherents; knowledge is what saves.  
    We have critically compared the concept of Valentinian wisdom with the biblical concept of 
Wisdom throughout this chapter, but we shall briefly summarize the major points of continuity 
and disparity.        
Firstly, and most significantly, the founding theological/philosophical monistic presupposition of 
Valentinian thought is starkly contradicted by the biblical affirmation of a purposeful divine 
creation that is freely given; placing no constraints or limitations on God. According to the 
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biblical account the creative act is neither solicited nor provoked and is supremely good in so far 
as it is in utter accordance with God’s good will. This crucial distinction would appear to refuse 
the possibility of construing the figure of Wisdom as a pivotal component in a mythological 
tragedy that narrates the fracture of an original monistic whole but, rather, is a purposeful 
creation that communicates God’s presence to the world; a personified relationship that is not 
comprised of dialectical conflict and tension, but of ontological harmony, which is further 
instrumental in the divine economy. Therefore, although both concepts portray Wisdom as 
having an active role in the formation of the world and maintain her presence within that same 
order, both are distinguished on the grounds of how this takes place and whether or not it is 
conceived as a positive or as a negative.  
    In the Valentinian myth, Sophia’s mediatory role between unity (the Pleroma) and otherness 
(existence external to the Pleroma) is inherently problematic and even contradictory, in so far as 
there is no real otherness to mediate between, since it is simply an accidental duplication of the 
same original whole, which must ultimately end in the negation of one or the other, or 
alternatively, are held together in mutual contradiction; within the biblical account, Sophia’s 
mediation is not constituted by this either/or dichotomy; it sustains a harmonious and non-
competitive relationship ‘between’ God and creation precisely because they do not belong to a 
common ontological category, which is also why she embodies both without contradiction, yet 
with purposefulness given that this relationship is grounded in their analogical relationship 
through the act of creation itself.  
     Furthermore, in biblical conceptions of Sophia, Christ is the measure of Wisdom’s theological 
functions of mediation. However, within the Valentinian proposal, the original purpose is to 
account for the reality of finitude in light of an infinite whole, this is what stimulates 
Sophiological reflection for the Valentinian. Thus, there is a clear reversal of theological 
priorities in the respective narratives.    
       Within Valentinian eschatology, as we have already seen, Sophia’s ‘creaturely’ existence 
(and those divine seeds pertaining to her fallen mode) is ultimately negated in the interests of 
restoring the original unity lost by disobedience and ignorance. Otherness cannot be sustained 
within the Valentinian Sophia precisely because, according to their foundational theological 
principle, there should be no such thing. Although like the Valentinian concept, the biblical 
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figure of Wisdom was said to bring creation close to God and grant immortality to souls and 
invite the world into Wisdom’s relationship to the divine, this does not appear to require the 
negation of the world in this process. 
    We noted in the text some deeper more general disparities between the two concepts. These 
were briefly discussed within the introduction and now appear to be fully accounted for. Firstly, 
Valentinian wisdom theology emphasises the salvific role of originary knowledge. It is correct 
knowledge that cultivates salvation, not divine grace as is the case with the biblical wisdom 
tradition. Secondly, the biblical concept of Wisdom was grounded, initially in the historical 
context of the Jewish people and later in the early Christians’ attempts to comprehend the event 
of Christ. Wisdom, in this context, is therefore thoroughly concrete and historical. However, 
within the Valentinian conception of Wisdom, clear precedence is given to the role of myth. In 
many respects, Valentinian wisdom theology could be considered ahistorical, in so far as the 
material world’s intrinsic value is denied in favour of the mythological ideal of the Pleroma. This 
then has an effect on the reality of the incarnation of Wisdom/Christ. For the Valentinian, 
Wisdom/Christ could not be concretely incarnated on account of the fact that the ideal Wisdom 
figure could have no natural place within a material body. Whereas, for the biblical conception 
of Wisdom, the incarnation appears to be in congruence with the created, material world, it is its 
crowning glory as it were.  
    Within the above analysis, we also detected some distinct political and social implications of 
the two respective discourses. Firstly, the biblical tradition appeared to require engagement with 
the world, not only due to the multicultural context of the Hebrew people that forced them to 
adapt and in some cases adopt foreign culture in order to maintain the existence of the Jewish 
identity, but because of the inherent value of the world’s various cultures which had to be 
construed as being related, in some sense to Wisdom, as everything was created through her. In 
distinction to this point, the Valentinian discourse appeared to engender a different social and 
political approach. Within this concept, the world is indiscriminately evil, that which is positive 
is not from the world but from the ideal Pleroma. Those outside of this ontological category 
would be considered as lesser persons. Little if any engagement with cultures and systems of 
thought outside this circumference would be permitted, because nothing positive could be 
obtained. The Gnostics are the ones with correct knowledge, which they must impart, without the 
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need of learning from alternate systems of thought. That being noted, freedom of thought within 
the Gnostic system itself was positively encouraged and not seemingly hierarchically governed 
or organized. However, this rule applied only insofar as the rudiments of the Gnostic 
commitments were upheld. 
Summative Remarks 
Within this chapter we have attempted to provide an archaeology for the Valentinian figure of 
Wisdom. We have analysed the rules of formation for the concept of Wisdom and the concept 
itself, as well as some of the potential political and social motivations for producing an 
authoritative concept of this particular sort. We critically compared these findings to those 
outlined in the previous chapter, noting points of continuity as well as discontinuity and why this 
was the case and some of the implications of these distinctions. We shall now turn our attention 
to the emergence of wisdom theology within the modern period. However, before we can do this 
we must investigate the rules of its formation. What context produced this particular type of 
wisdom theology in the modern period, what circumstances had a part in its emergence and 
popularity? Modern wisdom theology circumstantially grew out of theological engagement with 
German Idealism. Thus, its formative context can be considered to be this same philosophical 
tradition, as well as other factors. An archaeology would therefore require an assessment of this 
context in order to unearth the type of questions and circumstances that produce this particular 
type of wisdom theology, giving us an insight into the nature of the concept itself. We shall now 
begin to explore post-Kantian Idealism and how it contributed to producing a particular type of 
wisdom theology within modern British theology. 
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Chapter III 
The Monistic Turn of Post-Kantian Idealism, from Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) 
to Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814): The Rules of Formation for Modern Valentinian 
Speculation.  
In the previous two chapters an archaeology for both the biblical and Valentinian conceptions of 
Wisdom were outlined; offering a critical comparison, considering differences and similarities, 
between these two unities of discourse. Before assessing modern theological adoptions and 
adaptations of these two ‘traditions,’ we first need to account for the archaeological conditions 
that have produced modern theological wisdom discourses of this ilk. As already noted within 
the introduction, one of the major cultural and philosophical events and contexts that must be 
considered when engaging with modern wisdom theologies is German Idealism. Within this 
period of philosophical history, a certain set of distinctive questions and problems emerge, acting 
as one of the pivots on which a series of philosophies and theologies (including those of Hegel, 
Schelling and the Russian wisdom theologians) later rotate on. It shall be argued within the 
contents of this chapter, that these questions and problems can be considered as archaeological 
shifts relating to their earlier development within the Valentinian wisdom discourse discussed in 
the previous chapter. The archaeological significance of this point should not be underestimated, 
in so far as this will later provide the frame from within which modern wisdom theologies shall 
develop. 398        
    The philosophical questions and problems that we have just alluded to, to be discussed shortly, 
could be considered to be the product of a specific conception of the relationship between the 
infinite and the finite or the Absolute and creation, which succinctly arise out of Immanuel 
Kant’s ‘Ding an Sich’ and, specifically, how it comes to be interpreted, transformed, and 
ultimately rejected. In order to demonstrate this point, the chapter will essentially involve close 
analysis of the significant historical events which shaped this development, beginning with F.H. 
                                                             
398 Fichte has nearly always avoided the Gnostic characterisations that have been attributed to Schelling and Hegel, 
apart from Jurgen Gebhardt and Holgor Zaborowski who have hinted at Fichte’s relationship to Gnosticism. See: 
Jurgen Gebhardt, ‘Political Eschatology and Soteriological Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Germany’, in: 
Athanasios Moulakis (ed), The Promise of History: Essays in Political Philosophy, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1985, 
pp.51-69, p.65; Holgor Zaborowski, ‘Fall and Freedom: a Comparison of Fichte’s and Saint Paul’s Understanding of 
Original Sin’, in: Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds), After Jena: New Essays on Fichte’s Later Philosophy, 
Northwestern University Press, 2008, pp.162-183.        
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Jacobi and the ‘Spinozism controversy’ (1783-1787) and culminating in J.G. Fichte’s ‘Jena’ 
writings. However, firstly, Kant’s conception of the ‘thing in itself’ must be defined, so to be 
able to determine just precisely what it is that Kant’s interpreters would be engaging with.               
Kant’s Ding an Sich. 
Initially, the question of how the Absolute relates to the world was framed and answered 
primarily by Kant from within an epistemological framework; continuing the Cartesian initiative, 
Kant separated and prioritised epistemology over ontology when embarking on his first critique, 
which would ultimately chart the bounds of finitude399 by way of a thorough examination of the 
conditions (intuition and concepts) which ‘constitute...the elements of all our knowledge.’400 One 
of the purposes for such an investigation401 was to identify the ‘point at which [pure] reason 
[began] to misunderstand itself,’402 by demonstrating - based on the limitations of reason - what 
could and could not be thought by finite intellects and therefore, what could and could not be 
known or expressed by human reason. Having done this, he hoped to be able to rule out or 
‘dismiss all groundless pretensions’403 that had so far been apparent within metaphysics, simply 
by pointing to his a priori ‘eternal and unalterable laws of reason.’404 Therefore, the 
epistemological turn was meant to prevent the type of ‘groundless’ speculation produced by 
‘traditional’ metaphysics that resulted from – as far as Kant could see – the blending of 
epistemology and ontology, principally exercised by Plato, which resulted in ‘the false belief that 
we could experience a priori cognitions directly as a priori intuitions.’405  
    Kant’s dogmatic distinction between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible opens up 
the possibility of a dualism existing in every object encountered by finite sensibility and 
understanding: an object as an ‘appearance,’ something that is accessible to reason; however, 
                                                             
399 A young Martin Heidegger notes that the question of finitude is at the base of Kant’s attempt to ‘ground’ 
metaphysics: ‘the laying of the ground for metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning the finitude in human 
beings’ (Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (trans: Richard Taft), Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1997, p.152). 
400 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans: Marcus Weigelt), London, 2007, A50 = B74, p.85. 
401 One could also consider the first critique to be an attempt to overcome Humean scepticism, as well as an attempt 
to produce a system that mediated between Newtonian physics - the world as an enclosed machine, functioning on 
the basis of necessary and mechanical laws - with Leibniz’s insistence on the necessary interaction between the 
world and the metaphysical.   
402 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans: Marcus Weigelt), London, 2007, Axiii = xiv, p.8.  
403 Ibid, Axi =xii, p.7. 
404 Ibid, Axi =xii, p.7. 
405 Chris L. Firestone, Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, Surrey, Ashgate, 2009, p.46. 
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since this is the only manner in which an object could occur and be known by a finite intellect, 
there is also the possibility of the same object existing ‘outside’ of its finite comprehension as it 
is ‘in-itself.’ The former is commonly known as the phenomenal realm, where appearances 
occur, and the latter, the noumenal realm, where the possibility of ‘things existing in themselves’ 
materializes. Initially, such a dualism presents problems to pure reason, by way of antinomies, in 
respect to their mutual relation; as it would seem to be, for instance, logically impossible for 
natural laws (as phenomena), to co-exist with freedom (as a thing-in-itself) without one negating 
the other. Kant specifically highlights four such antinomies that he attempts to ‘resolve’ in his 
‘transcendental dialectic.’406 The one given above comprises his ‘third dynamical antinomy,’ 
which he ‘solves’ by suggesting that the apparent contradiction is only present when one 
mistakes appearances for things-in-themselves; thus portraying an either/or situation, where both 
now occupy mutually exclusive ground. However, when one adopts ‘transcendental idealism’ or 
dualism, Kant argues that both can be affirmed without contradiction,407 as they are no longer 
mutually exclusive; the phenomenal and the noumenal realms are not competing for the same 
‘space.’ Thus, the finite intellect will only ever see freedom as naturally necessitated, as that is 
the only way in which freedom, as noumena, could present itself to a finite mind - as a 
phenomenal appearance. So it is possible, from Kant’s perspective, to suggest that a free act 
could indeed be free, even though it occurs, in appearance, as something which is naturally 
necessitated. Although, one could legitimately ask, in that case, why should one ever posit the 
existence of any noumena at all? Kant’s response to this question is that, in the practical reason 
or facts of reason, there exists the ‘categorical imperative’ which reveals that we should freely 
determine ourselves in a specific way according to a moral ‘ought,’ which can paradoxically 
‘direct’ natural necessity to comply with it; thus making us practically aware of noumena as 
something which are distinct from mere phenomena.408 Undoubtedly, his distinction between 
practical and theoretical reason is another dualism, just like the ‘thing’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ 
and also the dualism existing between the intuition and the understanding, all three are mutually 
                                                             
406 A numerical restriction that Kant will later be taken to task for - along with his proposed resolutions to the 
antinomies - by Hegel. See: G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic (trans: A.V. Miller), New York, HB, 1999, p.191. 
407 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A531 = B559, p.462. 
408 Kant’s famous examples of the lustful man’s inclination being curbed by the presence of the gallows and a man’s 
willingness to overcome his love of life by refusing to bear false witness against an honourable man on a crooked 
prince’s whim are meant to demonstrate that spontaneity can be distinguished from natural necessity. See: Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (trans: Thomas Abbott), 2004, London, p.30. 
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conditioned by each other. The ‘solutions’ themselves only further emphasise the fact that we 
can have no conceptual insight into things-in-themselves.  
    As was suggested above, since no theoretical knowledge is permitted of the noumena, one 
may assume that this dualism would result in the end of metaphysics. However, although this is 
partially true, for Kant an enormous amount still depends on the ontological reality of things-in-
themselves; after all, without ‘noumenal’ freedom, God, or the immortality of the soul 
‘all...moral principles would be overthrown.’409 Thus, practical reason demands the reality of the 
noumena, but since it is impossible to ‘know’ of their reality despite their ‘practical necessity,’410 
Kant will have to radically redirect metaphysics if he is to sustain his philosophy. From 
henceforth, any ‘insight’ into the noumenal realm must now take place within the practical 
reason. So those questions, which traditional metaphysics were concerned with, namely, the 
existence of God or the immortality of the soul, still remain extremely significant, only now, the 
emphasis must shift from their ‘provability’ (of course impossible for Kant in a theoretical sense) 
to their utility as ‘regulative principles;’ providing both a satisfying conceptual tidiness for pure 
reason, that is ‘impelled by a tendency of its nature to go beyond its use in experience...to the 
outer limits of all knowledge,’411 and as a practical necessity in securing the value of morality. 
Kant will even go so far as to provide the so called ‘moral proofs’ for the immortality of the soul 
and the existence of God in his second critique as necessary postulates of practical reason.412 
However, despite the practical necessity of these noumena providing the possibility of an 
‘insight’ into their reality, this is by no means a conceptual insight; hence the radical distinction 
between the theoretical and the practical reason within Kant’s philosophy, which includes the 
priority of the latter. The only concepts that we have of noumena are as regulative principles 
given to us conceptually through analogy so as for us not to be left with nothing. Kant’s model of 
analogy is not an imperfect similarity between two things, but, rather, a ‘perfect similarity 
between two relations in wholly dissimilar things.’413 Thus, reason is satisfied with a concept of 
relation, but this provides it with no direct theoretical knowledge of the noumena.  
                                                             
409 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A828 =B856, p.650. 
410 Ibid, A812 = B840, p.640. 
411 Ibid, A797 = B825, p.630. 
412 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp.130-141. 
413  Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (trans: Gary Hatfield), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press ,2004 p.108. Kant’s famous example of his analogy of relation is: ‘the promotion of the happiness 
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    Ultimately, Kant provides us with two utterly distinct realms, upheld by the limitations of 
finitude, which in turn are ‘marked’ by the ‘in itself.’ We are told that these realms are utterly 
removed from one another and that there is no possibility of the noumena traversing this divide 
without itself ceasing to be noumena. The presence of ‘things in themselves’ within sensible 
intuitions can only occur by appearing as just another instance of phenomenal reality. 
Theoretically, therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the two. The distinction occurs in practical 
reason, where given the presence of a ‘categorical imperative’, we can at least posit the ‘reality’ 
of noumena as freedom, which becomes a necessary postulate for practical reason.414 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the children = A is to the love of the parents = B as the welfare of humankind = C is to the unknown in God’ 
(Ibid, p.109). 
414 There has been some recent suggestion that Kant’s dualisms are somewhat artificial; interpretations which he 
initially fuels himself by implying, in his introduction to the first critique, that: ‘there are two stems of human 
knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common root unknown to us’ 
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans: Marcus Weigelt), London, 2007, A16 = B30, p.55). The statement 
which Terry Pinkard suggests would have had those around Kant asking the question as to whether there was not in 
fact a cryptic monism lying behind this suggestion, that could perhaps be claiming that the other dualisms such as 
‘appearances and things-in-themselves…nature and freedom were…only different aspects of some one underlying, 
absolute reality’ (Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p.92). After all, as shall be seen, the post-Kantian idealists always insisted that they were simply following the 
‘spirit’ (The ‘spirit’ (general direction) of Kantian philosophy is the term used by several of the post-Kantians to be 
distinguished from the ‘letter’ (strict or static reading) of Kantian thought. Some of the post-Kantians used this 
distinction to highlight their novelty while maintaining their alliance with the Kantian project, which was 
distinguished from others, who according to Reinhold were ‘slaves to the letter of their master’ (K.L. Reinhold, ‘The 
Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between Kant and Hegel: 
Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.51-104, p.79) of Kantian 
philosophy to its logical conclusion when transforming it into a monistic system. Even more recent Kantian scholars 
have advocated a similar position; Henry Allison, for instance, has suggested that the distinction between the 
phenomena and the noumena is utterly unrelated to any notion of transcendence; he suggests that it is simply a 
distinction that occurs through different ways of interpreting empirical objects (Karl Ameriks, ‘The Practical 
Foundation of Philosophy in Kant, Fichte, and After,’ in Sally Sedgwick (ed), The Reception of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.109-129, p.114. See: 
Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. For similar readings, see: Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). However, Kant himself, according to the ‘letter’ of, at least the 
works published in his lifetime, never endorsed such monistic interpretations; he even identified Spinoza’s monistic 
claim to have grasped the one substance by pure thought as a ‘transcendental illusion,’ which obviously went 
beyond the limits of possible experience (Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p.92). He also categorically rejects Spinozistic monism in the second critique on the ground 
that it would undermine the entire enterprise of the metaphysics of morals (See: the ‘Critical Examination of the 
Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,’ in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (trans: Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott), New York, 2004, pp.94-113). However, the later Kant –especially in the Opus Postumum, perhaps 
influenced by the early reception of his thought - began to present the monism of Spinoza in a different light. There 
is a large amount of ambiguity concerning Kant’s complicated relationship to monism in these writings. Some of his 
remarks even seem to suggest that ‘Spinoza qualifies as a representative of transcendental idealism’ (Jeffrey 
Edwards, ‘Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant’s Final System of Transcendental Idealism,’ 
in Sally Sedgwick, The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.54-78, p.55). Compare, for example, just one of Kant’s comments in the Opus 
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    This is a brusque interpretation of the Kantian legacy that would be engaged with, interpreted 
and ultimately rejected by the post-Kantians. Despite the monumental influence that Kant’s 
philosophy had on those who came after him, the overall consensus quickly found that there 
were problems within the Kantian project; that it was incomplete and vulnerable to sceptical and 
dogmatic (realist) critiques. The primary motive for this consensus hinged on the nature of the 
Kantian dualisms and how they were received and interpreted; the context of which would lead 
post-Kantian thought in a very specific direction that called for Kant’s thought to be completed 
via a new monistic foundation that would provide the framework for Gnostic systems of thought 
to emerge within this philosophical discourse. We shall now explore this hermeneutical process. 
The ‘Spinozsim Controversy’: Jacobi and the Critique of Rationalism. 
One of the most significant events that would unwittingly shape the immediate reception and 
interpretation of Kant, along with much post-Kantian philosophical inquiry, would turn out to be 
a somewhat heated exchange of written correspondence between Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn 
(1729-1786) – an event that has come to be known as the ‘Spinozism controversy’ (1783-1787). 
Although, on the surface, a heated exchange between two philosophers does not imply anything 
extraordinary, it would come to be acknowledged as ‘one of the most significant intellectual 
events in late eighteenth century Germany.’415 
      After the death of G.E. Lessing (1729-1781), his friend of many years, Mendelssohn was 
reportedly preparing something of an intellectual eulogy for the deceased Lessing. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Postumum – ‘the thing-in-itself is not an object given outside of representation’ (Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum 
(trans: Eckart Fӧrster), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.173) - to his first critique, and note the 
apparent drastic shift in thought; although, as Jeffrey Edwards, amongst others, have noted (See: Frederick Beiser, 
German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 
210-211) scholars are far from coming to any conclusive opinion on this topic (Jeffrey Edwards, ‘Spinozism, 
Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant’s Final System of Transcendental Idealism’, in Sally Sedgwick, 
The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp.54-78, p.55). Edwards himself seems to suggest that Kant was forced to start coming to terms with 
Spinozism in regards to his own system when exploring the transcendental dynamics of material nature. Others, 
such as Lord, suggest that the Kantian ‘ether’ which is at the heart of his remarks on Spinozism, remains 
categorically distinct from God and freedom, which prevents an identity between transcendental idealism and 
Spinozism (Beth Lord, Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, 
Hampshire, Palgrave, 2011, p.182). Frederick Beiser also fails to see a notable shift between the first critique and the 
Opus Postumum (See: Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 210-214). 
415 Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1993, p.45. 
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once Mendelssohn’s intention had come to Jacobi’s attention, the latter resolved to write a letter 
to the former revealing that Lessing had confided in him that he was in fact a ‘Spinozist.’416 At 
this point, Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) was still very much a soiled name in German academic 
and public life; it was more often than not simply equated with atheism. To accuse someone of 
Spinozism, especially a figure as well-known and respected as Lessing, had all the ingredients 
for a public scandal. Jacobi’s main problem with Spinozism was that it represented, in his view, 
the inevitable culmination of all rationalism which had to be rejected for reasons that shall be 
seen. Initially, Mendelssohn took offence to Jacobi’s accusations, although he would ultimately 
accept the accuracy of Jacobi’s reports about Lessing, but simply putting it down to one of his 
bizarre philosophical outbursts, which he was apparently prone to, and therefore not to be taken 
too seriously. However, Mendelssohn found Jacobi’s attacks on rationalism far more problematic 
and attempted to refute them on several occasions. 417  
    Jacobi’s critiques of rationalism are sporadically scattered throughout his writings, but they 
can be condensed to one main objection to a specific position; a position which itself led 
logically to several other conclusions that Jacobi would also reject. At the heart of the 
rationalism that Jacobi was refuting was in fact, what is typically known after G.W. Leibniz 
(1646-1716), as the ‘principle of sufficient reason,’418 or as Jacobi preferred to call it: ‘a nihilo 
                                                             
416 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.93. For 
Jacobi’s personal account of Lessing’s revelation, see: F.H. Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters 
to Moses Mendelssohn.’ Lessing’s ‘confession’ was apparently occasioned by Jacobi handing Lessing Goethe’s 
poem Prometheus to read, they then debated the implications of the poem which led Lessing to explicitly concede 
that he was a pantheist. See: F.H. Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn’, in 
George di Giovanni (trans/ed), Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, 
London, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009, pp.181-200. 
417 For an overview of these see: Micah Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theological-Political 
Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.31-75. 
418 Leibniz coined the term ‘principle of sufficient reason:’ ‘all contingent propositions have reasons for being as 
they are rather than otherwise, or they have a priori proofs for their truth’ (G.W. Leibniz, ‘First Principles: 
Foundations of the Sciences’, in Phillip Wiener, Leibniz Selections, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951, 
p.94). It was in fact his commitment to this principle that led him to suggest that God must have created the best 
world out of a whole host of various other possibilities; this provides the principle with a reason for God creating the 
world, otherwise God’s creation of the world would be inexplicable and therefore irrational, as Leibniz notes: ‘In my 
opinion, if there were no best possible series, God would have certainly created nothing, since he cannot act without 
a reason’ (Ibid, p.95). The earliest use of the principle, following Aristotle’s indication, was most probably in the 
pre-Socratic Anaximander (c.610-456); who adapted a specific geometric idea into a ‘general expression for the 
principle of symmetry or indifference; it is indeed the same notion which was glorified in modern times by Leibniz 
as his principle of sufficient reason’ (Charles Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, Cambridge, 
Hackett Publishing, 1994, p.77). 
 
 
144 
nihil fit.’419 Although Spinoza does not use the former term, the explanatory reasoning in part 
one of his Ethics, leads Michael Della Rocca to conclude that ‘Spinoza employs the principle of 
sufficient reason more systematically, perhaps, than has ever been done in the history of 
philosophy.’420 For Jacobi, the conclusions that Spinoza reaches are the unavoidable outcomes of 
the principle of sufficient reason pursued to its logical end.421 The accuracy of Jacobi’s reading 
of Spinoza has been questioned,422 but nevertheless, the ‘correctness’ of Jacobi’s reading is not 
of any real concern here; whether it was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ has very little effect on the historical 
outcomes of his reading, which is what occupies the primary concern of the current juncture of 
this chapter. Jacobi contends that the logical implications of the principle of sufficient reason are 
as follows: if every reason has a reason there is the demand for a unique self-explanatory reason; 
a first cause. Spinoza, as Jacobi reads him, claims that this first cause can be neither transcendent 
nor rational,423 which in turn implies that the first cause is a single absolute substance of which 
everything else must necessarily be mere modifications of.424 In the first instance, the first cause 
cannot transcend its effects, either through its priority or its modality; through its priority, 
because if it were to be temporally prior to its causes it would need a further explanatory reason, 
which would mean it would no longer be the first cause; through its modality, because if the first 
cause did not require further explanatory ground and it was capable of existing independently of 
                                                             
419 F.H. Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn’, in George di Giovanni 
(trans/ed), Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, London, McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2009, p.187.   
420 Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza, New York, Routledge, 2008, p.30. 
421 Jacobi appeared to have a genuine existential fear of the conclusions of the principle of sufficient reason; fear that 
was most likely aroused in him by a mystical vision that he had as a young boy. Whilst attempting to ponder the 
notion of infinity he went in to a sought of trance that presented two unbearable conclusions to him: ‘the thought of 
annihilation, which had always been dreadful to me, now became even more dreadful, nor could I bear the vision of 
an eternal forward duration any better [one is reminded of the Hegelian bad infinity]. So powerful were the effects 
of this extraordinary experience, Jacobi had reason to suspect that he could ‘arbitrarily evoke it in me any time I 
want; and I believe that it is in my power, were I to do so repeatedly a few times, to take my life within minutes by 
this means’ (Paul Franks, ‘All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon,’ in: Karl 
Ameriks (ed), German Idealism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.95-117, pp.96-97).  
422 See, for example: Beth Lord, Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to 
Deleuze, Hampshire, Palgrave, 2011, pp.20-40. 
423 Spinoza’s eighteenth proposition in the first part of his Ethics would appear to support Jacobi’s first contention: 
‘God is the immanent, and not the transitive cause of all things...all things which are, are in God and must be 
conceived through him, and therefore he is the cause of the things which are in himself...outside God there can be no 
substance’ (Benedict Spinoza, Ethics (trans: W.H. White), London, Wordsworth, 2001, p.21). By ‘rational’ he 
probably means that proposition eighteen rules out the possibility of a hypostatic God. 
424 Again, this point seems to accord with Spinoza’s actual position, especially when read in light of proposition 
fifteen in the first part of the Ethics: ‘whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without 
God...Besides God there is no substance, nor can any be conceived ...But modes can neither be nor be conceived 
without substance; therefore in the divine nature only can they be, and through it alone can they be conceived’ (Ibid, 
p.14). 
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creation, then it would be conditioned by nothingness, and would not have a sufficient reason. 
The first cause could not be rational, because rationality involves at the very least, self-relation, 
and this relational quality would require a further explanatory reason. All that is left to assert is 
that all of reality must comprise one all-encompassing monistic system.425 That is a brief 
summary of the foundation of Jacobi’s critique of the type of rationalism that culminates in 
Spinoza. And according to Jacobi, this initial monistic turn requires atheism (rejection of a 
hypostatic God),426 fatalism (everything is part of one fundamental necessary process)427 and, 
ultimately, nihilism (because reality is explained tautologically by the fact of reality itself; which 
means that it is not explained at all). 
    Jacobi’s alternative to this process was, what he called, a salto mortale to faith.428 He believed 
it was the only way of escaping the principle of sufficient reason. For, within itself, its 
conclusions are irrefutable, because they are rationally correct according to its own logic. And, if 
Jacobi were to engage with it on its own ground he would simply be perpetuating the 
enterprise.429 He realised that he could undermine the whole process by a realism that was 
founded on a faith in God, the world, and freedom. By exhibiting faith, Jacobi could seemingly 
refuse the need or desire for the very thing that the principle promised – conclusive certainty 
through rational explanation.430 Although, in reality, Jacobi’s salto was not the saintly leap that 
one may first take it to be; after all, he maintained that our whole capacity to reason was in fact 
underpinned by a similar act of trust: ‘we are all born in the faith, and we must remain in the 
                                                             
425 Paul Franks, ‘All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon’, in German Idealism, 
Karl Ameriks (ed), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.95-117, pp.97-98.   
426 See Spinoza’s Scholium to proposition fifteen in the first part of his Ethics. 
427 See especially: Spinoza’s thirty-second and thirty-third propositions in part one of the Ethics.  
428Franks, All or Nothing, pp.95-117, p.99. 
429 This position seems to be the critique that is at the very centre of Milbank’s concerns in Theology and Social 
Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. 
430 Jacobi’s rejection of the specific form of rationalism that was circulating around his contemporaries, led to some 
rather scathing reports and condemnations in the typical ‘enlightenment championing’ history of ideas books. 
Heinrich Heine offers a portrait of Jacobi as a ‘quarrelsome sneak, who disguised himself in the cloak of 
philosophy’ (Heinrich Heine, ‘Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany,’ in Heinrich Heine, 
The Romantic School and Other Essays , Jost Hermand and Robert Holub (eds), New York, Continuum, 1985, 
p.181).  However, such reports were only mirroring statements made by some of Jacobi’s contemporaries. Moses 
Mendelssohn claims that Jacobi’s alternative in faith was in fact oppressive and counter –productive. Mendelssohn 
believed that Jacobi’s appeal to faith and distrust of rationalism, was a direct effect of his Christian faith which 
incorporated an acknowledgement of original sin that required redemption through grace, without which humanity 
was almost destined to fail in all reasonable inquiry. (Micah Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’s 
Theological-Political Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.108).       
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faith, just as we are all born in society, and must remain in society.’431 He eccentrically 
attempted to appeal to David Hume’s (1711-1776)432 scepticism of causality and a priori 
reasoning to support his claim that we require, fundamentally, faith or a ‘sentiment of belief’ in 
our senses to avoid a sort of paralysing scepticism; 433 in Jacobi’s own words: ‘without faith, we 
cannot cross the threshold, sit at a table, or go to bed.’434 Further points that would dampen the 
radicality of Jacobi’s faith were that, this belief itself provided something like philosophical 
‘immediate certainty,’435 which he opposed to rational derivative certainty produced through 
explanation. Faith, according to Jacobi, paradoxically provides a certainty of sort that ‘excludes 
all proofs absolutely’436 by ‘the representation itself agreeing with the thing being 
represented.’437 His association of faith with an immediate certainty, and indeed his contention 
that reason itself a priori requires an immediate certainty, will prove hugely influential over the 
post-Kantian idealists for which this will henceforth become the necessary requirement for any 
first principle, if it is to succeed in being just that. Nevertheless, Jacobi had hoped that by 
demonstrating that reason itself depended on faith, faith in God, freedom, and the world, would 
be much more palatable to the rationalists.  
    Jacobi’s open condemnation of rationalism would prompt a series of open essays entitled 
‘letters on the Kantian philosophy’ (1786-7) by K.L. Reinhold. Although initially Reinhold had 
been fairly critical of Kant’s philosophy,438 he would soon embrace Kantian thought with great 
enthusiasm, which apparently ‘exhibited all the earmarks of a conversion.’439 Reinhold’s primary 
                                                             
431 F.H. Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn’, in George di Giovanni 
(trans/ed), Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, London, McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2009, p.230. 
432 Jacobi will later utilise Hume in an attempt to unsettle the pretensions of Kant’s first critique that he has 
overcome scepticism and provided a certainty in reasoning that is detached from faith. 
433 See: F.H. Jacobi, ‘David Hume on Faith or Idealism and Realism’ in in George di Giovanni (trans/ed), Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, London, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2009, pp.253-330. 
434 Ibid, p.272. 
435 Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza, p.230. 
436 Ibid. 
437 Ibid. 
438 See: George di Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between 
Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.2-51,  p.9. 
439 See: Ibid. Reinhold’s character appeared to be very susceptible to constant fluctuations in opinions, which can be 
seen from his own turbulent history converting to Protestantism from Roman Catholicism and periodically feeling 
atheistic, with a whole host of philosophical conversions somewhere in between. Hegel ridicules Reinhold for his 
restless temperament: ‘as for Reinhold’s own philosophy, he gives a public history of it to the effect that in the 
transmigrations of his philosophical soul he first wandered into Kant’s philosophy, and after laying that aside, into 
Fichte’s; from there into Jacobi’s...’ [Hegel’s list continues] (G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and 
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concern for writing the letters was to prove the compatibility of Kantian rationalism with 
religious faith. It was in fact these letters that earned him the chair of philosophy at Jena, and 
contributed to the sudden popularity of Kant’s philosophy;440 J.W. Goethe (1749-1832) would 
claim that it was like ‘an explosion’ and Hegel ‘a thunderbolt out of the blue’.441 Kant would 
later thank him for this advertisement in a private letter lauding Reinhold’s ‘thoroughness and 
charm [which are] matchless.’442 He even claims that, at this stage, Reinhold’s ideas ‘agree 
precisely’ with his own.443 
    The most important arguments to have emerged from these letters, in respect to our concerns, 
were that according to Reinhold, Kantian philosophy was already immune to Jacobi’s critiques. 
He argues, quite simply, that the Kantian system demonstrates that practical reason already 
demands faith in God. This simple point emphasises that Kantianism cannot be compatible with 
the type of atheism that Jacobi believed rationalism would lead to, and that it ‘proves’ - 
practically of course - that faith is reasonable. Therefore, according to Reinhold, within Kant’s 
philosophy ‘reason ceases to be presumptuous and faith ceases to be blind, and instead of 
opposing one another...they mutually support one another in perpetual harmony.’444 Reinhold is 
suggesting that Kant’s position is, as it were, a via media between rationalism and faith. 
Furthermore, he argues that practical reason demands faith only in so far as the limitations of 
pure reason are sufficiently recognised; namely, when the phenomena/noumena distinction is 
upheld – as Reinhold notes: ‘Both [rationalism and fideism] now meet on the line that has 
become visible marking the limits beyond which knowledge may not proceed and the boundaries 
from within which faith may not remove itself.’445 As already noted, Reinhold’s purpose for 
authoring the letters was to demonstrate that Kant’s philosophy was compatible with faith. 
However, he also wanted to demonstrate to Jacobi that Kant’s ‘philosophical faith’ was to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Schelling’s system of Philosophy (trans: Harris and Cerf), New York, State University of New York Press, 1977, 
p.178-9).       
440 See: George di Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between 
Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.2-51,  p.9. 
441 Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1993, p.46. 
442 Immanuel Kant, Correspondence (trans: Arnulf Zweig), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.271. 
443 Ibid. 
444 K.L. Reinhold, ‘Second Letter: The result of Kantian Philosophy on the question of God’s existence’, in Karl 
Ameriks and James Hebbeler (eds), Reinhold: Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp.18-28, p.22. 
445Ibid. 
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distinguished from his ‘theological or historical faith’; a point which Jacobi had initially missed 
when he unwittingly appealed to Kant to support him in his critique of rationalism.446  
    Despite the enormous popularity of the Letters, their success would be short lived, as Jacobi 
had already started to pick flaws in the phenomena/noumena divide which Reinhold’s position 
depended upon; critiques which would prompt a radical shift in Reinhold’s own philosophy and 
indeed in all post-Kantian speculation.  
The Initial Reception of Kantian Philosophy: Jacobi and the Critique of Transcendental 
Idealism. 
Jacobi quickly turned his attention to demonstrating that Kantian transcendentalism is itself 
‘nihilistic’ and incoherent. Having argued this point, he then attempted to persuade his readers 
that the only rational conclusion to Kant’s dualisms is in fact Spinozism; which he will conflate 
together with Kantianism with the effect of demonstrating that all rationalism ultimately leads to 
monism and thus atheism, fatalism and nihilism. There is some debate concerning the accuracy 
of Jacobi’s reading of Kant, and especially his reading of Kant through Spinoza;447 but as noted 
before, the ‘correctness’ of Jacobi’s reading is not essential when analysing the effects of his 
specific reading for post-Kantian philosophy which, for better or for worse, would be the context 
in which the post-Kantians engaged with Kantian philosophy.  
    Jacobi reads Spinoza’s contrast between the two perspectives of the one substance’s 
perception of itself in its infinite and finite modes as being synonymous with Kant’s 
phenomena/noumena distinction. This would therefore imply that the Kantian appearances were 
merely modes of one immanent all-encompassing noumenal realm. Jacobi is led to this 
conclusion by his contention that Kant needs to hold a Spinozist conception of divinity/first 
cause in order to provide a coherent and convincing solution to his third antinomy; 
fundamentally, by providing an answer to reason’s need to reconcile an unconditioned self-
determining first cause with a series of conditioned and necessitated causes. He argues that if 
                                                             
446 He wrongly assumed that Kant’s rejection of the ‘rational’ ontological, cosmological and physico-theological 
proofs for God meant that he would be sympathetic to Jacobi’s own position, needless to say he was not, a fact that 
Jacobi had to come to terms with after the publication of Kant’s ‘what does it mean to orient oneself in thinking.’ 
See: Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (trans: Allen Wood and George di Giovanni), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.1-15. 
447 See, for instance: Franks, All or Nothing, pp.84-145. 
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Kant’s position requires the affirmation of both, the reality of natural determinism and an 
unconditional first cause of the cosmos, then the first cause must be immanent to the phenomenal 
realm.448 He suggests that Spinoza is grappling with this exact issue, but as already noted by 
Jacobi, the rational solution to this dilemma is only possible by an appeal to an immanent first 
cause. Within Kant’s epistemic strictures it is impossible to posit an unconditioned first cause 
that would be somehow detectable within the series of natural contingent causes, as if it were 
detectable, it would simply be just another contingent cause. Thus, the first cause, to save its 
transcendence, must be undetectable within the finite causal series. Obviously, within Spinoza’s 
system this in itself would already be unreasonable, because the transcendent cause would be 
creator ex nihilo, and thus freely determining, which contradicts the principle of sufficient 
reason. But even more worryingly for Jacobi, Kant’s priority of epistemology over ontology 
means that that which is to be can only be in so far as it exists as a possible experience for 
knowledge. Therefore, the first cause, if it is truly transcendent (in the Kantian sense) must ‘be’ 
nothing. Thus, Jacobi argues that Kant’s whole philosophy rests, quite literally, on nothingness 
and so Kantianism is nihilistic.449 Hence, Jacobi’s famous critique of transcendental idealism: 
‘without that presupposition [existence of noumena] I could not enter into the system, but with it 
I could not stay within it.’450 The only way Kant can salvage the rational coherency of his 
                                                             
448 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, p.31. 
449 However, this is precisely the problem, Kant cannot insist on the reality of external things as causes of their 
forms in us; if he could insist on it, then his whole system would collapse as it would mean he could know things-in-
themselves and get outside of the limitations of finite reason.      
450 F.H. Jacobi ‘supplement: On Transcendental Idealism’, In George di Giovanni (trans/ed), Friedrich Heinrich 
Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, London, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009, 
pp.31-38, p.36. The charge of nihilism seems to have spawned from Jacobi’s basic realist objection to Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. Put simply, Jacobi denies the coherency of Kant’s contention that ‘the transcendental 
idealist is...an empirical realist’ (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A371 = B417, p.344). Kant argues that empirical 
idealism necessarily occurs in the wake of transcendental realism and the only way to overcome empirical idealism 
(Kant has a caricature of Berkley’s idealism in mind here) is to become a transcendental idealist, who apparently 
cannot doubt the reality of appearances, simply because they are always accompanied by a sense of passivity within 
the intuiting and understanding subject; in other words, we are conscious that appearances are caused by something 
other than our will, although we cannot know anything about these causes we can at least posit them as the causes of 
our appearances. Nevertheless, Jacobi will still argue that a sense of passivity does not necessarily entail a need in 
positing the existence of things-in-themselves, Fichte will offer an alternative solution to account for the feeling of 
necessity in relation to the manifestation of appearances which incorporates an element of finite determinability, and 
the very fact that he is able to do this shows the arbitrariness involved in speculating about the existence of the 
noumenal realm. All of our appearances are fundamentally occurrences within human sensibility and understanding 
and it is impossible to know that they are anything other than that, in fact they cannot be anything other than that, 
because outside possible experiences nothing can be in the true sense of the word. Thus, Kant appears to appeal to 
something that cannot be as the object that causes representations within finite intellects. And if they do really exist, 
then Kant must concede transcendental idealism all together and become a transcendental realist, as he would 
implicitly be claiming that he had the cognitive capacities to intuit and understand the noumenal realm which would 
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arguments, and outwit the charge of nihilism is, according to Jacobi, to adopt an immanent first 
cause. It must be noted that these critiques are not based on a literal reading of Kant; to the 
‘letter’ Kant could not be read in this light. However, this is not Jacobi’s concern, for him, 
Kant’s philosophy is incomplete to the ‘letter’ and requires Spinozism as its logical culmination, 
as Lord notes: ‘Jacobi knows that Kant does not believe that God is an immanent cause. But he 
thinks Kant ought to believe it.’451  
    Therefore, Jacobi is arguing that the only real difference between Kant’s transcendental 
idealism and Spinoza’s monism is that Spinoza acknowledges the necessity and then affirms the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
immediately reduce the noumenal to the phenomenal. Therefore, Jacobi claims that the only logical conclusion 
implies that ‘the transcendental idealist must have courage...to assert the strongest idealism that was ever professed’ 
(Jacobi ‘supplement: On Transcendental Idealism,’ pp.31-38, p.338); even if, for Jacobi, all idealism is ultimately 
nihilistic because it presupposes that ‘objective’ reality is nothing but mere figments of the imagination. These 
critiques seem somewhat justified and it is not simply a case of Jacobi confusing transcendental idealism with 
empirical idealism, as if he were unable to distinguish the two, but, rather, Jacobi deliberately arguing that 
transcendental idealism must ultimately turn into empirical idealism, because the former is not rationally 
sustainable. Tom Rockmore has recently argued that Kant holds two incompatible versions of the ‘thing-in-itself’ 
simultaneously in the first critique, what he calls ‘representationalism’ and ‘constructivism’; the former posits the 
noumena as mediated ‘unknown’ causes of sensations, while the latter maintains that there is no knowledge of mind-
independent objects whatsoever, to the extent that it would be impossible to posit causes ‘outside’ of the finite 
cognitive process. Although, it would evidently be impossible to suggest that Jacobi is intentionally arguing the 
same point as Rockmore, in light of his arguments it is possible to note that the source of Jacobi’s critiques may 
come from this latent tension in Kantian thought. Jacobi is fundamentally refusing to grant Kant the possibility of 
positing ‘things-in-themselves’ as causes of phenomena given Kant’s second model of the noumena (Tom 
Rockmore, ‘Fichte, German Idealism, and the Thing in Itself’, in ‘Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (eds) 
Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism, New York, Rodopi, 2010, pp.9-21, see pp.12-15). There are 
indications that Kant must have been aware of these problems himself, since he sporadically, yet often emphatically, 
tries to deny his empirical idealism and dress his transcendental idealism in realist rhetoric. Accusations of idealism 
even rouse him to frustration in the second critique, where he states: ‘if one said, N is an idealist. For although he 
not only admits, but even insists, that our ideas of external things have actual objects of external things 
corresponding to them, yet he holds that the form of the intuition does not depend on them but on the human mind 
[N is clearly Kant himself]’ (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p.14). However, this is precisely the problem; Kant 
cannot insist on the reality of external things as causes of their forms in us; if he could insist on it, then his whole 
system would collapse as it would mean he could know things-in-themselves and get outside of the limitations of 
finite reason.  
451 Lord, Kant and Spinozism:,p.34 (my emphasis). Jacobi had already tried to show that Kant’s transcendental 
aesthetic already implicitly implied the immanent ontology that he was accusing him of holding. He suggests, in a 
footnote in the supplement on transcendental idealism, that like Spinozism, the transcendental aesthetic argues that 
time and space are just confused perceptions of an infinite whole (Ibid, p.37). This led to some confusion amongst 
Jacobi’s contemporaries as on the surface there seems to be no connection between Spinozism and transcendental 
aestheticism at all. However, Lord argues that Jacobi’s critique is not the result of him confusing the transcendental 
idea of space and time with an omnitudo realitatis, as Franks and Beiser have argued (see: Franks, All or Nothing, 
p.91-92. And Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1993, pp.54-55), bur, rather, Jacobi’s attempt to further emphasise the nihilistic base of 
Kant’s philosophy. Lord suggests that Jacobi knows that Kant’s space and time are ideal. But this is precisely the 
point, Spinoza’s substance is not; which makes Spinoza’s position rational and real, where Kant’s ideal space and 
time lack all reality, they are the ‘appearances and limitations of finite wholes that are themselves nonbeings’ (Lord, 
Kant and Spinozism, p.40).  
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reality of this immanentist ontology, where Kant does not, albeit because of his epistemic 
restrictions. However, the implications of Kant’s failure to acknowledge this reality means that 
Kant’s proposals are ultimately, after all, like Jacobi’s - ‘irrational’ and grounded on faith or, 
alternatively, they are groundless without faith and therefore nihilistic; or finally, they are 
rationally coherent and therefore Spinozistic.452 Jacobi’s either/or absolutism is enormously 
significant for the post-Kantians;453 for it puts them in a compromising position; they either 
adopt Jacobi’s position, embrace nihilism, or try to reform Kant’s philosophy by casting it into 
the monistic mould that Jacobi believes it requires.   
    The influence of Jacobi’s philosophy for the monistic turn cannot be emphasised enough. 
There is something deeply ironic about this conclusion, which perhaps challenges some of the 
‘romantic’ contemporary readings of Jacobi as a proto-Radical Orthodox theologian, heroically 
fighting the rise of secular reason.454 Of course, one could not doubt his intentions, which were 
to ‘prove’ the necessity of faith, but historically, there can be little doubt that it was Jacobi who 
accelerated the exact thing that he tried so desperately to avoid.455 Firstly, he makes Spinozism 
credible; in fact, he makes it extremely popular: ‘nearly all the major figures...became Spinoza 
enthusiasts in the wake of the controversy. Apparently overnight, Spinoza’s reputation went from 
a devil into a saint.’456 Secondly, he hints at the rational solution needed to dissolve the tensions 
that he had initially exposed in Kantian philosophy; namely, the need for an immediately certain 
monistic first cause or principle. However, having demonstrated that, within the rationalist 
model, immediate certainty could only be provided by Spinozism, Jacobi wrongly assumed that - 
like he had done on reaching this conclusion - his contemporaries would reject it and opt for the 
immediate certainty of faith. Unfortunately for Jacobi, the sheer velocity that enlightenment 
thinking was gaining would prove to be too strong for an ‘enthusiastic’ appeal to faith. They 
chose to attempt to ‘complete’ Kant’s system with the rational alternative that Jacobi had already 
provided them with: the monistic and ultimately pan/atheistic system. In the wake of Jacobi, the 
                                                             
452 For an assessment of Kant’s responses to these critiques see: Lord, Kant and Spinozism, pp.41-55. 
453 Even postmodern interpreters of Kant such as Giles Deleuze would come to view Kant through Jacobi’s lens. See 
especially: Giles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, London, Continuum, 2001.  
454 See especially: John Milbank, ‘Knowledge: The Theological critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi,’ in 
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds), Radical Orthodoxy: a New Theology, London, 
Routledge, 1999, pp.21-38. 
455 Dieter Henrich supports this reading of Jacobi’s historical significance. See: Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and 
Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, London, Harvard, 2008, p.113. 
456 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p.44. 
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post-Kantians now firmly believed that Kant’s system must account for some new monistic 
requirements. These effects could be seen almost instantaneously in the later work of Reinhold, 
which clearly attempted to respond to Jacobi’s call for the Kantian philosophy to be rationally 
completed.                                        
German Philosophy in the Wake of Jacobi: Reinhold’s Monistic Attempt to Complete the 
Kantian Enterprise. 
In response to Jacobi’s arguments, Reinhold produced his new philosophy, which would come to 
be known as the Elementar-Philosophie. Underpinning his new philosophical outlook was his 
belief that truth was universal and unconditional and that philosophy was slowly progressing 
towards obtaining this truth. According to Reinhold, the mark of this absolute truth is its 
‘universally binding’ nature; its sheer irrefutability and power in commanding total assent. Of 
course, for this to be possible, Reinhold believed philosophy needed to provide an 
incontrovertible foundation that, as of yet, had not been supplied. Karl Ameriks notes that 
Reinhold was in fact attempting to reformulate Kantian philosophy so that it fits the ‘radical 
Cartesian ideal.’457  He had hoped that this would be achieved and controlled by elite 
intellectuals operating in secret societies like the freemasons and the illuminate, both of which, 
Reinhold was an active member of.458 Despite the fact that it had not yet been realised, he 
maintained that each generation of philosophers had edged slightly closer to reaching this target. 
Reinhold points to Leibniz and John Locke (1632-1704) as particular exemplars in advancing 
towards this universal goal of philosophy.459 However, the fundamental flaw in both thinkers 
was, according to Reinhold, the weakness of the philosophical foundation which they had 
appealed to: the principle of non-contradiction. For Reinhold, the principle of non-contradiction 
                                                             
457 Karl Ameriks, ‘The Practical Foundation of Philosophy in Kant, Fichte, and After’, in Sally Sedgwick (ed), The 
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp.109-129, p.111. 
458Franks, All or Nothing, p.212. Karl Ameriks has noted that Reinhold’s elitism was a product of his mature thought 
and that initially he had hoped to present a philosophy that was immediately accessible to the non-academic public 
(Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000,  p.96-102). However, by the time of the Elementar-Philosophie, 
Ameriks is clear that there is considerable evidence that suggests that ‘Reinhold’s writing efforts were very much 
intertwined with activities connected with the far-flung political cells of the secret society...of the Bavarian 
Illuminati’ (Ibid, p.115).  
459See: K.L. Reinhold, Ueber das Fundament des Philosophischen Wissens, Jena, Mauke, 1791, p.63;  K.L. 
Reinhold, ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between 
Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.51-104, p.56. 
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could only provide a foundation for logic but not philosophy; as it could only account for the 
possibility of truth which does not necessarily imply the reality of truth. For instance, it may be 
impossible to think of things like squared circles within the principle, but it is in no position to 
rule out a belief in red polar bears; hence the possibility of a logically true statement does not 
necessarily imply its reality. Although, he does emphasise that any other foundation for 
philosophy could not by pass the principle of non-contradiction, but must incorporate its form 
and provide it with reality or content. The fragility of the foundation of Locke’s and Leibniz’s 
systems was exposed by Hume’s insistence that representations are nothing but impressions.460 
He maintains that Humean scepticism demonstrates that the principle of non-contradiction is 
based on an unfounded assumption when appealing to its validity as a foundation of knowledge; 
as ‘the principle of [non-]contradiction can demonstrate the necessity and universality of a 
judgement, only if in passing the judgement we assume the reality of its subject – the very thing 
which was to be inferred through the judgement.’461 Reinhold concludes that Hume leaves 
philosophy in a sorry state; it is a ‘philosophy that destroys all philosophy.’462 He applauds 
various attempts made by philosophers to combat the Humean challenges, especially the 
‘common sense’ riposte levelled by philosophers such as Thomas Reid (1710-1796) although, 
they show no real promise in providing the absolute foundation for philosophy that Reinhold is 
after, as it simply implies that ‘popularity passes as the criterion for truth.’463 The most 
promising breakthrough to occur in philosophy’s advance towards the ‘absolute foundation’ was 
irrefutably Kant, according to Reinhold. Undoubtedly, prior to Jacobi, he would have most likely 
conceded that Kant, whom he had earlier lauded as ‘the second Immanuel,’464 had indeed 
provided this secure foundation; however, after Jacobi, and the fact that Kant’s system had not 
commanded universal assent, Reinhold could only accredit him with providing the foundation 
for metaphysics or objects of experience, it could not provide a foundation ‘to ground the whole 
of philosophical knowledge;’465 as he ‘did not provide a foundation for science whose objects are 
beyond all experience...on the contrary he expressly showed that no such foundation is 
                                                             
460K.L. Reinhold, Ueber das Fundament des Philosophischen Wissens, Jena, Mauke, 1791, p.45.  
461 Ibid, p.58. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid, p.61. 
464 Daniel Breazeale, ‘Reason’s Changing Needs: From Kant to Reinhold’, in George Di Giovanni, Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold and the Enlightenment, New York, Springer, 2010, pp.89-113, p.90. 
465 K.L. Reinhold, ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,’ pp.51-104, p.64. 
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possible,’466 clearly a problematic gap considering it was precisely this point that had caused 
Jacobi and others’ lack of assent to the Kantian system. Thus, if Kantianism is to be ‘completed’ 
it must account, not just for the foundation of objects of possible experience, but for the 
foundation of all philosophy. In a sentence, Kant’s ‘is the science of empirical nature in as much 
as this can be known a priori; the other [a philosophy which would be universally binding] 
would be the science of the empirical faculty of cognition.’467 According to Reinhold, ‘thing’ 
oriented philosophy directed at objects, was simply not in a position to provide an absolute first 
principle, as the act of cognition itself is prior to any object. Cognition, following Kant, is 
comprised of understanding and sensibility. And due to the presence of a pure reason, he 
contends that we must also uphold a pure faculty of cognition. Once taken together, they all 
imply the entire faculty of cognition. However, cognition itself, although an advance on an object 
orientated investigation, is still not the first principle, as cognition requires circumstances that 
make it possible. Reinhold argues that all cognition requires the act of representation; before 
anything else, we must be able to represent ourselves to ourselves before the processes of 
cognition can begin. Hence, Reinhold believes representation is the first principle of philosophy. 
Therefore, in order to provide a foundation for the entire faculty of cognition he would need to 
supply a ‘science of the a priori form of representing through sensibility, understanding and 
reason’468 which in itself would be the science of the entire faculty of representation, which taken 
with the entire faculty of cognition, gives us Reinhold’s ‘Elementar-Philosophie,’ which he 
believes is in the position to provide an absolute, universally binding, first foundation for 
philosophy.  
    It is quite clear that in Jacobi’s wake, Reinhold is trying to insert measures into the Kantian 
system, such as a first principle - immediately certain and irrefutable – which is prior to all 
objects of consciousness and focuses on what consciousness is itself. Reinhold’s shift from 
describing the possibility of the objects of consciousness to describing consciousness as an act, 
has sometimes earned him the title of the ‘father of modern phenomenology.’469 Why does 
Reinhold believe that by focusing on the foundation of consciousness rather than its objects he is 
able to provide the absolute foundation for philosophy?  
                                                             
466 Ibid, p.66. 
467 Ibid, p.67. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p.228. 
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    The central thesis of Reinhold’s suggestions attempts to ‘complete’ Kant by answering 
Jacobi’s demands for an un-derived immediately certain first principle which is grounded in 
itself and not in faith. He attempts to provide this foundation by establishing the means of 
representing, which he does through his ‘principle of consciousness;’ it is worth quoting him at 
length as he describes this principle:  
The concept of representation...[must be] determined – independently of all philosophising, for 
the latter depends on this original determinateness for its correctness – the concept of 
representation can only be drawn from the consciousness of an actual fact [Tatsache]. This fact 
alone, qua fact, must ground the foundation of the Elementar-Philosophie – for otherwise the 
foundation cannot rest...it is not through any inference of reason that we know that in 
consciousness representation is distinguished through the subject from both object and subject 
and is referred to both, but through simple reflection upon the actual fact of 
consciousness...[Thus, it is able] to yield the last possible foundation for all explanation precisely 
because, qua fact, it admits of no explanation but is self-explanatory.470  
The principle of consciousness therefore reveals to us the very fact of representation; when a 
representation is made it is distinguished within the act of the subject from both, the object and 
the subject whilst remaining related to both simultaneously.471 Reinhold initially believes that 
this is an incontestable ‘fact of consciousness’ a characteristic requirement for the very 
possibility of consciousness itself; as Beiser notes: ‘it is from this fundamental principle alone, 
Reinhold believed, that it is possible to establish the systematic unity of the critical philosophy. 
This principle provides the single root for all Kant’s separate faculties...which now turn out to be 
so many forms of representation.’472  
    Now that Reinhold has his ‘first principle,’ he begins analysing the process of representation 
on which it is based. He makes a key distinction within the process of representing itself. The 
first is what he calls the ‘material’ of a representation, by which he means ‘that component of 
representation that makes it something given;’473 where there is an element of passivity within 
                                                             
470 L. Reinhold, ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), 
Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.51-
104, p.70. 
471 Dieter Henrich summarises Reinhold’s point with useful clarity. See: Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: 
Lectures on German Idealism, London, Harvard, 2008, p.131. 
472 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, Cambridge, Harvard, 2008, 
p.227. On this see also: Karianne Marx, The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2011, 
p.204. 
473 See: George di Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness’, in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between 
Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.2-51, p.14. 
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the subject. The ‘provider’ of the material of representation, that which makes it something 
given, is the ‘in-itself’, the idea of which only occurs in the very act where the ‘material’ is being 
ascribed to the ‘in-itself’ as cause of the material. For Giovanni, this act of ‘ascribing’ already 
posits Reinhold’s second distinguished component of representation, which is the ‘form’ of the 
representation. The ‘form’474 comprises the ‘active’ part played by the subject in representing, 
the conditions which it spontaneously sets itself when representing the ‘material.’ This dual 
aspect of representation means that the representation itself can be referred to as a product of the 
subject, given its ‘control’ over the material’s form but also as something distinct from itself 
given the element of necessity placed on the subject’s ‘forming’ by the facticity of the material. 
However, it can also distinguish the representation from the provider of the material as ‘thing in 
itself’ because of its own activity in creating the representation. Thus, ‘the subject can refer the 
representation to itself and to the object, yet distinguish it from both at the same time.’475 
However, in order for this distinction to occur successfully, the ‘in-itself’ must be posited; 
otherwise it would be impossible to uphold ‘within consciousness the distinction between 
consciousness itself, and what consciousness is about, without which the process of referring and 
distinguishing required by representation is not possible.’476 In order to uphold the ‘in-itself,’ he 
must acknowledge its ‘transcendental’ quality. However, instead of insisting on the 
incomprehensible nature of the ‘in itself’, like Kant, he now maintains that they are un-
representable. He upholds this as every representation requires the presence of form and 
material, neither of which can be had for the ‘in-itself;’ it cannot be ‘formed’ because it is 
extrinsic to form, and there can be no corresponding material for it because it is only posited as 
the hypothesised ‘provider’ of the material. Reinhold states this explicitly in the ‘versuch’: ‘the 
thing in itself is not representable, so how could it be knowable?’477  Giovanni argues that here 
we have some latent tensions if not contradictions in Reinhold’s thesis: 
It is granted ex hypothesi that the object ‘in-itself’ is not a representation; nor is the subject ‘in-
itself’ the product of its own spontaneity. On the other hand, it is also granted ex hypothesi that 
we have in sensation a material which corresponds to the object ‘in-itself’, and to which the 
subject imparts the form of representation by referring it to its transcendent object. But since 
                                                             
474 See, for instance: K.L. Reinhold, Versuch einer nuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermӧgen, Meiner, 
2010, p.125. 
475 Ibid, p.15. 
476 See: Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness’, p.15. 
477 Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.127. 
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knowledge occurs by means of representation, it follows on these assumptions that we do have 
knowledge of the object ‘in-itself’ – though restricted to the limits allowed by the material 
available in sensation.478  
In bridging the dualism between understanding and sensibility through representation, and given 
that all of Kant’s dualisms are mutually conditioned by each other, he has inadvertently bridged 
the dualism which his system needed to uphold in order to sustain the coherency of the faculty of 
representation; the distinction between the ‘thing’ and the ‘thing-in-itself.’  He is attempting to 
argue that ‘sensations are our first objects of representation,’479 and by doing so he faces an 
exaggerated version of the problem that Kant had created when attempting to formulate the 
relationship between sensation and understanding. Reinhold does, in fact, inadvertently attempt 
to solve this contradiction, although seemingly with little success.480  
        Reinhold’s Elementar-philosophie has undoubtedly interpreted Kantian thought through 
Jacobi’s critical lens. It has taken the Kantian project on a new course that has attempted to 
uphold the Kantian enterprise by providing it with an unquestionable self-explanatory first 
principle. In his attempt to rectify the ‘gaps’ in the Kantian system, he was forced to produce 
several monistic modifications of Kant’s philosophy. Put simply, the dualisms have been united 
in the monistic source that is representation; every cognitive process is a modification of this one 
first principle. However, in making this modification he was unable to sustain the radical 
incomprehensibility of the ‘things-in-themselves,’ because within this system they are only un-
representable, which – as Giovanni pointed out – does not imply that they were 
incomprehensible as Reinhold had assumed; thereby seemingly undermining his whole system, 
precisely by upholding his monism.  
    Thus, in the wake of Reinhold, ‘philosophical interest has been shifted away from the relation 
between consciousness and the ‘thing-in-itself.’’481 From these conclusions it can clearly be 
demonstrated that Reinhold has made a strong attempt to overcome Kantian dualisms by 
providing the Kantian enterprise with a monistic first principle, which was an absolute, 
immediately certain fact. It is for this reason that Paul Franks states that ‘Reinhold’s influence is 
                                                             
478 See: Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness,’ p.16. 
479 Ibid. 
480 ReInhold attempts to address these issues with his theory of cognition in Beiträge I; see: K.L. Reinhold, Beiträge 
zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständeniss der Philosophen, Meiner, 2004, pp.3-7.  
481 Giovanni, ‘The Facts of Consciousness,’ p.18. 
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truly massive,’482 to the extent that the major philosophers to emerge after him, namely Fichte 
and Schelling, are no longer Kantians but Reinholdians, that is until they develop their own 
unique contributions, which emerge precisely by critically engaging with Reinhold and providing 
more sophisticated responses to some of the dilemmas which he was addressing. Even though 
Reinhold himself will later adapt his thought, his later reformulations have little influence.483 
Despite the tensions in Reinhold’s philosophy appearing somewhat obvious, it would be the 
rigorous attack on the Elementar-Philosophie by the anonymous reviewer Aenesidemus (after 
about a year of anonymity, the reviewer was revealed as Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833) 
professor of Gӧttingen), that would cause many to abandon their alliance to Reinhold’s system 
and look for new initiatives to lead the post-Kantian enterprise to the monistic security that they 
all believed it required.                 
Schulze’s Critique of the Elementar-Philosophie and the Embryonic Emergence of Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre. 
It should be noted that Schulze was not the only ‘neo-Humean’ to re-introduce sceptical 
problems back into critical philosophy. Another influential figure was Salomon Maimon (1754-
1800), who, like Schulze, was a sceptic who wanted to challenge the foundations of the critical 
philosophy.484 His influence on the post-Kantians was notable and his critiques cannot be 
conflated with those of Schulze’s. However, it was specifically Schulze’s review of the 
Elementar-Philosophie (1792) that would inspire Fichte’s rejection of Reinhold’s first principle 
and encourage him to formulate his own; hence the focus shall primarily be on those specific 
critiques of Reinhold’s first principle that would cause Fichte to abandon it and declare, in a 
letter to Johann Friedrich Flatt (December 1793), that: ‘Aenesidemus...has convinced me of 
something which I admittedly already suspected: that even after the labours of Kant and 
                                                             
482 Franks, All or Nothing, p.203. 
483 Ibid, p.237. 
484 For his critique of Kantian transcendental idealism (1790) see: Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental 
Philosophy, London, Continuum, 2010. For his specific critiques of Reinhold see: Salomon Maimon, ‘Letters of 
Philates to Aenesidemus (1794), in in George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (eds), Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in 
the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, pp.158-203.  
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Reinhold philosophy is still not a science. Aenesidemus has shaken my own system to its very 
foundations...I have been forced to construct a new system.’ 485  
      Schulze attempts to demonstrate that Reinhold’s faith in representation as the first principle 
of philosophy has been misplaced on several levels. Firstly, he argues that the principle of 
contradiction must logically precede every other principle on the condition that before any 
statement can be made it must not contradict itself. However, Reinhold has already accounted for 
this criticism through his distinction between a principle’s ‘form’ and its ‘reality’ or content. 
Whilst he concedes that every principle’s form must a priori conform to the principle of non-
contradiction, form itself does not syllogistically imply reality. Thus a first principle would 
account for both simultaneously and it would therefore be prior to the principle of contradiction. 
However, Schulze extends his critique to suggest that even in ‘reality’ representation could not 
be proven to be the first principle, for it is merely a ‘generic concept of representation’486 from 
which it would be logically fallacious to deduce the reality of particular representations which 
are comprised by it. Schulze is here posing a logical objection to Reinhold that is something 
along the lines of: ‘we cannot infer the truth of the species...from the truth of the genus.’487 
    As we have seen, Reinhold categorically contended that his first principle went beyond ‘object 
orientated philosophy’ by providing the first principle of consciousness itself. However, Schulze 
argues that Reinhold’s foundation is no less ‘object’ driven than any other previous philosophy, 
as it depends on a phenomenon of experience, viz. a fact of consciousness. Putting aside 
Schulze’s Humean sensitivities at this point, which would have undoubtedly had him chomping 
at the bit in respect to Reinhold’s use of a priori reasoning, there are more subtle, yet no less 
potent, critiques of Reinhold to be drawn out here. As Reinhold chooses to transform this 
particular experience (the fact of consciousness) into a universal and necessary absolute 
postulate, he must generalise and abstract from this particular empirical experience. According 
to Schulze, every form of abstraction from a particular experience is marred by an air of 
                                                             
485 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, London, Harvard, 2008, p.147. Robert 
Pippin claims that the review has been proven to be ‘a major text for anyone interested in this origins question’ 
(interested, that is, in the inauguration of the distinctly post-Kantian set of issues that were to engage Schelling and 
Hegel).(Robert Pippin, ‘Fichte’s Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism’, in Sally Sedgwick (ed), 
The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp.147-171, p.147). 
486 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p.274. 
487 Ibid, p.275.  
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arbitrariness – why not abstract from another one? These criticisms present Reinholdian 
philosophy with a huge ultimatum: Schulze will permit Reinhold with a possible way out of his 
critiques by conceding that it is possible that Reinhold is not describing an actual empirical 
experience with his fact of consciousness but merely describing the possible conditions that are 
to be in place if the act of representation is to occur. However, if Reinhold concedes this point he 
must forfeit the whole aim of his philosophy which is to provide a foundation for philosophy in 
reality which surpasses mere possibility, if he were to accept Schulze’s ‘way out’ then, by his 
own principles, his whole philosophy would have failed; although, if he does not accept it, then 
Schulze’s penetrating critiques will all but eclipse his system by the fact that there appears to be 
nothing necessary about adhering to this first principle.488 Schulze appears to have demonstrated 
that Reinhold’s first principle fails as such and, that furthermore, it cannot – for that reason – be 
universally binding. These are the fundamental critiques that Schulze directs at Reinhold’s first 
principle, believing them to be sufficient in exposing the weaknesses of his proposal; although he 
does produce other logical objections. 
      Having briefly assessed the most prominent critiques that Schulze presents to the first 
principle of Reinhold’s Elementar-Philosophie, one can now begin to appreciate why any 
philosopher who shared the overall intentions of Reinhold’s project, especially his emphasis on 
the direction in which Kantian thought needed to go, would have to drastically rethink pledging 
allegiances to Reinholdian philosophy. In light of Schulze’s critique, the growing consensus was 
beginning to become clear: philosophy must continue the Reinholdian project in providing a 
systematic, immediately certain foundation for philosophy as a Wissenschaft; but that this could 
not be provided by the first principle of the Elementar-Philosophie. This contention was pointed 
out by J.G. Fichte in his potently influential review of Schulze’s work (1794). It has been 
suggested by Daniel Breazeale that the work itself ‘marks a genuine watershed in the history of 
German Idealism.’489 The work is given such an impressive complement because it is the point 
where Fichte realises that Reinhold is chasing shadows with his first principle, ‘Reinhold had not 
gone far enough in radicalising Kant’s idealist project, and so had not achieved a self-grounded, 
                                                             
488 Ibid, p.276. 
489 Daniel Breazeale, ‘Fichte’s Aenesidemus Review and the Transformation of German Idealism’, in Review of 
Metaphysics, 34:3, PES, 1981, pp.545-568, p.546. 
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thoroughly systematic philosophy.’490 It is upon this realisation, and in this very review that we 
start to get a sample of the new direction that Fichte wants to take post-Kantian thought.   
    Fichte’s review, the content of which was a product of his 1793 ‘Eigne Meditationen,’491 
fluctuates between defending certain aspects of Reinhold’s philosophy against Schulze’s claims, 
as well as vehemently criticising Reinhold himself, not only agreeing with Schulze on certain 
points, but also expanding his criticisms. There is no need to offer a complete assessment of the 
review, it is only necessary to highlight the central points that were to come out of it that would 
later become instrumental in directing Kantianism into a monistic system.   
    Firstly, Fichte categorically states that the postulation of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is a dead end and 
should no longer be pursued by critical philosophy. He appears to advocate this position as he 
has learnt from Schulze’s critiques of Reinhold that: when attempting to formulate a first 
principle from within the process of consciousness itself, and not in external objects, it makes 
very little sense to make it dependent on an external ‘in itself,’ without undermining the principle 
and lapsing into contradictions as Reinhold did. So from henceforth, idealism will be ‘liberated’ 
from this ‘dogmatic’ hindrance and there will no longer be an object within consciousness itself 
that is incomprehensible. For, firstly, Fichte claims, following Jacobi, that it is a logical 
absurdity; the ‘in-itself’ is, by definition, imperceptible, for it is ‘outside’ sensibility, and it is 
also inconceivable, as it is extrinsic to the understanding, so we are left with the conclusion: to 
‘postulate its existence is to think the unthinkable, and so ipso facto destroy its very existence as 
the unthinkable.’492 Secondly, and more importantly, Fichte feels emboldened to move towards a 
deeper form of idealism where he begins to suggest that nothing can ‘be’ if it is ‘apart’ from our 
process of thinking. When a first principle is to be located within the process of consciousness 
itself, it makes no sense to try and justify its truthfulness on the basis of correlating it to a pre-
existing objective or external reality; it must be the other way around; all reality is to correlate 
with what is subjectively true. Hence, he proposes that ‘the critical system demonstrates...that the 
                                                             
490 Robert Pippin, ‘Fichte’s Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism’, in Sally Sedgwick (ed), The 
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp.147-171, p.148. 
491 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, London, Harvard, 2008, p.184. 
492 Beiser, German Idealism, p.269. 
 
 
162 
thought of a thing, which supposedly has existence and certain constitutional characteristics in 
itself and independently of any faculty of representation is a whim, a dream, a non-thought.’493     
    The second significant conclusion to emerge out of the review is that Fichte, continuing to 
champion the Reinholdian method, insists that the postulation of the ‘thing-in-itself’ only 
emerges because Kant was not systematic enough and failed to deduce his whole philosophy 
from one monistic principle; in other words, Kant’s philosophy had not succeeded because it was 
not a holistic monism. Fichte states this explicitly:  
Kant has not traced the pure forms of intuition, space and time, to a single principle...After him 
therefore, the notion did indeed persist of a state of affairs which would be thinkable by some 
faculty of representation other than the human one, for in Kant the forms of intuition could pass 
for mere forms of the human faculty of representation...he himself has given a certain authority 
to this notion through the often repeated distinction between things as they appear to us and 
things as they are in-themselves – a distinction, however, which was certainly intended to hold 
only provisionally, and for the general reader.494 
Thus, Kant’s ‘failure’ is precisely what has allowed scepticism to re-appear in critical 
philosophy. Monism, in the guise of an absolute self-explanatory first principle, would have, 
according to Fichte, guarded against this sceptical return once and for all. And this is why 
Reinhold was right to seek it, in order to complete what Kant had started; in Fichte’s words: 
‘Reinhold gained for himself the immortal merit of drawing the attention of philosophical reason 
to the fact that the whole of philosophy must be traced back to one single principle.’495 If critical 
philosophy were to continue to uphold the ‘in-itself’, then scepticism would always re-emerge; 
as the criterion for truth would always rest on the extent to which a subjective truth corresponded 
to an objective one; corresponded to the ‘thing-in-itself.’ Hence, by removing the noumenal 
realm, the only criterion for truth would be what was subjectively true; it is true because it is true 
subjectively; as a parallel to Spinoza, he states:  ‘it is plainly the business of critical philosophy 
to show that...all that arises in our mind is to be completely explained and comprehended by the 
mind itself...critical philosophy shows us the circle which we cannot overstep, but within it, it 
provides our entire knowledge with the strictest coherence.’496 
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    Fichte also agrees with Schulze’s critique of the principle of consciousness as a mere 
abstraction from an empirical event, which means Reinhold’s first principle falls short of its own 
demands, namely, to provide truth beyond mere logical possibility and ascertain truth in reality. 
Hence, Fichte argues that ‘the principle of consciousness, which is placed at the apex of the 
whole of philosophy, is based on empirical self-observation and, as such, it undoubtedly 
expresses an abstraction.497 Fichte believes that Reinhold’s failure to provide a first principle that 
is true in ‘reality’ is down to his inability to see past his insistence on the first principle 
expressing or commencing with an actual fact (Tatsache); something that is substantially there 
awaiting discovery. Fichte contends (anticipating the first principle of the Wissenschaftslehre) 
that, philosophy does need a ‘real’ first principle that goes beyond formal logic; however, he 
argues that this need not be comprised by a fact: ‘if I may venture a claim which can be neither 
explained nor proven here – such a principle does not have to express a fact just as content; it can 
also express a fact as performance.’498 It is at this point where he begins to experiment with the 
Ich:  
The ego in intellectual intuition is because it is, and is what it is, it follows to this extent it is self-
positing, absolutely self-subsistent and independent. In empirical consciousness...the ego, as 
intelligence, is only with reference to something intelligible, and to this extent it has dependent 
existence. Now, this ego, which is thereby posited in opposition to itself, constitutes not two, but 
only one ego; and this is impossible on the required condition, for dependent and independent are 
contradictory. But since the ego cannot give up its characteristic of absolute self-subsistence, a 
striving thus arises to make the intelligible dependent on itself and thus bring to unity the ego 
which represents the intelligible and the self-positing ego. And this is the meaning of the 
expression, reason is practical. In the pure ego, reason is not practical; neither is it practical in 
the ego as intelligence; it is practical only in so far as it tries to unite the two.499   
We have, in this one paragraph, several embryonic components of what will become central in 
Fichte’s mature Jena Wissenschaftslehre, namely, intellectual intuition and self-positing as 
activity or fact-act, the pure Ich and the empirical Ich both comprising one Ich; the necessity of 
reason becoming practical given the infinite striving of the empirical Ich to unite itself with the 
pure ego’s infinite activity. Fichte only briefly explores these ideas in the review, only as a hint 
at where he thinks critical philosophy needs to go in order to be able to provide the first principle 
that Reinhold failed to lay.  
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    At this point it is important to note that Fichte has radicalised Reinhold’s move away from 
objects of consciousness to consciousness itself, to the extent that the ‘in-itself’ can longer even 
be posited as something utterly ‘outside’ of consciousness; anything that is, can only be insofar 
as it is related to our process of consciousness. Therefore, methodologically speaking, 
philosophy cannot, and should not, attempt to get ‘outside’ of the subjective realm, which is the 
only realm that could exist for us. This monistic move is precisely how Fichte believes he can 
overcome the scepticism of Schulze and Maimon; for there is no longer any ‘external’ reality 
apart from consciousness that subjective truths need to correlate to. If the weight of the sceptical 
critique rests on the proposition that we cannot know to what extent a subjective reality 
corresponds with an objective reality, then Fichte has pulled the foundation from their feet by 
encapsulating everything within the subjective sphere, where what is true is true because there is 
nothing else that could suggest that it were untrue.500 It is fair to say that Fichte has his 
methodology at this point but not a full account of the first principle itself; this is first produced 
in his 1794/95 Wissenschaftslehre (from now WL) which shall now be evaluated.  
Fichte and the Jena Wissenshaftslehre  
In the analysis that follows, it shall be demonstrated that – due to the context in which Fichte 
received the Kantian philosophy (through Jacobi and Reinhold) – he shall attempt to provide a 
monistic foundation for the Kantian project. However, by formulating his first principle and 
elucidating its implications, he will introduce very specific philosophical problems into post-
Kantian thought, which we will attempt to demonstrate can be considered to be archaeological 
                                                             
500 One is able to determine from this conclusion that Fichte had already anticipated the sceptical critiques of 
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shifts or modifications of Valentinian metaphysical presuppositions earlier noted in chapter II, 
and therefore providing the ‘Valentinian’ framework from within which later philosophers, such 
as Schelling and Hegel, will operate and construct their concepts.  
    These philosophical problems are introduced due to the manner in which Fichte transforms 
Kant’s ‘in itself’ and the relationship between the infinite and the finite; both of which can best 
be evaluated by focusing on the ‘absolute Ich’ and the Anstoss (check) in Fichte’s Jena system(s). 
Since our interest in Fichte only involves his philosophy’s immediate historical outcomes, in so 
far as it would direct and shape the thought of later post-Kantians within a Valentinian 
framework,501 our interpretation will not need to be directed by the vast range of conflicting 
literature regarding the debate concerning the ‘correct’ interpretation of Fichte’s philosophy.502 
The major concern is to draw out the specific set of philosophical problems that emerge in 
Fichte’s thought and to demonstrate why they occur.  
    When commenting on Schelling’s 1795 work ‘On the I as Principle of Philosophy’ in a letter 
to Reinhold (July 1795), Fichte states that ‘Schelling’s entire essay is a commentary on my 
writings.’503 However, from around about the appearance of his ‘System of Transcendental 
                                                             
501 In his 1794 letter to Hoven, Friedrich Schiller writes that he considered Fichte as ‘the greatest speculative genius 
of the present century’ (Emil Wilm, ‘the Relation of Schiller to Post-Kantian Idealism,’ in The Journal of English 
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lectures in Jena 1794. He wrote in mid-November of the same year to his friend Neuffer that ‘Fichte is the soul of 
Jena’ and he apparently missed all of his other classes in order to satisfy his temporary infatuation with Fichte’s 
thought. Although like Schiller, he was never fully converted to Fichte’s vision of philosophy (Beiser, German 
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Fichte as his ‘teacher’ and ‘predecessor’ and even describes his ‘system of Transcendental Idealism’ as an 
‘exposition of Fichtean idealism’ (F.W.J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy (trans: Andrew Bowie), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). H.S. Harris identifies Hegel as a ‘disciple and coadjutor’ of Schelling, 
although an independent thinker, he would have more than likely followed Schelling’s intellectual development and 
adopted Fichtean thought (H.S. Harris, ‘Introduction to the Difference Essays’, in G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference 
Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s system of Philosophy (trans: Harris and Cerf), New York, State University of New 
York Press, 1977, p.3). Friedrich Schlegel like Schelling, and presumably Hegel, conceived of Fichte as the 
culmination of Kantian thought. He wrote to his brother in 1795 that Fichte was ‘the greatest metaphysical thinker 
now living’ (Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2008, p.437).   
502 There has been hermeneutical controversy surrounding the WL since its very first publication; controversy that 
persists even to this day. For a brief summary of some of the interpretations that surround, perhaps, the most debated 
issue in Fichte’s thought: the absolute I, see: Alexandre Guilherme, ‘Fichte: Kantian or Spinozian? Three 
Interpretations of the Absolute I’, in South African Journal of Philosophy:29:1, pp.1-16). 
503 Daniel Breazeale (ed and trans), Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, London, Cornell University Press, 1993, 
p.401. 
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Idealism’(1800), there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Schelling was beginning to see his 
philosophy as an independent project detached from his earlier ‘Fichteanism’; although, 
dissatisfaction for Fichte’s philosophy was already circulating from the likes of Hӧlderlin (as 
early as 1795), which would have undoubtedly influenced Schelling and Hegel’s reception of 
Fichte. Schelling accuses Fichte publicly of incorporating his own ideas into the WL in 1806,504 
although he had already done this privately in 1801;505 incidentally, roughly around the same 
time as Hegel’s first acknowledged publication: ‘The Difference Between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy’ which explicitly suggests that post-Kantian thought should 
now move beyond Fichtean philosophy. The fact that Fichte denies Schelling’s accusations506 
makes little difference to the conclusions that can be drawn from them: Schelling and his 
contemporaries had ceased to be Fichteans from the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is, for 
this reason that the scope of our assessment of Fichte’s thought shall not extend beyond, what is 
typically considered to be, the ‘Jena period.’ 507  
Fichte’s ‘Three Forms of Positing’ as Valentinian Presuppositions. 
Fichte begins his first presentation of the WL by announcing that ‘our task is to discover the 
primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. This can be neither 
proven nor defined, if it is to be an absolutely primary principle.’508 Fichte’s emphasis on the 
nature of the first principle as something which can neither be proven nor defined is the product 
of the fact that it is not some ‘thing’ there, but, rather, it is something done; an act 
(Tathandlung); an act which makes all consciousness possible. Nothing can begin before it, no 
                                                             
504  In Darlegung des Wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der Verbesserten Fichtesenlehre (1806). 
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proof or definition could be provided prior to it being carried out. Thus, its discovery involves its 
performance.509   
    Initially, in the 1794/5 WL, Fichte attempts to elucidate this point with a rather intricate 
logical system. He begins with the basic formula of the law of identity A = A. According to 
Fichte, the truth of this formula requires no reflection; it is immediately certain and its 
truthfulness is not dependent on a secondary proof or further reason. Fichte believes that this 
formula implies that we can ascribe to ourselves the ‘power of asserting something absolutely’510 
without ‘reason.’  However, he is keen to point out that the absolute truth of A = A does not 
necessarily imply that there is actually an A. It is only true in its logical ‘form,’ it does not 
answer ontological questions. But what we can say is, that if an A did exist, then it would 
comply with the absolute truth of A = A;511 primarily being interested in the relationship that 
exists in A = A512 which he names X. He attempts to account for the ontological reality of A = A 
by locating the truth of X in the self as its ontological ground. Therefore, in the proposition A = 
A there is a ‘self’ which judges this formula and acknowledges the absolute truth of X. On this 
observation, he concludes that if it is the self that judges the formula, and we have already 
concluded that A = A is true absolutely without any derived explanation or reason, then the self 
must be the ground of its truth; we give the law of X to ourselves:  
X is at least in the self, and posited by the self, for it is the self that judges in the above 
proposition, and indeed judges according to X, as a law; which law must therefore be given to 
the self, and since it is posited absolutely and without any other ground, must be given to the self 
by itself alone.513  
However, he concedes that, although we cannot know whether and how the A is posited, based 
on the abstraction that has concluded that X is in the self - we must also conclude that A is in the 
self, given that A belongs to the necessary relationship designated by X: ‘A also must be present 
in the self, insofar as X is related to it.’514 A in the formula A = A is both subject and predicate 
related by X, both of which must be located in the self on the basis of his prior deductions. Fichte 
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believes that these proposals prove the ontological reality of A = A since they have been located 
within the self.  
    He then argues that A exists on the basis that, by X, the self asserts that A does exist for the 
self. Hence, within the self there is A = A, by the law of X, which is also subject and predicate 
that is totally united and one and the same within the self. He argues that this conclusion permits 
him to remove A = A and the relationship X is now equivalent to I = I; I am I, which is a fact of 
consciousness that can be posited just as absolutely as X is. Hence, it can be argued, that ‘I am I’ 
is now in a position to move beyond the limitations of the formula A = A; as by itself, it is still 
strictly a ‘formal’ proposition; the truth of which is conditioned only by possibility. ‘I am I’ on 
the other hand, is unconditionally true in form, given that it’s related by X (which has already 
been proven to be unconditionally true), but it is also absolutely true in content - in reality - as 
the I = I is living; it is the self; it is ‘I am.’ Fichte argues that ‘I am’ as it stands is simply a ‘fact.’ 
For if A = A is certain (or X, as the designated relationship, is certain) then ‘I am’ is also certain. 
From this we can conclude, that ‘it is a fact of empirical consciousness that we are constrained to 
regard X as absolutely certain; and so too with the proposition ‘I am’, on which X is founded.’515  
Therefore, the ‘I am’ or the ‘fact’ that, in the self, the self itself is posited is a necessary 
requirement for all facts of empirical consciousness (something like the Kantian unity of 
apperception). 
     As he noted earlier in his exhaustive process of reasoning, A = A requires a judgement by the 
self. Judgement, as Fichte understands it, is an activity of the human mind. So we can conclude 
that X = ‘I am’ is an activity as well as its own ground. Therefore, ‘what is absolutely posited, 
and founded on itself, is the ground of one particular activity of the human mind.’516 We are left 
with the suggestion that the self posits itself as its own pure activity. So that ‘the self posits itself, 
and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its 
own existence by virtue of merely existing. It is at once the agent and the product of action: the 
activity, and what the activity brings about; action and deed are one and the same, and hence the 
‘I am’ expresses an act.’517  
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    Fichte, turning his attention back to the proposition ‘I am I’, reasons that the ‘first’ I, in the 
statement ‘I am I,’ is absolutely posited as occupying the place of formal subject; ‘formal 
subject’ is here meant to mean that the ‘first’ I is the positing I which is active. The ‘second’ I 
occupies the predicative position and existence is the predicate, it is the ‘reflecting’ I. Although, 
he has distinguished the two I’s in the proposition ‘I am I,’ his earlier conclusions render this 
distinction somewhat artificial, as both I’s are utterly identical. He concludes from this process 
that ‘the self exists because it has posited itself;’518 because the subjective I and the reflective I 
are one and the same; subject and existence are one and the same. It should now become clear, 
according to Fichte, what he means by the word I in this context, which leads to the self as an 
‘absolute subject’ which is to say: ‘that whose being or essence consists simply in the fact that it 
posits itself as existing...it posits itself, so it is; and as it is, so it posits itself.’519 Hence, it can be 
concluded that the self exists for the self. To posit and ‘to be’ are identical in the self and the 
‘self-positing self and the existing self are perfectly identical.520 On the basis of the above 
demonstration, he contends that he has described the act which is consciousness itself; the act 
which stands at the forefront of his entire WL as its first absolutely unconditioned principle: ‘the 
self begins by an absolute positing of its own existence.’521  Therefore, the proposition A = A, as 
a logical principle, is in fact founded on the first principle of the WL; all reality is posited 
through this principle, through and for the self.522 As Zoller notes, for Fichte, intellectual 
intuition presupposes all consciousness and thinking, it is the foundation of all consciousness.523 
However, his first principle cannot stand alone, it initiates a second principle. 
                                                             
518 Ibid, p.98. 
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520 Ibid, p.99. 
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522 In his Nova Methodo, Fichte modifies this rather complicated logical introduction into his first principle in favour 
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ethics. See: J.G. Fichte, The System of Ethics (trans: Daniel Breazeale and Gunter Zoller), Cambridge, Cambridge 
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Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.34. Fichte also uses the example of thinking of a particular object such as a 
wall or desk in order to illustrate his first principle. See: J.G. Fichte, The System of Ethics (trans: Daniel Breazeale 
and Gunter Zoller), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.24. 
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    Fichte begins the introduction of his second principle by drawing attention to the fact that, just 
as it was with the first principle, the second principle is not able to be proven or derived. And 
that, just as he did before with the logical proposition A = A, he will begin with a ‘fact of 
consciousness.  ‘–A is not equal to A’ is, according to Fichte, as certain, under the same 
conditions, as A = A. Thus, he concludes that, in opposition to the first principle, ‘−A is posited 
absolutely, as such, just because it is posited.’524 From this conclusion, Fichte argues that 
because the proposition ‘–A is not equal to A’ occurs certainly among the facts of empirical 
consciousness (it is true because it is true), and because it was concluded from the first principle, 
that the facts of consciousness such as A = A are true insofar as they are grounded in the activity 
of the self, we can therefore conclude that this opposition can also be included among the acts of 
the self. This ‘opposition is, as to its form, an absolutely possible and unconditional act based on 
no higher ground [than the self].’525 Fichte can affirm this point as the act of counter-positing, 
although not contained within or to be derived from, still presupposes the identity of 
consciousness. Fichte is left with the following propositions: ‘A (absolutely posited) = A (the 
object of reflection). By an absolute act this A, as object of reflection, is opposed to –A, and this 
latter is judged also to be opposed to the absolutely posited A, since both A’s are the same: a 
likeness based of the positing and reflecting self.’526 So, by the absolute act the opposite is 
posited as opposed. Therefore, ‘every opposite, so far as it is so, is so absolutely, by virtue of an 
act of the self, and for no other reason. Opposition in general is posited absolutely by the self.’527 
However, if an –A is to be posited, an A must also be posited; the first proposition is conditioned 
by the latter. So the act of positing a –A is conditioned by an act which posits an A. Fichte uses 
this point to further emphasise that counter-positing is conditioned by positing; if it was not then 
it would not be counter-positing at all, but an absolute positing. Having already concluded that 
counter-positing does occur in the activity of the I, he now proceeds to address the implications 
of this fact. 
    He draws a distinction in the –A between its form and its matter; the form is determined 
absolutely by the act of counter-positing, it is an opposite, whereas the matter of the –A is 
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‘governed by A; it is not what A is, and its whole essence consists in that fact.’528 Whatever –A 
is, it can only be known to me ‘on the assumption that I am acquainted with A.’529 Therefore, 
when considering Fichte’s definition of A as an I, it can be concluded that the I or self is posited 
absolutely and any opposition which occurs can only be in opposition to the self and, that which 
is opposed to the self must be the ‘not-self’ or the Nicht-Ich. Given the fact that Fichte has 
already ‘proven’ that the proposition ‘–A is not equal to A’ is an unconditional fact of 
consciousness akin to A = A, he is also able to admit that ‘a not self is opposed absolutely to the 
self;’530 which is unconditioned in its ‘form’ but conditioned in its matter by the I. Undoubtedly, 
the introduction of his second principle produces more contradictions than explanations, which 
he attempts to address and reconcile with his third principle.  
    Fichte initially defines his third principle by acknowledging that the first and second principles 
are mutually exclusive: ‘If I = I, everything is posited that is posited in the self. But now the 
second principle is supposed to be posited in the self, and also not to be posited therein. Thus I 
does not = I, but rather self = not-self, and not-self = self.’531 Based on the laws of reflection, 
both the first and second principles are absolutely true and Fichte is not willing to relinquish 
either of them; even if he concedes that if both are correct then ‘the identity of consciousness, the 
sole absolute foundation of our knowledge, is itself eliminated.’532 In drawing these conclusions, 
Fichte has already outlined the task of the third principle: ‘to discover some X, by means of 
which all these conclusions can be granted as correct, without doing away with the identity of 
consciousness.’533 Firstly, the opposites which have been outlined, which are to be unified, both 
lie in the self (according to the pre -established conclusions). That is to say, both lie in 
consciousness and X (the relationship which is the unknown solution), must therefore also exist 
in consciousness,’534 because both are able to exist in the self, which anticipates a pre-established 
harmony of sort. Both opposites are the product of original acts of the self; consciousness being a 
product of the self’s first original act. However, the act of counter-positing which results in the 
not-self, presupposes the first act, or the relationship within the first act which was X. Therefore, 
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the ‘X (harmony between both opposites) itself must be a product, and an original act of the self 
at that’535 – it must be so, given the existence of consciousness itself, which presupposes the 
unity of these two opposites – ‘Hence there is an act of the human mind = Y, whose product is 
X.’536  Therefore, the form of Y is determined by the necessity to unify the two opposites and 
posit them together without mutual exclusion: ‘the opposites in question must be taken up into 
the identity of the one consciousness.’537  Although, we now know what Y must be, we do not 
know how it can actually be. Fichte’s answer to this ‘how’ is that the Y designates a mutual 
limitation of each opposite: ‘the act of Y will be the limiting of each opposite by the other; and X 
will denote the limits.’538 The new definition of X as a marker of the mutually limiting activity of 
the Y introduces, according to Fichte, the concepts of reality and negation as further opposites 
which must now be united. He states this because ‘limiting’ is an act of partially negating the 
reality of something; which itself must imply that the notion of limitation must also contain the 
notion of divisibility. Therefore, ‘by the act of Y both the self and the not-self are absolutely 
posited as divisible.’539 Fichte argues that reality is taken away from the self in so far as the not-
self is posited within the self; their mutual reality is divisible. Consciousness now contains the 
whole of reality, and the not-self is given reality to the extent that it does not belong to the self. 
Both the self and the not-self are now ‘particulars’ they are ‘finitised’ and are to be distinguished 
from the absolute self, for which the ‘not-self is absolutely nothing;’540 contrary to the ‘limitable 
self ‘ where the not-self is a negative quantity. Therefore, the self is set against itself through a 
concept of alienation: ‘consciousness is one: but in this consciousness the absolute self is posited 
as indivisible (first principle); whereas the self to which the not-self is opposed is posited as 
divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is in opposition to the 
absolute self.’541 Despite these propositions existing within consciousness, Fichte contends – 
based on his third principle – that the ‘opposing’ self and not-self were successfully unified 
through the concept of divisibility. His third principle can be abstracted into a formula which he 
calls the ‘grounding proposition’ and can be expressed thus: ‘A in part = −A , and vice versa. 
Every opposite is like its opponent in one respect, = X; and every like is opposed to its like in 
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one respect, = X.’542 X designated as the grounding proposition as every conjunction or 
distinction would need a priori to proceed from this formula. Therefore, the formula can be 
formulated slightly differently as ‘A = −A in respect of X.’543 Fichte states that his third principle 
is a ‘lower principle’ because, from within it, the self is ‘degraded’ into divisibility ‘so that it can 
be set equal to the not-self and in the same concept it is also opposed thereto.’544 His description 
of the degradation is as follows: ‘the self and the not-self, as equated and opposed through the 
concept of their capacity for mutual limitation, are themselves both something (namely 
accidents) in the self as divisible substance; posited, by the self, as absolute, illimitable subject, 
to which nothing is either equated or opposed.’545 
    Having evaluated Fichte’s dense and intricate first three principles, we are now in a position to 
suggest to what extent they introduce the Valentinian philosophical presuppositions and 
problems that begin to direct the entire shape of Fichte’s philosophical narrative. Firstly, in his 
first principle, Fichte associates the ‘creation’ of the self, and therefore consciousness, with an 
‘original’ infinite activity of the absolute self that is somehow disturbed by a counter activity that 
is contrary to its own. This process ‘creates’ divisibility in the self and a finite reality that is 
alienated from its original infinite activity. Given its origin, it is ‘aware’ of what it should be, its 
true unified self, and therefore desires to overcome its own alienation and be united with its 
infinite activity. It is precisely at this point where the philosophical problems are introduced. If 
we do assume that this is our starting point, why is there finitude at all? How has it occurred or 
what has caused it. Therefore, just as we saw in Valentinian thought, Fichte’s philosophy has a 
narrative structure committed to an original monism (absolute activity of the I), which is then 
disrupted or broken up (by the phenomenon of ‘counter-positing’). This disparity should not be 
the case; it must be reunited so that the original monism can be maintained or so that the 
divisible self can be identified with its own original infinite activity. Thus, in both instances there 
is no purposeful or deliberate communication from infinitude to finitude, but rather a primordial 
‘fall’ from this state or ‘disruption’ that produces a negative finite reality that must be negated or 
overcome. Fichte attempts to respond to these problems which his philosophy has introduced.            
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Fichte’s ‘Response’ to his  ‘Valentinian Philosophical Problems’. 
Although Fichte has attempted to explain the compatibility of the first two principles via the 
third, the question as to why and how this occurs has largely been left unanswered. In his attempt 
to respond to these glaring tensions within his own system, he introduces the notion of an Anstoß 
(‘check’ or ‘block’) which he hopes will explain the relationship between the three principles. 
The Anstoß is a primal interruption or block of the original infinite activity of the Absolute ego. 
This check produces the reflecting finite self as distinct from its own infinite activity, which it is 
now aware of. The finite self comprehends this infinite activity as its own, yet not as its own at 
the same time, in so far as it cannot be harmoniously united to this activity as the finite self is 
limited; markedly not infinite. Thus, the type of subjectivity that comprises all of human 
existence is a product of an original Absolute activity blocked and then reflected upon, without 
this event, the self as we know it could not exist. The Anstoß originates outside of the infinite 
activity of the Absolute ego, paradoxically functioning as an ‘in itself’ for this subject. However, 
it should not be considered as some higher ontological reality to the Absolute ego, for the 
‘check’ does not directly set bounds to the self’s activity by dictating what the self must be but, 
rather, it is the occasion that prompts the self to set its own limits to its own activity; therefore 
effecting it indirectly through itself as it were. The ‘check’ is fundamentally the ‘cause’ of the 
positing of the not-self and the external world. Fichte works out the implications of the ‘check’ 
between the divisible or intelligent I and the divisible not-I at some length in his works on 
natural right and ethics. Within the empirical ego’s daily life, the divisible not-self functions as a 
‘check’ in the life of the divisible I and that nature and the external world, although obviously 
‘real,’ are there only in so far as the self is to act; they are the conditions to which the self is 
called to exercise its own free determinability; the divisible not-self ‘summons’ the divisible self 
to freely determine itself by acting on the not-self within the external world. Hence, Fichte will 
make statements such as: ‘our world is absolutely nothing other than the Not-I; it is posited only 
in order to explain the limitedness of the I, and hence it receives all its determinations only 
through opposition to the I.’546 Therefore, the ‘check’ urges the self to posit beings ‘like itself’ 
outside of itself in an external world; Fichte conceives the natural world to contain its ends 
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precisely in the ends of the self; it has, as it were, a purpose in the self and not outside it;547 it is 
there simply to be determined by and for the self: ‘a rational being cannot ascribe a power to 
itself without simultaneously thinking of something outside of itself to which this power is 
directed.’548 Therefore, we could say that ‘rights’ designate the possibility of the divisible I’s 
activity upon other selves within the external world; other selves which are necessarily posited as 
being like the self with their own spheres or rights in which they can also exercise their own 
activity. The ethical law designates how we ought to act within these bubbles circumscribed by 
our rights.  
    It is clear therefore, that Fichte concedes the obvious point that the ‘check’ introduces a form 
of realism into his system, although he is eager to point out that ‘it presupposes neither a not-self 
present apart from the self, nor even a determination present within the self, but merely the 
requirement for a determination to be undertaken within it by the self as such.’549 In other words, 
it is no conventional realism. Fichte is always keen to make this point painstakingly clear. As in 
the introduction of the second principle in relationship to the first, where he emphasised that the 
not-self can only be posited insofar as the self was posited (even though it was still posited 
independently of the self), he makes this same point in relation to the ‘check.’ The check only 
occurs ‘in consequence of the latter’s own activity in positing itself; that its outward-striving 
activity was…thrown back into itself, from which the self-limitation…would then very naturally 
follow.’550 All of the above can be tidily summarised by the axiom: ‘no activity of the self, no 
check;’551 although, the check does provide the possibility for a particular form of determining 
activity by the self, which is enacted in opposition to, and against, an ‘objective’ realm.   
  From this evaluation of how Fichte attempts to respond to some of the Valentinian questions 
and philosophical problems that he had initially introduced, it is clear that they remain largely 
unsuccessful. Although Fichte appeals to the Anstoß as that which occasions the infinite activity 
of the Absolute self to revert back into itself, there is still no explanation as to why it occurs in 
the first place. Some responses to this objection would seem to suggest that the ‘check’ is posited 
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by the Absolute ego in order for it to be in a position to determine itself in a specific manner. 
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), in his letter to Goethe in October 1794, presents a typical 
caricature of this kind of interpretation: ‘Und all realität ist nur in dem Ich. Die Welt ist ihn nur 
ein ball, den das Ich geworfen hat und den es bei der reflexion wieder fängt.’552 However, as 
Slavoj Žižek notes: the ‘Anstoss is not simply the obstacle the absolute I posits to itself in order 
to stimulate its activity so that, by overcoming the self-posited obstacle, it asserts its creative 
power;’553 whatever the ‘check’ is, it is not reducible to any ‘controlled’ activity of the absolute 
self, it is utterly opposed to this and it is in so far as it is not this. Breazeale also emphasises this 
point emphatically when commenting on the Anstoß; he states that: it is ‘the presence, within the 
I itself, of a realm of irreducible otherness, of absolute contingency and incomprehensibility.’554 
A considerable amount of recent Fichte scholarship has been directed at dismantling these 
common hermeneutical ‘myths,’ precisely by emphasising those aspects of his thought which 
reveal his inability to give the eschatological ‘Valentinian response’ of total re-absorption of the 
finite self within the Absolute ego; usually by insisting on the realist implications of the ‘check’ 
and the eternal ‘frustration’ of the finite I, which can never truly become synonymous with its 
‘own’ infinite activity.555 However, the above point should not be taken as presenting the Anstoß 
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as a reaffirmation of the Kantian ‘in itself.’ If there is one thing that Fichte continually 
emphasised more than anything else it was that his system had overcome Kantian dualisms, 
especially the distinction between the ‘thing’ and the ‘thing in itself.’ Even though the not-I must 
be posited to account for the self’s limitation, it does not designate something that is ‘in itself’ as 
a realm ‘outside’ of the finitude of the I: ‘the not-I is nothing actual unless it is related to an 
instance of acting on the part of the I, for only on this condition and only by this means does it 
become an object of consciousness. The ‘thing in itself’ is thereby abolished once and for all.’556 
Whilst the Anstoss is never overcome – if it were then there would be no self at all – and the 
infinite activity of the I is never reconciled with the finite I’s attempts to receive it within its own 
mode of being, there is no longer an infinity or any other reality that is somehow outside or apart 
from the self. Henrich puts this point excellently: the Anstoß ‘is an other but its very otherness is 
to be in relation to the self or for the self.’557  
    Therefore, Fichte has undoubtedly transformed the Kantian ‘in itself’ in his attempt to provide 
a monistic first principle. The ‘in itself,’ is only posited to the extent that it is for the self and is 
in some sense only there because of the self’s activity; however, despite Fichte’s hope of an 
eventual harmonization of the finite I with its infinite activity, he never quite accounts for it. For 
the Anstoß can never totally disappear, if it did, there would simply be no self at all. It is for this 
reason that Hegel is able to assert that the synthesis of the finite and the infinite is incomplete558 
and that it even comprises a ‘bad infinite,’559 and that Fichte is able to be positioned somewhere 
in between Kant and the ‘absolute idealists.’ So there is clearly no response to why and how 
finitude is possible, and there is certainly no possibility of finitude ever being fully absorbed into 
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its original infinity. It is these precise questions that those working within the Fichtean 
framework will attempt to answer, using Gnostic mythology as a reference point.  
Summative Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to excavate and assess the archaeological frame (rules of 
formation) produced, through a complex web of immediate post-Kantian philosophical 
interactions, which will prove foundational for the later introduction of Gnostic mythology 
within philosophical discourses that will be shown to be pivotal in informing the construction of 
certain types of Valentinian concepts of Wisdom associated with modern theology. This frame is 
constructed on the basis of a specific set of philosophical problems emerging within the 
discourse of post-Kantian philosophy, when the Kantian system is turned into a monistic project. 
Through close historical analysis, we have shown how these questions eventually matured and 
reached fruition in Fichte’s ‘Jena system.’ Here we encountered a philosophy that began with an 
original monism (the Absolute and infinite activity of the Absolute ego), which was then 
disturbed and checked, causing finitude to fall away from this original state. The purpose of the 
finite ego was then to re-unite itself with its original infinite activity, however, despite attempts 
made by Fichte to account for this union, it was not possible within the limitations of his own 
philosophical commitments. We noted, throughout this analysis, that there were stark similarities 
with the questions and problems posed by Fichte to Valentianian wisdom theology, to the extent 
that they could be considered as archaeological shifts. However, although the questions and 
problems on which both Fichtean philosophy and Valentinan wisdom theology rotate are 
isomorphic in the archaeological sense, there is no final correspondence in so far as Fichte did 
not adopt the eschatological solutions proposed by the Gnostics to respond to these similar 
questions. What we are able to conclude is that these unanswered problems and questions will 
dictate the philosophies of the next generation of German philosophers, providing solutions that 
will not only consciously be modelled on Gnostic mythology, but will further provide the context 
in which modern theology will construct much of its concepts of Wisdom.  
    Now we shall explore how these questions transform into a fully developed Gnostic theology 
within Schelling.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Schelling and Valentinian Gnosticism: The Emergence of Gnostic Concepts and Their 
Authoritative Enunciation in Modern Philosophy   
In the preceding chapter, we began to explore the ‘rules of formation’ for ideas that would later 
develop into a distinctly Gnostic discourse within modernity. Within Fichtean philosophy, 
certain philosophical questions and problems surfaced (which were argued to be archaeological 
shifts from Valentinian discourses) which we shall here attempt to demonstrate, form the frame 
in which fully fledged Gnostic ‘concepts’ are produced within modern philosophy. There is no 
clearer example of these concepts developing than in the philosophy of Schelling, which shall be 
critically evaluated within this chapter, by engaging with Schelling’s philosophical journey 
through its four major phases: the early Transcendental or Fichtean/Spinozist Schelling of the 
Naturphilosophie; the Schelling of the Identitätphilosophie (c.1801-1809); his ‘middle period’ 
(c.1809-1827); and his ‘late philosophy,’ characterised by his critique of Hegel and his attempt to 
construct a ‘positive philosophy.’ Through all of these stages, we shall attempt to document and 
critically assess the emerging development of Valentinian theology within Schelling’s proposals, 
drawing on the analysis in chapter II. 
As already discussed in the introduction, Schelling’s philosophy has by no means been arbitrarily 
selected for the purpose of analysing the proposed advent of distinct Gnostic thought forms 
taking shape in modernity. But, rather, Schelling provides the philosophical substance, from 
which the first major modern wisdom theologies were construed, namely those of Solovyov and 
Bulgakov. Whilst it would be impossible to underestimate the role of Hegelian philosophy for 
these Russian thinkers, it is predominantly Schelling that is the key figure in this developmental 
process. Furthermore, their engagement with Hegel is conducted through the vehemently critical 
lens of this same philosophy, provided by Schelling. Thus, it is Hegel via Schelling for the 
Russian wisdom theologians. It is for this reason that this chapter shall be devoted to the 
development of Gnostic concepts within Schelling’s philosophy, although Hegelian thought will 
still be considered here, only to a much lesser extent.   
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    Werner Hamacher has noted that ‘in his reminiscences of Hegel, Schwegler reports that “a 
fellow doctoral graduate of Hegel’s told me that during his years at the [Tübinger] Stift Hegel 
principally studied Aristotle in an ancient worm-eaten Basel edition, the only one available at 
that time, whilst Schelling read the Gnostics, particularly the Ophitic and Valentinian 
systems.”’560 Although one’s immediate reaction to this report may simply be to dismiss it as 
third hand student hearsay, a closer look at Schelling’s adolescent academic writing may go 
some way to substantiating its content.  
    In 1790, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling was enrolled at the Tübinger Stift, by special 
exemption obtained by his father, at the unusually young age of fifteen, where students would 
study two years of philosophy and three years of theology as a preliminary to Christian ministry. 
Here, Schelling shared a room with two other promising young students who would also go on to 
play major parts in German Romanticism and Idealism respectively: Friedrich Hölderlin and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.561 Despite being five years their junior, Schelling was by no 
means out of place intellectually; his astute and creative mind, coupled with his flair for modern 
and classical languages, made him something of a young prodigy. The students at the Stift were 
taught by conservative Lutherans eager to encourage devotion to Lutheran orthodoxy however, it 
is quite clear from various first hand reports that many of the students had become disenchanted 
with ‘traditional’ theology as one noted: ‘one admired in the French revolution, the triumph of 
reason, and the decisive victory of philosophy…There was no longer any discussion of theology. 
That was empty twaddle.’562 This disillusionment may best account for the young Schelling’s 
early move away from Lutheran theology in favour of, what could be described as ‘esoteric’ 
speculation. There is evidence of this move as early as 1792 in his De Prima Malorum 
Humanorum Origine where he explores the notion of the ‘Fall’ whilst re-evaluating the 
relationship between evil and reason in a more positive light than orthodox Christianity would 
permit.563 Bruce Matthews has recently described this ‘exegesis’ of Genesis as falling within the 
                                                             
560 Werner Hamacher, Pleroma: Reading in Hegel, California, Stanford, 1998, p.91 (my emphasis). 
561 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, Chicago, 
University of Chicago, 2002, p.116. 
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‘Ophite and Valentinian Schools of Gnosticism.’564 Similarly, Schelling’s 1793 work entitled 
Über Mythen: historische Sagen und Philosopheme der ältesten Welt; a work largely inspired by 
Romantic sympathies, which explores the relationship between mythology and truth565, again, 
highlights Schelling’s interest in, and knowledge of ‘esoteric’ mythology. The third most 
significant work of this period, and the one which may go some way to explaining why Schelling 
could have been spotted reading the Gnostics, is his 1795 Latin dissertation on Marcionism and 
its relationship to the Pauline epistles: De Marcione: Paulinarum epistolarum emendatore. He 
later sent this piece to his friend Hegel, who responded in thanks with a letter which is perhaps 
revelatory of their theological attitudes at the time: 
I have at once found confirmation in it [Schelling’s dissertation] of a suspicion I have harboured 
for a long time, namely, that it would perhaps have done more credit to us and to mankind if no 
matter what heresy, damned by council and creeds, had risen to become the public system of 
belief, instead of the orthodox system maintaining the upper hand.566  
Although Schelling’s theology dissertation is principally an historical and an exegetical work,567 
it nevertheless provides concrete evidence of Schelling’s early interest in Gnosticism and his 
familiarity with the systems associated with them. Although one may initially be forgiven for 
refusing to draw any profound hermeneutical conclusions from, what may at first appear to be an 
insignificant adolescent phase, their prominence for Schelling cannot be emphasised enough. 
These themes resurface far too often and with far too much clarity throughout Schelling’s entire 
corpus for them to be ignored. Although interpretations of Schelling’s texts shall come later, just 
to illustrate this point it will suffice for now to highlight several examples. For instance, in his 
1802 treatise: Bruno, Schelling is already grappling with the problem of finitude in the wake of 
his adherence to an original monism, where he readily conceives of the finite realm as a ‘falling 
away’ (Abfall) from this original state: ‘men learned that the individual things had cut themselves 
off from the essentially identical.’568 Similarly, yet even more emphatically, in his 1804 work 
entitled Philosophie und Religion, Schelling again portrays creation as the negative product of a 
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566 G.W.F. Hegel, The Letters (trans: Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
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568 F.W.J. Schelling, Bruno: On the Natural and the Divine principle of Things (trans: Michael Vater), New York, 
State University of New York Press, 1984, p.134.  
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crisis in the Absolute itself: ‘the origin of the phenomenal world should not be imagined, as 
popular religion does, as a creation, as a positive…But as a falling away [Abfall].’569 He portrays 
the human soul as being the ‘fallen divine essence in man’570 and contends that the ‘ultimate goal 
of the universe and its history is nothing other than the complete…re-absorption 
[Wiederauflösung] into the Absolute.’571 Again, in his 1810 Stuttgart Privatvorlesung Schelling 
is still describing the world as being an aspect of divinity expelled from the Absolute: ‘The 
beginning of creation amounts indeed to a descent [Herablassung] of God’ and ‘God…excludes 
the inferior [dimension] of his essence from the superior one and expels it as it were from 
himself;’ which must then be re-inaugurated back into the Absolute.572 And, in Schelling’s 
second draught (1813) of Die Weltalter his justification for being able to describe the internal 
processes of the divine is that humanity is able to ‘remember’ them, in so far as there is 
something within us which was once a part of that original agonistic process:  
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he alone, of all 
creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present back into the deepest night of 
the past, how could he alone rise up to the beginning of things unless there were in him an 
essence from the beginning of times. Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is 
eternal of the soul has a co-science/consciousness [Mitt-Wissenschaft] of creation.573  
These, and similar themes are present throughout Schelling’s philosophy right up until the Berlin 
Lectures, not long before his death. Thus, Schelling’s early interest in Gnosticism is by no means 
a fleeting one, some of their most fundamental conventions remain apparent throughout a range 
of Schelling’s philosophical speculations. 
    By and large, Schelling has been a neglected figure in theological, historical, and 
philosophical scholarship; often simply by passed as an insignificant precursor to Hegel, or as an 
anti-rationalist theosophical thinker, or he is even simply ignored altogether.574 However, more 
recently, these caricatures have been challenged and the significance of Schelling has slowly 
begun to be recognised. Perhaps, the most instrumental figures in this rejuvenation are Manfred 
                                                             
569 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophy and Religion (trans: Klaus Ottmann), Connecticut, Spring Publications, 2010, p.27.  
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Frank and Andrew Bowie, amongst several others.575 However, amongst their respective 
projects, and certainly prominent in Bowie, is a strong tendency to suppress the theological and 
mythical elements so apparent within Schelling’s philosophy, where they are neglected as 
hermeneutical aids to understanding Shelling’s thought.576 It is important to note that the motives 
behind this move are largely related to the individual ‘rejuvenation projects’ themselves and not 
direct criticisms of utilising a theological approach when interpreting Schelling. These projects 
are largely concerned with demonstrating Schelling’s significance for contemporary philosophy; 
and, historically speaking, Schelling’s theology has always proven to be something of an 
obstacle to a recognition of his importance and therefore to the ‘rejuvenation projects’ 
themselves. However, this chapter is not concerned with vindicating Schelling, but assessing his 
philosophy in relation to themes that seem to be utterly and insuppressibly apparent within his 
philosophy, which, as we shall demonstrate, Gnosticism appears to be.          
Schelling’s Inheritance from Fichte: Transcendentalism, Spinozism, and the 
Naturphilosophie. 
It is quite clear from Schelling’s early philosophical writings, which he produced in the late 18th 
century, that he underwent an intellectual evolution that was typical of his generation.  In his 
Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt (1794), Schelling upholds that the 
dualisms apparent within Kantian thought had rendered philosophy incomplete, and that an 
immediately certain first principle was needed to supplement Kant (the general attitude of 
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German philosophy towards Kant post Jacobi).577 Until this point, Schelling would have been 
most appropriately considered a Reinholdian, although he quickly realises its limitations and 
seeks solace in Fichte. Manfred Baum has claimed that ‘it is very likely that Schelling’s 
transition from Reinhold to Fichte occurred in the summer of 1794.’578  This transition becomes 
even more apparent in Schelling’s Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, oder über das 
Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen (1795), where he states emphatically that: ‘it was not his 
(Reinhold’s) destiny to solve the intrinsic problems of philosophy, but to bring it into the clearest 
focus.’579 Schelling then goes on to rehearse, almost verbatim, Fichte’s own philosophical 
contentions. He argues that the ego’s self-positing is an original act capable of providing 
philosophy with its first principle; thus moving beyond the mere static factuality of Reinhold’s 
Elementar-philosophie (Fichte’s critique of Reinhold’s first principle). He also argues, like 
Fichte, that the ‘finite/subjective I’ must infinitely strive to unite itself with the infinite activity of 
the ‘Absolute I.’ And, by redirecting philosophy in this manner, Schelling believes that there can 
be no reality existing ‘in itself’ outside of the I’s original act; and therefore no more Kantian 
dualisms. All of these are fairly familiar Fichtean points.580 However, despite demonstrating his 
clear allegiance to Fichte, Schelling, even at this early stage, already starts to evidence an 
awareness of some of the tensions which were outlined in Fichte’s philosophy in the previous 
chapter, especially in Fichte’s failure to offer an explanation of why finitude occurs in the first 
place, and how it is to be successfully held together with the infinite. And, in anticipation of his 
later philosophical turns, Schelling starts to experiment with the notion of finitude returning to an 
absolute identity, which it once had with the infinite (with Fichte’s Absolute I itself), he states: 
‘without the premise that the Absolute I is the concept of all reality, no practical philosophy can 
be thought of whose aim must be the end of all not-I and the recovery of the Absolute I in its 
ultimate identity.’581 Thus, Schelling, like Fichte, accepts that there is an original unity that is 
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somehow disrupted; however, unlike Fichte, Schelling is more eager to account for why this 
‘stepping outside of itself,’582 of the Absolute I, has occurred in the first place, and how it can 
resolve itself back to its original state of identity (something that Fichte thought was impossible).       
    Therefore, in his Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (1795) Schelling is 
still discussing the original opposition in the Absolute I that forces it to step out of itself, but, 
significantly, he appears greatly dissatisfied with Fichte’s fractured Absolute; it is a stage that 
must be resolved: ‘it ought to become unnecessary.’583 Thus, like Valentinian wisdom theology 
and Fichte before him, Schelling begins with a monistic first principle, where he is then left with 
the problem of finitude per se, which appears alienated from this ideal. The problem of finitude 
can be characterised by the questions concerning why there is finitude when there ought not to 
be: hence his philosophical thinking starts to revolve around these problems which were 
identified in chapter II: ‘why is there a realm of experience at all?’584 And: ‘the very transition 
from the non-finite to the finite is the problem of all philosophy.’585 There is no doubt where this 
is leading to; a formulation of ‘absolute identity,’ which he initially imagines by attempting to 
synthesise Fichte’s idealism with Spinoza’s objectivism to propose, what Schelling later 
describes as, an ‘inverted Spinozism,’586 as elucidated in his Von Ich: ‘if the I is the only 
substance, then everything that is, is merely a quality (accidens) of the I.’587 However, it is not 
long before Schelling starts to question the ‘subjective nature’ of these early formulations and re-
explores this conception of monism in a more Spinozistic/objective format, which is 
characterised by his Naturphilosophie. 
    Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is perhaps best understood as an extension of his earlier 
experiments of combining Fichte with Spinoza, only in this instance, giving priority to Spinoza’s 
objectivism. Scholarly opinion is somewhat divided over the inspiration for Schelling’s decision 
to pursue this project. Frederick Beiser has suggested that Schelling was influenced by the 
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Romantics.588 However, Ryan Foster and Manfred Frank play down the significance of the 
Romantic circle on the young Schelling, Foster states that: ‘most of the architectonic of 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature was already in place before he ever met the Schlegels or 
Novalis.’589 Whilst Foster is correct to note that the foundations of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie 
were constructed prior to his introduction to the ‘Jena circle,’ Schelling’s positions are clearly 
typical of the Romantic response to Fichte, and also embody the Romantic’s reverence for 
nature, which could have been introduced to him prior to his move to Jena. For instance, as early 
as 1795, in his Urtheil und Sein, Hölderlin criticises Fichte for failing to account for absolute 
identity, which he believes must necessarily precede any division of the absolute being; hence by 
commencing with the self-positing I, which already presupposes a division of subject and object, 
Fichte is failing to commence with the Absolute itself, which is characterised by complete 
simplicity, and therefore his philosophy cannot be the complete and absolute system, which he 
claims it to be. He states that:  
Where subject and object are absolutely, not just partially united, and hence so united that no 
division can be undertaken, without destroying the essence [Wesen] of the thing that is to be 
sundered, there and not otherwise can we talk of an absolute being…When I say ‘ich bin ich’ the 
subject and the object are not so united that absolutely no sundering can be undertaken…On the 
contrary the ich is only possible through the sundering of the ich vom ich.590 
All of these positions Hölderlin had already anticipated in his 26 January 1795 letter to Hegel,591 
and before Schelling’s first major work on the philosophy of nature: his 1797 Ideen zu einer 
Philosopher der Natur. Thus, when he moves to Jena in 1798, to take up a teaching position, 
where he is brought into Friedrich Niethammer’s intellectual circle of friends - which included 
the Schlegel brothers, Novalis (G.F.P. Hardenberg), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich 
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Schiller, amongst others – he is already familiar with some of their ideas, 592which included 
hostility towards Fichte’s subjectivism and a mystical appreciation of nature.593 
    In respect to the task at hand, there is no need to offer an exhaustive elucidation of the intricate 
(and largely incorrect) ‘scientific’ propositions of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie; it will suffice to 
offer a broad outline of the intentions of this project. First and foremost, Schelling’s philosophy 
of nature can be interpreted as an attempt to read Fichte’s philosophy into the production of 
nature itself. This concern alone is enough to inspire Schelling to oppose the popular Newtonian 
conception of physical reality that was prevalent at the time. Robert Stern has stated that: 
‘Schelling stands opposed to the Newtonian picture of matter as made up of hard, impenetrable, 
inert particles that are acted on by forces external to them.’594 Schelling persistently rejects this 
Newtonian conception of nature, precisely because it does not permit the dynamic internal 
construction of nature that Schelling envisages as an ‘equilibrium of active forces that stand in 
polar opposition to one another.’595 Thus, he will claim that ‘absolute inertness…is a concept 
without sense or significance’ and ‘there is no seeing how the primary particles, in so far as they 
are absolutely impenetrable, and are thus incapable of compression, can communicate motion to 
another body.’596 These insights are also derived from Kant’s dynamic understanding of matter 
which he outlined in his 1786 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.597 Schelling 
attempts to read the oppositional dynamics of the Fichtean construction of self-consciousness in 
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to the production of nature itself, by highlighting the interplay between opposing forces within 
nature, which he chiefly explores through the phenomena of heat and combustion, light and air, 
and electricity and magnetism.598 One of the most significant positions to emerge out of 
Schelling’s 1797 Ideen zu einer Philosopher der Natur is that, contrary to Fichte, the natural 
world is no longer a negative objective reality posited for the end of the subject to realise its own 
freedom, but that the dynamic processes which construct the subject, are also as primal in the 
construction of the objective natural world: ‘we maintain that matter is real outside of us, and 
matter itself, in so far as it is real outside us…is possessed of attractive and repulsive forces.’599 
The significance of Schelling’s insights are realised in their indication of an absolute process that 
points beyond the specific subjective and the objective constructions; an original process that is 
replicated in these respective instances, which he expresses more learly a year later in his 1798 
Von der Weltseele: ‘the universal principle of life individualises itself in every individual living 
being.’600   
     In his Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799) Schelling continues to 
grapple with the construction of nature from the perspective of Fichtean logic. Interestingly, even 
here, he is still concerned with the problem of finitude and accounting for why and how an 
existence apart from the original monistic identity can be possible: ‘the supreme problem of the 
philosophy of nature: what cause brought forth the first duplicity out of the universal identity of 
nature.’601  However, he still continues to uphold the typical Fichtean positions within his outline 
of the construction of nature. For instance, he affirms the necessity of an Anstoß occurring within 
an infinite activity: ‘in order for a real activity to come to be out of an infinite (and to that extent 
ideal) productive activity, that activity must be inhibited, retarded.’602 Similarly, he contends that 
being is nothing more than a constructive activity: ‘being itself is nothing other than the 
constructing itself.’603 Moreover, Schelling argues that nature is comprised of an infinite activity 
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which requires the construction of its original duplicity through a check that gives it a concrete 
reality.604 He contends that this process is at the base of all natural phenomena and every 
organism, which he affirms by appealing to Kant’s conception of matter as the dynamic 
interrelationship of attractive and repulsive forces, read through Fichte’s insistence that 
consciousness requires the mutual limitation of opposed activities within a single whole: ‘each 
organism is itself nothing other than the collective expression for a multiplicity of actants, which 
mutually limit themselves to a determinate sphere.’605 Hence, it is quite clear that Schelling has 
simply allowed his original philosophical problems to migrate into the philosophy of nature. He 
is still concerned with why and how an original duplicity occurs, be it in the Absolute I or in 
nature. 
    Therefore, the significance of the Naturphilosophie is not so much in Schelling’s move away 
from Fichte, after all, he is still working very much from within the Fichtean framework; he just 
applies it to the objective/natural world. For Schelling, Fichte’s subjectivism and Spinoza’s 
objectivism are fundamentally opposite sides of the same coin.606  Schelling describes his 
Naturphilosophie as the ‘Spinozism of physics,’607 and its most significant contribution to 
Schelling’s development is that it points beyond Fichtean thought, in so far as it comprehends the 
significance of the objective world:  
There is no place in this science for idealist methods of explanation, such as transcendental 
philosophy is fitted to supply, since for it nature is nothing more than the organ of self-
consciousness, and everything in nature is necessary merely because it is only through the 
medium of such a nature that self-consciousness can take place.608  
Now Schelling comprehends the construction of nature and self-consciousness to be underpinned 
by the same fundamental process that points towards a more original reality of absolute monism 
that Fichte could not imagine; fundamentally, it is a step towards Schelling’s attempts to account 
for finitude, both subjective and objective, as a falling away from an original whole. However, 
first he must account for such an original identity which he explores in the second phase of his 
philosophy: the philosophy of Identity.  
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Identitätphilosophie: Schelling’s Original Monism. 
Although Schelling’s philosophy of identity, which is said to mark his definitive break from 
Fichte, is typically thought to commence with his Darstellung des Systems meiner Philosophie 
(1801), his articulation of an absolute identity, despite still utilising Fichtean language, appears 
to be apparent within the System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800). In this work, Schelling 
initially appears to have negated the contentions of his philosophy of Nature, by again 
highlighting the necessity of Fichte’s transcendental method. For instance, he claims that: ‘self-
consciousness circumscribes the entire horizon of our knowing’609 and ‘the self arises through 
the act of self-consciousness and thus apart from this act the self is nothing.’610 Despite 
Schelling’s initial re-adherence to Fichte’s transcendentalism, he is keen to accommodate his 
philosophy of nature within this method itself, by proposing that matter can be utilised to unite 
the two opposing activities of subject and object within the self. Firstly, he notes that: 
We must encounter the traces of two activities, of which one, in the absence of limits, would 
produce the positive infinite [a pure subject], and the other the negative [the production of the 
self limits its own infinite activity]…these two activities cannot be absolutely opposed to each 
other without being activities of one and the same identical subject. So nor can they be united in 
one and the same product without a third activity which synthesises them both.611 
And, for Schelling, this synthesising product is nothing other than matter itself: 
In constructing matter the self is in truth constructing itself. The third act is that by means of 
which the self as sensing becomes an object to itself. But this is incapable of derivation unless 
the two activities, so far completely separated, are exhibited in one and the same identical 
product. This product, namely matter, is thus a complete construction of the self.612 
Thus, transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature become united and ‘matter is 
indeed nothing else but mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities.’613  
                                                             
609 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (trans: Peter Heath), Charlottesville, University Press of 
Virginia, 2001, p.17.  
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    Schelling argues that three forms of intuition can be identified in nature: a simple intuition of 
‘stuff’ which can be identified through sensation; matter itself which is posited through 
‘productive intuition’ and thirdly ‘organisation’ which attempts to construct intelligence by 
‘organising matter’ into a hierarchy of organisms which appear in evolutionary stages until the 
highest organism is reached which is identical with consciousness:  
The intelligence will appear to itself, not merely qua organic as such, but standing at the summit 
of organisation. It can regard the other organisations only as intermediate stages, throughout 
which the most perfect gradually extricates itself from the fetters of matter…by way of which it 
becomes completely an object to itself.614 
Thus, strikingly, in anticipation of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) Schelling 
appears to be conceiving the world as an evolutionary process that culminates in the self’s self-
awareness. This move leads Schelling to the conclusion that this process itself, in contradiction 
to Fichte, must necessarily precede consciousness’ own self-awareness and ‘must thus appear, 
not as conditioned thereby, but rather as the condition thereof.’615 
    This conception of the organic production of the self therefore requires Schelling to posit 
several mutually conditioned dichotomies: the unconscious and the conscious, necessity and 
freedom, and the natural world and the human world. As we have already noted, for Schelling 
the organic world is part of the self’s own construction; but given the fact that this is the 
necessary condition for the intelligent consciousness, the latter can never comprehend that ‘it 
produces this world out of itself’616 this becomes buried in the unconscious. Thus in the first 
instance we have the priority of the unconscious, nature, and necessity.617 However, this process 
is subordinated to the construction of the intelligent self which opens up the possibility for the 
conscious, self-determining world.618 Following Fichte, Schelling contends that our freedom is 
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realised through our interaction with other selves which is governed by shared rights and the 
moral law.619 
    Schelling suggests that this process or history is conditioned by teleology; a purposeful 
progression within history that is driving towards an ideal: ‘the concept of history embodies the 
notion of an infinite tendency to progress.’620  This ideal is principally to reveal the highest stage 
of self-consciousness, as a universal task, which is characterised by legal, political, and most 
importantly, moral qualities.621  Within this teleological process, Schelling paradoxically 
imagines an interplay between the freedom of individual consciousness and the necessity of the 
unconscious drive of nature to progress to the goal. Although he attempts to hold them together, 
he appears to give clear precedence to the pre-determination of history that is governed by a goal 
and realised through freedom. If his teleological process necessarily presupposes a ‘pre-
established harmony’ between freedom and necessity, Schelling argues that it is ‘conceivable 
through some higher thing…[which] is the common source of the intelligent and…the free.’622 
And it is precisely this ‘higher thing’ that Schelling posits as the precedence of an ‘absolute 
identity’: 
Now if this higher thing be nothing else but the ground of identity between the absolutely 
subjective and the absolutely objective, the conscious and the unconscious…then this higher 
thing itself can be neither subject or object, nor both at once, but only the absolute identity, in 
which is no duality at all.623      
However, given its nature, this higher thing cannot become an object of knowledge but only of 
belief in the absolute or God which transforms this teleological process into a providential one, 
which gives us the religious consciousness; for Schelling, like Fichte before him, conflates God 
with the moral order itself.624 Thus, until the moral order is realised one can say that God does 
not exist; God exists when the moral order is realised as the end of the teleological process 
through every individual’s conscious contribution. To this extent one can even say, as Schelling 
indeed does, that ‘every individual intelligence can be regarded as a constitutive part of God.’625 
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623 Ibid, p.208 (my emphasis). 
624 See: J.G. Fichte, ‘On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World’, in: Daniel Breazeale (ed and 
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Thus, history is a progressive revelation of God which can only culminate in the completion of 
the historical process and the self-consciousness of God. It is worth quoting Schelling’s 
illustrative summary of this process at length: 
If we think of history as a play in which everyone involved performs his part quite freely and as 
he pleases, a rational development of this muddled drama is conceivable only if there be a single 
spirit who speaks in everyone, and if the playwright, whose mere fragments are the individual 
actors, has already so harmonised beforehand the objective outcome of the whole with the free 
play of every participant, that something rational must indeed emerge at the end of it. But now if 
the playwright were to exist independently of his drama, we should be merely the actors who 
speak the lines he has written. If he does not exist independently of us, but reveals and discloses 
himself successively only, through the very play of our own freedom, so that without this 
freedom he himself would not be, then we are collaborators of the whole and have ourselves 
invented the particular roles we play.626  
Schelling goes on to argue that art provides the best revelation of this pre-established harmony of 
the conscious and the unconscious/freedom and necessity/nature and self-consciousness in its 
ability to utilise the dichotomies simultaneously in its act of producing.627        
     Thus, Schelling has attempted to outline his conception of an original absolute identity as a 
necessary presupposition for synthesising Fichte’s transcendental philosophy and his own 
philosophy of nature, which he seemingly starts to imagine as two parts of a single philosophy. 
    He outlines this in detail in his 1801 Darstellung des Systems meiner Philosophie. Here, 
Schelling draws again the Kantian distinction between an appearance of a thing and how a thing 
‘really is’ in itself. This distinction is fashioned as an attempt to ‘solve’ the problem of finitude 
that his monism has created; essentially, he attempts to deny its reality ‘in itself;’ finitude is 
simply an ‘appearance’. He reasons that: 
Absolute identity is simply infinite. For if it were finite, then the ground of its finitude would lie 
either in itself or not in itself, outside it. In the first case, it would be the cause of some 
determination in itself, hence something simultaneously causing and caused, and therefore not 
absolute identity. In the second case, the ground of its finitude would be outside it. But there is 
nothing outside it…Therefore, just as surely as it is, is it infinite.628    
                                                             
626 Ibid, p.210. 
627 See: Ibid, pp.215-236. And, also: F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art (1802) (trans: Douglas Stott), 
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Therefore, absolute identity can never cease to be absolute identity as long as it is and thus 
‘everything that is, is absolute identity in itself…Everything that is, is in itself identical.’629 
Schelling then draws the conclusion that ‘there is no finitude [in itself].’630 Hence, in a bid to 
solve the problem of finitude he redirects his philosophy in the direction of attempting to 
demonstrate that: ‘absolute identity (the infinite) has not stepped beyond itself and that 
everything that is, insofar as it is, is infinity itself.’631 However, Schelling now has the problem 
of accounting for the fact that we perceive ourselves to be finite individuals. He attempts to 
suggest that this is merely a result of self- reflection, where the subject and object are 
distinguished and so too is mind and nature. But in itself ‘this separation simply does not happen, 
since everything that is is one, and within the totality is absolute identity itself.’632 This 
contention leads Schelling to confirm, in clear Spinozist fashion, that ‘each individual being is as 
such a determined form of the being of absolute identity, but not its very being, which is only in 
totality.’633 However, these positions create the obvious problem of how Schelling could have 
knowledge of this fact; in other words, how someone could philosophise from the absolute’s 
perspective. He attempts to address these methodological issues in his later clarifications of his 
system with little success.634  
    Despite his insistence on the non-reality of finitude ‘in itself’ the problem of finitude does not 
go away. This can be seen clearly in his 1802 Bruno - styled in the form of a Platonic dialogue - 
where he adopts rather esoteric modes of explanation, despite claiming to adhere to the Kantian 
restrictions of metaphysical reflection.635 For, if one is philosophising from within the absolute 
itself ‘philosophy is necessarily esoteric, by its very nature.’636 It is here that Schelling begins to 
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experiment with the possibility of finitude (at least as an appearance) falling away from its 
original identity: 
The soul is the most similar to the divine and the immortal, while the body most closely 
approximates the polymorphous, divisible, and ever changeable. Men learned that the individual 
things had cut themselves off from the essentially identical…Now we notice that concrete things 
are similar to the essentially identical; we perceive that they strive to imitate its identity but never 
achieve a state of perfect similarity. Since this is so, we must have known the archetype of the 
essentially identical, the absolutely indivisible, in some non-temporal way, before birth as it 
were.637  
It is clear that Schelling is working from within the structures of the Valentinian cosmology that 
were outlined in chapter II, in his attempts to negatively explain finitude. However, it is 
important to note that this mythology is only a description of the appearance of things, in itself 
‘the finite and the infinite are completely identical in reality.’638 However, despite this absolute 
monism, given the fact of finite experience (even if it is only an appearance) Schelling is forced 
to concede that ‘the absolute identity of all things also contains within itself [the possibility of] 
the difference of all forms.’639 Thus, the original identity must be said to ‘include the difference 
of all things in an indivisible unity….the universe sleeps in an infinitely fruitful womb.’640 In 
realising this possibility of difference, residing in this idea within the absolute itself, the world is 
actualised in appearance ‘in which, for themselves, but not for the eternal, they withdraw from 
the absolute and achieve existence within time.’641 Schelling even appears to narrate the 
Valentinian myth of a fallen demiurge to describe this process: once withdrawn from the 
absolute ‘it shatters the perfection of that first unity, and recovering for itself infinitely many 
things, it breathes forth what it took from above in innumerably many individual beings. In this 
way everything that exists originates from a unity, though it is separated from it.’642  
    In his 1804 System  Schelling further reiterates how he can comprehend this fact, and seems to 
state explicitly that he can philosophise from the Absolute’s perspective precisely because we are 
aspects (albeit fallen) of that Absolute itself: 
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The knower and that which is known are the same. That distinction itself is already a product of 
our subjectivity and thus of our finitude…in truth, there does not ever nor anywhere exist…a 
self…or non-self. To say, I know or I am knowing already [posits] the proton pseudos. I know 
nothing…Not I know, but only totality knows in me…Yet this One that knows is also the only 
thing known…for the knowing and the known are not different but the same.643 
Schelling regards the realm of appearances, which constitute our mode of knowing as a negative 
sphere isolated from the unity which it is in itself and strives to know for itself: ‘the phenomenal 
world is merely the stage on which things appear, not according to their Being in God [in 
themselves] but according to their own life and, precisely therefore, according to the law of 
nothingness, privation, and finitude.’644  
    We have already seen that Schelling’s negative conception of finitude (given its state of 
contradicting his ideal monism) is something which ‘ought not to be’ and is already interpreted 
through the medium of ‘Valentinian mythology’ as a falling away from the divine. This is 
brought into even sharper focus in Philosophie und Religion (1804).  
    It is most likely to have been intended as the promised accompanying work to Bruno, only in 
an adapted form. It may have been informed by his correspondence with his friend and 
interlocutor Carl August Eschenmayer (1768-1852) who had criticised Schelling’s conception of 
the Absolute and had queried how the Absolute could duplicate itself through its own self 
differentiation.645 The work is somewhat polemical in nature; Xavier Tilliette suggests that this 
can be explained by taking note of Schelling’s environment at the time; having recently married 
his long term lover Caroline Schlegel, he had taken a teaching post in the University of 
Würzburg, which apparently had a fideistic stronghold including a sizable number of Jacobi’s 
supporters.646  
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    The tone of the work is set early on when Schelling declares that: ‘the true mysteries of 
philosophy have as their most noble and indeed their soul content the eternal birth of all 
things,’647 which he, again describes as a ‘tearing away’ from an original oneness.648 He 
contends that this splitting up is the product of the Absolute’s ‘self-recognition.’649 He explores 
various philosophical and religious contexts which he believes could be regarded as similar to his 
own contention; notably he rejects the Neoplatonic theory of emanation and Zoroastrian 
dualism.650 Finally, he dismisses the possibility of finitude being purposively and positively 
created, instead claiming that: ‘Its [the phenomenal world’s] cause…cannot lie in an impartation 
[Mittheilung] of reality from the Absolute to the finite world…it can only lie in a remove 
[Entfernung], in a falling away [Abfall] from the Absolute.’651 Schelling cryptically alludes to 
these positions being ‘the tenet of the Greek mystery cult’s secret teachings…that the origin of 
the phenomenal world should not be imagined, as popular religion does, as a creation, as a 
positive…but as a falling away.’652 He even contends, in Valentinian fashion, that there is a 
spiritual component in humanity that contains the ‘fallen divine essence in man’ which must be 
re-absorbed into the Absolute: ‘the ultimate goal of the universe and its history is nothing other 
than the complete reconciliation [Versöhnung] with and re-absorption [Wiederauflösung] into the 
Absolute.’653 
    Schelling will later concede that his presentation of this falling away thesis is not as clear as he 
would like, even if the ‘main idea’ is to his satisfaction. He later writes to Eschenmayer 
commenting on this work stating that: ‘it might be necessary to improve upon my, in many 
instances, faulty expressions as far as the main idea is concerned.’654 The modifications that 
Shelling would go on to make to his system lead us roughly into the next major phase of 
Schelling’s philosophy, which has come to be regarded as the ‘middle period.’           
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The ‘Middle Period’: Narrating God’s Agonistic Becoming. 
Schelling’s seminal Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit 
und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (1809) was his last significant publication to 
occur within his lifetime and it stands at the watershed of his transition from his identity 
philosophy to the themes that will rise to prominence in the ‘middle period.’ Typically, the work 
is described as an exercise in theodicy.655 However, whilst this is not incorrect, there are many 
themes that underlie this enigmatic work. Broadly speaking, Schelling’s purpose is to justify the 
reality of evil as a necessary component to the possibility of human freedom, following Kant’s 
conception of radical evil, which he outlined in his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
bloßen Vernunft (1793).656 Although, Schelling’s essay can also be read as a reformulation of the 
basic problems which he grappled with in his Philosophie und Religion as an attempt to account 
for the reality of human finitude in light of an infinite monistic whole, and their mutual 
relationship; which Schelling now imagines through the medium of a shared radical freedom.  
    The work commences with an affirmation of pantheism: ‘if pantheism denotes nothing more 
than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, every rational viewpoint in some sense 
must be drawn to this doctrine.’657 Despite this affirmation, Schelling outlines the difficulties of 
compatibility with the one and the many that such a doctrine necessarily entails. He suggests that 
these difficulties are largely the product of a misunderstanding of the function of the copula in 
the statement: ‘God is the world’: ‘for, if, admittedly, it seems at first glance as if freedom, 
which was unable to maintain itself in opposition to God, had perished in identity here, then one 
can say that this appearance is only the result of an imperfect and empty notion of the law of 
identity.’658 Schelling prefers to imagine a more harmonious conception that upholds difference 
within the identity of pantheism, where he gives the example of ‘the containment of one thing 
within another. An individual body part, like the eye, is only possible within the whole of the 
organism; nonetheless it has its own life for itself.’659 In light of these pantheistic observations, 
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Schelling contends that finitude is a self-revelation of God and that, furthermore, the world can, 
and indeed must be, considered as sharing a univocal ‘Being’ with God which legitimises the 
possibility of this self-revelation: ‘The procession [Folge] of things from God is a self-revelation 
of God. But God can only reveal himself to himself in what is like him, in free beings acting on 
their own, for whose Being there is no ground other than God but who are as God is.’660 In his 
search for this ‘common denominator,’ he explores this notion of a common ground between 
God and the world, which leads to the suggestion that both God and the world can be contained 
within a shared participation in an act of primal willing [Urwille]: ‘in the final and highest 
judgement, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal Being [Ur-sein] to which alone all 
predicates of Being apply.’661 According to Schelling, following Kant, the freedom of this will 
must be measured by its original capacity to commit both good and evil.662 In his search for the 
common origin of this primal will, Schelling argues that it can be located in the ‘ground’ of 
God’s own being, which, he claims, must be distinguished from God per se:  
Since nothing is prior to, or outside of God, he must have the ground of his existence in himself. 
All philosophies say this; but they speak of this ground as of a mere concept without making it 
into something real and actual. This ground of his existence, which God has in himself, is not 
God considered absolutely, that is in so far as he exists; for it is only the ground of his existence. 
It is nature – in God, a being indeed inseparable, yet still distinct, from him.663     
Schelling appears to be elucidating a rather heterodox reading of the classical theological 
insistence that God is identical with his existence e.g. his essence is his existence, by positing a 
seemingly ‘real’ distinction between the two. He claims that the ground has precedence over 
God’s existence in one sense, to the extent that a possibility can have precedence over an 
actuality, yet at the same time affirms, in Aristotelian fashion, that God has precedence over his 
ground, in so far as the ground is only the ground of God if the actuality of God is assumed to be 
prior to his possibility; otherwise it would simply be an empty possibility and not specifically the 
possibility of God.664 Schelling then applies a rather bizarre kind of metaphysical logic in an 
attempt to simultaneously hold together the free independence of creatures and their absolute 
dependency on God: 
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The concept of becoming is the only one appropriate to the nature of things. But they cannot 
become in God…since they are different from him toto genere…in order to be divided from 
God, they must become in a ground different from God. Since, however, nothing indeed can be 
outside God, this contradiction can only be resolved by things having their ground in that which 
in God himself is not he himself, that is, in that which is the ground of his existence.665  
  Thus, Schelling’s actual distinction between the ground of God’s existence and God himself 
allows Schelling to posit the disparity between God and the world which permits their mutual 
freedom, whilst also upholding their pantheistic identity, in so far as they are both produced from 
a common Ungrund of pure will, characterised by yearning and desire, which ‘gives birth’ to 
both.666 For Schelling, this primal will of desire is inherently anarchistic, unruly, and free and is 
both the common ground of God and the world and of each of their respective ‘freedoms’ which 
is realised through the ground itself and the dominion that one must exert over this anarchic base: 
After the eternal act of self-revelation, everything in the world is, as we see it now, rule, order 
and form; but anarchy [Regellose] still lies in the ground, as if it could break through once again, 
and nowhere does it appear as if order and form were what is original but rather as if initial 
anarchy had been brought to order, This is the incomprehensible base of reality in things, the 
invisible remainder…remaining eternally in the ground.667 
Schelling then proceeds to narrate the process of this dialectic as it unravels in God himself 
through a Trinitarian conception, which is deeply dependent on Jacob Boehme’s theosophical 
speculations:668 
Corresponding to the yearning, which as the still dark ground is the first stirring of divine 
existence, an inner, reflexive representation is generated in God himself through which, since it 
can have no other object than God, God sees himself in an exact image of himself. This 
representation is the first in which God, considered as absolute, is realised although only in 
himself; this representation is with God in the beginning and is the God who was begotten in 
God himself. This representation is at the same time the understanding – the word – of this 
yearning and the eternal spirit which perceiving the word within itself, and at the same time the 
infinite yearning , and impelled by the love that it itself is, proclaims the word so that the 
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understanding and the yearning together now become a freely creating and all-powerful will and 
build in the initial anarchy of nature as its own element or instrument.669  
 
It is important to note Schelling’s use of an alien yearning and. This same theme is narrated 
within Valentinian cosmology in which, however, this alien yearning is hypostasised as Sophia.  
     Schelling goes on to argue that because humanity has, at the base of its existence, this same 
unruly ground, humanity can be said to have ‘in relation to God a relatively independent 
principle within himself.’670 However, whereas in God, this unruly base has been conquered and 
brought into a harmonious unity with himself, humanity has this principle as severable from 
itself, and this fact generates ‘the possibility of good and evil.’671 Thus, the root of all evil is this 
unconquered unruly principle that tends to exert itself over the harmony of the whole; a short-
sighted and selfish individuality. Although evil takes its origin from the ground of God’s 
existence it is not consciously willed by him (which always tends towards the good); a position 
that Schelling can uphold given his distinction between the ground of God’s existence and his 
understanding and will. Thus we have two wills in God: the will of the ground to assert itself and 
the will of God which is a tendency towards love and unity. The latter must emerge out of the 
former: ‘the dark principle had to be as ground so that light could be raised out of it.’672 
    Schelling appeals to a modified conception of the incarnation to explain how the ground in us 
can be once again overcome and tamed only by God on our behalf: 
In order to counter personal and spiritual evil [creaturely evil], the light of the spirit in fact 
appears likewise in the shape of a human person as a mediator in order to re-establish the rapport 
between God and creation at the highest level…God must become man so that man may return to 
God. The possibility of being saved is restored only through the re-established relation of the 
ground to God.673 
This agonistic process and the possibility of evil is justified, in the eyes of Schelling, to the 
extent that it is dialectically necessary. There would be no life and no goodness if the yearning of 
the ground did not provide the summons for a response to conquer it: ‘where there is no struggle 
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there is no life.’674 Therefore, it is in this sense then that ‘good and evil are the same thing only 
seen from different sides.’675 And, when he hypothetically asks himself why the result of this 
process could not be established from the beginning, he simply responds by affirming that all life 
(divine and creaturely) entails the necessity of becoming which necessarily involves suffering.676  
     In 1809, Schelling unexpectedly lost his wife Caroline, which had a profound effect on him 
and on his philosophy.677 Shortly after his loss, in1810, Schelling gave a small series of lectures 
in Stuttgart (Stuttgart Privatvorlesung) where he again reaffirms his commitment to the ‘falling 
away’ thesis to account for finitude and attempts to justify his intimate knowledge of the internal 
construction of the divine. He states: ‘the true system can never be created but only uncovered as 
one that is already inherent in itself: that is, in the divine understanding.’678 According to 
Schelling, the initiation of ‘creation’ is ‘indeed a descent of God; he properly descends into the 
real, contracts himself entirely into the real.’679 And this occurs because when God comes to 
consciousness he does so by ‘separating himself from himself’ e.g. by distinguishing a subject 
from an object. Thus, this creates the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious, 
whereby the former is ‘expelled from himself’ with the intention of educating this expelled 
aspect so it may once again be compatible with himself: ‘all creation, then, involves a soliciting 
of the superior and properly divine [dimension] within what had been excluded.’680 This is 
apparently conceived as a necessary process of the ‘complete coming to consciousness of the 
complete personalisation of God.’681 Schelling suggests that beings that have become alienated 
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by F.W.J. Schelling, New York, State University of New York Press, 1994, pp.195-244, p.197.  
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from the original whole, in this constructive process of the divine, feel a sense of their alienation 
from a unity and seek to find it once again: ‘free beings…in separation from God…must search 
for their unity and cannot find it. God can no longer be their unity, and hence they must search 
for a natural unity that, because it cannot be the true unity of free beings, remains but a temporal 
and finite bond.’682 This was a characteristic outlined in the soteriological and eschatological 
conventions of the Valentinian narrative in chapter II. However, this mutual alienation cannot be 
sustained: ‘the gap must not remain, for otherwise it would affect God’s very existence.’683 
Following his incarnational conception of the reconciliation between the world and God and the 
world and man, that he outlined in his essay on Freedom, he again propounds that God must 
enact this reconciliation on our behalf. Many of these themes are revisited with greater detail and 
much more profundity in Schelling’s famous Die Weltalter.  
The Becoming of God in the Ages of the World.  
The earliest record of Schelling’s initiation of die Weltalter was in a diary entry which he made 
on September 15, 1810, where he announces its beginning.684 He authored many and various 
drafts of die Weltalter, most notably on – what he intended to be the first book of the entire 
project - ‘the past.’ Schelling appears to have remained continually dissatisfied with all of his 
productions. In the 1813 draft, Schelling’s son and editor of his works, notes that his father had 
attached a note towards the end of the work asking for the remainder of it not to be printed as 
‘the treatise falls into utter falsehoods from this point forward.’685 This long process of 
dissatisfaction and re-drafting explains why the project was never completed and never came to 
print in Schelling’s life-time. Jason Wirth has noted that:  
in 1939 Horst Fuhrmans discovered in the cellar of the library of the university of Munich a large 
chest, filled with a disorganised mass of many thousands of folio pages, each crammed with 
writing from Schelling’s own hand. Among the sheets were…two corrected versions, set but not 
printed, of the first book of die Weltalter, as well as more than twelve quite different handwritten 
versions of the first book.686 
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Unfortunately, all of these were lost during the allied bombing of July 1944. All we have now 
are the three drafts of, what was intended to be the first book of the project, 1811, 1813, and 
1815. I share the judgement of Schelling’s son and Jason Wirth, that the 1815 version (or third 
draft) is the most complete and sustained presentation of the first book, and for this reason I shall 
utilise it as my principal source for engaging with die Weltalter.687    
    There are a variety of conflicting ways of interpreting this work,688 and despite Schelling’s 
avowal of ignorance in the 1811 draft,689 in the 1815 version it is quite clear that he is narrating, 
what he believes to be, the internal becoming of the Absolute; and, moreover, that he is able to 
do this, in so far as humanity is an aspect of this very becoming itself; we can remember it 
because there is an ‘essence from the beginning of times…drawn from the source of things and 
akin to it, what is eternal of the soul has a consciousness of creation.’690      
    Schelling contends that necessity and freedom exist in God with the primacy of the former, to 
the extent that God must necessarily exist before he can be free: ‘necessity lies at the foundation 
of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest.’691 Schelling hypostasises this quasi-
independent, yet necessary, aspect of God as his nature. He then further identifies two opposing 
forces at work within God’s nature: a force of love and a force of self-assertion (Egoität). The 
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688 For instance, Walter Schulz argues that Schelling brought German Idealism to its logical conclusion of absolute 
knowing (see: Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, 
Pfullingen, Neshe, 1975). However, Jürgen Habermas – according to Žižek – demonstrates the first ‘progressive 
appropriation of Schelling that interprets Weltalter as a break with the German Idealist logic of the Absolute, 
introducing the motif of radical historicity and contingency’ (Slavoj Žižek, The Abyss of Freedom, Michigan, 
University of Michigan, 2000, p.87; see also: Jürgen Habermas, ‘Dialektischer Idealismus im übergang zum 
Materialismus: Geschichtsphilosophie Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Contraction Gottes’, Berlin, 
Luchterland, 1969, pp.108-61). Following a similar line of interpretation, Manfred Frank suggests that the work 
anticipates later philosophical movements such as existentialism (see: Manfred Frank, Der unendliche Mangel an 
Sein: Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1975). Whereas, 
Henrich Heine suggests that the religious themes of the Weltalter were outlined as early as Philosophie und 
Religion, from which ‘philosophy stops with Herr Schelling, and poetry, that is to say folly begins’ (see: Henrich 
Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, Halle. Otto Händel, 1887, pp.117-18).  
689 Schelling states that: ‘I would like to take this opportunity to say…what I so often felt, and in an especially lively 
way with this present presentation: how much nearer I am than most people could probably conceive to this growing 
silent of knowledge which we must necessarily encounter when we know how infinitely far everything that is 
personal reaches such that it is impossible actually to know anything at all’ (Schelling, The Ages of the World, 
p.xxvii).  
690 Ibid,p.114. Hegel makes very similar claims in his 1812 Logic where he describes the science as ‘truth as it is 
without veil and in its absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in 
his eternal essence before the creation of nature and the finite mind’ (G.W.F. Hegel, Science of logic (trans: A.V. 
Miller), Prometheus, 1999, p.50); seemingly, the natural conclusion from the end of the Phenomenology.    
691 Schelling, The Ages of the World, p.5. 
 
 
205 
force of love can have no being ‘for itself’ in so far as its very nature is to be outstretching and 
for an other. However, this is opposed by its own ground of being which is nothing other than 
itself (as the necessary being). This force is seen as a necessary preliminary to the force of love 
realising itself for itself: ‘two principles are already in what is necessary for God: the outpouring, 
outstretching, self-giving being, and an equivalently eternal force of selfhood, of retreat into 
itself, of being in itself.’692 Despite this proposal implying an obvious challenge to divine unity, 
Schelling argues that it is essentially no different from ‘person x’ being angry in the morning and 
gentle in the afternoon, person x is the same person in both instances.693 He then suggests that a 
dialectical struggle ensues within the nature of God between the self-assertive force and the 
loving force; both mutually negating each other.694 This then generates a third force within God’s 
nature, that is the resolution of the opposing powers, thus: 
God, in accordance with the necessity of his nature, is an eternal no, the highest being-in-itself, 
an eternal withdrawing of its being in to itself…But the same God, with equal necessity of its 
nature, although not in accord with the same principle, but in accord with a principle that is 
completely different from the first principle, is the eternal yes, an eternal outstretching, giving 
and communicating of its being. Each of these principles, in an entirely equal fashion…has the 
same claim to be God…yet they reciprocally exclude each other…But in an equally eternal 
manner, God is the third term or the unity of the yes and the no.695 
According to Schelling these ‘three potencies/powers’ are constantly striving for the priority of 
their being. However, their taxonomy is apparently established by an ‘unconscious’ (eternally 
presupposed) decision (Entscheidung).696 The first power (A₁) is the force of self-assertion, the 
force to be in itself: ‘what is altogether first in God…is that God restricts itself, denies itself, 
withdraws its essence from the outside and retreats into itself.’697 According to Schelling, this 
negating force reflexively posits the second potency (A₂): ‘a being cannot negate itself as actual 
without at the same time positing oneself as the actualising potency’698 which is the potency to 
communicate its being out of love. These two forces threaten to negate the unity of God, 
however, this is impossible: ‘hence, facilitated by the eternal necessity through the force of 
indissoluble life, they [A₁ and A₂] posit outside and above themselves a third, which is the unity 
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[A₃].’699 The third potency is the eternal end of the dialectic, just as the first potency was the 
eternal beginning. However, because each of the three potencies has an integral right to be, they 
all vie to assert themselves as the dominant force, and thus the dialectic rotates cyclically in 
eternity on a loop. Schelling contends that this cycle is ‘not a true existence but only an eternal 
drive and zeal to be, without actual being.’700It is clear that actuality cannot arise out of this 
eternal process of vying to be actual, to reveal itself, there needs to be a separation (Scheidung) 
from this process from something utterly outside of it: ‘liberation…can only come through an 
Other that is outside of it and wholly independent of it.’701 However, because of its distinction 
from what is ‘necessary’ in God (e.g. his nature), this Other, if it exists, cannot exist necessarily 
to the extent that it is not related to what is necessary in God; and since there is no conception of 
something being freely actual in God, we are left with the position that it is a possibility ‘the 
eternal freedom to be.’702 Schelling describes this possibility as a ‘pure will;’ a will which desires 
no object. This Other is related to God’s nature in so far as its mere possibility rouses the 
potencies in God to seek a harmony with this pure will: 
In that eternally commencing life there lies the wish to escape from the involuntary movement 
and from the distress of pining. And through its simple presence, without any movement, that 
which is higher…rouses in that life [of necessity] the yearning for freedom. The obsession abates 
into yearning, wild desire turns into a yearning to ally itself…with that will that wills nothing 
[the Other, the pure will], with eternal freedom.703  
Now, what was initially a will to self-revelation by each of the three potencies, is now converted 
into a yearning for unity and submission to the possibility of being freely actual: ‘by virtue of an 
eternal wanting or decision. It [what is necessary in God] eternally and inseparably allies itself to 
the highest as its immediate subject and becomes its unwavering Being [or the ground of its 
actuality], its abiding substratum.’704 However, this conversion leaves a waste product from the 
nature of God which is extradited, as it were, out of God’s nature: ‘each potency is transformed 
into the relationship of the totality…Therefore, that blind, necessary being which strove to be the 
One and which nonetheless could not be it, is debased to the All.’705 This has strong parallels in 
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Valentinian Gnosticism which narrates Sophia’s desire or yearning to achieve something which 
was not possible for her to achieve (to know and be united with Bythus). This desire is later 
overcome through ‘external aid’ but the consequence of her desire (Achamoth) must be expelled 
from the Pleroma and, in doing so, generates finite material existence ‘outside’ of the totality. 
This is precisely what happens to the yearning of God’s nature in Schelling’s conception; he 
even utilises Gnostic images to explain this proposal: ‘this entrance of yearning into the eternal 
nature marks a new moment…This is that moment that the intimating primal world marked as 
the splitting apart of the world egg…that moment in which the earthly and the heavenly first 
divided.’706 Schelling is clearly alluding to ancient Greek creation myths. His mentioning of the 
‘world egg’ is most likely a direct reference to the Orphite creation myth, although his emphasis 
on the primal split of an original totality through the introduction of an alien desire within the 
whole itself, is perhaps better understood in light of Valentinian Gnosticism.707 
    During this process of transition to the realisation of the free actuality of the whole via the 
subordination of God’s nature to the higher principle, the Other, ‘the highest potency of eternal 
nature, what within it is free and akin to spirit (A₃), is elevated to the immediate subject of pure 
Godhead. But the two other potencies, which equally were primordial beginnings, become only a 
condition and…the way to this highest potency’708 and these other two potencies become the 
‘prime matter’ of everything other than the divine subject or the ‘divine exterior.’ Thus, A₁ 
becomes the basis for nature as we experience it: ‘the original negation is still the mother…of the 
entire world that is visible to us.’709 A₂ becomes the substratum of the spiritual world which is in 
closer proximity to the divine. Whereas A₃: ’Is that universal soul by which the cosmos is 
ensouled, the soul which through the immediate relationship to the Godhead is now level-headed 
and in control of itself. It is the eternal link between nature and the spiritual world as well as 
between the world and God.’710 
    Schelling insists that although this language implies temporal succession within the divine, the 
process itself was never incomplete; it is eternally completed; the succession is in eternity itself: 
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God can never come to have being. God has being from eternity. But what follows from this? 
Nothing but that the cision likewise happened from eternity…on account of the supernatural 
being of freedom, the primordial state of the contradiction, that wild fire, that life of obsession 
and craving, is posited as the past…as an eternal past, as a past that did not first become past, but 
which was the past from the primordial beginning and since all eternity.711 
In typical Idealist fashion Schelling upholds that consciousness can only arise through a 
juxtaposition to something which is other than itself; in God himself this other something is the 
past in God (or the unconscious principle): 
All consciousness is grounded on the unconscious and precisely in the dawning of consciousness 
the unconscious is posited as the past of consciousness. Now it is certainly not thinkable that 
God was unconscious for a while and then became conscious. But it is certainly thinkable that in 
the same inseparable act of the dawning of consciousness the unconscious and the conscious of 
God were grasped at the same time. The conscious was grasped as the eternally present but the 
unconscious was grasped with the ascertainment of what is eternally past.712    
Schelling believes that he has here ‘described the eternal life of the Godhead.’713 
    Therefore, Schelling has adhered to the conventions of Valentinian Gnosticism in his attempts 
to explain the problem of finitude that he inherited from Fichte, and which was here the product 
of an expelled yearning within God’s nature. After die Weltalter and with Hegel’s rise to 
prominence, Schelling turns his attention to the state of philosophy as he finds it, and his 
dissatisfaction, and subsequent critique of his old friend Hegel proves pivotal in his later 
philosophical endeavours, which we shall now explore. 
The Late Philosophy 
 Negative and Positive Philosophy and the Road to the Philosophy of Revelation. 
Hegel died in 1831, leaving his prestigious chair in Berlin vacant. The initial legacy of Hegelian 
thought in Germany was received in a variety of ways. By and large, Hegel had left a whole host 
of orthodox disciples who intended to uphold, defend, and evangelise the philosophical world 
with the ‘absolute system.’ However, there were also religious conservatives who had been left 
disturbed by Hegel’s treatment of religion and its apparent implication of pantheism (religious 
conservatism seems to be the motive behind King Wilhelm IV pushing for Schelling to replace 
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Hegel in Berlin ‘to counter the Hegelian spread’ as it were). Other philosophers had been left 
with a feeling of absence; a considerable lack of wonder, freedom and excitement in 
philosophising, which had been replaced by the rigorousness and completeness of Hegel’s 
system. For instance, Goethe, as early as 1812, had written of his disgust of Hegel’s system, 
describing it as a ‘miserable sophistical joke.’714  
    Schelling was officially appointed to occupy the vacant Berlin chair in 1840. This decision 
was rather peculiar in many respects; after all, Schelling had published nothing significant since 
his essay on human freedom in1809, he had slipped off the radar somewhat during his ‘quiet 
years’ from around about the period just after the early 1820’s. On paper, Schelling did not 
appear to be a standout applicant. Significantly, however, it seems that Schelling had shaped his 
response to Hegel during these quiet years; offering some important lectures whilst at the 
university of Munich, where he first began to explicitly formulate his critique of Hegel, which 
was published by Victor Cousin in 1834.715 Perhaps, therefore, the attraction of Schelling’s 
philosophy, in the eyes of his would be employers, was in its critical stance towards Hegelian 
thought, which was disliked by a considerable amount of influential hierarchs in Berlin (as we 
have just mentioned, King Wilhelm IV being, perhaps the most significant). Schelling’s 
appointment was met with mixed reactions. The ‘young Hegelians’ saw this as a repressive move 
by religious conservatives. Friedrich Engels described Schelling’s philosophy as ‘ just bits of 
nonsense which existed only in Schelling’s head and laid no claims whatever to any influence on 
the external world.’716 He would later release a pamphlet in an attempt to discredit Schelling’s 
thought and as a direct protest to him being appointed, despite attending his lectures himself.717 
Others anticipated Schelling with great excitement. For instance, the Russian anarchist 
philosopher Mikhail Bakunin was once the somewhat unlikely source of these gushing reports on 
Schelling, which were contained in an 1841 letter to his family: ‘you cannot imagine with what 
impatience I have been waiting for Schelling’s lectures…I have read much of his works and 
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found there in such an immeasurable profundity of life and creative thinking that I am convinced 
he will now reveal to us the treasure of meaning.’718 Similarly, a young Søren Kierkegaard (also 
an attendant of the lectures) wrote: I am so thrilled to have heard Schelling’s second lecture – 
indescribable…I have now placed all my hope in Schelling.’719 
    Schelling’s critique of Hegel is a crucial part of his later philosophy; his attempts to ‘get 
beyond Hegel’ shape the majority of the content of his late philosophy. Although they are 
sporadically distributed in Schelling’s writings, the core of his critique of Hegel is formulated in 
his 1833/34 lectures entitled Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.720 
    Schelling’s most prominent criticism of Hegel’s philosophy is that it apparently depends on an 
argument in logic that is similar to the one found in the ‘ontological proof of God’ in accounting 
for the reality of the first principle of his system. According to Hegel, his logic begins with 
Being or pure being which is utterly indeterminate.721 However, for Schelling pure being is 
nothing but a pure abstraction from real being; a mere concept that necessarily has no basis in 
reality: ‘it is an impossibility to think being in general…being is rather necessarily and at all 
times something determinate.’722 Thus, Schelling equates pure being with a vacuous nothing 
(Nichts). Ironically, this appears to be something that Hegel already does himself, to the extent 
that ‘Nothing’ is an absence of any determination which makes it identical with pure being: ‘pure 
being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same.’723 However, Schelling thinks that Hegel cannot 
really be implying that pure being is an absolute absence, otherwise he would have stated 
nothing at all as his first principle: ‘it cannot be his intention to declare pure being to be an 
Ungendanken, after he had just declared it to be the absolutely first thought.’724 From the identity 
of pure being and nothing Hegel produces the notion of ‘becoming.’ However, Schelling 
suggests that this is smuggled in to the equation through a rhetorical sleight of hand. For, pure 
being cannot be pure being if it is only ‘not yet nothing’ (this introduction of the ‘not yet’ is the 
only way that Hegel can produce the concept of becoming, according to Schelling) this simply 
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implies that pure being is actually a mere concept of a possibility and therefore a determinate 
being after all. Schelling reformulates Hegel’s proposition to read thus: 
One ought rather to say that it is the transition from nothing, from not yet being, to real being, so 
that, in becoming, nothing and being are not united but instead nothing is left behind. However, 
Hegel loves this inexact way of expressing himself; but that way the most trivial things can be 
given the appearance of something extraordinary.725   
    Schelling further argues that Hegel’s logic is nothing more than an abstract concept or form. 
Thus, at best, all it can do is demonstrate how something must be (its form) once it is in 
existence; it is not at liberty to be able to demonstrate reality per se: ‘the in itself of a geometrical 
figure remains the same whether or not it exists.’726 However, according to Schelling, this is 
precisely what Hegel attempts to do; derive reality from a simple concept and thus restates the 
‘fallacy’ of the ‘ontological proof’: ‘the old metaphysics, which was built up out of various 
sciences, had as its universal basis a science which also had concepts only as concepts as its 
content: ontology. In his Logic Hegel had nothing in mind but this ontology.’727  
     In a markedly modern ‘postmodern’ critique of Hegel, Schelling implies the necessity of 
introducing reason to alterity so that it does not become narcissistically infatuated with itself 
which here has resulted in the ‘absolutisation’ of contingent truths: 
This is the pretension to complete systemisation…the claim that all concepts have been included 
and that outside the circle of those that have been included no other concept is possible…But 
what if concepts can be shown which that system knows nothing about…or has only taken up the 
ones it has done in the sense in which they are compatible with the system once the system has 
been presupposed.728 
According to Schelling, Hegel absolutises contingent truths by abstracting concepts taken from 
reality, however, ‘abstractions cannot…be taken for reality before that from which they are 
abstracted; becoming cannot be there before something becomes, existence not before something 
exists.’729 In other words, Hegel presupposes that which he seeks to ground (this is precisely why 
it mimics the ontological proof of God), Schelling puts this excellently when stating that: ‘the 
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whole world lies, so to speak, in the nets of the understanding or of reason, but the question is 
how exactly it got into those nets, since there is obviously something other and something more 
than mere reason in the world.’730 
    Schelling is keen to point out that he is not simply critiquing Hegel’s logic on account that it 
provides no reality in sense-perception, but rather that the object of these logical concepts must 
have a reality ‘outside’ of the concepts themselves, which need not be just in sense perception, 
which is the locus for Schelling’s theological critique of Hegel (e.g. God a ‘reality’ which is 
neither a pure concept or an object in intuition). Schelling states: 
Hegel thinks the only objection to or criticism of the idea of his Logic are that these thoughts are 
only thoughts, because the true content is supposed to be in sensuous perception…But it is not a 
question of that…the fact that the content of philosophy is only thoughts cannot be criticised, but 
rather that the object of these thoughts is only the concept.731 
Thus, Schelling thinks that it is aimlessly tautological: ‘eine Wissenschaft die die Begriffe nur als 
Begriffe zum Inhalt hatte.’732 This tension between concept and reality comes sharply in to focus 
when Hegel attempts to account for the reality of nature, according to Schelling. Given the 
Absolute is the completed idea, Hegel is forced to narrate a ‘double becoming’ of the Absolute, 
where he suggests that reality and nature ‘fall out’ of the concept,733 seemingly for no apparent 
reason other than the fact that reality and nature exist and therefore need to be accounted for 
within the concept (however awkward and inconvenient this may appear): 
In the Idea there is no necessity at all for any kind of movement. The idea could not, for instance, 
progress further in itself, but would rather have completely to break away from itself…if it is 
assumed [reality]…then it is not assumed because of a necessity in the Idea itself, but simply 
because nature happens to exist…Hegel must come to reality. But in the idea itself there is, then, 
no necessity at all for progression or becoming other.734 
And, according to Schelling, even if one were to grant Hegel the Abfall of his concept into 
nature, one would still have to question its reality; for there appears to be no ‘outside’ of the 
concept that is not already inherently a part of the concept itself; William Desmond phrases it 
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thus: ‘every move “outside” thought is only a quasi-move; for the “outside” is again the 
“inside.”’735 Schelling elucidates this point brilliantly when he states: 
In this [the Hegelian process] alone nothing else occurs save thinking; it is not a real process that 
develops here, but rather just a logical one; the being into which the potency passes over is a 
being that itself belongs to the concept and, thus, is only a being in the concept, not outside it.736 
    Thus, for Schelling, Hegelian philosophy marks out the limits of a particular type of 
philosophising, which he designates as ‘negative philosophy.’ Negative philosophy is essentially 
the rigorous demonstration of the logical form of all existence that is fashioned a priori. It is 
important to note that Schelling does not consider negative philosophy opprobrious in itself, but 
rather as the necessary preliminary to what he will later define as the ‘positive philosophy.’ He 
believes that the exhaustion of negative philosophising in fact points towards the need for a 
positive philosophy: ‘precisely because what the science of reason comprehends a priori – or 
construes is being – it is vital for it to have a control through which it can demonstrate that what 
it has found a priori [e.g. in the concept] is not a chimera.’737  This is exactly what Schelling 
believes Hegelian philosophy is unable to do; unable to get outside of the confines of its own 
logic and that is why he conceives it as the culmination of the negative project, although 
Schelling appears unwilling to even confer this status upon Hegel: ‘I [did not] consider the 
Hegelian philosophy to be the negative. I am not able to inflict this honour upon it…Since, on 
the contrary, its fundamental error consists precisely in that it wants to be positive…the 
philosophy that Hegel presented is the negative driven beyond its limits.’738 Schelling contends 
that, within Hegel’s system, the Absolute or God is robbed ‘of all transcendence and draws him 
into this logical thinking, into a merely logical concept into an idea itself.’739 Therefore, if 
negative philosophy points towards the necessity of an accompanying positive philosophy, what 
will this philosophy look like? 
    According to Schelling, the positive philosophy must seek to independently confirm the 
findings of the negative philosophy by means of proving its reality. Thus, it must necessarily 
begin with the sheer facticity of Being and reality and seek to demonstrate the reality of the 
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negative concepts through experience (Erfahrung): ‘for only experience, and not reason, can say 
that, that which has been construed really exists.’740 And, therefore it must simply accept the 
actuality of Being and commence with that fact, for any assessment of a mere possibility will 
regress into negative philosophy: ‘So muß ich vom Prius ausgehen, vom Sein; das ist aber nicht 
möglich, ohne von vorn, einer neue Wissenschaft, anzufangen. Jetz haben wir den Anfang der 
Philosophie gefunden.’741 The crucial distinction therefore, according to Schelling, is that, 
whereas negative philosophy deduces reality from an a priori concept, the positive philosophy 
begins with reality and seeks to prove the a priori concept via experience, thus the a priori is 
proposed and then proved a posteriori in the positive philosophy. However, what exactly must 
Schelling prove in the positive philosophy? Essentially, he wants to prove the existence of God 
that was attained in the negative philosophy. However, he is quite clear that he cannot prove this 
a priori; for the positive philosophy must simply assume the facticity of Being as being this prius 
which is necessarily outside of the concept and therefore outside of reason itself which he comes 
to call the Umgekehrte Idee, the inverted idea: ‘that which just is is being from which…every 
idea…every potency is excluded. We will, thus, only be able to call it the inverted idea the idea 
in which reason is set outside itself.’742Schelling is emphatic that this absolute prius cannot be 
proved (for it is the condition of the possibility of thinking per se). Thus, Schelling believes that 
he can only prove the consequences of this prius: what the consequences are that follow from 
this, these must be factually proved, and only thereby do we prove the divinity of that prius- that 
is God, and that God therefore exists.’743 Therefore, the concept of divinity attained within the 
negative philosophy must be demonstrated, in reality and therefore from experience, to apply to 
that which cannot be proved; the sheer facticity of being or the ‘Unvordenkliche Sein,’ that is the 
‘unprethinkable being.’744 Thus, the task of positive philosophy is therefore something akin to an 
‘empirical metaphysics’ which is, according to Schelling, the only possible type of metaphysics 
post-Kant, which must culminate in a philosophical religion: 
Kant forbade metaphysics’ transcendence, but he forbade it only for dogmatising reason, that is, 
for reason that of itself seeks, by means of inferences, to reach existence; he did not forbid 
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reason to proceed conversely from that which simply and, thus, infinitely exists to the concept of 
the most supreme being as posterius.745 
    Therefore, the method of the positive philosophy marks the initiation and direction of 
Schelling’s late philosophy. Before going on to evaluate his last proposals, it is important to note 
that many regard Schelling’s method as hopelessly flawed and that the philosophical religion (or 
Schelling’s theology) which he will seek to establish on its foundation, is doomed to failure 
before it has even begun.746 The most obvious critique of Schelling’s method is that it simply 
leaves him vulnerable to the same fundamental critiques that he levelled against Hegel, and as 
we shall see, there is a strong tendency for Schelling’s proof to simply be an exercise in forcing 
‘the facts to fit the thesis’, as it were, in, what is essentially, an inverted version of what Hegel 
did when he made reality conform to the a priori concept. However, despite this criticism, 
Schelling’s critique of Hegel still appears relevant, even if he was unable to ‘get beyond Hegel’ 
himself.  
    The obvious Hegelian response to Schelling’s criticisms is that any attempt to get beyond 
thought or the concept, is simply impossible, for the very notion of an ‘unprethinkable being’ 
could not even be posited as an idea unless it were already somehow available to thought. This 
basic contention is part of Hegel’s reinterpretation and re-appropriation of the ‘ontological proof’ 
of God. Whereas Kant had sought to identify a definitive distinction between concept and reality 
(where the mere identity of the former could not necessarily include the latter),747 Hegel affirms 
that the concept necessarily includes being in itself:  
Being is supposed to be distinct from the concept. We believe that we can regard the concept as 
strictly subjective, as finite; but the characteristic of being is in the concept itself. The finitude of 
subjectivity is sublated in the concept itself, and the unity of being and concept is not a 
presupposition vis-à-vis the concept, against which it is measured.748   
    Therefore, there can be no Being beyond or separate from the concept within this form of 
reasoning. However, according to Schelling, we must uphold that the condition of all thinking 
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cannot itself be an aspect of it, this would be tautological; it would amount to the possibility of 
the infant being able to articulate itself before having learned its first language; the articulation 
can only occur once the language has been learned and this origin cannot be within the language 
itself, it must be presupposed as an apparatus which has simply been given. However, the sheer 
‘givenness’ of the language can be articulated without necessarily encompassing its own origin 
or the total comprehension of the giver, which appears to be the point that Schelling is making. 
    Before Schelling attempts to construct his positive philosophy he embarks on the task of 
constructing his own negative philosophy which he proposes in his Philosophy of Mythology 
(Berlin lectures).  
Schelling’s Negative Philosophy: The Philosophy of Mythology. 
One of the most notable aspects of Schelling’s later philosophy is the esteem in which he holds 
mythology, despite conceding that it is essentially a human projection. However, what 
distinguishes him from other adherents to this or a similar theory (such as Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1804-1872)), is that these projections themselves are revelatory of a divine providence 
progressively unfolding within history; as Edward Allen Beach notes: ‘Schelling’s purpose is to 
demonstrate that these very projections themselves and the processes by which they unfold in 
human experience may be factors in the revelation of a divine providence.’749  
    The early lectures are essentially discussing the study of mythology itself, where Schelling 
queries previous hypotheses proposed by thinkers such as Gottfried Hermann (1772-1848)750 and 
David Hume (1711-1776).751 The initiation of Schelling’s own contributions to the subject 
assume, in line with his empirical method, the fact of mythology itself as an historical 
occurrence, but very quickly lapse into, what can only be described as at best dubious 
anthropology. Schelling suggests that mythology has not been ‘invented’ by individual acts of 
genius (e.g. Homer or Hesiod) but, rather ‘has proceeded from the people itself. The mythology 
of a people is bound up with its life and essence in such a way that it could only proceed from 
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out of the people.’752 Then with a substantial amount of speculative presumptuousness, Schelling 
concludes from this observation that humanity must have originally been held together by a 
single universal spiritual connection, apparently revealed in the very act of the communal 
production of mythology.753 Significantly, he claims that mythology informs history as opposed 
to history producing various mythologies. If this is the case, Schelling believes that this primal 
unity of humanity could have only been produced out of a common belief in monotheism, which 
therefore becomes the ‘historical presupposition of mythology.’754 However, given the ‘later’ 
phenomena of polytheism, and that mythology is indicative of the historical circumstances of the 
peoples that produce it, this would imply that the primal unity of humanity had been severed. 
Thus, Schelling’s proposed homogenous humanity that shared a common universal culture and 
language was disrupted by a ‘spiritual crisis’ that resulted in the generation of polytheism, 
various languages and cultures, and the reality of ‘peoples’ (e.g. nations): ‘a spiritual crisis in the 
interior of man had to precede the emergence of peoples’755 and ‘the emerging polytheism was 
the cause of the separation of the peoples.’756 Fundamentally, Schelling is describing a ‘tower of 
Babel’ like event. Therefore, there was an apparent unity of humankind that was officiated by ‘a 
principle – which gave space in consciousness to no other except itself – can only have been an 
infinite one, only a God which entirely filled consciousness, which was common to all mankind, 
a God that…pulled them into its own unity.’757 However, the emergence of polytheism indicates 
the splitting up of this unity, which is described as a ‘crisis’: ‘polytheism is the means of the 
cision that was hurled into the homogenous humanity.’758  
    Schelling then turns his attention to assessing the nature of this original monotheistic God. He 
claims that it may not be the ‘actual’ Absolute one ‘in itself,’ for the mythological process does 
not require it to be such, but, rather, only that for that particular humanity, or in appearance, this 
One presented itself as an Absolute; Schelling thus distinguishes ‘absolute monotheism’ from a 
‘relative monotheism.’759  The relative monotheistic deity bares strong resemblances to the 
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Valentinian demiurge; a god posing as the Absolute but destined for redundancy once the primal 
unity has been re-established. Schelling describes the cision, or what he calls the emergence of 
the second phase of mythology (polytheism), as consisting of an almost violent process of 
transition where the God posing as the Absolute is revealed as an imposter and the ensuing 
struggle generates the polytheistic epoch: ‘the heretofore immutable God [A], as soon as he is 
required to accept determinations from a second, cannot remain the same, and in the unavoidable 
conflict with this second God cannot avoid proceeding from figure to figure’ in an attempt to re-
assert its primacy.760 Schelling illustrates this point through the dramatic struggles of Uranus, 
Kronos, and Zeus. The appearance of the second God and the polytheistic process reveals ‘God 
A’ to be nothing more than ‘the first potency of polytheism.’761 The significance of the 
appearance of the second epoch reveals that humanity is in fact alienated from the true and actual 
monotheistic God and points towards the possibility of this process leading towards his 
revelation, which presupposes the overturning of the demiurge, and the mythological process 
itself, which is the ground of the revelation of the true God: ‘revelation only occurs where some 
type of darkness is broken through; thus it presupposes a darkening, something that has stepped 
between consciousness and the God who is supposed to reveal himself.’762 However, Schelling 
contends that this cision or fall from divine unity is not directly accessible to human 
consciousness as it is a ‘pre-historical’ or ‘supra-historical’ event.763 Furthermore, this process 
itself or ‘the history of the gods’ is apparently the ground and process of the ‘actual becoming of 
God in consciousness.’764  
    Schelling then goes on to offer a ‘mystical’ reading of this entire process, which narrates the 
original place of humanity within the unity of the Godhead (here something like a Pleroma) 
which is then disturbed, resulting in humanity being dislodged from its primary position to a 
peripheral and external realm, where there is the vague reminiscences of its previous state, which 
is expressed through the mythological projection of a realm of gods, which is only sublated when 
humanity returns to its primal position in the divine unity: 
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We must proceed from…a Being of man in the divine unity. Man is created in the centre of the 
Godhead…As long as he finds himself in this centre he sees things as they are in God, not in the 
spiritless and unityless externality of the usual seeing…[However] as soon as man has moved 
away from this middle point and has removed himself, the periphery leads him astray, and that 
divine unity is confused…However as man intends to return to his central position…there 
emerges that middle world, which we name a world of the gods, out of the striving and fighting 
to hang on to the original divine unity in that which is already disturbed and diverged, that world 
of the gods that is as it were the dream of a higher existence…after he has sunk from that higher 
existence…[which] persists up to the final awakening…a return to the primordial Being 
[Urseyn].765  
    Schelling further contends that the causes and objects which are generated within the 
mythological process, are, in fact, the potencies within God which agonistically construct his 
self-consciousness. Mythology therefore becomes the outward display of the mutual interplay of 
these powers within history moving towards God’s self-consciousness, which can only be 
finalised through history itself.  Thus, there is yet again, Schelling’s use of Valentinian 
cosmology to attempt to overcome the problem of finitude.766 There is a primal unity which is 
split up internally through an alien force or desire that results in externality, finitude, and a 
falling away from this ideal. History then becomes the means by which that which is external to 
God is re-absorbed back into the Absolute and the problem of finitude is resolved; thus he 
describes the mythological process as a path to ‘reunification’ and self-restoring,’ which has, as 
its presupposition, ‘the estrangement from the divine self’767 which culminates in ‘the restoration 
of the sublated unity.’768 When viewed in this light, no particular mythology is considered true, 
but only the entirety of the process itself, which is slowly moving towards the final stage of 
reunification which Schelling believes is first realised through Christianity: ‘the true God…the 
entrance to whom is first opened up by Christianity.’769 Put simply, the whole mythological 
process has been moving towards the construction of Christianity or the possibility of the 
philosophy of revelation which has Jesus Christ as its culmination and therefore the completion 
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of the historical process leading towards God’s self-consciousness and the re-absorption of that 
which was alienated from God, in finitude, with God himself: ‘Christ in his appearance is 
therefore precisely the end of revelation because he removes this being that alienates from 
God.’770 As has been noted, the mythological process and the philosophy of mythology are 
meant to culminate in the philosophy of revelation. 
The Positive Philosophy: The Philosophy of Revelation. 
In his 1841/42 Berlin lectures entitled Philosophie der Offenbarung, Schelling attempts to 
construct the positive philosophy of revelation which was set to accompany and conclude the 
negative philosophy which he outlined in the mythological process of world history. For 
Schelling, working within a strict idealist framework, a ‘living God’ is one that internally comes 
to be by opposing himself to himself and then sublating this distinction. Put simply, God must be 
subjected to the same process which formulates the self-consciousness within us; otherwise we 
are left with nothing but the ‘dead God of the scholastics.’771 As we have already noted in 
Schelling’s methodology, he begins his philosophy with the fact of Being itself: ‘Anfang der 
positiven Philosophie ist also das Sein, das nie potentia gewesen, sondern immer actu.’772 He 
calls this pure actuality the Unvordenkliche Sein as that which must simply be presupposed in 
reality. However, in itself, this ‘unprethinkable Being’ is not the Godhead, which is what 
emerges out of the process of becoming within the divine; e.g. it is the result.773  In order for this 
Godhead to be realised the Being of God must ‘go out of itself’ to fashion an other that it could 
be opposed to, in order for the process to be initiated, and it is only in this other’s ‘lordship over 
its, now opposed Being, that the Godhead can be realised: ‘Die Gottheit besteht in dem Herrsein 
über das Sein.’774 Within this movement of internal becoming of the ‘living God’ there is a 
‘suspension’; a middle between the ‘two stages’ and it is here that the world is said to be 
contained: ‘Die Welt ist die Suspension des actu Existierenden in der Gottheit.’775  
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    The entire process is excited by God’s Being and its desire for self-assertion, which Schelling 
labels B. God must overcome B (e.g. part of himself) in order to realise himself as the living 
God.776 This B is something that has been ‘thrown out of God’777 and has constituted the 
foundation of material creation. Thus, the world, as the intermediary or obstacle to God 
becoming the realised living God, must necessarily become the platform where this process will 
play itself out. As we have already noted, these potencies tussle for supremacy within history and 
the mythological process itself until they are resolved in the revelation of Christianity. Schelling 
now narrates this agonistic movement of the potencies within God through a theological idiom in 
the doctrine of the Trinity. The Father is the first potency that begets the second potency, the 
Son, in an ‘unceasing act’ in his attempts to master his Being (B) and construct his own 
personality and real existence.778 The third potency, the Spirit, only emerges after the Son has 
conquered B and the personality of the Godhead as a whole is realised as the unity of the three 
principles and their Being: ‘Im überwundenen B ist der Vater, Sohn und Geist Verwirklicht.’779    
    It is the ‘incarnation’ of the second potency780 and the realisation of the independence of the 
Son ‘outside’ of the Father that marks Schelling’s second ‘time epoch’ in history; the first prior 
to creation is the time of the Father, the time since creation is the time of the Son which, is itself 
divided into two parts – a period of suffering through B (which includes the mythological 
process and the construction of paganism) and the period when the Son overcomes B and returns 
to the Father.781 This marks the fundamental difference between mythology and revelation; the 
former is a necessary process occurring within human consciousness which leads to the 
possibility of revelation, which is assumed to be freely given and unnecessary: 
Doch ist der große Unterschied, daß die Vorstellungen der Mythologie Erzeugnisse eine 
notwendigen prozesses, oder natürlichen, sich selbst überlassenen Bewußtseins sind, auf welches 
keine freie Ursache einen Einfluß ausübte; dagegen wird die Offenbarung als etwas gedacht, das 
                                                             
776 Ibid, p.182. 
777 ‘Schöpfung ist nicht etwas einfach Positives, gleichsam ein aus sich Hinaussetzen’ (Ibid, p.181).  
778 Ibid, pp.194-95. 
779 Ibid, p.196. 
780 For a concise discussion of Schelling’s Christology see: Tyler Tritten, Beyond Presence: The Late F.W.J. 
Schelling’s Criticism of Metaphysics, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2012, pp.325-332; S.J. Garcia, Christology in 
F.W.J. Schelling’s ‘Philosophie der Offenbarung’: The incarnation of the Second Potency, Microfilms International, 
1993.  
781 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung (1841/42) (ed: Manfred Frank), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1977, 
pp.207-208. 
 
 
222 
einen Actus außer dem Bewußtsein und ein Verhaltnis, voraussetzt, welches die frieieste aller 
Ursachen, Gott, sich Freiwillig zum Menschen gegeben hat.782 
Schelling contends that during Christ’s incarnation (Menschwerdung) he was not in unity with 
the Father (a sought of kenotic abasement) which was necessary in order for God to set himself 
outside of God (in the Son) so that he could be in the position of a mediator between himself and 
B: ‘nur die außergöttliche Existenz macht ihn fähig zum Mittler.’783 However, Schelling goes on 
to read Christ’s activity or the activity of the second potency throughout the entire history of the 
world, slowly working towards this climax.784 The primary cause of Christ’s incarnation is the 
will to redeem and reabsorb B or the ‘außergöttlichen Sein.’ In the Incarnation, divinity and 
humanity become identical in a shared personality (not a shared substance)785 and God becomes 
ruler of the außergöttlichen Sein or B through its identity, through the incarnation, and then its 
negation in Christ’s death, which marks Christianity as the necessary end of the mythological 
process, in so far as the unity and personality of the Godhead has been achieved, which ushers 
into human consciousness the epoch of the third potency: the Holy Spirit which is realised in the 
Church.786 
Summative Remarks. 
Therefore, we have documented and critically analysed Schelling’s philosophical path from his 
early dependency on Fichte to his mature philosophical output. We have sought to demonstrate 
that Schelling had indeed inherited the ‘Valentinian philosophical problems’ (outlined in chapter 
II), from Fichtean Idealism, and that he would go on to attempt to resolve these problems 
utilising Gnostic mythology itself. We noted Schelling’s familiarity with the Gnostic sources 
from his youth and how the narrative structure of his ‘solution’ to the philosophical lacunas of 
Fichte’s system, were clearly indebted the conventions of Valentinian Gnosticism. We noted 
Schelling’s commitment to an original monism that was contradicted by finitude. Furthermore, in 
his attempts to resolve this contradiction, he narrated a ‘metaphysical fall’ that resulted in an 
aspect of God being alienated from his own being and generated multiplicity and finitude (this 
narrative was expressed in various ways in his Bruno, Philosophy and Religion, Human 
                                                             
782 Ibid, p.250. 
783 Ibid, p.263. 
784 Ibid, p.278. 
785 Ibid, p.289. 
786 Ibid, p.332. 
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Freedom, The Ages of the World, and Philosophy of Mythology). Despite this rupture within the 
Absolute, the finitude and God remained ontologically bound to each other in a state of angst 
which was constantly moving towards a unified resolution through a historical process that 
would eventually culminate in the fallen divine principle being overcome and reabsorbed back in 
to its original monistic unity (as outlined in the Philosophy of Revelation). We shall now assess 
how Schelling’s Gnosticism would shape the identity and functions of the Wisdom figure in 
Russian Sophiology.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 
Chapter V 
 
Russian Sophiology: The Synthetic Appropriation of Gnosticism and Idealism in the Figure 
of Wisdom 
 
In the previous chapter we traced the development of Schelling’s philosophy, from its early 
dependency on Fichtean idealism to its mature theogonic and cosmogonic dialectics which 
typified his later output. The clear current of Valentinian theology and mythology was identified 
to course throughout his entire corpus; most notably in his inheritance of the Valentinian 
philosophical problems from earlier idealists, and his persistent attempts to resolve these 
tensions, precisely by constructing theological systems that drew heavily on mythological and 
cosmological narratives that were indicative of Gnostic thought forms. The task of this current 
chapter is to analyze the extent to which these ideas have filtered through into aspects of 
nineteenth and twentieth century Russian philosophy and theology that utilized Schelling so 
significantly. This has proven to be something of an anomaly within the history of ideas, for 
apart from some notable exceptions,787 Hegel was the main export of modern German 
philosophy. However, nineteenth and twentieth century Russia has proven to be an exception to 
this typical pattern, embracing – at that time - the rather unpopular ideas of Schelling with such 
notable enthusiasm, that his influence would soon become felt by several significant generations 
of Russian intellectuals.788 Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) once remarked that ‘Schelling’s was a 
philosophy beloved by us [the Russian people], and remained so throughout the nineteenth 
                                                             
787 For instance, Schelling’s influence on S.T. Coleridge has been well documented; see: Christopher Bode, 
‘Coleridge and philosophy’, in: Frederick Burwick (ed), Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009, pp.588-620. Moreover, Paul Tillich’s theology was notably indebted to Schellingian thought as he 
acknowledges himself, describing Schelling as his ‘teacher’ and noting his dependency on the philosopher; see: Paul 
Tillich, Schelling und die Anfänge des Existentialistischen Protestes, in Hauptwerke I (Gunther Wenz ed), Berlin, 
De Gruyter, 1989, p.392.   
788 The cultural influence that Schelling had over the Slavophiles is particularly notable; following Schelling’s 
portrayal of Hegelian philosophy as being the culmination of western rationalism, which gave substance to the 
Slavophiles’ resistance to western culture, see: Sergey Horujy, ‘Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian 
Philosophical Humanism’ (trans: Patrick Michelson), in: G.M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (eds), A History of 
Russian Philosophy 1830-1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defence of Human Dignity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp.27-52, p.28; N.V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles, 
Cambridge, 1952; Vsevolod Setchkarev, Schellings Einfluß in der russischen Literatur der 20er und 30er Jahre des 
XIX Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1939.    
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century.’789 Similarly, Bulgakov himself acknowledges that ‘Schelling was the sole western 
thinker to have created a foundation on which Russian thought could build.’790 Furthermore, 
Orlando Figes notes that Schelling had something akin to a ‘God like status’ in Russia and that 
there were even ‘Schelling cults.’791 However, although Schelling’s influence spanned over such 
a breadth of Russian intellectuals, it is two specific ‘Schellingians’ that shall occupy the interests 
of this chapter: Vladimir Solovyov and Sergius Bulgakov. The former has been described as ‘the 
last and greatest Russian Schellingian’792 and his work has been provocatively characterized as 
having ‘the pantheistic tendencies of Russian Schellingian-Gnosticism.’793 Similarly, Bulgakov 
was no less influenced by Schelling; for instance, Aidan Nichols writes that ‘Schelling’s 
philosophy underlies Bulgakov’s theology at many points…so much so that Bulgakov can be 
called a Christian Schellingian.’794 
    The significance of both individuals being philosophically grounded in Schelling’s idealism, is 
in the extent to which this same philosophy informs the theological reception and construction of 
the biblical, apocryphal, and Valentinian Wisdom figure that features so prominently in their 
respective theological and philosophical systems. For in the first instance of Solovyov, 
Schelling’s dialectical idealism is consciously synthesized with, and expressed through Gnostic 
and Valentinian cosmology and mythology (a task that was partially initiated by Schelling 
himself), which subsequently informs the identity and theological functions of Sophia herself. 
The prominence of Gnostic and Valentinian thought in Solovyov’s philosophy has been fairly 
                                                             
789Nikolai Berdiaev, ‘Concerning the Character of Russian Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century’, cited 
from: http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berdlib/1930345.html. Last accessed: 28/02/2011.    
790 Sergius Bulgakov, The Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household (trans: Catherine Evtuhov), Yale 
University Press, 2000, p.23. 
791 See: Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia, London, Picador, 2003, p.313. 
792 See: Arsenij Gulyga, Selling, Zizn zamecatel ‘nykh ljudej, Mosckva, 1984, p.302, cited in: Paul Valliere, 
‘Solov’ëv and Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation,’ in: Wil van den Bercken, Manon de Courten, and Evert van 
der Zweede (eds),Vladimir Solov’ëv: Reconciler and Polemicist, Paris, 2000, pp.119-129, p.119; on Schelling’s 
relationship to Solovyov see also: Manon de Courten, History, Sophia, and the Russian Nation, Bern, Peter Lang, 
2004, pp.207-269; Paul Valliere, ‘Solov’ëv and Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation,’ in: Wil van den Bercken, 
Manon de Courten, and Evert van der Zweede (eds),Vladimir Solov’ëv: Reconciler and Polemicist, Paris, 2000, 
pp.119-129. 
793 Evgenij Trubeckoj, Mirosozercunie VI, Mosckva, 1913, pp.392-397, cited in: Paul Valliere, ‘Solov’ëv and 
Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation,’ in: Wil van den Bercken, Manon de Courten, and Evert van der Zweede 
(eds),Vladimir Solov’ëv: Reconciler and Polemicist, Paris, 2000, pp.119-129, p.119.  
794 Aidan Nichols, Light from the East: Authors and Themes in Orthodox Theology, London, Stag books, 1995, p.59; 
see, also: Nicholas Sakharov, I Love Therefore I am, New York, St.Vladimir’s Press, 2002, p.99.  
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well acknowledged,795 even amidst a plethora of various other unreferenced sources and 
influences ranging from the Kabbalah right through to his own mystical experiences, one can 
still clearly detect the tenets of Valentinian Gnosticism and their influence. Like Schelling before 
him, Solovyov maintained a keen interest in nearly all things esoteric. His first published work 
was entitled The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism (1873) and was clearly reminiscent 
of Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology. After the completion of his master’s dissertation, he 
traveled to London in 1875 on a funded research trip to the British Museum with the 
authenticated purpose of studying different varieties of Gnosticism.796 It also appears to be no 
coincidence that it is around this time that Solovyov first commenced writing his Sophie; a work 
that is conspicuously immersed in Valentinian cosmology. Therefore, there is no doubt that 
Solovyov had both studied and admired Valentinus and his School (he once described him as 
being ‘one of the greatest intellectual geniuses of all time’797 and briefly describes the 
Valentinian system with accuracy and favour in his seminal work on ethical theory The 
Justification of the Good (1897)798). The importance of Solovyov’s synthesis of idealism and 
Gnosticism in his Sophiology is in the fact that this template provides the foundation for 
Bulgakov’s own Sophiological endeavors. And, although Bulgakov is well aware of the 
theological ‘dubiousness’ of some of Solovyov’s sources, which he increasingly attempts to 
refine and filter, as recent scholarship has shown,799 it will be nonetheless one of the contentions 
of this chapter that this process of refinement is neither radical nor extensive enough to negate 
the Valentinian foundations of Solovyov’s Sophiology or indeed his own.  
                                                             
795 See, for instance: Maria Carlson, ‘Gnostic Elements in the Cosmogony of Vladimir Soloviev,’ in: Judith Deutsch 
Kornblatt and Richard Gustafson (eds), Russian Religious Thought, London, Wisconsin Press, 1996, pp.49-68; Paul 
Valliere, Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key, Michigan, 
William B. Eerdmans, 2000, p.112; Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir 
Solovyov, Cornell University, 2009, p.11.   
796 See: Oliver Smith, Vladimir Soloviev and the Spiritualization of Matter, Academic Studies Press, 2011, p.26; 
Paul Allen, Vladimir Soloviev: Russian Mystic, Lindisfarne, 1978, chapter 4. 
797 See: Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Studies in Theological Style: Lay Styles: II, Edinburgh, 
T.&T. Clark, 1986, p.285.   
798 See: Vladimir Solovyov, The Justification of the Good (trans: Nathalie A. Duddington), New York, Cosimo, 
2010, p.41. 
799See, for instance: Rowan Williams, Sergei Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology, Edinburgh, T&T 
Clark, 1999;  Aidan Nichols, Wisdom from Above: a Primer in the Theology of Fr. Sergei Bulgakov, Gracewing, 
2005; Andrew Louth, ‘Sergei Bulgakov and the Task of Theology’, in: Irish Theological Quarterly74:3 2009, 
pp.243-257, p.250. 
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    The focus of this chapter shall therefore be the Sophiological positions of Vladimir Solovyov 
and Sergius Bulgakov.800 The primary contention of this chapter shall attempt to demonstrate 
that the ‘Sophiological systems’ of Solovyov and Bulgakov construct synthetic philosophical and 
theological positions through the medium of Sophia which is itself a deliberate (at least in the 
instance of Solovyov) blend of Schellingian philosophy, the Judeo-Christian figure of Wisdom, 
and the Gnostic (Valentinian) cosmological and mythological narratives, which have been 
inherited through the influence of Schelling and German idealism more broadly.   
    To address these issues we shall first evaluate the ‘wisdom writings’ of Solovyov, with the 
view to providing strong evidence of his dependency on Schelling and his conscious use of 
Valentinian cosmology and mythology in the construction of his ‘Sophiology.’ Solovyov’s most 
significant ‘wisdom writings’ shall be taken to be The Sophie (1876), Lectures on Divine-
Humanity (1877-1881), and Russia and the Universal Church (1883), which shall form the basis 
of the evaluation of his adoption and construction of the function of the Wisdom figure within 
his philosophy. Then finally, we shall offer a detailed consideration and critique of Bulgakov’s 
Sophiology, which shall be analyzed in two major stages: early Sophiological writings and their 
relationship to Solovyov and Schelling (including his 1912 Philosophy of Economy and 1917 
The Unfading Light), and his mature Sophiology of the two trilogies (The Burning Bush (1927), 
The Friend of the Bridegroom (1927), Jacob’s Ladder (1929) and: The Lamb of God (1933), The 
Comforter (1936), and The Bride of the lamb (1945)) as well as other significant essays and 
publications of this period.801  
Solovyov and Sophia: Mysticism, Esotericism, Idealism, and Valentinian Wisdom Theology 
Solovyov’s Personality and its Significance for his Sophiology 
                                                             
800 I note ‘Sophiological positions’ specifically because the range of their respective philosophies embodies more 
than just references to the figure of Wisdom (however integral that figure has proven to be to their various 
proposals), and given the scope of this study, I shall only consider aspects of their theology and philosophy that I 
consider to be absolutely necessary to the exposition of Sophia within their writings. This is not an individual study 
on the thought of Solovyov and Bulgakov, but on their Sophiology, and only insofar as this has provided the basis 
for a particular theme in John Milbank’s theology; this lens shall remain constant throughout the proceeding 
assessments and I ask the reader to remain mindful of this disclaimer when noting any ‘gaps’ in content.     
801 Bulgakov’s earlier output from the end of the nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth shall not be 
considered here, principally because they bare no direct relation to his later Sophiology, but are rather characterized 
by his atheist and Marxist commitments of the time.  
 
 
228 
Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov802 was the son of a respected professor of history at Moscow 
University with family connections to the priesthood, whilst his mother was of Ukrainian 
descent. He was one of nine other children and he was apparently a withdrawn, dreamy, and 
somewhat strange child. Although Solovyov had a fairly strict and pious upbringing, we are told 
that, from about the age of fourteen, he became a convinced atheist and materialist; the Russian 
philosopher and boyhood friend of Solovyov, L.M. Lopatin once reminisced that ‘there was a 
period in his life [Solovyov’s] when he was a thorough materialist…never since have I met a 
materialist so passionately convinced.’803 Having graduated from the gymnasium that he had 
attended since his eleventh year, he enrolled himself, at the age of eighteen, in the Moscow 
faculty of natural science. However, his earlier atheistic tendencies had begun to soften and he 
became increasingly interested in philosophy; thus abandoning his scientific studies he was 
accepted by the faculty of history and philology from which he graduated in 1873. His final year 
of education took place in the Moscow theological academy, by which time he had reignited his 
Orthodox faith.804  
    Solovyov was an incredibly enigmatic and paradoxical figure for a variety of reasons. His 
nephew, S.M. Solovyov, once suggested that his uncle was the prototype for two lead characters 
in Dostoyevsky’s famous The Brothers Karamazov; the rational and analytical Ivan and the 
‘other-worldly’ mystically inclined Aloysha.805 The unlikely coincidence of these two seemingly 
                                                             
802 See, for instance: L.Müller, Soloview und der Protestantismus, Freiburg, 1951; P. Zouboff, Godmanhood as the 
Main Idea of Vladimir Solovyev, New York 1944; K.V. Mochulski, V.S. Solovyov, Paris, 1936; N.O. Lossky, History 
of Russian Philosophy, New York, International Universities Press, 1951, pp.81-133; N.O. Lossky, ‘The Philosophy 
of V.L. Solovyev’ (trans: Nathalie Duddington), Slavonic Review II (1923), pp.346-358; D. Stremooukoff, Vladimir 
Soloviev and his Messianic Work (trans: Elizabeth Meyendoerff), Belmont, 1980; Jonathan Sutton, The Religious 
Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Towards a Reassessment, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988; V.V. Zenkovsky, 
A History of Russian Philosophy II (trans: George Kline), London, Routledge, 1953, pp.469-532; Nicolas Zernov, 
Three Russian Prophets: Khomiakov, Dostoyevsky, Soloviev, London, SCM Press, 1944; Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, 
Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, Cornell University, 2009; Frederick Copleston, A 
History of Russian Philosophy X, London, Continuum, 2003, pp.201-241; Oliver Smith, Vladimir Soloviev and the 
Spiritualization of Matter, Academic Studies Press, 2011; Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, 
Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2000; Paul Allen, Vladimir 
Soloviev: Russian Mystic, Lindisfarne, 1978; William Desmond, Is There a Sabbath for Thought, Fordham 
University Press, 2005, Brandon Gallaher, ‘The Christological Focus of Vladimir Solov’ev’s Sophiology’, in: 
Modern Theology XXV:IV (2009), pp.617-646; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Studies in 
Theological Style: Lay Styles: II, Edinburgh, T.&T. Clark, 1986. 
803 L.M. Lopatin, ‘The Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov’ (trans: A. Bakshy), Mind XXV (1916), p.428. 
804 See: V.V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy II (trans: George Kline), London, Routledge, 1953, 
pp.474-75. 
805 Solovyov’s nephew S.M. Solovyov once suggested that his uncle was the prototype for two characters in 
Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov: the mystically inclined Aloysha and the rational and analytical Ivan. 
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incompatible personalities provides as a good a character profile as any for Vladimir Solovyov: 
he was a vegetarian (which is still almost akin to lunacy even in contemporary Russia) and an 
avid supporter of animal rights. He had strong Slavophile tendencies whilst being an advocate of 
ecumenism and a papal sympathizer.806 He supported women’s rights and lectured at the 
women’s higher courses807 and was an outspoken critic of corporeal punishment; a view which 
he most famously expressed in a lecture several weeks after Alexander II’s assassination (1881), 
calling for the perpetrator to receive mercy and forgiveness (something which lost Solovyov 
much support).808 He was a poet and a rigorously analytical philosopher. He considered himself a 
prophet and was undoubtedly something akin to an ‘esoteric mystic.’  Although Solovyov’s 
conception of Sophia was influenced by a wide variety of sources and most especially - as this 
chapter will intend to show - by Valentinian Gnosticism, one cannot deny the place of 
Solovyov’s own enigmatic and mystical personality within this formative process itself.809 For, 
when Solovyov adopts the figure of Wisdom within his philosophy, she is not merely an abstract 
mediator between God and creation, nor a particular mythical figure within a wider cosmogonic 
narrative (although she is both of these things for Solovyov as well) but primarily and firstly she 
is a real and tangible female person that Solovyov believed himself to have encountered three 
times within his life and a figure to whom he felt personally connected. For instance, during his 
time in London, Solovyov attended various séances810  where he apparently became fascinated 
with the phenomenon of ‘automatic writing.’811 Solovyov appears to have attempted to channel 
the creativity of Sophia in his own writings using this technique on numerous occasions; for 
instance, in some of the original fragments of Sophie there are instances of automatic writing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Although Dostoyevsky was a good friend of Vladimir Solovyov’s this claim cannot be definitively verified; see: 
S.M. Solov’ev, Vladimir Solov’ev: zhizn’ I tvorcheskaia evoliutsiia, Moskva, Republika, 1997, p.180, cited in: 
Vladimir Solovyov, The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge (trans: Valeria Nollan), Michigan, William 
B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.2.  
806 See: Vladimir Solovyev, Russia and the Universal Church (trans: Herbert Rees), London, Centenary Press, 
pp.85-140. 
807 On its history see: Christine Johanson, Women’s Struggle for higher Education in Russia 1855-1900, McGill-
Queens University Press, 1987. 
808 See: Bernice Rosenthal and Martha Chomiak (eds), A Revolution of the Spirit: A Crisis of Value 1890-1924, 
Fordham University, 1990, p.38. 
809 Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, Cornell University, 2009, 
p.11. 
810 V.V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy II (trans: George Kline), London, Routledge, 1953, p.475. 
811 Automatic writing is apparently an attempt to channel spiritual forces, where one enters into a trance like state 
and becomes the instrument of a particular spirit which is then able to communicate messages through the possessed 
person’s own writing. For an account of ‘automatic writing’ see: Anita Muhl, Automatic Writing, Kessinger, 2003.   
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within the margins themselves.812 His own fascinating account of his encounters with Lady 
Wisdom are documented in his poem Three Meetings (1862 -75-76) which sheds some light on 
Solovyov’s own conception of Sophia herself. 
    Firstly, Solovyov is emphatic that these ‘experiences’ were indeed real: ‘have you not thrice 
appeared to my real sight? You have not been a figment of the mind.’813 He was apparently nine 
years old when the first vision took place on the feast of the Ascension within a Church service: 
‘The sanctuary was open…But where were priest and deacon? 
Where was the crowd of praying people? Suddenly,  
The stream of passions dried up without a trace. 
Azure was all around; azure was in my soul. 
Suffused with golden azure, and your hand 
Holding a flower that came from other lands, 
You stood there smiling a smile of radiance. 
You nodded to me and vanished in the mist.’ 814      
 
The second encounter occurred during Solovyov’s research trip, whilst he was sitting in the 
reading room of the British Museum. Apparently, he was beckoned by ‘mysterious powers’  ‘to 
choose for reading everything possible concerning her [Sophia].’815 He then recalls the 
encounter: 
‘But once – it was autumn – I said to her:  
“O blossoming of divinity! I feel 
Your presence here. But why have you not revealed 
                                                             
812 For examples of this see, for instance, Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of 
Vladimir Solovyov, Cornell University, 2009, p.134; and for an account of Solovyov’s use of this technique see: 
Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, ‘Who is Sophia and Why is She Writing in my Manuscript: Vladimir Solovyov and the 
Channeling of Divine Wisdom’, in: Journal of Eastern Christian Studies III-IV  (2007).  
813 Vladimir Solovyov, ‘Three Meetings,’ in: Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus, The Religious Poetry of Vladimir 
Solovyov, Semantron Press, 2008, p.99. 
814 Ibid, p.100. 
815 Ibid, p.101. 
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Yourself to my eyes since I was a child?” 
Hardly had I thought these words 
When all around was filled with golden azure 
And before me she was shining again – 
But only her face, it was her face alone.’816  
 
Following this encounter, Solovyov recalls hearing an internal voice instructing him to go to 
Egypt to see Sophia again. Needless to say, given Solovyov’s temperament, he recklessly heeded 
this call spending the last of his small stipend on travel expenses to Cairo, where he would 
receive further instruction directing him to go into the Sahara desert. Thus, a penniless and rather 
disheveled Solovyov marched into the desert wearing a warm overcoat and a top hat, where he 
was set upon by a group of Bedouins817 who mistook him for a demon. Solovyov mentions that 
he feared for his life, but after being held trial by sheiks of two tribes he was bound and taken 
into the middle of the desert, untied and abandoned. He then informs his readers that he was 
lying in freezing conditions in star lit darkness fending off hungry Jackals, when his internal 
voice commanded him to sleep:818 
Then I fell into a deep sleep; and when I waked 
The fragrance of roses wafted from earth and heaven. 
And in the purple of the heavenly glow 
You gazed with eyes full of an azure fire. 
And your gaze was like the first shining 
Of universal and creative day. 
What is, what was, and what will be were here 
Embraced within that one fixed gaze…The seas 
And rivers all turned blue beneath me, as did 
                                                             
816 Ibid, p.102. 
817 Bedouins are desert dwelling tribes. 
818 Even Solovyov himself remarks on the comedy of this whole scenario given its sheer absurdity (see: Vladimir 
Solovyov, ‘Three Meetings,’ in: Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus, The Religious Poetry of Vladimir Solovyov, 
Semantron Press, 2008, p.104). 
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The distant forest and the snow-capped mountain heights. 
I saw it all, and all of it was one, 
One image there of beauty feminine… 
The immeasurable was confined within that image. 
Before me, in me, you alone were there. 
O radiant one! I’m not deceived by you. 
I saw all of you there in the desert… 
And in my soul those roses shall not fade 
Wherever it is the billows of life may rush me.’819 
Thus for Solovyov, Sophia is a very real feminine entity that he believed himself to be 
acquainted with. Therefore, having obtained a brief biographical outline of Solovyov and 
underlined some of the personal characteristics that would eventually become influential in his 
philosophical output, and especially in his Sophiology, we shall now explore some of his 
philosophical commitments that would also play a huge part in shaping his theogony, 
cosmology, and soteriology where the figure of Sophia features so prominently. 
Solovyov and Schellingian Idealism: The Path to Integral Knowledge and the Inheritance 
of the Valentinian Presuppositions and their Accompanying Philosophical Problems. 
Solovyov’s first significant philosophical publication was his completed Master’s dissertation 
entitled The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against Positivism (1874). The thesis itself is a lucid 
and conscientious critique of western philosophy, deeply indebted to Schelling, which 
culminates in several unique proposals to support philosophy in overcoming its perceived 
impasse.    
     Solovyov describes Hegelian philosophy as a form of ‘panlogism’820 by the use of which he 
intends to encapsulate Schelling’s entire critique of western philosophy which culminates with 
Hegel himself. His criticisms hinge on Schelling’s distinction between negative and positive 
philosophy with specific reference to the limitations of the former; or, on Schelling’s insistence 
                                                             
819 Ibid, p.105. 
820 Vladimir Solovyov, The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (trans: Boris Jakim), Steiner, 1996, 
p.46. 
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that an abstract concept only constitutes a possibility and must therefore be distinguished from 
reality. Solovyov puts it thus: 
Hegel’s Philosophy, as a system absolute in its sphere, completely self-enclosed, cannot be 
rejected partially…One can exit it only by recognizing the one-sidedness or limitation of its 
whole sphere or of its very principle, i.e., the principle of abstract concept, the sphere of pure 
logic…Hegel’s doctrine… was immediately rejected in its absoluteness by a simple axiomatic 
assertion: concept is not everything. In other words, concept as such is not yet reality.821  
Solovyov argues that the success of Hegel’s system lies in its ability to pass itself off as 
something actually existing when in truth, this is a mere sophism; a form of deception that 
Solovyov likes to call a ‘hypostasized abstraction,’822 which is easily deconstructed: 
It is perfectly clear that those quantitative and qualitative determinations which constitute a 
material object, such as shape, size, mass, colour, and so forth, do not exist by themselves in 
separation…The separateness of these elementary properties is only a result of rational 
abstraction [something that occurs in human reason only]…[Then, in Hegel’s system] actual 
being is attributed to them, a being which they do not have in their separateness.823    
Like Schelling before him, Solovyov then concludes that Hegel’s philosophy already implies a 
beyond in its very completeness; the need for an accompanying philosophy: ‘Hegel’s system, by 
concluding philosophical rationalism and expressing it in all its exclusiveness (and thus making 
its limitations obvious), called into being the demand for another philosophy, not abstract-
logical, but positive.’824 And, again following Schelling, Solovyov insists that this positive 
philosophy must take on the form of empiricism (in order to qualify logical possibility through 
experiential reality): ‘it [positive philosophy] must be based on the content of consciousness. 
That is it must have an empirical source of knowledge.’825 Thus, situating himself firmly within 
the methodology of Schelling’s positive philosophy, Solovyov attempts to construct his own 
proposals within this apparatus. 
                                                             
821 Ibid, p.50. 
822 Ibid, p.96. 
823 Ibid, pp.93-94 (my emphasis). 
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825 Ibid, p.71, a point which Solovyov makes again and again, see for instance: ‘from Hegel’s logic we take some 
more general concept…the concept of being-for-itself, it is clear that we do not find out from this concept whether 
or not anything that is for itself actually exists. We can discover this only empirically. On the basis of the concept 
we can assert only that being-for-itself is thinkable or possible, and that if something that exists for itself actually 
exists, it must satisfy all the logical moments that are contained in the concept of being-for-itself. However, in 
logical concepts we know only the possibilities and necessary conditions of that which exists, not that which exists 
itself’ (Ibid, p.109). Compare this with F.W.J. Schelling, Grounding of Positive Philosophy (trans: Bruce Matthews), 
New York, State University of New York Press, 2007, p.130, p.151.    
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    One of the primary questions that Solovyov now seeks to answer, in the wake of his borrowed 
method, is fundamentally: how one can come to empirically know an ‘in-itself’ immediately 
through sense and thought?  Solovyov’s response to this question is markedly Idealist in 
affirming that this process can be identified within self-consciousness itself, where we both feel 
and think ourselves independently of external representation: ‘in our consciousness we a have a 
certain reality; a certain immediate manifestation of that which truly exists and therefore know 
that which truly exists.’826  Solovyov believes that he is on the path to satisfying the demands of 
Schelling’s methodology and producing a positive philosophy: 
All other objects are accessible to us only from outside, in forms of representation, whereas we 
are accessible to ourselves from within as well, from the subjective side in self-consciousness or 
inner feeling, where the independent essence is reflected in the most immediate way. In self-
consciousness, this essence does not enter into the forms of external representation, but is known 
by us as our own will.827   
This suggestion leads to one of the central tenets of Solovyov’s whole metaphysics: the principle 
of All-Unity. According to Solovyov, if the ‘in-itself’ or the ‘truly existent’ (истинно-сушее) is 
really accessible to us within our own self-consciousness, where we have an immediate sense or 
inner feeling and thought of ourselves, then this must presuppose an internal ontological 
connection between ourselves and the ‘truly existent.’ To characterize this connection, Solovyov 
suggests that our Spirit is a mere aspect, component, and manifestation of that Spirit which truly 
exists in-itself, which he contends is a monistic whole or ‘all-one:’ 
An essential identity between metaphysical essence and the knower, i.e., our spirit, is 
presupposed. This essence is thus determined to be the all-one spirit, of which our spirit is a 
particular manifestation or image, so that through our inner experience we can obtain real 
knowledge of metaphysical substance.828     
It is quite clear from his appeal to an integral knowledge of an absolute monistic reality which 
humanity forms a constitutive part of, that Solovyov has not only adopted Schelling’s 
philosophical methodology, but more significantly, Schelling’s monism with its notion of 
absolute identity. This foundational commitment to a primary monism, as we have consistently 
seen, always generates the Valentinian philosophical problems that Solovyov appears to have 
                                                             
826826 Vladimir Solovyov, The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (trans: Boris Jakim), Steiner, 
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827 Ibid, p.74. 
828 Ibid, p.138. 
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inherited from Schelling’s Idealism. In turn this always produces the ‘problem of finitude’ e.g. 
‘why and how does it exist in light of this higher reality’ which is nearly always accompanied by 
the opprobrious acknowledgement of its existence as something which should simply not be; 
something which contradicts this higher reality and must be negated. These issues quickly 
become the axis on which Solovyov’s philosophy begins to rotate as he attempts to respond to 
them; which he does in his fragmentary and incomplete work The Sophie (1876). 
Solovyov’s Valentinian Mythology and Cosmology: A Response to the Valentinian 
Philosophical Problems.    
As we have already noted, Solovyov first started writing The Sophie on his research trip to 
London which he subsequently abandoned when he had his second mystical encounter with 
Sophia who apparently summoned him to Cairo. Taking a ‘scenic route’ back from Egypt to 
London via Italy he completes, at least a rough draft of the work, which he describes as being of 
a ‘mystical-theosophical-philosophical-theurgic-political context, in a dialogic form.’829 The 
work itself had, it was thought, initially been intended as his doctoral dissertation, however after 
some careful reflection, Solovyov decided against this, given the overt esoteric character of the 
production. Despite Solovyov’s high intentions for the work it was never published and never 
fully completed. Judith Kornblatt describes it as being ‘several chapters of differing length and 
completeness, filled with notes to himself, snippets of barely decipherable automatic writing, and 
Gnostic and other mystical terminology.’830 The text ranges from philosophy to grand 
expressions of Gnostic mythology (which were clearly informed by Solovyov’s research at the 
time in the British Museum). However, despite the state of the incomplete work, one cannot 
doubt its importance for Solovyov who wrote to his father (May 1876) claiming that ‘it [The 
Sophie] will be the basis of all my future endeavors and I can do nothing without referring to 
it.’831 
                                                             
829 Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, Cornell University, 2009, 
p.109. 
830 Ibid. As Kornblatt suggests, the work is notably unpolished; not only were there margins full of notes correcting 
the text and making various suggestions but there were even mundane notes to himself , such as: ‘I owe 637 francs 
to the little Chinese man’ (Ibid, p.157), which demonstrates the depth of its incompleteness. 
831 Ibid, p.109. 
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    The most interesting aspects of The Sophie, in respect to our concerns, are undoubtedly those 
instances where Solovyov attempts to tackle the Valentinian philosophical problems, which he 
inherited from Schelling, precisely by appealing to Gnostic cosmology and mythology, which we 
shall now evaluate.  
    One of the first aspects of Gnostic thought to surface in this text is Solovyov’s appeal to, what 
we have called existential alienation, which is the inevitable product of the ‘problem of finitude.’ 
The status quo is perceived to be in contradiction to the truly existent, which can be felt by those 
who have a special perception, which subsequently causes existential angst in the perceiver. One 
of Solovyov’s most significant points is that this higher reality is revealed by the human 
phenomenon of laughter: 
It is obvious that man can only be free of the exterior necessity of the phenomenal world because 
he does not belong completely to it…He can only be free of the world because he belongs to 
another one. Thus, human laughter proves man’s natural freedom, proves as well his status as a 
metaphysical being…He laughs…because he knows quite well that true reality belongs to that 
other world, to the ideal world, of which this one is only a deformed shadow.832 
 
    In the first dialog of the work between the mysterious feminine figure Sophie and the 
inquisitive philosopher, Solovyov affirms his commitment to his monistic ‘first principle’ which 
he sometimes refers to as ‘unity and absolute simplicity.’833 Continuing to explore some of the 
issues which he addressed in his masters dissertation, he again poses the question as to how 
someone can come to know the truly existent ‘in itself.’ And this time, slightly modifying his 
theory of integral knowledge, suggests that the truly existent can be known through its self-
manifestation, which occurs precisely through external phenomena and reveals a certain insight 
in to its inner nature through its self-revelation: 
 Sophie: Do you know me? Do you know with whom you are speaking? 
Philosopher: As if I could not know you! 
Sophie: You no doubt know me as phenomenon, that is, insofar as I exist for you or in my 
external manifestation. You cannot know me as I am in myself, that is my thoughts and intimate 
feelings as they are in me and for me. You know them only when they manifest themselves 
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outwardly in the expression of my eyes in my words and my gestures. These are only external 
phenomena and yet… 
Philosopher: And yet, when I look into the deep azure of your eyes, when I hear the music of 
your voice, is it outward phenomena of sight and sound that I perceive? My God! I know your 
thoughts and feelings, and, by your thoughts and feelings, I know your inner being. 
Sophie: You know the interior phenomena by way of the exterior, and, by that, the being-
itself.834 
This manifestation of the Absolute must, contends Solovyov in typical idealist dialectical 
fashion, form an essential part of its own constitution as the Absolute, without which it would 
simply not exist: ‘it must be the union of itself and of its opposite. In order to be truly absolute 
and infinite, it must also be the principle of relativity and finitude.’835 Thus, Solovyov begins to 
conceive of the problem of finitude as a necessary expression of the infinite and the absolute in 
order for it to truly ‘become itself’ as absolute. He frames this dialectical process within the 
familiar Schellingian theogony that we explored in the previous chapter. Hence, he suggests that 
God’s substance is constituted by two opposing poles or drives towards being: one yearns for 
divine unity and simplicity and is therefore inward looking, and the other is a drive to love or to 
communicate its being in otherness and multiplicity.836 The indispensable role of ‘creation’ is 
therefore to become the platform in which the Absolute can overcome what is necessary in its 
being by what is free (through its self-assertion over the creation). The creation itself engenders a 
new dialectical relationship within the absolute: matter and spirit. And when spirit manifests 
itself to matter it hierarchically emanates ontological degrees of its manifested self which are 
subsequently divided into mind, soul and body.837  However, although Solovyov has accounted 
for the need of finitude and its purpose insofar as it is part of the Absolute’s dialectical 
becoming, he then attempts to explore what this means for the world itself. The philosopher asks 
‘where the new world [our world] comes from?’ And Sophie explains that this world is not new 
in its essence (which is still essentially united to the monistic absolute), but is an aspect of the 
Absolute which is in a ‘state of separation;’ it has become something akin to an ‘extra-divine 
state’ which should not exist.838 Solovyov contends that this extra-divine state is underpinned by 
three levels of being: matter (which acts as the substance of the extra-divine world), the world-
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soul (and the plethora of individual souls which are contained within it, which Solovyov uses 
interchangeably with Sophia and the ideal form of humanity839) which is the spiritual dimension 
of this separated reality and that which remains in connection with the Absolute, and finally there 
is a formal principle to this world which is that which makes the world what it is or gives it its 
form; which is divided into two opposing drives, one being that of the creative Demiurge (which 
Solovyov uses deliberately as it is ‘ a name which is blessed by Christian Gnosticism’840) and the 
other being a satanical force that vies with the Demiurge for supremacy over this world, which is 
also sometimes called the cosmic spirit.841 As we have already noted, this extra-divine world is, 
in its essence, still a component of the Absolute which is a manifestation of its necessary process 
of self-realization; however, according to Solovyov, there is another dimension to this 
mythology, where he tries to account for how this extra-divine world has come to be 
underpinned by these three principles. For, he suggests that the soul of the world wanted to know 
the divine spirit or the Absolute directly and be like it: ‘it wanted to be for itself, to create and 
govern its world like the Divine Spirit and, in becoming equal to that Spirit, to unite itself with it 
and to know it directly.’842 Just like Sophia in the Valentinian mythology, this is something 
which it is simply not capable of, and its consequences are ontologically devastating for this 
yearning aeon which then falls away from its essential unity with the Absolute, which Solovyov 
describes as a ‘transcendental event’ and the ‘fall of the soul.’843    
He states that: ‘the soul is a principle of unity and love insofar as it is passive and submits to the 
ideal spiritual world. But in rising up against them and in separating itself out, in becoming 
egotistical, it becomes the principle of separate and exclusive being, of division, of hatred and 
struggle.’844 Thus, in its alienated state of non-conformity to the truly existent, the soul is divided 
into its positive creative capacity as Demiurge and its self-affirming and negative capacity as 
Satan or the cosmic spirit.845  
    Solovyov, in typical Gnostic fashion, is adamant that the soul’s current state cannot remain 
unresolved insofar as it contradicts the truly existent and must be restored to the divine Spirit: 
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‘the integral organism of divine humanity, lacerated by the fall…must be restored.’846 This 
restoration occurs through a gratuitous descent of the divine Logos which unites itself to the soul 
in the person of Jesus Christ, this can occur given that every human soul is an aspect of the fallen 
world-soul and the principles of separation and struggle are overcome by Christ and the extra-
divine world is once again, in its essence, conformed to the truly existent.847  
    This rather complicated and highly speculative mythology, which attempts to account for the 
world in light of his commitment to his Schellingian monism, has all of the components of the 
Valentinian narrative outlined in chapter II: there is the foundational monism, the problem of 
finitude, a rejection of the finite world in light of that which truly exists above, an attempt to 
explain this finite realm through an event within the Absolute itself which results in an aspect of 
itself falling away and constituting multiplicity which contradicts the truly divine, and then there 
is the restitution of this fallen aspect through the descent of the Logos; this mythology is all 
framed within Solovyov’s dialectic which is clearly indebted to Schelling. This basic narrative 
will form the foundation for Solovyov’s Sophiology, which we shall assess shortly. However, 
before we do so, we shall need to take account of the further developments in this basic narrative 
that Solovyov elucidates in his The philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge (1877) 
Solovyov’s Valentinian Narrative Transposed into His Philosophy: Further Dialectics and 
Metaphysics. 
In his Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge, Solovyov continues to grapple with many 
of the issues that occupied his endeavors in The Sophie, only this time with much greater 
astuteness to his philosophical audience. The first part of the book is a general historical 
introduction and assessment of Western and Eastern philosophy. One of his major contentions to 
emerge out of this process is that, for Solovyov, there are three basic forms of being: feeling, 
thinking, and willing, which, when manifested in the social realm of existence, constitute three 
corresponding states: the economic society, the political society, and the religious society.848 
According to Solovyov, these three basic social realms were originally parts of a single whole; 
apparently the spheres of knowledge or thinking (philosophy, theology, and science) were united 
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in theosophy; the branches of society or willing (Church, government, and economical society) 
were united within a single theocracy; and the dimension of feeling (mysticism, fine art, and 
technical art) were contained within a single theurgy. However, this original harmony was 
slowly deconstructed throughout history. And Solovyov believes that pessimism is the only 
logical conclusion which can be drawn from the current state of the social world, which he 
describes as a ‘game not worth a candle.’849 This pessimism is quickly transformed into a 
longing for another world which acts as an impetus to not give up on finite existence, he states 
that one must: ‘acknowledge that there exists, higher than a person and external nature, another 
absolute, divine world, endlessly more real, rich, and alive than the world of apparent, superficial 
phenomena.’850 And, moreover, following Schelling, that this acknowledgement is a natural 
human response, given the fact that ‘a person himself in his eternal origins belongs to that 
transcendental world.’851  
    The next logical question to pose is therefore how does one awaken this internal awareness of 
the higher realm within society itself? Solovyov responds by claiming that it is a task for the 
Russian people (a clear hint of his Slavophile tendencies) which must occur through a special 
type of knowing which he calls ‘free theosophy’ that is an ‘organic synthesis of theology, 
philosophy, and experiential science, and only this synthesis may contain in itself the integral 
truth of knowledge.’852 Solovyov suggests that the first step to obtaining this knowledge can 
occur by reflecting on the finitude of the world which is not self-sufficient, appealing to 
Aristotle; he claims that the world must posit a higher cause or sustainer as its first principle.853 
However, this acknowledgement can only present the inquirer with the knowledge of some 
unknown necessary cause. Solovyov contends that it must be known philosophically, for if it 
cannot be known then it cannot exist, and if it does not exist then the world itself could not be 
acknowledged (which contradicts empirical reasoning); thus if this unknown cause does exist, 
and it is known, then Solovyov must explore how it can come to be known. After exploring the 
two most obvious forms of epistemology, realism and idealism, he concludes that neither 
overcomes the problem of the unknown which can only be grasped within the realms of 
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mysticism (which Solovyov acknowledges as a legitimate form of epistemology),854 which he 
takes to be the necessary ‘basis for a genuine philosophy.’855 Thus, the purpose of this 
philosophy is to ‘promote in…the sphere of knowledge, the displacement of the center of human 
existence from its own given nature to the absolute, transcendental world, in other words – to 
promote a person’s internal union with the truly existent.’856 Furthermore, picking up some of the 
themes of his Sophie, this mystical knowledge is indebted to the self-manifestation of the truly 
existent which engages the whole sphere of human knowing in its mystical, psychical, and 
physical components.857 Therefore, this knowledge is ‘inspired’ by the truly existent through ‘the 
action of higher, ideal entities upon the human spirit’858 (which appears to explain what 
Solovyov was doing when he attempted to channel Sophia in his own writings).  
    Despite sounding like a pre-Kantian appeal to dubious modes of epistemology, Solovyov does 
defend his account of mystical knowledge on the pretense that the limits of the human mind 
cannot be circumscribed by any philosophy, even Kant’s, for in doing so one would already have 
gone beyond the realms of human knowing by making absolute and definitive claims to truth that 
could not be known from within this side of the posited epistemological parameter (Solovyov 
appears to be drawing attention to Jacobi’s critique of the paradoxes within Kant’s method).859 
     According to Solovyov, this truly existent reality is a solitary unity which is both beyond 
being and non-being. The world’s only connection to it is that its existence is a product of this 
Absolute’s self-manifestation or its ‘relationship to an other.’860 This conclusion would then 
suggest that human beings within the world are able to have knowledge of this truly existent in 
so far as we are parts of its own self-revelation.861 To account for the Absolute’s relating to an 
other (the world), Solovyov constructs his own form of theogonic and cosmogonic dialectics, 
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which is at once both heavily indebted to Hegel whilst remaining critical of his system. 
Therefore, put slightly more accurately, Solovyov is attempting to produce a ‘post-Schellingian’ 
form of Hegelian dialectic that seeks to confirm its logical content by appealing to a reality 
independent of the logical system itself. Solovyov calls this ‘positive dialectics’: ‘it 
acknowledges that the logical content of our pure thought is identical to the logical content of 
that which is existent…that the same…definitions we dialectically consider also belong to the 
existent , but completely independently of our thought.’862 Following Schelling’s theogony in 
Die Weltalter and the Freiheit essay, Solovyov affirms that the Absolute contains two poles 
within its being: one that strives for unity and the other that strives to communicate its existence: 
‘the absolute necessarily in all of eternity is distinguished in two poles…the first is the principle 
of unconditional unity or individuality…the second is the principle or generating force of 
being.’863 However, in order for it to realize itself as the Absolute, it must posit itself for itself 
which it must do in its opposite: ‘it eternally finds in itself its opposite, since only through the 
relationship to this opposite can it affirm its own self, hence they are completely interrelated.’864 
    This process of ‘othering’ the Absolute occurs within the Triune model. The ‘truly existent ‘ is 
in a state of pure potentiality, which Solovyov describes as the ‘positive nothing’ (or the 
Kabbalistic En-Sof, or the Father)  which then differentiates itself from itself within an ‘other,’ 
which Solovyov calls the Logos, Word, Son, or Manifestation, and finally affirms itself for itself 
through a third synthesis which he designates as the Holy Spirit.  Thus we are left with: 
First, in substantial, fundamental, and primary unity with the super-existent, i.e., in pure 
potentiality or positive nothing (En-Sof, or God the Father); second, in differentiation from the 
super-existent, or in the act of manifestation (in Logos or the Son); and third, in the free, i.e., 
mediated, unity with the super-existent (in the Holy Spirit).865 
Within the manifestation of the Absolute, Solovyov draws three ontological distinctions: ‘the 
concealed Logos’ which is simply the un-activated possibility of manifestation; the ‘revealed 
Logos’ which is the idea of the possibility of the manifestation itself accessible to the mind, and 
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thirdly the ‘concrete idea’ or Sophia which is the realization of the manifestation and which is 
fully accessible to consciousness and is how humanity can come to know the truly-existent.866   
    Solovyov does not elaborate further on the role of Sophia within his dialectical trinity until his 
seminal Lectures on Divine-Humanity (1878) which we shall turn to shortly. However, the basic 
dialectical system which has proven to be a philosophical elaboration of the proposals which he 
outlined in The Sophie remains at the heart of his future Sophiological writings 
The Role of Sophia Within the Lectures on Divine-Humanity    
The Lectures were delivered in late January through to March 1878 in twelve public talks, which 
included a fairly high profile audience (including Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy). Within them, 
Solovyov continues to develop his dialectical system, but crucially, with regard to the interests of 
this chapter, he develops his understanding of Sophia with diligent attention and outlines her 
functions within his philosophical system which we shall now evaluate. 
    As is typical of Solovyov, he sets out to ‘prove’ the reality of an ideal world (which this time 
he does by appealing to Platonic Idealism and Leibniz’s Monadology) underlying physical 
phenomena. Furthermore, appealing to Spinoza, he suggests that the variety of ideas are 
contained within one single whole and are simply various modifications of this unity, which 
nevertheless can be distinguished:  
God is all; that is to say; all in the positive sense, or the unity of all comprises the proper content, 
object, or objective essence of God; and that being, the actual being of God is the establishment 
or the positing of this content , of this essence; and in it, the assertion of him who posits, or the 
extant one.867    
This distinction leads Solovyov to differentiate between the essence or content of God’s being 
(the all) and God himself ‘the possessor of the content’ or the subject: ‘we have to distinguish the 
expresser from the expressed.’868 Within this distinction of subject and content, Solovyov 
elucidates his triune dialectic which contains three stages:  
In this first status, all is contained in God, i.e., in the divine subject…here, all as totality is not 
distinguished actually, but exists only as a possibility…In other words, in that first status only, as 
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the extant one, is God actual; whereas his content – all or the universal essence – exists only in a 
latent state.869 
However, without the actualization of this latent state God would simply not exist, thus he must 
posit this content and realize it beyond its mere possibility: ‘God not only must contain it in 
himself, but must assert it for himself, i.e., He must assert it as the “other one.”’870 Thus, like 
Hegel, Solovyov appears to dialectically move from a complete abstraction equated with nothing 
to its determinate opposite. Therefore, the antithesis of the One is now required for the 
advancement of the dialectic: ‘the absolutely-extant which itself is not subject to any 
determination, determines itself by manifesting itself as the unconditionally one through the 
positing of its “other one”, or its content  i.e., all.’871 The projection of this other, reflexively 
invites the third and final stage that will complete the dialectic ‘one in which it has the aspect of 
a finished, completed unity: or the absolute which has asserted itself as such.’872 Hence, the 
dialectic is completed, the result is an affirmation of what was already there, only now posited 
for itself. Within this process, one is able to identify three different activities within the same 
absolute subject, and since they cannot be considered in succession, they must be posited at the 
same time, which Solovyov believes requires three different hypostases to constitute the divine 
subject: 
It is necessary to assume for these three eternal acts three eternal subjects (hypostases), the 
second of which being immediately begotten by the first, is the direct image of its hypostasis, 
expresses by its actuality the essential content of the first, serves for it as the eternal expression 
or the word; while the third, proceeding from the first, as from the one who has already found its 
expression in the second, asserts the second as expressed or in expression.873  
    Proceeding from Solovyov’s Trinity, one is then able to detect three modes or faculties within 
the Absolute that correspond to one of the trinities he outlined in the Philosophical Principles of 
Integral Knowledge: the will (which is the will to manifest itself), the perception or knowledge 
(that which represents the will to manifest and perceives it), and in the mutual interaction 
between will and perception we get feeling. Each of these faculties in turn suggests the 
respective qualities goodness, truth, and beauty: the will desires to manifest itself which is good, 
the perception acknowledges itself which is the truth, and it also feels this interaction which is 
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beautiful. These distinctions posit the three modes of being within the expression: Spirit, Mind, 
and Soul, all of which is held together by the result of the dialectical process ‘the idea of the 
ideas’ which is represented by love.874  He then attempts to locate this entire dialectic within a 
Christian idiom that Solovyov, like Schelling, believes the world has moved towards, passing 
through various religions and philosophies to produce the idea of the ‘divine human’ which is the 
culmination of a ‘mythological process’ that sees the Absolute express itself for itself. 
    Undoubtedly, the most significant tenet of Christianity for Solovyov is the notion of the 
Incarnation.875 According to Solovyov’s dialectic, the most universal and abstract being must 
necessarily also become the most individual being, in so far as dialectical logic requires positions 
to be conditioned by their opposites; to posit universal being is to posit individual and 
determinate being, to the extent that one is defined in opposition to the other and actually 
produces this other within itself dialectically. Thus, Solovyov reasons that: ‘the universal 
organism, which expresses the unconditional content of the divine beginning [the Logos or 
Manifestation], is pre-eminently a particular individual being.’876 Solovyov is restating the 
division that he drew, in his Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge, within the 
Absolute’s manifestation of itself, the Logos, which was divided into the two ideal possibilities 
of its manifestation to its realized manifestation or the concrete idea, which Solovyov termed 
Sophia. Within this current explanation, the individual being as the realized possibility of the 
abstract manifestation is in fact the historical Jesus or Sophia: ‘this individual being, or the 
realized expression of the unconditionally- extant God, is Christ.’877 Thus, Christ literally 
becomes the locus of all of the Absolute’s content, both in its ideal universality and in its 
concrete individuality, and uniting the two in himself:  
In the divine organism of Christ, the acting, unifying beginning, the beginning which expresses 
the unity of the unconditionally-extant one, obviously is the word or Logos. The unity of the 
second kind, the produced unity, in Christian theosophy bares the name of Sophia.878  
Solovyov also refers to Sophia as the ‘concrete idea,’ ‘the body of God,’ ‘the matter of divinity,’ 
the ‘world-soul,’ and the ‘ideal humanity.’ 
                                                             
874 Ibid, p.148. 
875 It is important to note that Solovyov is not really interested in the historical Jesus of Nazareth, but simply in the 
idea of divine-humanity that he represents (see: Ibid, p.152). 
876 Ibid, p.154. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Ibid. 
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    In an attempt to articulate this realized manifestation of the All in the concrete Sophia, 
Solovyov appeals to Proverbs 8 to contend that Sophia is the ‘ideal creation’ containing within 
itself all of the possibilities of the created order which constitute the ‘content of divinity;’ an 
ideal realm composed of various triads of being: including willing, perception, and feeling; 
goodness, truthfulness, and beauty, and spirit, mind, and soul; all of which make up the monistic 
divine world which has clear similarities to the Valentinian Pleroma: 
Thus to God, as the integral being, together with unity belongs plurality – the plurality of 
substantial ideas, i.e., of potencies or forces with definite special content. These forces, each 
possessing its own particular definitive content, related in a different manner to the content of the 
others, necessarily represent secondary wholes or spheres. They all constitute one divine 
world.879 
However, just as Solovyov discovered in The Sophie, whenever such an ideal monistic reality is 
narrated, one inevitably then must confront the ‘problem of finitude’ which Solovyov 
immediately faces, having outlined this notion of a perfect Pleroma, for it now ‘presents itself to 
the mind as that which by itself ought to be, as the normal.’ However, the finite world contradicts 
this sentiment, and thus his task must now be ‘the deduction of the conditional from the 
unconditional; the deduction of what by itself ought not to be from the unconditional norm.’880 
Solovyov proceeds to carry out this Valentinian task, precisely by appealing to the figure of 
Sophia. 
    According to Solovyov, Sophia can be equated with the ideal form of humanity which exists 
in God eternally as part of his own manifestation to himself.881 Humanity, as a category, is 
presupposed by God as the object of his own manifestation. Humanity is therefore composed of 
two ontological modes: the individual human or transitory/necessary fact, and humanity’s 
essence which is dialectically opposed to the transitory person as being free and ‘necessarily 
eternal and all-embracing.’882  Sophia contains both possibilities of humanity within her own 
ideal existence within God. In an attempt to account for the finite world, Solovyov explores the 
possibility that it may be a product of some evil activity. Evil, as encountered within the 
phenomenal world is begotten through egoism which disturbs the harmonious whole of the 
                                                             
879 Ibid, p.155-6. 
880 Ibid, p.158 (my emphasis).  
881 Ibid, p.159. 
882 Ibid, p.162. 
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natural world, however this appears to be nothing more than a pre-given state of our existence 
(Solovyov accepted Darwinian natural selection).883  Therefore:  
Evil, having no physical origin, must have a metaphysical beginning; the producing cause of evil 
may be the individual being not in his capacity as a natural, already conditioned phenomenon, 
but in his unconditional eternal essence, to which belongs the immediate and original will of that 
being.884  
Thus, the origin of the phenomenal world, in its current state of egotistical evil, is to be 
accounted for by a fall of the ideal humanity (Sophia) from within the Solovyovenian Pleroma: 
‘the primordial origin of evil may have had place only in the domain of the eternal pre-natural 
world.’885 However, Solovyov still must account for how this fall has taken place. Sophia, in her 
capacity as ‘ideal humanity,’ contains the entire multiplicity of human possibility within herself. 
She is both divine and human, being contained by neither one nor the other, which gives her a 
relative freedom: ‘containing in herself both the divine beginning and the created being, she is 
not defined exclusively by either one or the other and, consequently, remains free.’886 Given this 
relative ‘freedom’ that is a property of Sophia, she has the capacity to egotistically affirm herself, 
which is precisely what Solovyov claims she does, resulting in the disruption of the Pleroma and 
Sophia’s fall from the same:  
The soul [Sophia] can detach the relative center of her life from the absolute center of the divine 
life, can assert herself outside of God. But thereby the soul necessarily loses her central position, 
falls from the all-one focus of the divine being to the circumference of multiple creation…with 
her self-assertion she becomes separated.887   
The result of this fall is that: ‘the natural world, which has fallen away from the divine unity, 
appears as a chaos of disjointed elements, these elements in their loss of freedom and mechanical 
interaction give birth to matter,’888 which in turn produces finitude and the plurality of 
                                                             
883 Ibid, p.166. 
884 Ibid, p.166, (my emphasis). 
885 Ibid, p.169. 
886 Ibid, p.173. Although Solovyov speaks of freedom and mediation here, these are both slightly misleading 
concepts. For the dialectic dictates that the creation and humanity are necessary for the divine’s own self-realization 
and are a part of this very process; similarly, there can be no real mediation in this scenario because, strictly 
speaking, no mediation is necessary, for the divine and humanity are, in essence, the same thing.  
887 Ibid, p.175. This notion of moving from the centre of divine unity to the peripheral multiplicity of the same is 
clearly reminiscent of Schelling’s same proposal of a ‘transcendental fall’ within his philosophy of mythology, see: 
F.W.J. Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology (trans: Mason Richey and Markus 
Zisselsberger), New York, State University of New York Press, 2007, pp.143-144. 
888 Vladimir Solovyov, Lectures on Godmanhood (trans: Peter Zouboff), Semantron Press, 2007, p.176. 
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being.889Having narrated the mythological fall of Sophia from the divine Pleroma or the All-
Unity which is deeply indebted to Valentinian thought and Schelling’s own reconstruction of this 
same narrative, Solovyov then describes the Soteriological aspect of his Valentinian mythology.  
    In an attempt to reestablish the lost unity of the monistic reality, the Logos (or the in-itself of 
the divine Sophia; that which remains ideally within the Pleroma within her essence) seeks to 
impart form on to the fallen Sophia/world soul/ideal humanity which requires this grace of 
deification: 
By a free act of the world soul, the world united by it, fell away from divinity and fell apart 
within itself into the multitude of elements warring among themselves; by a long series of free 
acts that whole rebellious multitude must make peace among themselves and be reconciled with 
God, and be reborn in the form of the absolute organism.890  
The coincidence of Sophia and her ideal counterpart, Logos, first occurs in the consciousness of 
humanity, the elemental forces of matter within the fallen world had slowly moved towards 
producing beings that could facilitate this reunion in its concrete reality (Solovyov’s coopting of 
evolutionary theory), which initially occurs successfully. However, historical humanity becomes 
enchanted by its own freedom and seeks to exercise it in the manner that Sophia did within the 
Pleroma, whereby it ‘loses its inner bond with the absolute being’891 and engenders a second 
‘historical fall.’ In order for this second disrupted unity to be healed, the narrative requires an 
Incarnation of the Logos, which history must slowly prepare itself for and teleologically move 
towards this culminating event, which occurs through a mythological process (deeply indebted to 
Schelling’s own project of the same nature) that sees the world pass through various faiths, 
philosophies, and traditions, that culminate in Christianity and the historical Christ or the God-
man: 
In order that the divine beginning could really overcome the evil will and life of man, it is 
necessary that it appear for the soul a living personal force, able to penetrate into the soul and 
take possession of it; it is necessary that the divine Logos should not only influence the soul 
externally, but be born within the soul not limiting or enlightening it, but regenerating it…the 
actual union of the divine beginning with the soul also necessarily assures an individual form, 
i.e., the divine Logos is born as an actual individual man.892   
                                                             
889 Ibid, p.177. 
890 Ibid, p.179. 
891 Ibid, p.183. 
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This Incarnation re-assumes the divine unity that Sophia had lost through deification and the 
‘spiritualization of matter’ and assures that a similar fall can never take place, by the Logos 
conquering the disobedient or egotistical part of the human will, through his life of discipline and 
resistance to temptation which ultimately leads to his acceptance of his own crucifixion and thus 
overcomes egoism once and for all, which is an ethical task that all of humanity must seek to 
imitate Christ in.893    
    These Lectures form one of the most essential expressions of Solovyov’s Sophiology, 
however he later elaborates on these themes in his Russia and the Universal Church (1883) 
which shall now be considered. 
Sophiology in Russia and the Universal Church.  
Solovyov draws the familiar distinction between the divine subject and his essence or content, 
which is his self-manifestation in the ideal possibility of creation, which is called Sophia: ‘this 
universal substance, or absolute unity of the whole, is the essential Wisdom of God 
(הָמְכָה/Σοφια). Possessing in itself the latent potentiality of all things.’894 Sophia as the ideal unity 
within God, dialectically implies her opposite of a potential state ‘outside of God’ which is 
antinomically consisted of plurality and division: ‘this is indeterminate and anarchic plurality, 
the chaos or the ἄπειρον of the Greeks, the German Schlechte Unendlichkeit, the וּהוֹת and וּהוֹבּ of 
the Bible.’895 In a markedly Schellingian proposal, Solovyov claims that ‘this antithesis of the 
Divine Being is from all eternity suppressed and reduced to that state of pure potentiality.’896 
However, if the Absolute is to be the true Absolute, then he must overcome this irrational 
antitype of himself and reduce it to nothingness by assimilating it into his own unity:897 
The Godhead must be able to meet every manifestation of rebellious chaos not only with an act 
of force suppressing the contrary act, not only with a reason or an idea convicting it of falsity and 
excluding it from true being, but also with a grace penetrating and transforming it and so 
drawing it back to unity.898 
                                                             
893 Ibid, p194. 
894 Vladimir Solovyev, Russia and the Universal Church (trans: Herbert Rees), London, Centenary Press, p.156. 
895 Ibid, p.157. 
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Hence, the Absolute must respond to this chaos through the threefold approach of suppression, 
persuasion, and transformation: ‘this threefold victorious reaction of the divine principle against 
potential chaos is the inner eternal manifestation of the Absolute substance of God or of the 
essential Wisdom which, as we have seen, is all in unity.’899 Although God has an ideal victory 
over chaos in his essential being, he has not yet achieved the same end in the ‘reality’ of chaos 
itself, so in order for this to occur, God must separate chaos from himself which produces the 
foundations of the earth.900 This new ‘externality’ to God then acquires a hypostatic reality 
which is driven by its desire to oppose God and his unity: ‘an urge implies a will, and a will 
implies a psychical subject, that is to say a soul.’901 This world-soul now becomes the antithesis 
of Wisdom an inverted Wisdom that constituted the substance or content of all that is external to 
God. Following the narrative of the Lectures, Solovyov contends that this principle has its own 
freedom and is faced with two possibilities:  
The world-soul has a twofold and variable character: it can will to exist for itself outside of God, 
it can take the false point of view of chaotic and anarchic existence, but it can also abase itself 
before God and, by freely attaching itself to the divine word, bring all creation back to perfect 
unity and identify itself with the eternal Wisdom.902 
According to Solovyov, the world-soul is enticed by the drive of chaos although: 
Having conceived chaos and given it a reality relative to itself, the soul conceives the desire for 
deliverance from this discordant existence of aimless and irrational agitation in an abyss of 
darkness. Drawn hither and tither by blind forces striving with one another for exclusive 
existence, rent asunder, disintegrated, reduced to a countless multitude of atoms the world-soul 
feels a vague but profound desire for unity.903  
Thus, having exercised its freedom, which resulted in its isolation from the divine unity, the 
world-soul longs once again for its reunification with the Absolute. And, it is this very longing, 
according to Solovyov, which attracts the grace of the heavenly Logos who subsequently 
responds by imparting a new idea to the world-soul, and lays the foundations of the material 
world.904 Solovyov further suggests that the heavenly Logos and the Holy Spirit impart further 
form to the exiled world-soul, which in turn produces the heavenly beings of angels, pure 
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intelligences, and spirits which engenders the divide between heaven and earth.905 According to 
Solovyov, these heavenly beings have the capacity to model themselves after the divine Wisdom 
or engender chaos; those who follow the latter path are the ‘fallen angels.’906  
    The ultimate purpose or teleology of the fallen earth, is to be re-absorbed into the divine unity. 
This ‘soteriological’ process has two aspects to it: the ecstatic ascending movement of the earth 
through the fallen world-soul’s desire to reconnect with its original unity, and the descending 
grace of the divine Wisdom. Similarly to the proposal of the Lectures, the earth teleologically 
evolves and moves towards the production of humanity and various religious systems that 
culminate in Christianity, which can facilitate the re-union through the notion of ‘divine-
humanity,’ which has three perfect expressions that act as summative points to the historical 
process: the feminine reception of divinity in the virgin Mary, the masculine counterpart in Jesus 
of Nazareth, and the social product of this unity in the Church: ‘the process of universal history; 
and the threefold fruit which it bears is: perfect woman, or nature made divine, perfect man or 
the God-man, and the perfect society of God with men.’907 Therefore, Solovyov’s conception of 
history ends when the re-unification begins with the Incarnation of the divine Word or the divine 
Wisdom that re-absorbs her degenerate counterpart into her own unity within the divine whole. 
    Therefore, it seems reasonable from these evaluations to conclude that Solovyov’s Sophiology 
is underpinned by Schellingian Idealism and Valentinian Gnosticism as well as other esoteric 
and unique patterns of thought. From the former he inherited his commitment to monism, his 
philosophical methodology (including his dialectic, theogony, and cosmogony), the Valentinian 
philosophical problems (including the problem of finitude and existential alienation), and the 
means of addressing these problems, i.e., by advocating a ‘transcendental fall’ to account for the 
reality that must be negated in its re-absorption back into the monistic first principle. All of these 
notions were already identified to be integral parts of the Valentinian structural narrative that 
Schelling had studied as a youth. Solovyov utilized all of these factors in the construction of his 
own Sophiology which he directly supplemented with Valentinian mythology, which he both 
admired and had studied at length. Valentinan mythology was clearly formative in constructing 
the theological functions that Solovyov’s Sophia performs; Sophia is utilized to explain how the 
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problem of finitude arises and how the construction of an external finite material world came 
into being (playing an integral role in the transcendental fall within the Absolute), and how the 
unity is re-established through a divine descent. Therefore, having found Solovyov’s Sophiology 
to conform to the conventions of Valentinian Gnosticism, we shall now explore Bulgakov’s 
adoption and adaptation of Solovyov’s Sophiology, and assess to what extent these same 
conventions form the basis of his own Sophiological positions 
Sergius Bulgakov’s ‘Sophiological Antinomism’
908
    
Bulgakov’s Journey from Orthodox Christianity to Marxism, and back to Orthodoxy via 
Philosophical Idealism and Solovyov.  
Sergius Nikolaevich Bulgakov was born in 1871 to an Orthodox Priest, Nikolai Bulgakov, 
serving at a cemetery church in Livny, and Aleksandra Azbukina. Bulgakov was, as to be 
expected, immersed in Orthodoxy from his early childhood, and in 1884, at the age of thirteen, 
entered Orel theological seminary in preparation for ministry. However, like Solovyov before 
him, the adolescent Bulgakov grew dissatisfied with the Orthodox faith and in 1888 left the 
seminary and enrolled in a secular educational institute. In 1890 he enrolled in the faculty of law 
in Moscow University, where he embraced Marxism and devoted his studies to politics and 
economics.909 Following his studies, he was subsequently granted a research fellowship and 
traveled to Western Europe to complete his graduate dissertation (Capitalism and Agriculture 
1902).910 However, during this period his enthusiasm for Marxism started to waver as he began 
to rediscover the faith of his childhood, which was reignited by an experience of ‘spiritual 
transformation’ whilst viewing the Sistine Madonna in Dresden. He reminisces that: 
                                                             
908 ‘Sophiological Antinomism’ is Brandon Gallaher’s phrase, like Gallaher, I believe that Bulgakov’s method of 
doing theology ‘antinomism’ (which shall be explained in the course of this chapter) lies at the very centre of all of 
Bulgakov’s theological thinking, even though he rarely makes this specifically clear. It is a point that has been 
desperately neglected in Bulgakov scholarship. The pioneers of this hermeneutical shift must largely be accredited 
to Brandon Gallaher and Jonathan Seiling, see: Brandon Gallaher, There is Freedom: The Dialectic of freedom and 
Necessity in the Trinitarian Theologies of Sergii Bulgakov, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 2010 (Ph.D 
Thesis, publication forthcoming: Oxford University Press), p.76; Jonathan Seiling, From Antinomy to Sophiology: 
Modern Russian Religious Consciousness and Sergei N. Bulgakov’s Critical Appropriation of German Idealism, 
(Ph.D Thesis, 2008).    
909 He published several articles in this field, for instance: On the Regularity of Social Phenomena (1896) and On 
Markets in Capitalist Conditions (1897).  
910 Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key, 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2000, pp.227-29. 
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My knowledge of art was perfectly insignificant and I hardly even knew what awaited me in the 
gallery. And there, into my soul peered the eyes of the Queen of Heaven approaching on clouds 
with the Pre-eternal child…I was bedside myself, my head was spinning, tears at once joyful and 
bitter flowed from my eyes, the ice in my heart melted and a kind of knot in my life came 
undone. This was not an aesthetic emotion…it was…a miracle…I was still a Marxist then and I 
involuntarily called this contemplation a prayer, and every morning, aiming to find myself in the 
Zwinger before anyone else, I ran there, to pray.911     
Bulgakov returned to Russia in 1900 and his experiences in Europe had undoubtedly left their 
mark on him. Although he did not immediately return to the Orthodox faith, his Marxism quickly 
subsided and was replaced, like so many of Bulgakov’s contemporaries, by a growing 
commitment to German Idealism. This cultural turn is reflected in the 1902 publication of 
Problems of Idealism, which was a series of essays produced by a distinguished group of Russian 
intellectuals, including Semen Frank, Nikolai Berdiaev, and Bulgakov himself, amongst 
others.912 According to Paul Valliere: ‘for this group idealism meant the trenchant and principled 
rejection of all forms of positivism and philosophical materialism. Problems of Idealism was 
designed to overturn the worldview of the Russian radical intelligentsia.’913 This personal 
intellectual shift in Bulgakov is documented in his 1903 From Marxism to Idealism914 and opens 
up previously forbidden paths of inquiry for the materialist Marxist (‘metaphysical questions – 
God, immortality, good and evil, and the like’915). Bulgakov’s intellectual and spiritual journey 
had, in many respects, mirrored Solovyov’s, and it is therefore no surprise that he starts to read 
him in 1902 as a natural progression from his move to Idealism. Indeed, he devotes one of his 
essays in From Marxism to Idealism to Solovyov, where he characterizes his thought as: ‘a 
balanced and harmonious synthesis of modern thought and knowledge, an integral worldview in 
which the demands of critical philosophy, metaphysical creativity and natural science are all 
                                                             
911 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, 
William B. Eerdmans, 2012, pp.9-10; see also Bulgakov’s reflections in the autobiographical Tikhie dumy (1911-
15). 
912 See: S.N. Bulgakov, ‘Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress’, in: Randall A. Poole (ed and trans), Problems of 
Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy, Yale University Press, 2003, pp.85-124. 
913Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key, 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2000, p.231.  
914 See: Sergei Bulgakov, Ot marksizma k idealizmu: sbornik statei (1896-1903), Frankfurt am Maim, Posev, 1968. 
For Bulgakov’s theological assessment of Marx see: S.N. Bulgakov, Karl Marx as a Religious Type: His Relation to 
the Religion of Anthropotheism of L. Feuerbach (trans: Luba Barna), Massachusetts, Nordland, 1979. 
915 Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key, 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2000, p.231.  
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taken into account and harmonized.’916 Following the 1905 revolution, Bulgakov remained 
politically active and was elected to the second Duma (following the 1905 reforms) from the 
Orel region in 1907.917 Bulgakov was a liberal and closely affiliated with the Constitutional 
Democratic Party, although he stood independently.918 However, after the dissolution of the 
Duma, Bulgakov no longer pursued a career in politics and was readmitted into the sacramental 
life of the Orthodox Church in the same year.919 In 1909 Bulgakov had an essay, entitled 
Heroism and Humility, published in the influential book Landmarks, written by a group of 
leading liberal intellectuals, who sought to re-promote Christianity within Russian intellectual 
life.920 He was now in no doubt that his future academic endevours would need to be informed 
by the Christian faith.  This shift also coincided with the immense personal tragedy that 
Bulgakov’s family suffered – losing their four year old son Ivashechka. In some autobiographical 
digressions in his Unfading Light (1917), Bulgakov describes a profound mystical experience 
that occurred during his son’s funeral, which appears to have marked his unwavering return to 
the Orthodox faith from dogmatic Marxism.921  
    It is shortly after the difficulties of 1909 that Bulgakov first began to seriously engage with 
Solovyov’s Sophiology.922 It is clear that at these early stages that he embraces Solovyov’s 
conception of Sophia and Schellingian philosophy, rather uncritically, and utilizes them both in 
his attempts to provide an ‘ontology for social economy’ in, what is generally considered to be 
his first Sophiological work: The Philosophy of Economy (1912). Later in Bulgakov’s short 
introduction to Sophiology: Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An outline of Sophiology (1937), he 
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Sergej Bulgakov und Peter Struve im interesse einer theologischen Besinnung, Munich, Kaiser Verlag, 1971, 
pp.241-65; Catherine Evtuhov, The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious 
Philosophy (1890-1920), Cornell University Press, 1997, pp.101-14. 
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Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, pp.15-16. 
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rehearses a more cautious assessment of Solovyov, acknowledging that ‘Solovyov’s doctrine of 
Sophia is undoubtedly syncretistic: side by side with ancient Orthodox tradition we can detect 
elements derived from the ancient Gnostic systems.’923 He then goes on to claim that although he 
regards Solovyov as his ‘philosophical guide to Christ’ ‘personally, though I do not share his 
Gnostic tendencies.’924 This is a claim that we shall seek to assess in the following evaluation of 
Bulgakov’s Sophiology beginning with his 1912 Philosophy of Economy.  
Schelling, Solovyov, and Valentinian Gnosticism in Bulgakov’s Sophiology in the 
Philosophy of Economy. 
In essence, the Philosophy of Economy is a critique of Neo-Kantianism925 and dogmatic Marxist 
materialism, two popular trends of thought in twentieth century Russia. He attempts to offer an 
alternative to these strains of philosophy, by providing an ‘ontological foundation for social 
economy’ patterned on Schelling’s philosophy of nature and Solovyov’s conception of Sophia. 
For the purposes of this evaluation, we must focus on Bulgakov’s use of the figure of Sophia. 
    Bulgakov’s initial motives for adopting the figure of Sophia are born out of his Idealist 
critique of Kantian thought and his commitment to Schelling’s conception of the ‘world-soul’, 
which he synonymizes with Solovyov’s Sophia, in an attempt to supplement Kant.926 In order for 
human social economy to be possible, Bulgakov acknowledges that we must be able to posit a 
‘single true transcendental subject of economic activity,’927 which must in turn be humanity as a 
whole. However, in the wake of Kant, how can such a noumenal entity be affirmed? According 
to Bulgakov, Kant’s epistemological theory of human cognition suffers from some major defects 
that could arguably be said to undermine his entire philosophical enterprise. Offering a slightly 
modified version of Jacobi’s critique of Kant, Bulgakov contends that the cognitive process that 
Kant’s thought is built upon must belong to a human subject; however, this could hardly be a 
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particular individual subject, as Kant would be unable to elevate this one empirical instance of 
human cognition to a universal theory, but neither could he appeal to some ‘transcendental ego’ 
which, if known, would already undermine Kant’s epistemology in so far as an ‘in itself’ would 
have been comprehended. These observations lead Bulgakov to the conclusion that Kant’s 
‘subject,’ which is the foundation of his philosophy, is a ‘methodological fiction’ which if used 
to found a theory of knowledge would be akin to ‘hammering a nail into thin air.’928 Bulgakov 
attempts to remedy these lacunas in Kant, by suggesting that in order for his thought to work, we 
must affirm a ‘general transcendental subject:’ ‘a general theory of knowledge is impossible 
unless we make the leap toward acknowledging the existence of a general transcendental 
subject.’929 The significance of this realization is that Kant’s epistemology requires an 
accompanying ontology which his theory seems unable to provide, thus there is a natural return 
to the metaphysics that Kant thought he had dispelled.930 Thus, philosophy requires an ideal 
humanity that is realized in individual human subjects; Bulgakov believes that Schelling and 
Solovyov’s monism is the only way forward: ‘only one knows, but many engage in the process 
of cognition. This one, this transcendental subject of knowledge, is not the human individual but 
humanity as a whole.’931 
    This monistic ideal pan-humanity is quickly identified with Schelling’s ‘world soul’, 
Solovyov’s Sophia, an ‘ideal organism’, a ‘metaphysical forefather’, and simply ‘the Pleroma’ - 
Bulgakov uses the names interchangeably at this stage.932 Therefore, ‘Man can attain knowledge 
in his capacity as the eye of the world soul insofar as he carries within himself the rays of the 
Pleroma of the divine Sophia.’933 And, furthermore, ‘this original, metaphysical unity of 
humanity is a positive spiritual force acting in the world as a unifying principle.’934  However, as 
we have consistently seen in our studies, when such an ‘original ideal unity’ is upheld, one 
inevitably faces the Valentinian ‘problem of finitude’ i.e., ‘why is there a finite world at all 
which exists in alienation from this original whole?’ Like Valentinus, Schelling, and Solovyov 
before him, Bulgakov must now recourse to a mythological narrative of a metaphysical fall that 
                                                             
928 Ibid, p.128. 
929 Ibid. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid, p.130, 132, 139. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid, p.131. 
934 Ibid, p.140. 
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explains the present state of the world. Bulgakov, realizing the logical direction of his thought, is 
forced to pose these questions to himself: ‘why does our empirical reality remain alienated from 
Sophia…How can we explain such a state of things? What hypothesis (not scientific of course, 
but metaphysical) would render it comprehensible?’935 Bulgakov’s response is typical of what 
we have encountered in previous thinkers: 
The current stage of struggle…is comprehensible only as a violation of Sophia’s primordial 
unity, in which the metaphysical center of being becomes displaced and a general illness of being 
results; this decentralization results in the world’s being plunged into the process of becoming, of 
subjection to time, to contradictions, evolution, economy. The chaotic state of the empirical 
world is the result of a falling away from the Sophic world in its complete and absolute harmony, 
where everything finds itself in everything else and ultimately God, through that timeless 
metaphysical act that in religion is known as original sin.936 
Following Schelling, Bulgakov suggests that this ‘metaphysical fall’ or ‘primordial catastrophe’ 
is not an historical, but a metaphysical event that is the product of a primordial self-affirming 
will.937 This primordial ‘splitting’ of the Absolute whole or Sophia requires a certain duplicity 
within her own being which invites the narration of two Sophias - ontologically identical, but 
modally alienated from each other: ‘a heavenly, timeless Sophia and an empirical Sophia.’938 
This appears to mimic the Valentinian distinction between Sophia and Achamoth. And, like the 
Valentinian narrative, Bulgakov affirms that this alienated Sophia must be reunited with her 
heavenly counterpart, which occurs through the historical process which is directed by a 
teleological drive to re-establish the original harmony.939 
    As a slight digression, it is important to note that there is a sub plot to Bulgakov’s 
Sophiological fall narrative that has a lot to do with his rejection of death. Despite death being a 
constant presence in Bulgakov’s early childhood (his father’s ministry was in a cemetery church) 
and it being no stranger to his adult life given the loss of his four year old son, he is never shy of 
reminding his readers of its alien status with regard to the original intention of God’s creation.940 
                                                             
935 Ibid, p.149. 
936 Ibid, pp.149-50 (my emphasis). 
937 Ibid, p.150. 
938 Ibid, p.151. 
939 Ibid, pp.152-53. 
940 See especially: his reasons for rejecting the Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception: Sergius Bulgakov, 
The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009. The fact that Mary dies 
after having been miraculously exempted from original sin indicates to Bulgakov that this could not have been the 
case given death’s unnatural presence in ‘pre-lapsarain creation.’ 
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Thus, in the wake of Darwin (where death is seemingly one major and necessary component in 
constituting our own current existence) and in his rejection of the Biblicist reading of the Genesis 
creation narrative, Bulgakov’s theology needs to have humanity ‘before,’ as it were, humanity 
has evolved, which leads him into metaphysical/anthropological theories of a fall of this pre-
human humanity, in order to explain death and evolution as a negative and ‘unnecessary process’ 
not ordained by God. These requirements certainly lend themselves to Gnostic speculation.941  
    Therefore, having outlined Bulgakov’s conception of Sophia in his early Philosophy of 
Economy and having demonstrated its dependency on Schelling, Solovyov, and Valentinian 
mythology, we shall now explore Bulgakov’s further adaptations of this narrative in his second 
major Sophiological work, The Unfading Light (1917). 
Sophia as a Personified Antinomy and Bulgakov’s Remodeling of the Gnostic Narrative. 
Bulgakov’s second major Sophiological work, The Unfading Light, marks his first attempt to 
refine his early sapiential speculations; largely, by consciously moving away from the sources 
that underpinned the Philosophy of Economy (Schelling and Solovyov) and by rejecting the 
explicit references to the Gnostic narrative that he had earlier embraced. Thus, we begin to 
encounter a very different emphasis in Bulgakov’s theology, which is seemingly committed to 
apophaticism, for instance: ‘faith presupposes mystery as its object and at the same time its 
source.’942 This turn further inspires sharp critiques and dismissals of individuals, such as Hegel, 
Schelling, and Solovyov, who were pivotal to his earlier thinking.943 However, despite these 
                                                             
941 Even David Bentley Hart acknowledges the attractiveness of certain Gnostic theories when faced with the horror 
of death: ‘like Paul or the author of John’s Gospel, the Gnostics understood spiritual liberation as something 
subversive of the order of “this cosmos,” a manumission  from the sway of the ancient terrestrial and celestial 
powers, a glorious escape from the kingdom of death. Any Christian who has not felt at least an occasional stirring 
of the pathos of Gnosticism…and of a rage against the fashion of this world, and of a mysterious yearning for 
another and perfect world, at once strange and familiar, cannot in all likelihood appreciate the spiritual and moral 
sensibility of the New Testament’ (David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami?, 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2005, p.95).    
942 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.31. 
943 He says of Hegel: ‘metaphysical Gnosticism received its most extreme expression in the philosophy of Hegel. 
Hegelian panlogism is at the same time the most radical immanentism known to the history of thought’ (Ibid, p.35). 
Similarly, of his once beloved Schelling he now writes that ‘for all his profundity and exegetical skill one has to 
acknowledge that Schelling introduces opinions about Divinity and the Holy Trinity that are completely 
inadmissible for Christianity…a sad attempt of presumptuous speculation…this is rationalistic lack of taste, which 
one would least of all want to see in Schelling, and he has paid for it not only with heresy but also with contradiction 
of his own self’ (Ibid, pp.201-2). And of Solovyov he writes that ‘in general [he] sins by the excessive rationalism in 
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critiques his dependency on the above thinkers remains strong throughout his entire theological 
career. 
  Having distanced himself from his earlier endevours, Bulgakov briefly outlines his ’new’ 
theological methodology that inspired this shift in his thought, and which is fundamental to his 
Sophiology from here on. He claims that at the heart of the religious consciousness is the 
antinomy between God as transcendent mystery and God who is relative and immanent to 
creation: ‘if we translate this fundamental and elementary fact of religious consciousness into the 
language of religious philosophy, we will see immediately that before us is a clearly 
contradictory combination of concepts, leading to antinomy.’944 Bulgakov is quick to distinguish 
a theological antinomy from a simple logical contradiction (a mistake) and from a dialectical 
contradiction that is to be surpassed by synthesis.945 In contrast to these two possibilities, he 
states: ‘antinomy is completely different. It is generated by the recognized inadequacy of 
thinking to its subject or its tasks; it reveals the insufficiency of the powers of human reason 
which is compelled to stop at a certain point.’946 He later expands on this definition claiming 
that: ‘an antinomy simultaneously admits the truth of two contradictory, logically incompatible, 
but ontologically equally necessary assertions. An antinomy testifies to the existence of a 
mystery beyond which the human reason cannot penetrate. This mystery, nevertheless, is 
actualized and realized in religious experience.’947 There is much to unpack and clarify in these 
statements on his theological method that appears to be informed by his close friend and mentor 
Pavel Florensky (1882-1937).948  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
his theology’ (Ibid, p.152). See, also his various critiques in: S.N. Bulgakov, Die Trägodie der Philosophie, 
Darmstadt, Verlag, 1927.    
944 Ibid, p.104. 
945 Ibid, p.105; on this distinction see also: Sergius Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology, 
Steiner Books, 1993, p.77. 
946 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.105. 
947 Sergius Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology, Steiner Books, 1993, p.77. 
948 Philosophical Antinomism is an epistemological theory of Florensky’s that he first outlined (albeit briefly) in the 
letter on ‘contradiction’ in his Magnum Opus: The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: an Essay in Orthodox Theodicy 
in Twelve Letters (1914); see: Pavel Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: an Essay in Orthodox Theodicy 
in Twelve Letters (trans: Boris Jakim), New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1997. He appeals to thinkers as 
diverse as Heraclitus, Plato, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and above all Nicholas of Cusa, as his inspiration for his 
proposal. Put simply, for Florensky, truth can only be obtained in finite thought ‘if it foresees, so to speak, all 
objections to itself and answers them’ (Ibid, p.109). How is this possible? Truth must embrace its own negation and 
doubt within itself a priori and accept them, thus apparently overcoming any objections to its truthfulness by 
encompassing all possible responses to this claim which are included in its own negation. Therefore, truth has the 
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    Firstly, at the heart of antinomical thinking is a primordial distinction within God himself: 
God as Absolute and God as Absolute-relative. This basic antinomy within God, which he calls 
the ‘self-bifurcation of the Absolute,’949 reflexively generates two others which he conveniently 
outlines in a table in his 1931 The Icon and its Veneration:  
I. Theological Antinomy (God in Himself) 
THESIS: God is the Absolute and, consequently the pure NOT, the Divine Nothing (Apophatic 
Theology). 
ANTITHESIS: God is the Absolute-in-itself self-relation, the Holy Trinity (Kataphatic 
theology). 
II. Cosmological Antinomy (God in Himself and in Creation) 
THESIS: God in the Holy Trinity has all fullness and all bliss; he is self-existent, unchanging, 
eternal, and therefore absolute (God in Himself). 
ANTITHESIS: God creates the world out of love for creation, with its temporal, relative, 
becoming being, and becomes for it God, correlates Himself with it (God in creation). 
III. Sophiological Antinomy (Divine Wisdom in God and in the world) 
THESIS: God, unisubstantial in the Holy trinity, reveals Himself in His Wisdom, which is His 
Divine life and the Divine world in eternity, fullness and perfection (non-creaturely-Sophia – 
Divinity in God) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
appearance of self-contradiction: ‘the thesis and the antithesis together form the expression of truth. In other words, 
truth is an antinomy, and it cannot fail to be such’ (Ibid). Florensky attempts to deduce a formula for the theory of 
antinomy by way of symbolic logic and concludes with: ‘P = (P∩-P) ∩ V.’ Thus, P = V (veritas/truth) which 
includes P and –P (Ibid, p.113). However, Florensky concedes that in its appearance an antinomy is 
indistinguishable from a mundane logical contradiction (a squared circle), the only difference is that an antinomy is 
endorsed by the Church in its dogma, which one must choose to accept through an act of rational kenosis or 
intellectual asceticism. The best account of Florensky’s thought and his antinomical epistemology is still: Robert 
Slesinski, Pavel Florensky: A Metaphysics of Love, New York, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984, pp.79-120. For 
an excellent assessment of Florensky’s biography see: Avril Pyman, Pavel Florensky: A Quiet Genius: The Tragic 
and Extraordinary Life of Russia’s Unknown Da Vinci, Bloomsbury, 2010.     
949 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.184. At certain points, Bulgakov seems to believe that this Sophiological 
distinction is akin to the Palamite distinction between God’s essence and his energies; thus he writes: ‘we have on 
the one hand, the complete incomprehensibility (transcendence) of the Godhead in its essence (ousia), but at the 
same time the Absolute reveals itself, it becomes God for the world in its activity (energeia)’ (Brandon Gallaher and 
Irina Kukota, ‘Protopresbyter Sergii Bulgakov: Hypostasis and Hypostaticity: Scholia to the Unfading Light,’ in: St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Quaterly 49:1-2 (2005), pp.5-46, p.17, see also: p.23).  
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ANTITHESIS: God creates the world by His Wisdom, and this Wisdom, constituting the divine 
foundation of the world, abides in temporal spatial becoming, submerged in non-being 
(creaturely Sophia – Divinity outside of God, in the world).950 
All three dimensions are aspects of the same fundamental antinomy of God as transcendent and 
God as immanent.  The antinomical method is essentially, following Schelling, a further attempt 
to do theology after and independently of Hegel (a modern post-modern theology), where 
Bulgakov attempts to uphold difference within unity, even when this would suggest logical 
contradiction, which seems to be grounded in Chalcedonian Christology. Therefore, at first 
glance, providing one probes no further than the surface, Bulgakov has escaped the Gnostic 
narrative that characterized the Sophiology of the Philosophy of Economy, for in the wake of the 
affirmation of antinomy, Bulgakov does not need to explain finitude in the shadow of the 
monistic whole, neither does finitude contradict the Absolute (therefore, no longer requiring a 
metaphysical fall to narrate its existence) the antinomy affirms both God and the world 
simultaneously. And, even if this may appear to be a logical contradiction, it certainly cannot be 
a mistake, given that it is revealed and resolved in religious experience.951 
    According to Bulgakov, God ‘steps out of his transcendence and absoluteness into 
immanence.’952 However, given that there is no ‘outside’ to Bulgakov’s monistic God, creation 
must therefore relate to God within God or be part of God’s own self-relation.953 The creation of 
the world (as in Hegel) therefore begins to look like a form of self-determination that Bulgakov 
characteristically describes in terms of Kenosis.954   
Alongside the Absolute which is super-essentially, being appears in which the Absolute discloses 
itself as creator, is revealed in it, is realized in it, and participates in being, and in this sense the 
world is God in process…in creating the world God thereby flings himself into creation.955 
Hence, the antinomy is clear: 
                                                             
950 Sergius Bulgakov, Icons and the Name of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, 
pp.35-6. 
951 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.110. 
952 Ibid. 
953 Ibid, p.154. 
954 Ibid, p.185. A major theme in his Trinitarian theology, Christology, creation theology, Pneumatology, Mariology, 
Angelology, ethics and nearly every aspect of his thought, for a simple outline of his kenotic thought see his 1924 
sermon ‘The power of the Cross: On the Exaltation of the Lord’s Cross’, in: Sergius Bulgakov, Churchly Joy: 
Orthodox Devotions for the Church Year (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, pp.1-7.    
955 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.196. 
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God is an unchanging entity, wholly satisfied and wholly blessed, and the world process neither 
adds anything to him nor subtracts anything from him. But at the same time God is also creator 
of the world. He lives and acts in the world…consequently God himself becomes in the world 
and through the world, he is subject to the process, and one can thus say that God is not complete 
insofar as the world is not complete.956 
When faced with an antinomy the task of theology, according to Bulgakov, is to neither reject 
nor solve it but to ‘lay it bare.’ This is precisely where the figure of Sophia comes in. No longer 
will she be used as she was in the Philosophy of Economy, but now as a personification of the 
antinomy between God as Absolute and Absolute relative and God and the world, in essence to 
mediate the antinomy by expressing its difference in unity.  
    According to Bulgakov, the self-bifurcation of God generates two related, yet distinct aspects 
within God himself: 
In setting alongside itself the extra-divine world, the divinity thereby places between itself and 
the world a certain border and this border, which according to the concept itself is found between 
God and the world, the creator and the creature, is itself neither the one nor the other but 
something completely particular, simultaneously uniting the one and the other.957   
Thus, in the production of the world, a metaxu is posited in relation to God and the world; a 
boundary where the world meets God and is united with him, yet is simultaneously distinguished 
from him; something akin to an ontological ‘cross-over point.’ Bulgakov hypostasizes and 
personifies this metaxu as Sophia: ‘occupying the place between God and the world, Sophia 
abides between being and super-being; she is neither the one nor the other, or appears as both at 
once.’958 At this stage, most likely under the influence of Florensky, Sophia is given a hypostatic 
quality that comes close to ‘quaternitizing’ the Trinity, which Bulgakov is forced to qualify after 
the publication of the Unfading Light.959 
                                                             
956 Ibid. 
957 Ibid, p.217. 
958 Ibid, p.219. 
959 He does this in a short treatise: Ipostas’ i Ipostasnost (1925) where he attempts to draw a distinction between  
Person (hypostasis) which is used of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and Ipostasnost (hypostaticity) which is the 
possibility to be hypostasized i.e., to be the life of personality. It is neither a concrete personality nor an abstract 
essence detached from personal life. Thus, Sophia is not a fourth hypostasis somehow added to the divine Trinity, 
but the divine life of the Persons which is characterized by Sophia: ‘in the realm of Spirit, along with the hypostasis, 
and its nature, is determined still one more possible state – hypostaticity. This is the capacity to hypostasize oneself, 
to belong to a hypostasis, to be its disclosure, to give oneself up to it’ (Brandon Gallaher and Irina Kukota, 
‘Protopresbyter Sergii Bulgakov: Hypostasis and Hypostaticity: Scholia to the Unfading Light,’ in: St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quaterly 49:1-2 (2005), pp.5-46, p.17, see also: p.28).    
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The divine triunity, God-love, in its closed, self-sufficient, eternal act of divine, substantial love 
exteriorizes…the object of this divine love, loves it, and thus pours out on it the life creating 
power of trihypostatic love. Of course this object of love is not only an abstract idea or a dead 
mirror, it can only be a living essence, having person, hypostasis. And this love is Sophia.960  
Bulgakov does not aid matters by adopting Florensky’s controversial phrase ‘fourth hypostasis’ 
to characterize Sophia.961 In essence, the divine life of the Trinity condescends to include within 
itself Sophia as the world-soul, ideal creation, ideal humanity, or all-unity as a feminine 
‘receptive’ principle existing within God himself. 
    However, even with the antinomical affirmation of God and the world, ‘the problem of 
finitude’ still appears to haunt Bulgakov’s narrative (we shall shortly explore why this is the 
case), for this world still appears to be in contradiction to its ideal Sophianic state: ‘one has to 
simultaneously affirm that the world is Sophia in its foundation and is not Sophia in its 
condition.’962 However, at this stage, Bulgakov resists the temptation to re-posit a metaphysical 
fall narrative to explain this ontological duplicity existing within Sophia herself, instead he draws 
the distinction between Sophia in potential and the ideal Sophia as entelechy to be realized 
within the historical process, that is the transition between Sophia in potential to realized Sophia: 
‘in the religious process, which constitutes the essence of the world’s history, it is a matter of 
salvation from the world, humanity’s recovery of God.’963 
     Therefore, we have noted the transition that affects Bulgakov’s Sophiology in the Unfading 
Light and its distinction from his earlier conceptions of Sophia; here Sophia becomes the 
hypostasized metaxu existing between God and the world, which is grounded in the theological 
methodology of antinomism. This shift in Bulgakov’s approach to theology is central, yet 
remarkably difficult to identify (as Bulgakov never provides a detailed account and 
acknowledgement of his ‘methodology’, there are only scattered references and its constant 
presence in the background of his theology), despite its centrality to Bulgakov’s entire 
theological output. We noted some of its characteristics and accredited it with removing some of 
                                                             
960 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.217 (my emphasis).  
961 Ibid, p.217; for Florensky’s notion of Sophia see: Pavel Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: an Essay 
in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters (trans: Boris Jakim), New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1997, pp.231-
84. 
962 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.229. 
963 Ibid, p.328. 
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the narrative structures in Bulgakov’s Sophiology that had previously necessitated Gnostic 
mythology. On the surface, the antinomical method allows Bulgakov to simultaneously affirm 
God as transcendent Absolute whilst acknowledging God as relative to creation, and with this – 
like knocking down the first domino in a long chain – he is then able to affirm all of the other 
antinomies that follow, but principally, God and the world, and the two distinguished Sophias: 
creaturely Sophia or (Sophia in potential) and the Divine Sophia (Sophia as entelchy). Bulgakov 
is quite clear that this is inspired by his commitment to the truth of Chalcedonian Christology, 
which confirms the unity and distinction of divinity within humanity in the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth.964 Bulgakov essentially develops Chalcedonian Christology into a general 
metaphysical ontology that encompasses God and the world, which for him is necessary insofar 
as a ‘foundation’ is needed to conceive the possibility of such a union in Christ, which he makes 
clear in later writings.965 These are the modifications by which Bulgakov is supposed to adapt 
and filter his Sophiology from its earlier, more ‘dubious’ sources. Given the significance of this 
process for Bulgakov’s theology, it is necessary to explore this feature. 
    At first glance, the antinomical method in Bulgakov’s writings appears to be a rejection of his 
earlier dependency on idealist dialectic, in favour of something broadly resembling Kantianism. 
Thus, theological truths have a tendency to produce, what Bulgakov perceives as antinomies for 
theoretical reason (God is both one and three, Jesus is both divine and human, and so forth) there 
is no attempt to overcome them or avoid them (as in Hegel, or even Kant to some extent), but to 
embrace them. And as we noted earlier, these ‘tensions’ cease to be problematic within the 
worshiping life of the Church, they are ‘resolved’ within Church practice, just as Kant attempts 
to address his antinomies through the practical reason. In this reading, Bulgakov appears to be 
advocating an apohatic theology that embraces mystery, albeit via Kant. However, rather 
unexpectedly, given his earlier perceptive critiques of Kantian philosophy, Bulgakov appears to 
fall victim to the inherent tensions existing between ontology and epistemology within Kant’s 
philosophy which were outlined by Jacobi. Following Kant, Bulgakov appears to prioritize 
                                                             
964 For instance: ‘The dogma of divine-humanity is precisely the main theme of Sophiology, which in fact represents 
nothing but its full dogmatic elucidation’ (Sergius Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology, 
Steiner Books, 1993, p.17). 
965 ‘This appears also as the ontological ground of the possibility of the Incarnation, of the re-union of both natures 
in the one hypostasis of the Logos, the divine and the human, of the world uncreated and created, bearing witness to 
their primordial unity in Sophia’ (Brandon Gallaher and Irina Kukota, ‘Protopresbyter Sergii Bulgakov: Hypostasis 
and Hypostaticity: Scholia to the Unfading Light,’ in: St. Vladimir’s Theological Quaterly 49:1-2 (2005), pp.5-46, 
p.17, see also: p.32). 
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epistemology over ontology insofar as ‘to be’ is necessarily equated with ‘to be known,’ it 
therefore syllogistically follows that if being is not known then there is simply no being. This 
problematic first arises in Bulgakov’s antinomy between God as Absolute and God as Absolute 
relative. Following this logic, strictly speaking there can be no transcendent Absolute as distinct 
or more than the God who reveals himself to the world, principally because such an Absolute 
could not be known and thus it could not be in any sense of the word, it would [not] ‘be’ a mere 
emptiness, an absence, nothing.966 However, this is not the divine nothing of a Pseudo-
Dionysius, the God who is both beyond being and non-being, but the nothing rendered as such 
by Kantian epistemology. Thus, in order for God to be, God must be known, in order for God to 
be known, there must be a comprehending other, this must therefore imply that God is only God 
insofar as he is bound to this knowing other. However, since there could not be a point when 
God was not God, otherwise he would not be God or the Absolute at all, but another becoming 
being bound to the possibility of its own non-being, this comprehending other must therefore be 
ontologically as necessary to God as he is to himself. Hence, this comprehending other is either 
God relating to himself or God relating to the world; but both seem to amount to the same option 
given that, if creation were to perform this role it would be equi-eternal with God himself and 
ontologically indistinguishable from the same and therefore not a ‘creation’ in any sense of that 
word. Bulgakov implies this on numerous occasions: ‘In order that God may be, the world must 
exist, and it likewise becomes the condition for the being of God.’967 Similarly: ‘one must 
include the world’s creation in God’s own life, co-posit the creation with God’s life, correlate 
God’s world-creating act with the act of His self-determination.’968 Of course, Bulgakov means 
‘God’ in the sense of the relative Absolute, but this is precisely the problem, there can be no God 
other than a God who reveals himself (even if the antinomy implies a sense of (pseudo) 
transcendence) there is simply ‘no room’ for such transcendence, unless Bulgakov is to draw an 
ontological distinction within God himself (something akin to Eckhart or Palamas for instance), 
which would only invite a host of other theological critiques, and is an option that Bulgakov 
                                                             
966 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, pp.107-9. See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter (trans: Boris Jakim), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2004, p.360. 
967 Sergius Bulgakov, The Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), 
Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.110 (my emphasis). Bulgakov affirms this contention even more explicitly 
in his later work, for instance, see: Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2008, p.120.  
968 Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2002, p.44. 
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could not appeal to, given the strictures of his epistemology. Therefore, it seems that he must 
logically collapse the Absolute into the Absolute relative: ‘God, as the absolute relation in 
himself, is the Holy trinity…Negative or nonrelative Absoluteness is just as unconditional and 
primordial in Divinity as the absolute relation.’969 And similarly: 
The absolute relation in God, i.e., the Holy Trinity, does not arise in God as his secondary self-
definition; it is just as primordial and absolute in God as its absoluteness. One can say that Ur-
Gottheit and Gott are equally primordial and pre-eternal, that they are interpenetrating and 
identical.970                   
Furthermore: ‘God is a relative concept that already includes a relation to the world.’971 And: 
‘the creation of the world exists for God in his eternity, and in this sense it is equi-eternal with 
God.’972 Moreover: ‘God’s going outside himself into extra-divinity is precisely the creation as 
God’s pre-eternal creative act.’973 
     Thus, in another bizarre and ironic twist, Bulgakov appears to embody, within his own 
theological methodology, the move from Kant, who he had used precisely to move away from 
idealist dialectic, directly back to the ‘absolute idealists’ (Schelling and Hegel) which he thought 
he had left behind. For since there can be no authentic transcendence within the antinomical 
method, the antinomies are transformed into dialectical contradictions. So now, if we return to 
the three central antinomies that Bulgakov outlined above, we will need to read them differently. 
Firstly, God as Absolute and God as Absolute relative must be reformulated to simply ‘God as 
relative,’ for there can be no beyond this relative God. Secondly, God and the world turn out to 
be indistinguishable, insofar as both are ontologically bound together,974 which finally implies 
that the creaturely Sophia and the Divine Sophia are simply one and the same Sophia. Therefore, 
there are no real antinomies to be engaged with here, for in true idealist style, Bulgakov merely 
demonstrates that what appears to be dialectically opposed is in fact one and the same thing. We 
are therefore left with an Absolute becoming itself in an other that in the end is revealed to be no 
                                                             
969 Sergius Bulgakov, Icons and the Name of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.29. 
970 Ibid, p.30. 
971 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.121. 
972 Ibid, p.123. 
973 Ibid, p.122. See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb (trans:Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2002, p.31. 
974 For instance: ‘since there is nothing, and can be nothing, that could have a relation to God and be not-God, this 
relative being of the world, too, is a divine being’ (Sergius Bulgakov, Icons and the Name of God (trans: Boris 
Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p.30). 
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other at all. And, just as all of Bulgakov’s antinomies are bound to the initial ‘antinomy’ between 
God as Absolute and God as Absolute-relative, its revelation to be one and the same thing 
threatens to reveal the same fate for all of the other antinomies: thus, leading to pantheism, 
monophysitism, a collapse between the Economic and Immanent Trinity, even Bulgakov’s 
kenotic thought would become less convincing insofar as sacrifice and kenosis, would be a 
veiled form of self-relating. In essence, the suggested antinomies in Bulgakov’s thought, are, 
borrowing the phrase from William Desmond, ‘counterfeit doubles.’ Gallaher concludes this 
point excellently when stating: ‘the central difficulty in Bulgakov’s system is not that it is 
antinomic…but that he is not antinomic enough insofar as his cosmological and Sophiological 
antinomies are false antinomies as the same…is simply stated twice but in a different form.’975  
    Is there a way out of this total monistic immanence, can one rescue transcendence for the 
antinomical method? Perhaps, if one were to abandon its idealist heritage. However, in doing so 
one would only seem to generate further problems. An antinomy is, for all intents and purposes, 
indistinguishable from a logical contradiction, the only significant difference which distinguishes 
it from nonsense or a simple mistake, is that the Church endorses them. At worse, the 
antinomical method is then a form of ecclesiastical totalitarianism that simply cannot be 
questioned but only accepted on the basis of the authority that has legitimized its use. Or, 
alternatively, if antinomism is legitimate and truthful, and it is simply a more prior form of 
reasoning revealed to humanity, then how could one legitimately make use of accepted methods 
of identifying truth; if the principle of non-contradiction could be wrong at its very foundation or 
even just in certain cases (which the Church endorses) how could it be used effectively at any 
other point, a factor that does not appear to effect Bulgakov. However, perhaps the biggest flaw 
of the antinomical method is simply that it is unnecessary to theology, insofar as it remains too 
close to oppositional and dialectical thinking. For orthodox Christian theology, God and the 
world (transcendence and immanence) are not ontological conundrums or problematic 
relationships. Put simply, God’s transcendence is not purchased at the expense of his 
immanence; it is precisely because God is transcendent that one can equally affirm a unique form 
of immanence. And so it follows that in affirming God one does not detract from the world, in 
                                                             
975 Brandon Gallaher, There is Freedom: The Dialectic of Freedom and Necessity in the Trinitarian Theologies of 
Sergii Bulgakov, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar (Ph.D Thesis; Regent’s Park  College; Oxford, publication 
forthcoming: Oxford University Press), 2010, p.107.  
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upholding God’s omnipotence one does not negate human freedom, and so forth. The 
antinomical method already presupposes ontological (because this is not distinguished from 
epistemology) incompatibility between God and the world; the ‘clashing of opposites’; but God 
can only collide with the world if he is too much like the world in the first place- another ‘thing.’ 
Once God’s transcendence is truly upheld then such tensions immediately dissolve, as does the 
sense of the antinomical method, which of course has already been confirmed in the Christian 
proclamation that Christ is both God and human.976  
    It is important to note that I remain completely convinced that Bulgakov intended none of 
these positions,977 however, I also remain completely convinced that his theological 
methodology and his Sophiology must logically lead to these conclusions. 
    Therefore, although Bulgakov appeared to have moved beyond his early Sophiological 
speculations, the implications of his theological method inevitably draw him back to it. Thus, if 
the Sophia in potential is identical to the realized Sophia as entelechy (which seemingly must be 
the case) why do they appear to be so divergent? The ‘problem of finitude’ resurfaces again, 
which Bulgakov will again recourse to a metaphysical fall to address in his 1927 Burning Bush.     
The Return of the Valentinian Narrative in Bulgakov’s First ‘Trilogy’ (1927-29)
978
 
                                                             
976 William Desmond has attempted to rescue dialectic from holistic immanence by outlining a ‘metaxological’ 
philosophy that highlights that immanence always exceeds its own state and points beyond itself, and thus locating 
us in the ‘between’ (see especially his excellent trilogy: William Desmond, Being and the Between, New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1995; William Desmond, Ethics and the Between, New York, State University of 
New York Press, 2001; William Desmond, God and the Between, Oxford, Blackwell, 2008; William Desmond, 
Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double, Surrey, Ashgate, 2003).  One is reminded of Erich Pryzwara’s statement that: 
‘the genuine Catholic form of evidential statement is essentially one of reference to the incomprehensible, yet of a 
reference which does not leap the bounds of the comprehensible, but flows on calmly to the end, until it merges, like 
the estuary of a river, into a sea of mystery’ (Erich Przywara, Polarity (trans: A.C. Bouquet), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1935, p.47). 
977 For instance, Bulgakov rejects that possibility that Christ could have become incarnate within the angelic nature 
because of its inherent proximity to the divine nature; he clearly believes that there is a strict ontological and 
essential difference between creator and creation but this contention does not appear to follow from the logic of his 
theology (see: Sergius Bulgakov, Jacob’s Ladder (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, p.148). 
978 The so called ‘smaller trilogy’ is comprised of books on Mariology, John the Baptist, and the angels. Bulgakov 
conceived it as a theological explication of the Deisis icon, and it demonstrates the authoritative significance of 
iconography and Liturgy for Bulgakov’s theology. Drawing theological conclusions from icons may seem like a 
strange concept for a Western Christian (a major factor in Bulgakov’s insistence that John the Baptist participates in 
the angelic nature is that he appears with wings in the Deisis (Sergius Bulgakov, The Friend of the Bridegroom 
(trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2003, p.131)), however this is not so amongst Orthodox 
Christians, where the icon is perceived as a genuine revelation. According to Florensky, the ‘ideal world’ correlates 
with the ‘real’ world constantly. The iconographer, through asceticism and prayer, can become so attuned to the 
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Bulgakov gives his most detailed account of the fall in his 1927 Mariological work The Burning 
Bush. Here, he embarks on an original and excellent account of ‘bogochelovechestvo’ 
(Godmotherhood) which Bulgakov conceives as being inseparable from Christology. He offers a 
pervasive and polemical attack on the Roman Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception, as 
well as outlining a perceptive theology of grace, providence, and history.979 For the purposes of 
this investigation, we shall focus on Bulgakov’s account of the fall, which his theology 
seemingly requires given the disparity of the duplicated Sophias from their original and intended 
unity. 
    According to Bulgakov ‘the primordial human being was created pure and unblemished. 
Therefore he was a personal bearer of Divine Wisdom, of Creaturely Sophia.’980  Thus, similarly 
to Henri de Lubac in the West, Bulgakov rejects any sharp distinction between the ‘natural’ and 
the ‘supernatural’ (for Bulgakov, these seem practically indistinguishable).981 In fact, such a 
distinction is the result of the fall: ‘that distinction in the human as a creaturely being that was 
disclosed only after the fall, namely, between that which belongs to the human as a creature, and 
that which is given to him only in virtue of an extraordinary gift of grace but which itself does 
not belong to him.’982 The significance of this position is that ‘creatureliness’, in its current state, 
is not a norm of its being. Therefore, the duplicity of Sophia is a product of the fall that ought not 
to be. This observation is somewhat confirmed by Bulgakov’s insistence that the fall is a pre-
temporal event that takes place within ideal humanity itself or the creaturely Sophia (something 
akin to the Kabbalistic Adam-Kadmon): ‘in him [pan-humanity/Adam] this entire race existed: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
ideal world that glimpses of it can be gained and represented in iconographic format: ‘when we pass from ordinary 
reality into the “imaginal” space, naturalism generates imaginary portrayals whose similarity to everyday life creates 
an empty image of the real. The opposite art – symbolism – born of the descent, incarnates in real images the 
experience of the highest realm; hence, this imagery – which is symbolic imagery – attains a super-reality’ (Pavel 
Florensky, Iconostasis, New York, St. Vladimir’s Press, 1996, p.45).   
979 This is a good introduction to Bulgakov’s account of synergy (the cooperation of divinity and humanity), for 
another excellent essay that outlines this crucial Bulgakovian concept, see: Sergius Bulgakov, Relics and Miracles 
(trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2011, pp.43-115. 
980 Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009, p.15. 
981 See, for instance, Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Etudes historique, Paris, Aubier, 1946; Henri de Lubac, The 
Mystery of the Supernatural (trans: Rosemary Sheed), Crossroad, 1998; Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism in Modern 
Theology (trans: L.C. Sheppard), Crossroad, 2000; Henri de Lubac, Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, Ignatius, 
1984. For a slightly more cautious approach to the relationship between nature and grace see: Karl Rahner, 
Theological Investigations IV (trans: Kevin Smyth), London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966, pp.165-88; for a 
good analysis of Rahner’s position see: Stephen J. Duffy, ‘Experiences of Grace’, in: Declan Marmion and Mary E. 
Hines (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.43-63.  
982 Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009, p.15. 
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the whole of humanity was present as a single, all-encompassing nature and essence.’983 This 
ideal humanity was not an ‘individual’ hypostasis but a pan-human hypostasis whose fall 
resulted in ‘the falling away of humankind from God, and in it, of the whole world, the 
disruption of the internal norm of humanity’s being.’984 However, as we have already noted, the 
ideal humanity is synonymous with Sophia in its creaturely guise, which is also ontologically 
bound to the Divine Sophia, hence any fall of ideal humanity must reflexively be a fall of God 
from God.985 And, although Bulgakov consistently critiques Origen’s cosmology986 and attempts 
to align himself with the tradition which espouses the theory of ‘divine ideas,’987 it is difficult to 
comprehend how an idea could have the capacity to will and rebel before it has come into its own 
proper existence.988  What has fallen away from God is quite clear when Bulgakov states: 
‘Sophia is the single life, the single essence, the single content of the life of the whole most Holy 
Trinity; and with respect to the world and humankind…she is the divine world, its foundation or 
idea in God, the world in God prior to its creation.’989 Therefore, if the metaphysical fall is a 
falling away of God from God or the duplicating of Sophia, as it appears to be, Bulgakov will 
                                                             
983 Ibid, p.20. 
984 Ibid, p.27. 
985 Sometimes Bulgakov equates the ideal creation with Christ: ‘Christ’s humanity contains in itself every human 
being (excepting sin) and every human person with its personal characteristics. It is the universal, all- human, all-
personal I’ (Sergius Bulgakov, Jacob’s Ladder (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, p.3). 
986 Ibid, p.30. 
987 See, for instance: Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2009, p.58, and Sergius Bulgakov, Jacob’s Ladder (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 
p.31, 42, 66, 67, 82, 87. 
988 Bulgakov attempts to equate his thought with Maximus the Confessor’s, see: Sergius Bulgakov, Sophia, the 
Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology, Steiner Books, 1993, p.42. Balthasar appears to share this observation 
when he notes the close similarities between Gnosticism, Maximus’ cosmology and ‘Russian Sophia mysticism’ 
(see: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco, 
Ignatius Press, 1988, p.192, 382). At least in Maximus’ most comprehensive outline of his critical reformulation of 
Origen’s cosmology (Ambigua VII), the divine ideas do not function as an attempt to affirm some pre-existent 
anthropological, quasi hypostatic principle existing in God (although, the divine ideas undoubtedly have 
anthropological and Christological implications), they merely follow from a creation theology that makes certain 
claims about the world in light of a particular understanding of God. Therefore, if God is eternal and creation does 
not mark a change in God, then the ‘idea’ of creation must be ‘contained’ within God as a certain exemplar for the 
world that will come to be for itself out of nothing. This appears to be how Aquinas utilises this principle (see: 
Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, CUA Press, 2008). Although Bulgakov’s 
approach is not entirely unrelated to the above thinkers, it is quite clear that the anthropological ‘idea’ existing 
eternally in God is more than an intellectual ‘blueprint’ for creation, but a hypostatic entity that is very much in 
being for itself and capable of willing and rebelling against God. Perhaps, the most theologically responsible answer 
would echo Augustine’s in Book XI of his Confessions, where he denies the sense of the question, insofar as any 
answer already smuggles in some conception of ‘time’ in relation to God where there can be no such conception, 
given that it is created.         
989 Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009, 
p.136. 
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need to resolve this tension with a restoration narrative that negates Sophia’s duplicity.990 He 
anticipates such a response by suggesting that the world is a historical process teleologically 
driven by the ‘fallen Sophia’ to regain her lost identity with her heavenly counterpart 
(Bulgakov’s version of Hegel’s List der Vernunft)991. This process generates various progressive 
stages in history that culminates, reaching its highest points, in the figures of Mary and John the 
Baptist,992 the arrival of these two figures on the world stage marks the possibility of the divine 
descent; the Incarnation and the ‘re-union’ of the duplicated Sophias. There is a simultaneous 
‘bottom to top’ and ‘top to bottom’ movement that ends with their mutual identity. This is 
precisely why for Bulgakov, the ‘divine Incarnation is inseparably connected with the divine 
motherhood, the one implies the other.’993 Hence ‘the Mother of God is Sophianic in the utmost 
degree. She is the fullness of Sophia in creation and in this sense is creaturely Sophia.’994 
    Bulgakov draws a similar conclusion about the significance of John the ‘Forerunner’: he 
‘came as a living representative of all human kind. In his person was accomplished the meeting 
of the God-man with humanity.’995 Therefore, John naturally has the same significance for the 
Incarnation as Mary does: ‘if not for John, Christ the savior could not have come into the 
world…the place he occupies in relation to Christ is correlative to that of the Mother of God.’996 
                                                             
990 It is important to note that this metaphysical fall is not something akin to the ‘angelic fall.’ It is clear in 
Bulgakov’s Angelology that it is Sophia or the ideal creation that falls; the angels and humanity simply make up two 
modes of existence for the one Sophia: ‘The Wisdom of God, the self-revelation of the Holy Trinity…contains the 
idea or prototype of creation, the divine world, pre-eternally existing in God…She is God himself in his self-
revelation, with respect to the creaturely world she is the world before creation, kosmos noetos, the divine world, the 
prototypical containing in itself the sufficient and exhaustive foundation for all that is’ (Sergius Bulgakov, Jacob’s 
Ladder (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, p.28) and ‘the angelic world and the human world are 
distinguished by the form of their being, but have a unity of creative foundation…Divine prototypes, the ideas of the 
world, are realized in creation in two ways: in heaven-spiritually, non-incarnately, and on the earth in incarnation’ 
(Ibid, p.31).   
991 ‘God’s providence in the natural world is the Divine Sophia herself, acting in the natural world as a force of 
internal movement’ (Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2002, p.201). 
992 It is this synergistic process that allows Bulgakov to sidestep the problematic that the dogma of the Immaculate 
Conception seeks to solve i.e., Mary’s personal effort in soliciting divine grace and the grace that enables Mary to 
prepare the world for the Incarnation; for Bulgakov it is both without tension given that it is precisely divine grace 
that has worked through the Old Testament Church and ‘produced’ Mary yet not arbitrarily, but through the natural 
process of history.   
993 Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush (trans: Thomas Allan Smith), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2009, 
p.107. 
994 Ibid, p.105. 
995 Sergius Bulgakov, The Friend of the Bridegroom (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2003, 
pp.12-13. 
996 Ibid, p.5. 
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Both figures thus represent the fallen Sophia in her highest potential, having grown into these 
individual representatives of the world that are ready to receive God: 
In them, humanity experiences self-restoration and self-salvation in the measure that such 
experience is given to and therefore required of humanity. The fallen human essence [Sophia] is 
raised to the highest level that is accessible to it…The Old Testament is accomplished, and 
therefore overcome.997 
    Therefore, it would appear that Bulgakov re-appropriates the Gnostic narrative structure that 
he had seemingly abandoned post Philosophy of Economy. We noted that, despite the theory of 
antinomy, Bulgakov was unable to avoid the ‘problem of finitude,’ given the ontological identity 
of the divine and the creaturely, which then forced him to re-visit his metaphysical fall narrative, 
which narrates the cause of the duplicity of Sophia in her two respective modes of existence 
divine and creaturely, which Bulgakov quickly attempted to negate by advocating the re-union of 
the disjointed Sophias - via an historical process- which culminates in fallen Sophia’s readiness 
for the divine descent in the Incarnation. We shall now explore Bulgakov’s further Sophiological 
developments and the depiction of the ‘reunion’ of the two Sophias in the Incarnation, which he 
outlines in his mature trilogy.    
Sophia in the Mature Trilogy (1933-45) and Beyond. 
In Bulgakov’s major dogmatic work on Christology, The Lamb of God (1933), he attempts to 
articulate his conception of the distinction between the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia. 
Leo Zander, in his influential Bog I Mir (1948), suggested that Bulgakov moves away from his 
earlier ‘monistic’ Sophiology towards a more dualistic conception of Sophia.998 However, we 
will have reason to question the authenticity of the ontological difference between the Divine and 
creaturely Sophias as we shall see shortly. According to Bulgakov, personal spirit is univocally 
shared by all intellectual beings (divine or human) and must include ‘a personal consciousness of 
self.’999 Personal spirit must therefore be comprised of hypostasis/subject and nature/object: ‘the 
personal thus has in itself its own nature, in which it lives ceaselessly realizing itself for itself 
through this nature, defining itself and revealing itself to itself.’1000 Furthermore, this 
                                                             
997 Ibid, p.4. 
998 According to Zander this occurred as early as 1928/30 in his Gravy o Troichnosti (Chapters on the Trinity) see: 
Aidan Nichols, Light From the East: Authors and Themes in Orthodox Theology, Stagebooks, 1995, p.72. 
999 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.89. 
1000 Ibid. 
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intercommunicative dynamic is the ‘indissoluble unity of the personal self-consciousness.’1001 
Bulgakov further elucidates his understanding of ‘nature’ by defining it as the ‘world’ or 
‘content’ of the hypostasis, which is both given, and determining in respect to the hypostasis, as 
well as simultaneously being shaped and defined by it.1002 Although Bulgakov maintains that the 
hypostasis/nature dynamic is essentially the same for all intellectual beings, there is one crucial 
distinction to be made: 
In relation to the hypostasis of God as the Absolute subject, there is the trihypostatic personality, 
which in one personal consciousness of self unites all the modes of the personal principle: I, 
thou, he, we, and you; whereas a unihypostatic personality has all these modes except I outside 
itself.1003  
Despite the unity of the hypostatic and the natural within God constituting one divine existence, 
he is keen to uphold the distinction between hypostasis and nature: ‘the nature is eternally 
hypostasized in God as the adequate life of the hypostases, whereas the hypostases are eternally 
connected in their life with the nature, while remaining distinct from it.’1004     
     Bulgakov later utilizes this distinction of hypostasis and nature to narrate an elaborate 
theogonic mythology grounded in a metaphysical Trinitarian kenosis (greatly reminiscent, in 
ambition, of Schelling’s own theogony in his Essay on Human Freedom and the Ages of the 
World) where he speaks of ‘mutual sacrifice’ and ‘self-renunciation’ for the sake of the other 
hypostases (each performing their own self-sacrifice); a process that threatens to ‘end in tragedy’ 
(presumably the self-destruction of the Father and the Son in their mutual depletion) but for the 
Holy Spirit, the ‘joy’ that unites Father and Son.1005   
                                                             
1001 Ibid. 
1002 Ibid, p.90. 
1003 Ibid, p.94. 
1004 Ibid, p.97. 
1005 Ibid, pp.98-101; see also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2004, p.180. Rowan Williams calls its ‘potent mythology’ (Rowan Williams, A Margin of Silence: The 
Holy Spirit in Russian Orthodox Theology, Quebec, 2008, p.23). Interestingly, Hans Urs von Balthasar proposes a 
similar conception of metaphysical Trinitarian kenosis (albeit with some ‘erotic’ imagery): ‘[the] Power of Christ is 
the perfect image of the eternal Father precisely because neither Christ nor the Father holds anything back for 
himself or places any reservations on his own self surrender…unlike the man in the act of intercourse, Christ does 
not give away just a little of his substance. No, Christ gives away his entire substance, just as the eternal Father, in 
begetting the Son, makes over to the Son his entire divine substance, and then again both of them give this substance 
over to the Holy Spirit, without division, in an act of communal love’ (Hans Urs Von Balthasar, New Elucidations, 
San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1979, p.17). He also suggests that the Father’s ‘womb’ is left empty in the generation 
of the Son (Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama III: The Dramatis Personae: The Person in Christ, (trans: 
Graham Harrison), San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1992, p.518). 
 
 
274 
    According to Bulgakov the divine nature, although eternally related to the hypostases, exists 
also ‘by itself’ which is characterized as the Divine Sophia: ‘the Divine Sophia is nothing other 
than God’s nature, His ousia…ousia and Sophia are identical.’1006 Although, as we have already 
noted, Bulgakov rejects the Divine Sophia being a ‘fourth hypostasis,’ he insists that there is 
something ‘hypostatic’ about her; her ability to be compatible with the hypostases implies that 
she has ‘hypostaticity,’ hence: ‘the nature must therefore be considered not only as something 
existent in God, as ousia-Sophia, but also as something independent, as Divinity or the Divine 
world in itself.’1007 Bulgakov also uses the phrase ‘Pleroma’ to identify this Divine world.1008 
And, even though she is not a hypostasis, he contends that Sophia still ‘answers’ the three 
hypostases and responds to them with a form of love (however passive this form may be); she is 
a ‘living entity.’1009 Bulgakov also has a tendency to describe the Divine Sophia as God’s 
‘Glory’ yet the latter principally refers to the manifestation of the divine life to and for itself: ‘the 
revelation of God’s Beauty and All-blessedness.’1010And: ‘the Divine Glory is thus the Glory of 
God about his Divinity that is being revealed. This is God’s joy about himself.’1011 
    Having outlined, what Bulgakov considers to be unique to the Divine Sophia, he then goes on 
to define the relationship of the Divine Sophia to creation. According to Bulgakov, the creation 
of humanity in the ‘image of God’ suggests an ontological correlation between God and 
humanity that ‘builds a bridge of ontological identification between the Creator and creation.’1012 
This ‘bridge of ontological identification’ implies a certain inseparability between theology and 
anthropology: ‘this identity signifies not only the divinity of man but also a certain humanity of 
God.’1013 As we have already noted, this metaxu or ‘ontological cross-over point’ between God 
and creation, is given positive expression in Bulgakov’s Sophiology: ‘there is something in Man 
that must be directly correlated with God’s being’, and this is none other than Sophia herself: 
‘Sophia is the pre-eternal humanity, and the Logos is the Divine man. The Divine Humanity and 
the God-Man, that is, the humanity of Divinity and the divinity of humanity, are given pre-
                                                             
1006 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.101. 
1007 Ibid, p.103. 
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Ibid, p.105. 
1010 Ibid, p.107. 
1011 Ibid, p.109. 
1012 Ibid, p.112 (my emphasis).  
1013 Ibid. 
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eternally in God.’1014 Bulgakov’s further attempts at clarifying these points do little but intensify 
reservations, despite attempting to soften his suggestions by appealing to their analogical nature; 
he seems to immediately sublate this disclaimer by withdrawing his appeal to analogy:  
The definition of divine nature as pre-eternal Humanity or Divine-Humanity…is conceived as a 
reflection from the creaturely world, from creaturely humanity. In this sense this definition is 
only an analogy, but one that is understood realistically: that is, not only are all the distinctions 
of state preserved, but the identity of being is also preserved.1015  
This radical ontological and dialectical identification between God and the world forces 
Bulgakov to reject any proper notion of a creatio ex nihilo (because the world is fundamental to 
God’s own being) and affirm a creatio ex Deo, which is worth quoting at length: 
The All in the Divine world, in the Divine Sophia, and the All in the creaturely world, in the 
creaturely Sophia, are one and identical in content (although not in being). One and the same 
Sophia is revealed in God and in creation. Therefore, if the negative definition “God created the 
world out of nothing” eliminates the idea of any non-divine or extra-divine principle of creation, 
its positive content can only be such that God created the world out of Himself, out of his 
essence. And the idea that the content of the world was invented ad hoc by God at the creation of 
the world must be fundamentally rejected. The positive content of the world’s being is just as 
divine as its foundation in God.1016 
Bulgakov attempts to fashion some ontological distinction between the divine and the creaturely 
by affirming their modal distinction: 
That which exists pre-eternally in God, in His self-revelation, exists in the world only in 
becoming, as becoming divinity. And metaphysically the creation of the world consists in the 
fact that God established its proper divine world not as an eternally existent world but as a 
becoming world…The Divine Sophia became also the creaturely Sophia. God repeated Himself 
in creation.1017 
As we have already shown, Bulgakov’s antinomical reasoning can fashion no ‘space’ for a 
transcendent God who exceeds his own relativity; however, he is still conscious to avoid his 
                                                             
1014 Ibid, p.114. 
1015 Ibid, p.116 (my emphasis). 
1016 Ibid, p.126 (my emphasis). Bulgakov conceives of ‘nothing’ dialectically, in a very similar vein to Hegel. 
Nothing can only be conceived in relation to a something, thus God’s positing of something from within his essence 
dialectically produced an opposing nothing which gives rise to being in becoming. See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The 
Bride of the Lamb (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2002, p.44, 48. 
1017 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.126; see 
also: Ibid, p.127. See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 
2004, p.270). 
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contention lapsing into a crude pantheism,1018 which he attempts to avoid by upholding a modal 
distinction between the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia, although one is ontologically 
identical to the other, in their current modes of existence (actuality and potentiality) they are 
distinguished. Nonetheless, it seems incredibly difficult to accept that this clause is able to avoid 
the obvious implication of pantheism. A modal distinction is simply not radical enough. This 
leads Bulgakov back to the ‘problem of finitude,’ if they are, in essence, identical, why should 
one fail to conform to the other. Bulgakov appears to waver between two possibilities, the first is 
that this historical becoming of the externalized essence of God is purposeful (yet why would 
there need to be a historical process at all?) the second is that it is the product of a fall (as 
Bulgakov outlined in the Burning Bush), which must amount to a fall within God himself and 
propel Bulgakov back into the Gnostic narrative that he has attempted to avoid. He gives clear 
expression to this second option, stating that ‘nature turned to Him [God] not her Sophianic but 
her creaturely face, the face of the “fallen” or “dark” Sophia, this image of nonbeing (i.e., of 
materiality) in an illegitimate, abnormal, distorted state.’1019 And, even more explicitly: ‘having 
become the fallen Sophia, the world broke away from the Divine Sophia in the mode of its being, 
although of course not in its foundation.’1020 He even refers to this ‘fallen Sophia’ using a 
Valentinian vocabulary, calling her ‘Achamoth.’1021 This then leads Bulgakov directly back into 
Valentinian mythology: ‘can the “fallen Sophia”…be received into the hypostasis of the Logos? 
Is she worthy of being united with the Divine nature…Has the “fallen Sophia” not lost her 
dignity and the possibilities associated with it?’1022 Bulgakov claims that she has prepared herself 
through the historical process of the world which, in turn, is nothing more than the restoration of 
what was originally in place: ‘the presentation of the human race for the reception of the 
Incarnation was accomplished in the Old Testament Church by God’s providential 
                                                             
1018 Although, Bulgakov does later acknowledge that his system is akin to a certain ‘pious’ form of pantheism which 
he believes amounts to panentheism (see: Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William 
B. Eerdmans, 2004, p.199). 
1019 Ibid, p.146. 
1020 Ibid, p.154. See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 2002, p.160, 169, 170, 171. 
1021 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, pp.154-55. 
See also: Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2004, p.201. 
1022 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.199. 
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government;’1023 a process which, as we have already noted, culminates in Mary the Theotokos 
and John the Forerunner.1024   
    Before outlining this restoration narrative, Bulgakov is keen to account for the ontological 
possibility of the Incarnation, which he has already achieved from the perspective of his 
theology, but now attempts to do so from his anthropology (which in essence are in fact the same 
thing in Bulgakovian thought). And, far from alleviating the force of these critiques, it appears to 
enforce them. He contends that ‘by his initial essence Man must already be divine-human in this 
sense; he must bear hypostatic divine-humanity within himself and represent, in this capacity, an 
ontological “site” for the hypostasis of the Logos.’1025 Therefore, Bulgakov’s basic anthropology 
includes an uncreated divine spark or spirit that directly correlates to the divine essence, a 
created soul, a mind, and a fleshly body. Thus, the hypostasis of the Logos merely replaces, the 
would be divine spark in the human being within his Incarnation, which does no violence to his 
general anthropology, given that this aspect of humanity was already divine: ‘the human spirit in 
Man, which originates from God, is in Christ the Pre-eternal Logos.’1026 With the descent of the 
Logos, the cyclical Gnostic narrative completes itself: humanity is ‘deified here to such an 
extreme degree that it is capable of becoming an inseparable part of the divine life of the God-
man and, in Him, an inseparable part of the life of the Holy Trinity.’1027 The re-union of the 
duplicated Sophias is complete: ‘In Christ, in His Divine-Humanity, the total Sophianization of 
creation, and, in this sense, the identification of the creaturely Sophia and the non-creaturely 
                                                             
1023 Ibid. 
1024 He also states: ‘in his fall, Man, loses his perfect humanity, which remains beyond the limits of history as an 
unactualized ideal. Human history begins and proceeds in the same “evolutionary” way as the rest of creation, with 
the difference, of course, that, even in the natural process, man retains the supernatural principle of his spirit’ 
(Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2002, p.181). 
1025 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.186. 
1026 Ibid, p.188. In Bulgakov’s attempt to conceive of the divine human union in the Incarnation he inevitably raises 
the complicated issues surrounding Christ’s divine-human economy and the mutual relation between the two 
natures. In an attempt to affirm a qualified form of divine passibility (not that far removed from some of the 
suggestions of Jürgen Moltmann and Eberhard Jüngel) he draws the Idealist distinction between ‘being in its self’ 
and ‘being for itself’(Ibid, p.216, 221, 224) to advance a kenotic Christology that upholds that ‘in itself’ Christ’s 
divine nature remained impassible and did not suffer, yet sacrificing this knowledge during his Incarnation, Christ is 
not aware of this fact, thus ‘for itself’ the divine nature does participate in the suffering of the human nature, which 
even includes the participation of the other two hypostases, blurring the distinction between the Immanent and 
Economic Trinity (see: Ibid, p.232, 257, 260, 313). Aiden Nichols describes his approach as a ‘quasi-Cyrilline 
theology of kenosis’ (Aidan Nichols, Wisdom from Above: A Primer in the Theology of Father Sergei Bulgakov, 
Gracewing, 2005, p.97).      
1027  Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (trans: Boris Jakim), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2008, p.381. 
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Sophia are attained.’1028 The Incarnation therefore completes, and yet initiates in another sense, 
the process of re-union and gives birth to the Church (the community of Spirit) which remains 
bound to Christ, both personally and ontologically, through his Ascension and inauguration of 
the sacramental life of the Church, which is moving towards the complete realization of the 
Kingdom of Heaven ‘where there will no longer be a boundary between God and the world that 
has fallen away from him and opposes him.’1029  
Summative Remarks  
Therefore, from the evaluations outlined in this chapter, it would appear that we are now in a 
position to affirm that the conventions of Valentinian mythology are indeed at the very basis of 
Russian Sophiology. We have documented Solovyov’s appropriation of Schellingian philosophy 
and his personal interest in Valentinian Gnosticism, which were both shown to play pivotal roles 
in the construction of his Sophiology. In accepting and responding to the Valentinian 
philosophical problems, Solovyov utilises the figure of Wisdom to account for the reality of 
finitude (through a metaphysical fall narrative), which he further described as occurring within 
the Absolute itself. This fall implemented the subsequent ontological duplicity of Sophia who 
was constructed in two modes: a heavenly Sophia and a fallen Sophia. He then appealed to the 
Valentinian soteriological narrative to account for the reunion of the separated Sophias and the 
reaffirmation of his monistic first principle.  
    We then sought to evaluate the extent to which Solovyov’s Sophiology underpinned 
Bulgakov’s. Initially, it was demonstrated that Bulgakov had adopted this same Sophiological 
outline in his early works, although later sought to situate his Wisdom discourse within a more 
orthodox framework. However, having explored his attempts to achieve this (most notably in his 
theological methodology) we concluded that his revisions were not extensive enough to avoid 
close archaeological association with Valentinian Gnosticism.  Therefore, in conclusion Russian 
Sophiology does appear to be underpinned by Valentinian Gnosticism. We shall now explore the 
development of Sophiology in contemporary British theology.     
 
                                                             
1028 Ibid, p.396. 
1029 Ibid, p.420. 
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Chapter VI  
Wisdom in Contemporary British Theology: Gnostic and Biblical accounts of Sophia in 
John Milbank and Paul Fiddes’ Wisdom Theologies 
This thesis has sought to investigate the proposal that Valentinian Gnosticism has played a 
significant, even if somewhat implicit, part in the construction of influential modern philosophies 
and theologies. The lens through which this claim has been studied has been focused on the 
theological theme of Sophiology, the suitability of which was discussed in the introduction. 
Adopting a Foucauldian/archaeological approach to this question, this thesis investigated the 
development of the concept of the figure of Wisdom within Jewish and early Christian traditions 
by evaluating the social, cultural, political, philosophical and theological contexts and 
exchanges, out of which clear ‘rules of formation’ for this particular concept of Wisdom, located 
within this particular authoritative and regulated tradition, developed. A parallel process was 
repeated for the concept of a Valentinian Sophia, before offering a critical comparison between 
the two concepts of Wisdom; the result of which, indicated overlap and similarity yet also clear 
and emphatic distinctions. Two related yet opposing concepts of Wisdom developed out of these 
investigations, one biblical and the other Gnostic. It is these  two strands of Sapiential thought 
that we shall here argue are prevalent in contemporary British theology, namely in the 
Sophiology of John Milbank and Paul Fiddes, thus corroborating the thesis that Valentinian 
Gnosticism is one significant thought form that has assisted the production of certain types of 
modern philosophies and theologies. However, a simple structural comparison between what was 
discovered in the chapters on biblical and Gnostic Wisdom theologies with Milbank’s and 
Fiddes’ proposals would hardly be sufficient to suggest anything other than a similarity of 
narrative form that may well have been coincidental. Adhering to the archaeological method, it 
has first been necessary to document and investigate the ‘rules of formation’ for this particular 
type of contemporary discourse on Wisdom. What conditions (social, philosophical and 
theological) have led modern Wisdom theologies to reproduce these concepts from Gnostic and 
biblical narratives. In order to explore this, we documented and suggested how the conditions 
that produced the Gnostic concept of Sophia in the second century, came to be located within 
modern philosophical discourses in a modified form, notably in post-Kantian Idealism and in 
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Schelling’s speculative philosophy, which ultimately resulted in a particular (archaeologically 
shifted) concept of the Gnostic Sophia narrative emerging in modern philosophy and directing 
the shape of this discourse. We then discussed how this philosophical register was culturally 
adopted within 20th century Russia. Two individuals, most notably Solovyov and Bulgakov, 
translated Schellingian thought into the branch of theology known as Sophiology. We observed 
the creative fusion of German Idealism, with direct Gnostic references; as well as biblical, 
mystical and other idiosyncratic components. Thus, we have now arrived at the advent of 
Sophiology within modern British theology. In this chapter, we shall investigate two modern 
proponents of Wisdom based theologies which differ and converge both with each other and with 
the early Wisdom discourses outlined in chapters I and II. John Milbank’s Sophiology, which he 
outlines in its most developed form in his essay Sophiology and Theurgy and Paul Fiddes’ 
Wisdom theology, composed in his Seeing the World and Knowing God, shall be critically 
analyzed and compared before offering a final comparison of these modern Wisdom theologies 
with those outlined in the biblical and Gnostic narratives, attempting to determine to what extent 
either or both are indebted to the Gnostic concept of Sophia.   
John Milbank’s Theology in Context and his Turn to Sophiology 
 
John Alasdair Milbank was born in London 1952. He was brought up as a Methodist and 
schooled at Hymer’s College, Hull, before studying history at the Queen’s College, Oxford, in 
the early 1970’s. He then came under the theological mentorship of Rowan Douglas Williams (b. 
1950) (Williams is the only person Milbank explicitly acknowledges to have taught him 
theology), whom he met at Westcott House, whilst training for ordination within the Church of 
England at Cambridge.1030 At the point of meeting Williams, Milbank described himself as a 
‘flaccid Anglican’ with fairly liberal, historicist, and even pantheistic views, which were 
radicalized by Williams’ recommendation for him to read Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) 
and some Continental philosophy. Milbank claimed that after a long summer of reading, he 
emerged as an ‘orthodox Christian.’ After eventually deciding not to pursue ordination, Milbank 
instead went on to study for, and later produce his doctoral thesis on the thought of the Italian 
critic of rationalism and promoter of classical thought Giambattista Vico (1668 -1744) at 
                                                             
1030
 See: John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (second edition), Oxford, Blackwell, 
2006, ‘Acknowledgements.’ 
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Birmingham University.1031 Subsequently, he held a teaching fellowship at Lancaster University 
(1983-1991) and was also a lecturer in Ethics at Cambridge University and Fellow of Peter 
House, Cambridge (1993-8). He then took up a Professorship at the University of Virginia, 
before accepting his current position as Professor in Religion, Politics, and Ethics at Nottingham 
University in 2004.1032 
    Milbank’s most significant work to date is his 1990 Theology and Social Theory: Beyond 
Secular Reason. Milbank offers a concise summary of the purpose of this project in his 2006 
preface to the second edition of the same work: 
Theology and Social Theory was written in the middle of the Thatcherite era, out of the 
conviction that a theological vision alone could challenge the emerging hegemony of neo-
liberalism…I sought to show why, for reasons quite exceeding the political, a Catholic Christian 
account of reality might be entertained as the most finally persuasive one. But then, for both 
theological and historico-philosophical reasons, I sought also to argue that only a new embracing 
of such an account could free us from our contemporary historical deadlock.1033  
 
Milbank’s intentions here appear to be twofold: it is a political work designed to challenge neo-
liberal assumptions from a Socialist’s perspective.1034 And it is also a theological work, insofar 
as he further seeks to demonstrate that these neo-liberal assumptions are themselves grounded in, 
                                                             
1031
 This has now been published in two volumes: John Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the Thought of 
Giambattista Vico: The Early Metaphysics I, Edwin Mellen Press, 1991; John Milbank, The Religious Dimension of in 
the Thought of Giambattista Vico: Language, Law, and History II, Edwin Mellen Press, 1993.   
1032
 All of the above biographical information has been sourced from: Maurice Cowling, Religion and Public 
Doctrine in Modern England III, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.372, and Milbank’s own 
discussions. 
1033
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p.XI. 
1034
 Milbank’s political beliefs tend to veer to the left; he describes himself as a ‘Christian Socialist,’ (For Milbank’s 
understanding of Socialism see: John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, London, Routledge, 2003, 
pp.162‐187; John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, London, SCM, 2009, pp.63‐12) yet, by 
his own admission, he can also harbor strong conservative tendencies, for instance, see his arguments against gay 
marriage, the role of sex within society, and human rights: John Milbank, ‘The Impossibility of Gay Marriage and 
the Threat of Biopolitical Control,’ ABC Religion and Ethics (2013), cited at:  
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/04/23/3743531.htm. Last cited: 18/06/2013; John Milbank, ‘Fry’s 
Unsexing of Sex,’ 2010, cited at: http://theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Milbank_FrysUnsexingOfSex.pdf. 
Last cited: 18/06/2013; John Milbank, ‘Against Human Rights,’ 2009, cited at: 
http://theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/online‐papers/. Last cited: 18/06/2013. In light of these convictions, he has 
also described himself as a ‘radical conservative.’ Perhaps, the best description of Milbank’s political views can be 
sourced from his own observations: ‘I have always stood proudly amongst those who see themselves as 
‘conservative theologically, radical politically’ (John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, 
London, SCM, 2009, p.XI). More recently, the term ‘blue labour’ (popularized by Maurice Glasman (b.1961)) has 
been adopted by Milbank (see: John Milbank, ‘Blue Labour; One Nation Labour and Postliberalism: A Christian 
Socialist Reading, 2012, cited at: 
http://theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Milbank_BlueLabourOneNationLabourAndPostliberalism.pdf. Last 
cited: 18/06/2013. 
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and the product of a particular theological misconception, that has its origins in ‘Franciscan 
Scholasticism.’ And, in exposing these connections, Milbank seeks to offer an alternative 
theological vision (characterized by a finite world, in all of its components, ontologically 
participating in God) to the one inherited by modernity, which is heavily grounded in his reading 
of Augustine of Hippo (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Furthermore, in outlining 
this specific theological genealogy, Milbank identifies the presence of a secular counter-narrative 
to the truly theological one that he proposes, which he contends is in fact nihilistic (to the extent 
that it is not informed by theology).  
     In 1997, Milbank published, what many describe as being the sequel to Theology and Social 
Theory, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, and Culture. Here, Milbank further 
reiterates the central arguments outlined in Theology and Social Theory, whilst also attempting to 
ground these ideas within a further developed Christological and Ecclesiological idiom.1035 
    These two major works were the primary inspiration behind the birth of the Anglo-Catholic, 
Anglo-American, Cambridge ‘theological movement’ known as Radical Orthodoxy. Milbank 
was its co-founder along with Graham Ward (b.1955) and Catherine Pickstock (b.1952), all of 
whom acted as co-editors of the first major theological contribution of Radical Orthodoxy: 
Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (1999), which is a collection of articles written by various 
authors sympathetic to the aims of the movement. The introduction to this work, co-written by 
Milbank, Ward, and Pickstock, further confirms the ambition of Milbank’s earlier works: ‘the 
present collection of essays attempts to reclaim the world by situating its concerns and activities 
within a theological framework.’1036 Milbank’s own contribution to this series included his essay 
entitled Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi, where he 
attempts to utilize the relatively neglected German figures of J.G. Hamann (1730-1788) and F.H. 
Jacobi (1743-1819), who had, in their own ways, criticized Enlightenment rationality within a 
broadly theological idiom, in support of his own purposes.  
    The publication of Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology marked the initiation of the Radical 
Orthodoxy book series (supported by Routledge), which has published, to date, over thirteen 
                                                             
1035
 Milbank has been accused of neglecting the historicity of Christ and establishing a fully‐fledged ecclesiological 
foundation for his Christian critique of modernity (see: John Milbank, ‘Alternative Protestantism,’ in: James K.A. 
Smith (ed), Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post‐Secular Theology, Michigan, Baker, 2005, pp.25‐43).    
1036
 John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock, ‘Introduction,’ in: John Milbank, Graham Ward, and 
Catherine Pickstock (eds), Radical orthodoxy: A New Theology, London, Routledge, 2002, p.1. 
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books from various authors sympathetic to the concerns of Radical Orthodoxy.1037 Among these 
publications are two more of Milbank’s significant contributions: the first, co-authored with 
Pickstock, is entitled Truth in Aquinas (2001) where Milbank attempts to offer an alternate 
reading of Aquinas1038 as a Platonic/Neoplatonic metaphysician committed to an ontology of 
participation; or, perhaps simply to claim Aquinas as Radical Orthodoxy’s own.1039 Either way, 
Milbank further elucidates his theological response to the problem of modernity by affirming his 
understanding of a ‘metaphysics of participation’, informed by his reading of Aquinas’ use of 
‘analogy.’ These arguments are further elucidated and substantiated in his 2003 Being 
Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, where he emphasizes the significance of the theme of ‘gift’ 
alongside his commitment to ‘ontological participation.’ He is keen to explore the relationship 
between God and creation and the divine and human interaction (in its various modes: the 
incarnation, ethics, politics, etc.). It is in the preface to this edition that Milbank first highlights 
his admiration for Sergius Bulgakov and his Sophiology, where he intimates its future 
significance for his own theology.1040  
    In 2005 Milbank published a short work on the theology of Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), 
specifically his controversial understanding of the relationship between the Supernatural and the 
Natural.1041 Milbank attempts to ‘enlist’ de Lubac to the Radical Orthodoxy cause in a similar 
                                                             
1037
 Radical Orthodoxy also now have their own journal: Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics. 
1038
 See also: John Milbank, ‘On Thomistic Kabbalah’, in: Modern Theology: 27:1 (2011), 147‐185. 
1039
 Milbank’s reading of Aquinas is far from conventional, it diverges significantly from the typical readings offered 
by British theologians such as Herbert McCabe (1926‐2001), Nicholas Lash (b.1934), and Denys Turner (b.1942) for 
instance. These theologians tend to emphasize the ‘non‐participatory’ ramifications of Aquinas’ use of analogy, 
preferring to read it as a manner of logically speaking about God when committed to an apophatic theology 
working from the premises of what we have come to understand about creatures and God as their cause/creator 
(see: Herbert McCabe, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: III: Naming and Knowing God, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.104‐107; Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus, Eugene, Wipf & 
Stock, 1986, pp.95‐119; Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp.193‐225). Furthermore, Karen Kilby has offered a similar reading of Aquinas in: Karen Kilby, 
‘Aquinas, the Trinity, and the Limits of Understanding,’ in: International Journal of Systematic Theology: VII;IV 
(2005), pp.414‐427. Although, it is notable that respected Aquinas scholars such as David Burrell and Fergus Kerr 
have supported Milbank’s reading. However, Paul DeHart has recently criticized Milbank’s reading of Aquinas and 
affirmed the accuracy of the former scholars (see: Paul DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry, 
London, Routledge, 2012).        
1040
 See: John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, London, Routledge, 2003, p.XII. 
1041
 On this dense topic see: Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Etudes historique, Paris, Aubier, 1946; Henri de Lubac, The 
Mystery of the Supernatural (trans: Rosemary Sheed), Crossroad, 1998; Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism in Modern 
Theology (trans: L.C. Sheppard), Crossroad, 2000; Henri de Lubac, Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, Ignatius, 
1984. For a slightly more cautious approach to the relationship between nature and grace see: Karl Rahner, 
Theological Investigations IV (trans: Kevin Smyth), London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966, pp.165‐88; for a 
good analysis of Rahner’s position see: Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy London, Routledge, 
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manner to the way in which he utilized Aquinas. Milbank wants to affirm that de Lubac’s 
understanding of the Supernatural saturates every aspect of the created order with divine 
presence and truly challenges the premises of the secular narrative of an independent secular 
order. He also claims that de Lubac’s positions marked a watershed in Western theology, that 
undermined, Milbank’s understanding, of the strict Barthian distinction between God and the 
world, nature and grace, and the many other dialectical dichotomises that grew out of these 
initial ones, and confirmed the sensibilities of secularity. He writes:  
No pure Barthianism has survived this encounter, even amongst insightful Protestants. For it 
became clear in the wake of this book [Surnaturel] that Barth’s theology, for all its apparent 
innovation, remained confined within a Baroque contrast of nature with grace, and of reason with 
revelation, and had failed to reckon either with the analogia entis or the surnaturel as governing 
both philosophy and theology according to a logic rooted in a non-idolatrous understanding of 
the Creator-created divide.1042 
 
He also criticises renowned twentieth century Catholic theologians Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(1905-1988) and Karl Rahner (1904-1984) on the grounds that they diverge too greatly from de 
Lubac.1043  
        In 2009, Milbank continues to interpret and re-appropriate theological figures when he turns 
his attention to the Russian theologian Sergius Bulgakov (1871-1944). Milbank produced his 
essay entitled Sophiology and Theurgy: A New Theological Horizon published in Adrian Pabst 
and Paul Schneider’s Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy, to be 
discussed shortly. Here Milbank describes Bulgakov as one of the ‘Russian masters’ and lauds 
his theology as being the most ‘significant theology of the two preceding centuries. ’1044 Milbank 
attempts to integrate Bulgakov’s creative use of the biblical figure of Wisdom within his own 
ontology, as a means of grounding his themes of gift and participation. However, he also begins 
to explicitly acknowledge the paradoxical nature of his understanding of participation and seeks 
to accept and express this antinomy through the mediation of the figure of Wisdom, after the 
pattern of Bulgakov. As well as adopting Sophia for this task, he also becomes increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2004, pp.53‐60; Stephen J. Duffy, ‘Experiences of Grace’, in: Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.43‐63.  
1042
 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2005, p.65. 
1043
 Ibid, p.67. 
1044
 John Milbank, ‘Sophiology and Theurgy: the New Theological Horizon’, in Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider 
(eds), Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, 
Surrey, Ashgate, 2009, pp.45‐86, p.45. 
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attracted to the Catholic Hegel scholar and philosopher William Desmond; specifically, his 
‘post-Hegelian’ method of philosophizing typified by his ‘metaxological way.’1045 Moreover, he 
begins to adopt many of the foundational positions of Neoplatonic figures such as Iamblichus 
(c.250-330) and Proclus (c.412-485), as well as Pseudo-Dionysius (c. late fifth century), Meister 
Eckhart (1260-1327) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) whom he believes to have accepted the 
paradoxical nature of ontological participation. It has proven to be a highly influential work that 
has catapulted ‘Russian Sophiology’ into Western thought, engendering a variety of different 
reactions as already discussed within the introduction.  
     In the same year Milbank writes a collaborative work with Slavoj Žižek entitled The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?; where he further develops this conception of 
paradox as an alternative to the ‘Hegelian system.’ At this time he also published a collection of 
previously published essays on a variety of themes ranging from British theology and politics to 
interfaith dialogue, which he entitled: The Future of Love: Essays in Political Philosophy.  
     In 2010, Milbank again collaborated with Žižek and also Creston Davies, producing a book 
on St. Paul: Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian 
Philosophy. Milbank contributes two essays in this volume, one on ‘biopolitics’ and the other 
again, on the theme of mediation, this time in conversation with the suggestions of the French 
philosopher Alain Badiou (b.1937). 
     Milbank further elucidates the theme of mediation within participation in his 2011 Stanton 
Lectures; especially lectures IV and V.1046 
    Most recently Milbank has published his Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being 
and the Representation of the People (2014). This book revisits and expands the central 
arguments of Theology and Social Theory.   
                                                             
1045
 William Desmond has attempted to re‐interpret dialectic in the hope of avoiding a form of holistic immanence 
that it can typically invite, by outlining a ‘metaxological’ philosophy that highlights that immanence always exceeds 
its own state and points beyond itself, and thus locating us in the ‘between’ (see especially his excellent trilogy: 
William Desmond, Being and the Between, New York, State University of New York Press, 1995; William Desmond, 
Ethics and the Between, New York, State University of New York Press, 2001; William Desmond, God and the 
Between, Oxford, Blackwell, 2008; William Desmond, Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double, Surrey, Ashgate, 2003).  
One is reminded of Erich Pryzwara’s statement that: ‘the genuine Catholic form of evidential statement is 
essentially one of reference to the incomprehensible, yet of a reference which does not leap the bounds of the 
comprehensible, but flows on calmly to the end, until it merges, like the estuary of a river, into a sea of mystery’ 
(Erich Przywara, Polarity (trans: A.C. Bouquet), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935, p.47). 
1046
 See: http://theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/2011/03/12/john‐milbanks‐stanton‐lectures‐2011/.  
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    In addition to these works listed as his most significant, Milbank has published a variety of 
articles and papers, and even poetry.1047 His future endevours appear to include a longer term 
project developing a ‘fully-fledged Trinitarian ontology.’    
     The sheer breadth of Milbank’s interests and influences make it very difficult to locate his 
theology in any given context. Yet we can note some of the most major influences on his work, 
which seem to be most easily acknowledged within three criteria: political, philosophical, and 
theological (although these undoubtedly intersect at every point for Milbank). Firstly, one must 
acknowledge those thinkers who have historically challenged secular definitions of reason and 
rationality, and specifically Vico, Hamann, and Jacobi, all of whom have had a significant 
influence on Milbank’s thought.1048 One could also note Alasdair MacIntyre’s (b.1929) influence 
in this respect also, especially his critique of post-Enlightenment ethics in favor of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics;1049 and, perhaps, Stanley Hauerwas (b.1940), and his emphasis on ‘post-liberal’ 
theology.    
    Milbank has also been markedly influenced by the French postmodern thinkers, specifically 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), and René Girard (b.1923), as well as 
Jaques Derrida (1930-2004) and Alain Badiou. Milbank appears to be the first British theologian 
to engage on a significant level with French philosophical thought, which truly marked a 
paradigm shift in the pattern of British theology. Milbank recounts a tongue in cheek anecdote 
that illustrates this point: 
It was once said to me, by the late Texan theologian John Clayton, in Lancaster, that he had 
finally worked out what was “weird” about me: “Most of us, John, are trying to combine German 
theology with Anglo-Saxon philosophy. A few trendy people go for Continental philosophy as 
well. But you’re doing the opposite – with utter perversity you’re trying to combine British 
theology (of all things!) with Continental philosophy – and what is worse, with French stuff.1050    
   
    The ‘typical’ postmodern evaluation of modernity (in the wake of Hegel) seems to have suited 
the intentions of Milbank’s theology as he notes himself:  
The end of modernity…means the end of a single system of truth based on universal 
reason…theology…no longer has to measure up to accepted secular standards of scientific truth 
                                                             
1047
 See: John Milbank, The Legend of Death: Two Poetic Sequences, Eugene, Cascade, 2008. 
1048
 For one outline of the central ideas of these thinkers see: Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, 
Hamann, and Herder, Pimlico, 2000. 
1049
 See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.  
1050
 John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, London, SCM, 2009, p.IX. 
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or normative rationality…In postmodernity there are infinitely many possible versions of truth, 
inseparable from particular narratives…[each  with their own] unfounded reasons.1051  
 
 One should also mention the British philosopher Gillian Rose (1947-1995), and the influence 
she had on Milbank’s engagement with Hegel and social theory generally.  
    Theologically, as we have already noted, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas, Eckhart, and 
Nicholas of Cusa play a significant role in Milbank’s theology. And this tendency to revisit 
patristic and scholastic thinkers would appear to have been inspired by the twentieth century 
Catholic movement known as the Nouvelle Théologie,1052 especially Henri de Lubac. Milbank 
has also been distinctively influenced by Sergius Bulgakov. The common thread that appears to 
attract Milbank to these theological figures is their respective conceptions of the relationship 
between God and creation, which always presupposes some form of participation metaphysics 
(broadly informed by Neoplatonism). In light of these commitments, Milbank has tended to 
theologically shun many of the stances of, what one might describe as a particular German 
Protestant theology and philosophy (particularly Barth and Kant), that would seem to emphasize 
a certain type of ontological disparity between God and the world. However, this approach has 
also extended to his rejection of a particular Orthodox theology characterized by the positions of 
Gregory Palamas.  
    From within his own tradition there are obvious influences to note, John Henry Newman 
(1801-1890), Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994), and Rowan Williams, all of whom have seemed 
to have imparted a certain disposition, or way of approaching theology, that Milbank has 
adopted.            
    Milbank has proven to be extremely influential in contemporary Anglo-speaking theology, as 
early as 2001 he was described as being ‘the most important British theologian in the world in 
the last ten years.’1053 He has inspired a plethora of books and articles that have sought to apply 
his thought and major contentions.      
                                                             
1051
 Ibid, 337. 
1052
 On this topic see: Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie: New Theology, Inheritor of Modernity, 
Precursor of Vatican II, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2010.   
1053
 Gareth Jones, ‘Review: The Word Made Strange’, in: Journal of Theological Studies, April 2001, pp. 467–470. 
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    As we have already acknowledged, Milbank’s Sophiology must be seen as an extension of, 
and means of grounding his most sustained theological aim, which is to promote creation’s 
ontological participation in the Being of God.1054  
The significance of this theme has been well acknowledged by Milbank and his commentators 
alike. 1055 
    Participation metaphysics’ rise to prominence, when contextualized within the Radical 
Orthodoxy ‘narrative,’ is easily documented: the emergence of an autonomous ‘secular reason’ 
has resulted in Christianity and its theology being confined to a dubious space within the ‘secular 
metanarrative,’ whereby its claims to truth are then rigorously policed by a supposedly 
‘objective’ and ‘universal’ reason debunked of all transient prejudices. Secularity governs the 
‘objective’ public spheres (e.g. politics, academia, and reason itself) while religion, and all other 
‘questionable practices,’ are to be strictly contained within the private and subjective realms, 
which are only tolerated because of the secular commitment to individual liberty. According to 
Milbank, generally speaking, all Liberalism can be characterized by these rudimentary 
tendencies and assumptions.  
    Why does theology find itself in this context? Its genesis, as conceived by Radical Orthodoxy, 
is apparently the result of the theological failures of the Church herself; most notably in post-
Aquinas Scholasticism. It is not necessary to rehearse the entire Radical Orthodox reading of 
Christian theological history,1056 for we can simply note that there are some reoccurring ‘villains’ 
within the narrative itself. For instance, it supposedly all begins with the Franciscan Scholastics, 
John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) and William of Ockham (c.1280-1339), when they depart from 
Aquinas in adhering to a natural theology which predicates Being of Creator and creature 
                                                             
1054
 John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock, ‘Introduction,’ in: John Milbank, Graham Ward, and 
Catherine Pickstock (eds), Radical orthodoxy: A New Theology, London, Routledge, p.3. See also: John Milbank, 
‘Beauty and the Soul,’ in: John Milbank, Graham Ward and Edith Wyshcogrod (eds), Theological Perspectives on 
God and Beauty, London, TPI, 2003, p.7. 
1055
 See, for instance: Steven Shakespeare, Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction, London, SPCK, 2007, p.104; 
James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post‐Secular Theology,  Michigan, Baker, 2004, 
pp.185‐231; Adrian Pabst, Radical Orthodoxy: Pour Une Révolution Thélogique, Ad Solem, 2004; Ralph Norman 
describes the theme of participation in Radical Orthodoxy as the ‘theological “glue” that holds it all together’ 
(Ralph Norman, ‘Review of Graham Ward’s Christ and Culture’, in: International Journal of Systematic Theology 
9:2, 2007, pp.242‐245, p.244); John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, London, Routledge, 2003, 
pp.ix‐xiii.  
1056
 For a comprehensive example of their approach to the history of Christian theology see: Connor Cunningham, 
The Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology, London, Routledge, 2002; see 
also: Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, 
pp.121‐167.    
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univocally, so that it can be considered epistemologically acceptable.1057 This decision 
apparently projects God and the world ‘onto the same stage’ of univocal being, where their 
difference must then be dialectically accounted for, which subsequently produces mutually 
exclusive spheres local to each, which reaches one of its culminations in Kantian philosophy 
according to Milbank. Hence, from the initial opposition of God and the World, we encounter the 
dialectical distinctions of the natural and the supernatural, reason and revelation, works and faith, 
philosophy and theology and, eventually, the secular and the sacred. According to Milbank, 
modern theology is characterized by its acceptance of these distinctions and its willingness to 
work from within the boundaries marked out for it (Milbank would cite liberal Protestantism and 
Karl Barth’s Neo-orthodoxy as typical examples).1058 Milbank’s theological project (Radical 
Orthodoxy) is nothing more than an ambitious attempt to reverse this process and question the 
secular foundations of reason itself.  
    After his ‘diagnosis’ of modernity, we are led back to Milbank’s theological prescription: 
participation. If being is predicated analogically of Creator and creature, then God’s difference 
and transcendence are no longer in competition with creation, and God is (according to 
Augustine of Hippo) the One who is, and must be, simultaneously ‘superior summo meo’ and 
‘interior intimo meo.’  And, since God is the only One who can be in this way, all other instances 
of being (which have, therefore, been revealed to be unessential) become radically dependent, 
ontologically, on God, to the extent that, as Augustine further claims: ‘unless you were within 
me, I would have no being at all.’1059 Such an affirmation is also indicative of the fragile nature 
of finite being, thus revealing created existence to be the supreme instance of divine grace. 
Therefore, all things participate – through the gift of finite being - in the divine esse; all things 
that exist (only excluding those things which are sinful and, therefore, privative and non-existent) 
are inherently related to God through their very existence. Milbank is then able to demonstrate 
(from the metaphysics of participated being) that there can be no finite space (political, 
                                                             
1057
 See: John Duns Scotus, ‘Cognitio Naturalis de Deo I, II’, in: Allan Wolter (ed), John Duns Scotus: Philosophical 
Writings, Indiana, Hackett, 1987, pp.20‐24; William of Ockham, ‘Quodlibetal V: I’, in: Philotheus Boehner (ed), 
William of Ockham: Philosophical Writings, Indiana, Hackett, 1990, pp.97‐102. 
1058
 For a classic example of this taking place, see: Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other 
Basic Writings (trans: Schubert Ogden), Minneapolis, Fortress, 1984, pp.1‐45. And in the case of Neo‐orthodoxy, as 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer appears to have recognised, Barth rejects the liberal project to the extent that he refuses the 
task of ‘abridging the Gospel;’ however, he also affirms and retreats more deeply into, by his conservatism 
(‘positivism of revelation’), these isolated spheres that have been allotted to theology by liberalism itself (see: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, London, SCM, 1953, p.89).   
1059
 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, Book I:II (trans: Henry Chadwick), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.4. 
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philosophical, or otherwise) that is not already saturated with divine presence; the traditional 
dichotomies, which were outlined above, can no longer be supported; put simply, there is no 
longer any space left for the purely secular.1060 
    One would be forced to concede that such a Révolution Thélogique, as Adrian Pabst has called 
it, would have either been ignored or scorned, were it not for the cultural fertility provided by the 
contemporary postmodern climate, as Milbank is well aware and keen to exploit;1061 whereby, 
theology is supposedly left in a state of ‘sceptical relativism’1062 in which all narratives have 
been confined to the same epistemological plane of ungrounded faith, implying that their only 
claims to truth can be substantiated by how persuasive the respective narratives ultimately turn 
out to be. Milbank claims that the task of  Radical Orthodoxy has, in reality then, changed little 
from liberal theology, only now persuasiveness does not occur through the ‘apologetic mediation 
of a supposedly neutral human reason’1063 but, through faith in the intrinsic beauty of the 
‘Christian logos itself.’1064        
    As already noted, Milbank’s typical method for expressing his themes of participation and gift 
have been through, his reading of, the ‘analogia entis,’ although he is quite clear that ‘analogy is 
predicated upon the metaphysics of participated being’1065 and not vice versa.1066 However, as 
Milbank’s thought evolves, he begins to discover various tensions in his theory of ontological 
participation and is seemingly forced to find new ways of addressing these issues, which he does, 
through one medium, by utilizing the theological positions of Russian Sophiology.  
                                                             
1060
 Milbank’s position is not entirely novel to British theology – John Henry Newman appears to outline a similar 
conception of metaphysical participation in his conception of knowledge as its own end; neither is it foreign to 
political theology – Eric Voegelin outlines a similar ontology in order to combat political totalitarianism See: John 
Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, New Haven, Yale, 1996, pp.25‐91; Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and 
Gnosticism, Washington, Regnery, 1997, p.30. Milbank, frequently praises theologies and philosophies that have 
questioned the typical dichotomies outlined in the text; most consistently, he appeals to Henri de Lubac’s 
conception of the natural and the supernatural (see: John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the 
Debate Concerning the Supernatural, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2005);  and philosophers such as F. H. Jacobi 
and J.G. Hamann in their rejection of autonomous reason removed from faith (see: John Milbank, ‘Knowledge: the 
Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi’, in: John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward 
(eds), Radical orthodoxy, London, Routledge, pp.21‐38; also: John Milbank, ‘Hume Versus Kant: Faith, Reason, and 
Feeling,’ in: Modern Theology 27:2 (2011), pp.276‐297).  
1061
 John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, London, SCM, 2009, p.337. 
1062
 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (second edition), Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, 
p.1.  
1063
 Ibid. 
1064
 Ibid. 
1065
 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, London, Routledge, 2001, p.46 
1066
 David Burrell appears to agree with Milbank on this point. See: David Burrell, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith 
Perspective, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, pp.115‐120.  
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    While he acknowledges his intellectual debt to the ‘Russian masters,’ he makes it emphatically 
clear that he has no interest in merely restating what they have already proposed but, rather, to 
tease out and creatively extend their speculations ‘in my own idiom, which will not hesitate…to 
extend Sophiological reflection beyond the conclusions arrived at by the great Russian 
masters.’1067 And, this is precisely what he does, giving birth to, what has quickly come to be 
considered as, Milbank’s own unique Sophiology. Yet the question remains ‘why Sophiology;’ 
what tensions and aporias within Milbank’s current ontology direct him to turn to Russian 
Sophiology, what solutions does Sophiology offer?    
     In 2003, John Milbank first wrote of the importance of the ‘Russian Sophiological tradition’ 
in the context in which he believed it could aid him through a particular theological/ontological 
dilemma concerning God’s relationship to creation. There is no mention of Sophiology in 
Milbank’s first two major works (Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason: 1990 
and The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture: 1997). This appears to be due to the 
fact that here Milbank is principally concerned with expending his intellectual efforts on 
diagnosing what is wrong with modernity, how it has gone wrong, and what he can do to rectify 
it. Although he intimates his theological response to the problems he has identified (by insisting 
that there can be no finite world independent of God; in all of its modes it is, because it 
participates in the Being of God) he does not fully address all of the theological issues that will 
eventually grow out of this central position. This occurs a little later, when Milbank begins to 
comprehensively acknowledge and come to terms with the theological tension lying at the base 
of his ‘ontology of participation,’ it is this same tension on which the axis of Milbank’s own 
Sophiology will later consistently turn: if God is all (ontologically speaking) that is and creation 
is other to God, how can creation properly exist? The attempt to avoid the possible pantheistic 
implications of participation metaphysics, whilst ensuring that such avoidance would not further 
substantiate the conception of an independent finite world grounded in secularity, is a crucial 
theme in Milbank’s ontology and the central issue that his Sophiology will eventually attempt to 
address by finding a mode of mediation for these positions. This dynamic is so fundamental to 
clarifying the context in which Milbank will go on to utilize ‘Sophiology’ that it is worth quoting 
him at length on it: 
                                                             
1067
 Ibid, p.50. 
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If, according to the Thomistic view to which I subscribe, the occasion for incarnation was our 
deliverance, then nevertheless for Aquinas, in accordance with Chalcedonian logic, the upshot of 
the Incarnation exceeds its occasion. The result of the contingency of deliverance is 
paradoxically the eternal inclusion of a human nature under a divine enhypostatization. Since 
God is impassable, although this circumstance only begins to be in time, this beginning-to-be 
must somehow belong eternally to God…The task here is to think through this paradox, without 
lapsing into idealist gnosis which ontologizes a necessary passage through evil. In some 
fashion…he is eternally humanity as well as God. This is an aspect of what some Russian 
theologians have deemed the ‘Sophiological’ mystery of God being eternally more than God, 
even though there is nothing more than God, and creation is not necessitated.1068  
  
Milbank first attempted to respond to this ontological aporia in Truth in Aquinas. According to 
Milbank, the ontological tension can be somewhat resolved by affirming that the very existence 
of God includes an immanent expression of ‘mediated otherness’ within God’s dynamic ‘life’ as 
Trinitarian ‘relation;’ creation can then simply be conceived as an agapeic overflow of God’s 
own gratuity:  
Aquinas details God’s presence to creatures, under the heading of divine substance. This 
drastically indicates that God’s omnipresence simply is God himself, and that there cannot really 
be any being ‘other’ than God. Such omnipresence is seen as the direct effect of divine 
goodness…For only this impossible self-exteriorization will explain how there can be something 
other to God participating in God, when God is in himself the repletion of being.1069  
 
As he first outlined in Theology and Social Theory,1070 Milbank also appeals to de Lubac’s 
notion of the supernatural in order to shed some light on this difficulty. In 2005, in his short 
book on de Lubac, Milbank writes: 
de Lubac’s theory of the supernatural seeks to remain with the paradox that God who is all in all 
yet brings about a not-God to share in his nature. Here de Lubac is close to the mystery that God 
is the God who can be outside himself- and therefore is the God who elevates creatures into 
deity. 
 
However, it is on this precise point that Milbank again mentions Sophiology, stating that this is a 
‘notion explored more rigorously by the Russian Sophianic tradition, especially Bulgakov.’1071 In 
the same work he also goes on to state that Bulgakov is ‘one of the two truly great theologians of 
the twentieth century.’1072  
                                                             
1068
 Milbank, Being Reconciled, p.XII (my emphasis). 
1069
 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, London, Routledge, 2001, p.37 (my emphasis). 
1070
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp.220‐230. 
1071
 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 2005, p.77. 
1072
 Ibid, p.104. 
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    In 2006, in the preface to the second edition of Theology and Social Theory, Milbank again 
attempts to address the ontological tensions in his theory of participation. This time he appeals to 
thinkers such as Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) who emphasize 
the ‘paradoxical’ relationship between God and creation that is characterized by their 
‘coincidence’ as ‘opposites.’ He also explicitly states that ‘the modern Russian tradition of 
Sophiology has also fundamentally to do with the problematic that I am indicating here.’1073 
    In 2009 Milbank co-authored a work with Slavoj Žižek (The Monstrosity of Christ) where he 
focuses on the theme of paradox within ontological participation. He abandons the ‘principle of 
non-contradiction’ and attempts to offer some theological and philosophical justification for this 
decision. Yet the main reason for this move is precisely to try to uphold the paradoxical ontology 
of participation that is so crucial to this theology. Milbank therefore reaches the point where he 
needs to ground and express his paradoxical ontology which he attempts to do by utilizing the 
Russian Sophiological tradition. 
    According to Milbank, we should not consider this ontology to be a speculative anomaly, as 
there seems to be a persistently paradoxical, yet fundamental, notion of ‘otherness’ emerging 
within Christian doctrine more generally: where difference must be upheld at the very same time 
that identification and unity must also be maintained. Theologians must distinguish between God 
and creation whilst avoiding pantheism and dualism; the ‘distinctiveness’ of the Persons of the 
Trinity must be acknowledged, yet without compromising their unity. Similarly, a divine and 
human nature must be distinguished in Christ, yet without separation or division. Even the 
slightest adjustment to the ‘paradoxical nature’ of this notion of otherness would result in a 
whole host of dialectical dichotomies: modalism or tritheism, monophysitism or nestorianism, 
pantheism or dualism, and so forth. Therefore, Milbank contends that this paradox is a form of 
mediation within otherness that attempts to sustain identity within difference. We are therefore 
left with an inexpressible mystery within theological attempts to conceive of ‘otherness’ and 
identity between God and creation; it cannot occur but it simultaneously must: there must be 
difference; there must be identity; although both need to be distinguished, neither can imply 
ontological incongruence. At this theological threshold, Milbank is convinced that the 
Sophiological speculation of the ‘Russian masters’ is the most promising attempt to think 
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 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p.XXVII. 
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through, and subsequently express, this notion of paradoxical mediation within the theme of 
participation, and – like his ‘predecessors,’ remains convinced that the biblical figure of Wisdom 
is in a position to provide theology with a persuasive expression of this form of mediation, which 
he hopes will be able to ‘tackle the problem of a necessary but seemingly impossible mediation 
that lurks within traditional speculative theology,’1074 by embodying a mysterious and 
paradoxical relationship, apparent within otherness, that is grounded in the non-competitive and 
peaceful conception of the same, revealed in Christ - the God-Man –  and which is ultimately 
locatable within the Trinity itself.1075  
     Furthermore, Sophiology also presents itself to Milbank as a tradition, like his own theology, 
that is markedly at home in the current climate that theological discourse finds itself in, namely, 
postmodernity. And he believes this to the extent in which the Russian thinkers are grappling 
with the same post-Hegelian problems that characterize postmodernity and Milbank’s own 
theology.1076  According to Milbank, Sophiological speculation succeeds, where Continental 
philosophy and modern theology has failed, in its responses to the problematic ontological 
themes of difference and identity which have been produced in classic German philosophy. For 
instance, the postmodern Continentals Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), Jean-Francois Lyotard 
(1924-1998), Jaques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze have all remained dissatisfied in their own 
ways, like the Russian thinkers and Milbank himself, with the ‘Hegelian’ conception of 
‘otherness,’ in their case,  believing the dialectic to be a means of taming difference and 
absorbing it into a static identity.1077 One can read much of Levinas’ and Derrida’s philosophy as 
                                                             
1074
 John Milbank, ‘Sophiology and Theurgy: the New Theological Horizon’, in Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider 
(eds), Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, 
Surrey, Ashgate, 2009, pp.45‐86, p.50. 
1075
 Brandon Gallaher has recently lent support to Milbank’s reading of Bulgakov. He claims that Bulgakov’s 
understanding of Wisdom is grounded in his philosophy of antinomy (антиномия) and that his Sophiological 
speculation ‘quickly evolved into a metaphor for understanding the tension between God and the world’ (Brandon 
Gallaher, There is Freedom: The Dialectic of Freedom and Necessity in the Trinitarian Theologies of Sergii Bulgakov, 
Karl Barth, and Hans Urs von Balthasar , 2010, p.46 (Ph.D. Thesis: Oxford; publication forthcoming Oxford)); see 
also: Jonathan Seiling, From Antinomy to Sophiology: Modern Russian Religious Consciousness and Sergei 
Bulgakov’s Critical Appropriation of German Idealism, Canada, 2008.      
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 John Milbank, ‘Sophiology and Theurgy: the New Theological Horizon’, in Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider 
(eds), Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, 
Surrey, Ashgate, 2009, pp.45‐86, p.50. 
1077
 See: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (trans: Alphonso Lingis), Pittsburgh, Duquesne, 1969, p.296; Jean‐
Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (trans: Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi), 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p.34; Jaques Derrida, Positions (trans: Alan Bass), Chicago, 
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an attempt to re-conceptualize ‘otherness’ in light of a genuine recognition of difference, be it 
through the Levinasian ‘non-in-difference of Difference,’1078 or the Derridean différance. 
However, as Milbank has contended, by affirming the ultimate superiority of difference, over 
and against identity, one seemingly just propagates the ultimacy of nihilism (where there is no 
identity whatsoever).1079 And, as far as responses to these issues go in modern systematic 
theology, Jürgen Moltmann, Eberhard Jüngel, Robert Jenson (b.1930), John D. Caputo (b.1940), 
and even Karl Barth in his own way, for instance, have tended to simply embody Hegelian 
dialectic within their own theology, often with little filtration. 1080 Hence, continental philosophy 
and modern theology have ‘failed’ to satisfy the demands of Milbank’s ontological vision, which 
he believes can find its fullest satisfaction in Sophiological speculation.    
       Therefore, we have seen that the logic of Milbank’s central commitment to ‘ontological 
participation’ can threaten to dissolve into pantheism. However, in realizing this possibility, 
Milbank attempts to avoid this conclusion by simply invoking the absolute ontological difference 
between God and creation (despite this not being implied by the logic of his theology) and 
attempting to hold both positions together simultaneously. However, by doing this, Milbank is 
led to abandon any ‘traditional’ concept of a responsible and accessible epistemology in favor of 
the notion of ‘paradox.’1081 In order to be in a position to express this paradoxical conception of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p.44; Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (trans: Paul Patton), New York, 
Columbia, 1994, p.44. 
1078
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Philosophy and Positivity’ (trans: Jeffrey Kosky), in: Regina Schwartz (ed), Transcendence: 
Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond, New York, Routledge, 2004, pp.31‐43, p.41. 
1079
 See: Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, part IV. 
1080
 See, for instance: Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the 
Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism (trans:Darrell Guder), Michigan, William B. Eerdmans, 
1983, p.101; Eberhard Jüngel, ‘My Theology – a Short Summary’ and ‘the Revelation of the Hiddenness of God: a 
Contribution to the Protestant Understanding of the Hiddenness of Divine Action’, in Eberhard Jüngel, Theological 
Essays II (trans: A. Neufeldt‐Fast and J.B. Webster), Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1995, pp.1‐20 and pp.120‐45; Jürgen 
Moltmann, God In Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, London, SCM, 1985, pp.86‐94; Jürgen Moltmann, 
The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, London, SCM, 1981, pp.21‐61; Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, London, 
SCM, 1974, pp.206‐84; Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology I: The Triune God, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001, pp.125‐146; John D. Caputo utilizes Hegel in affirming a radical theology devoid of metaphysics (although he 
criticises Hegel for not going far enough); see: John D. Caputo, ‘The Perversity of the Absolute, the Perverse Core of 
Hegel, and the Possibility of Radical Theology’, in: Slavoj Zizek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis (eds), Hegel and 
the Infinite: Religion, Politics, and Dialectic, New York, Columbia, 2011, pp.47‐67.  For Barth’s use of Hegelian logic: 
see: John R. Betz, ‘Beyond the Sublime: the Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (part 2)’, in Modern Theology 22:1 
pp.1‐50, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006; Graham Ward, ‘Barth, Hegel and the Possibility for Christian Apologetics’, in: 
Jeremy Morris (ed), Faith and Freedom: Exploring Radical Orthodoxy, Third Millennium, 2003, pp.17‐39.   
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 See: John Milbank, ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox Versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek’, 
in: Slavoj Žižek, John Milbank, and Creston Davis (eds), The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? London, 
MIT Press, 2009, p.167. 
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participation, Milbank requires a mediatory figure that is at once both created and divine or an 
embodiment of the paradox that Milbank wishes to uphold. This is precisely where Sophia 
comes in: 
The important thing to note is that one can take Sophiology as the attempt to think through the 
place of mediation…where, it would seem, there cannot possibly be any mediation and yet, 
without it, everything threatens to fall apart…One could say that Sophia names a metaxu which 
does not lie between two poles but rather remains simultaneously at both poles at once. As such 
it does not subsist before the two poles, but it co-arises with them such that they can only exist 
according to a mediated communication which remains purely occult, a matter of utterly 
inscrutable affinity.1082   
In order for his re-conception of ontological participation to work successfully, Milbank 
therefore must locate this paradoxical form of mediation within God himself; he must –as he 
does in fact seek to do - demonstrate that within the Triune life of God, there is an otherness that 
includes identity (which Milbank conceives as Sophia) which mediates the identity and 
difference of the divine Persons as well as the divine Essence and Persons themselves; a 
relationship which is then participated in (to various degrees) by the rest of creation: 
One sees the Sophianic principle of ‘impossible mediation’ operating most supremely in the case 
of the divine Trinity. The same principle is then participated in, in various modes, by the 
creation, by humanity, by the incarnate Logos, by the Mother of God, by the Church, and by 
what one might call the liturgical-economic process.1083  
 
 
Milbank is convinced that this form of mediation must originate and be grounded within God’s 
own mode of relating to God’s self as Triune relationship, in order for it to be successful. Thus, 
after identifying this paradoxical dynamic within the divine Trinity itself, Milbank will then seek 
to show that all other forms of relating (between God and creation), in whatever mode, must also 
be inherently connected to, and an integral part of this original mediation within the Trinity. 
Therefore, the main purpose of Milbank’s Sophiology is to account for this form of mediation 
within the Trinity, and then to elucidate its place in God’s relationship to creation generally, his 
relationship to creation through Christ, the ‘ontological interaction’ between God and the world 
within ‘theurgy,’ and God’s relationship to creation through the Church (also including its 
Mariological dimensions). All of this is achieved for Milbank through the figure of Sophia.   
                                                             
1082
 Milbank, Sophiology and Theurgy,  p.50. This is almost identical to Bulgakov’s own Sophiological project; see 
the analysis in chapter IV pp.42‐45. 
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    Therefore, we shall now evaluate each component of Milbank’s Sophiology in turn, whilst 
critically discussing its relationship to both the Gnostic concept of Sophia and its biblical 
counterpart.                               
 
 ‘Impossible Mediation’ Within the Trinity: Sophia as the Divine Essence. 
Milbank’s first use of the figure of Sophia occurs within his attempt to ground paradoxical 
participation or ‘otherness’ within the divine Trinity itself, where Sophia is adopted in order to 
provide a form of mediation between the Persons of the Trinity; a certain ‘something’ if you will, 
that guarantees their essential unity whilst upholding their hypostatic distinction – which, 
following Bulgakov, Milbank suggests can be conceptualized as Sophia:  
If there were in no sense a shared ‘something’ (homoousios if one likes) involved in substantive 
relations, then the engendered would be sheerly ‘other’ to the engendering and the proceeded to 
the proceeding…Instead, the Son ‘is not’ the Father as in pure relation to him, but at the same 
time he ‘is’ the Father (as Augustine indicates), insofar as the persona is not other to the essence 
and stands forth just as much in respect of being in itself the essence, as in respect of being in 
itself a substantive relation. 1084 
However, Milbank notes that the traditional conception of mediation for the divine hypostases 
via the divine essence, itself harbors a further need of mediation in order to uphold ‘its’ 
distinction from ‘its’ inherent relations at the ‘intersecting point’ of their total unity, and 
therefore also of the Persons themselves: 
Via this point of intersection between relation and essence in the person, the engendered is in 
some sense the unengendered and the proceeded is likewise in some sense the proceeding. It 
follows then, that there is in a certain fashion a dynamic substantive mediation between essence 
and relations which involves also a mediation between the persons themselves.1085 
Although, as Milbank indicates, any concept of such a mode of mediation would at once threaten 
to usurp the harmony of the Trinity; for seemingly, it would either need to be another hypostasis 
(thus suggesting a quaternity as opposed to a Trinity) or some higher essential process of which 
the Persons would be mere modifications of. Instead, following Bulgakov,1086 Milbank suggests 
that this form of mediation could be characterized by its ‘hypostasticity;’ ‘something’ (an 
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 Ibid, p.54. 
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essence) that already approaches the personal, or is defined by its power to personify, without 
actually being an hypostasis itself: 
If there is any third term between the essence and the persons (and in consequence between 
person and person), this threatens to become itself a fourth hypostasis, or else the persons to be 
reduced to mere modes of a super-fundamental process…Instead, Bulgakov’s point is rather that 
what is common to the three persons cannot itself be exactly impersonal, even if it is also not 
exactly in itself a person: therefore it is at once an essence and yet something already 
approaching the personal.1087  
Thus, slightly elucidating Bulgakov’s rather complicated notion of ‘hypostasticity,’ Milbank 
suggests that we can conceive of this mediation as ‘the power to characterize;’ which is Sophia: 
the divine world or content (in the Bulgakovian sense) that gives personal shape to the 
hypostases and thus both identifies them whilst distinguishing them also. ‘The possessable and 
the transferable character of all persons, human and divine, rather derives initially from the 
‘shape’ that they derive from the objective world…Personal character arises from the subjective 
alteration of objectivity.’1088 According to Milbank, after the suggestions of Bulgakov, this 
relationship between essence and its characterizing hypostasis is common to all intellectual 
beings: human and divine: ‘hence even the infinite persons of the Trinity cannot be 
personal…simply in themselves and as relational, unless they are always mediating and are 
equally mediated by an objective personifying power.’1089 Here, Milbank is entrenched in the 
German philosophical theme of the subject/object relationship, albeit through Bulgakov’s 
theological lens.   
    Interestingly, Milbank flirts with the possibility of this mediating principle being a ‘self-
grounded hypostasis’ but rather surprisingly rejects this option on the basis of the authority of 
Bulgakov’s own Kantian understanding of ontology and epistemology and their mutual 
relationship. Milbank therefore seems to affirm, with Kant and Bulgakov, that being must be 
epistemologically registered in a ‘comprehending other’ for it to be at all: ‘as Bulgakov 
recognized, one cannot take Being alone to be the primary principle. What is, manifests itself, 
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else it is unthinkable.’1090 As we have already seen in Bulgakov, Milbank then faces the problem 
of positing the necessity of a ‘comprehending other’ that appears to be crucial and essential to 
God’s own existence: 
If we posit an initial Being which is ‘one,’ and insist that it can only be if it shows itself, then we 
have immediately also to posit a ‘second,’ which is the receiving capacity. The problem of 
mediation between the expressing first and the expressed – and so it would seem, reflexively 
expressed – second, then arises.1091  
    After analyzing attempts made by Hegel and Schelling to account for this ‘comprehending 
otherness,’ Milbank concludes that both positions are marred by an agonistic process that fails to 
account for a peaceful notion of original and harmonious difference: ‘neither Hegel nor Schelling 
therefore, entertained the truly radical thought of a real original difference exceeding any 
tensional process of development.’1092 In an attempt to propose an alternative to these positions, 
Milbank invokes the figure of Wisdom (or more specifically, its original duplication) to account 
for an original, yet peaceful, otherness that comprises the very existence of God: 
If one does entertain this [Sophiological mediation], then one can project the epistemological 
necessity of original twoness onto the ontological plane…Then one is confronted with the 
mystery of Sophia, of original mediation…That which is, is dynamic self-expressive life, but as 
such it is also the otherness of active reception of this dynamism. It is, indeed, super-eminently 
sperm and womb, forever conjoined and forever apart.1093   
Given Milbank’s characterization of the divine essence as Sophia, the problem of the 
‘comprehending other’ appears to be resolved through a thoroughly Trinitarian schema, without 
implying the necessity of the divine creation. For, as we have already seen, Bulgakov appeared 
to suggest that the ‘comprehending other’ was ultimately the creation itself (put more simply, for 
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 Ibid, p.57. As to be expected, there is no acknowledgement of Kant here, instead Milbank tries to ground his 
position in Gregory of Nyssa’s suggestion that the transcendent God is known in his dynamis which is his self‐
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proposing instead that being is independent of subjectivity (whether divine or human) (see: Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, London, Continuum, 2009).      
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Bulgakov, the second Person of the Trinity and creation were interchangeable), thus 
necessitating its own existence and blurring the ontological boundary between God and the 
world, which appeared to merge into one single process of divine self-becoming (as we have 
seen, after the pattern of Schelling and Hegel). However, by affirming that the ‘comprehending 
other’ is a natural expression of the self-expressive love of God and locating this dynamic within 
the Sophiological life of the divine Trinity itself, Milbank is able to affirm God’s total aseity, and 
subsequently uphold the clear distinction between God the Son and the creation, as well as the 
pure gratuity of the creative act as unnecessary to God’s own existence:  
One must indeed conceive of the divine essence as Sophia, a characterizing power…character 
can be communicated from one person to another, and there can arise a kind of collective 
character. Indeed for character to be character at all as an expressive showing forth, it must be in 
principle communicable and must even be actually communicated in some measure. Thus all of 
the Godhead is characterized and all the persons of the Trinity share in and hypostasize the 
power to give which is also the power to receive that marks life as such and supremely 
intellectual life.1094          
    Therefore, we have noted Milbank’s adoption of the Wisdom figure in his attempts to ground 
a specific conception of paradox within the divine Trinitarian life, and despite accepting some of 
the key insights of Bulgakov’s Sophiology, he seems to have avoided the implications of the 
complex issue surrounding the relationship between epistemology and ontology, and the 
reflexive need of the ‘comprehending other,’ that was so instrumental in Bulgakov’s theology for 
introducing elements of Gnostic mythology into his Sophiology, by locating this process within 
the complete dynamic life of the Trinity itself. Thus, Sophiological Trinitarian mediation upholds 
and even requires the unity and the distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
    Despite its indebtedness to Bulgakov, this Trinitarian theology, which Milbank espouses here, 
is clearly more closely related to the concept of Sophia that was identified in the biblical tradition 
as opposed to the one existing within the Gnostic narratives. Wisdom is identified with the divine 
Son, in a manner that is typical of Pauline and Johanine wisdom theology. Although this theme is 
elaborated to include the notion of the divine essence, also characterized as Sophia, this 
development simply appeared to be a logical progression from identifying the Son with Wisdom, 
as that which holds the Trinity in interpersonal communion must be said of all three Persons of 
the Trinity. Milbank is clear that the generation of the Son is not synonymous with the creation 
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of the world as it was for Bulgakov and Valentinus, where Sophia and her fall were equated with 
the existence of the world. We shall now explore Milbank’s further Sophiological developments.        
   
‘Impossible Mediation:’ God and the World. 
Having ‘grounded’ his conception of ‘paradoxical mediation’ within a Trinitarian ontology, 
Milbank now has the task of showing how created existence relates to, and participates in this 
divine life. And, although Milbank may have initially appeared to have avoided Bulgakov’s 
conflation of God the Son and the world with his need for the ‘comprehending other,’ his 
commitment to a particular conception of ontological participation may after all render all other 
forms of being and mediation as mere modes of this initial fundamental process at play within 
the divine Trinity itself. For, according to Milbank: 
In the above fashion one sees the Sophianic principle of ‘impossible mediation’ operating most 
supremely in the case of the divine Trinity. The same principle is then participated in, in various 
modes, by the creation, by humanity, by the incarnate Logos, by the Mother of God, by the 
Church, and by what one might call the liturgical-economic process.1095     
Therefore, Milbank is now trying to articulate the place of created otherness within the 
Sophiological mediation of the divine Trinity, which seems an impossible and paradoxical task 
given the ubiquity of the process itself: ‘in the case of the whole of the creation, how can it 
possibly exist at all? There is nothing but God, in his ubiquity. If there is also the creation as well 
as God, then the creation must lie within God.’1096 This theological theme that Milbank is 
grappling with is by no means a new issue within his theology. It can be seen throughout 
Milbank’s theology and most notably in his formulation of the concept of ‘gift’ (so integral to 
Milbankian thought). The French anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) once argued that a 
gift can never be ‘pure’; by which he appeared to suggest that every gift solicited a counter-gift 
and that in the act of giving, even if this is disguised, a contract was established that provoked 
the necessity of a gift’s reciprocation. Thus a seemingly endless process of contractual giving 
ensues and regulates society. Mauss states that there is a ‘rule of legality and self-
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302 
interest…[which] compels the gift that has been received to be obligatorily reciprocated.’1097 
Derrida is the first major thinker to engage with the philosophical and ethical implications of 
Mauss’ findings, and although accepts the thesis that a pure gift is impossible, nevertheless 
argues that accompanying the gift is a distinguished act of giving which can be utterly 
unreciprocated and totally unilateral and not impossible. Such a mode of giving is closely 
associated with madness for Derrida, yet this is not necessarily a negative phenomenon.1098 
Milbank engages with Derrida and Mauss in an attempt to explore the theological implications of 
this understanding of the gift. He argues that if God is Trinity, then the Father’s act of giving in 
the generation of the Son (the gift) - through the Spirit – already entails a reciprocation in 
gratitude. However, within the Trinity the act of giving, the gift and gratitude all occur 
simultaneously in the same act. Rejecting Derrida’s idea of a pure act of giving without 
reception, Milbank insists that there must be reception and gratitude if the economy of gift is to 
ever get off the ground. If there was no receiver, then there would be no gift. For Milbank, this is 
a Trinitarian and interpersonal understanding of gift; the gift establishes relationships. Milbank 
ultimately extends this Trinitarian schema to include the act of creation. Creation is given, and is 
indeed a gift, insofar as it is reciprocated. For this reason, Milbank must insist (like Bulgakov 
before him, although for slightly different reasons) on the primacy of the angelic and human 
spiritual creation ‘before’ the world as it were, otherwise the gift could not be received. We shall 
discuss shortly, the theological challenges that Milbank faces when attempting to account for this 
ontology in light of Darwinian theory, which asserts that humanity was the product of an 
evolutionary adaptation of species and was not ontologically ‘prior’ to the material creation. It is 
in response to this difficulty that Milbank does come close to adopting Gnostic Sophiological 
themes. Furthermore, it is also this ontology that leads Milbank to assert that at the base of 
creation there exists a divine reception of the gift of creation. According to Milbank this implies 
that creation is indeed ‘kenotic’ insofar as the gift could be rejected or ignored and indeed is 
when the perfect reception of this gift in Mary and Christ is established and rejected by the wider 
human community. Although, this is the context in which this issue is developed within 
Milbank’s theology, within Wisdom theology this question could be considered as a slightly 
modified version of the Valentinian monistic ‘problem of finitude,’ if the Sophiological 
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dynamism of the divine life of the Trinity is, ‘all that there is’ ontologically speaking, then how 
is finitude to be accounted for? And as Milbank has already suggested, the answer to this aporia 
appears to be by locating it within the divine life itself; hence the creation becomes another 
aspect to the process of othering that is the life of the Trinity itself: ‘If the creation lies within 
God, God must inversely lie within the creation. God must be also that in himself which goes 
outside God…Since God is all in all, at the bottom of that nullity which is alone proper to the 
creation must lie God.’1099 Thus, at first glance, creation, as it was in Bulgakov’s Sophiology, is 
subsumed under the role of the ‘comprehending other,’ given that the ubiquity of the ‘othering 
process’ renders no other ontological space available where such an implication would not 
present itself. Milbank is now facing the difficult task, that Bulgakov had engaged with 
previously, of attempting to account for genuine ontological difference between God and the 
world, when the world appears to be an integral and necessary part of the process of the divine 
life itself.  Milbank explicitly rejects Schelling and Hegel’s dialectical account of this same 
dynamic, yet he is aware of how similar their proposals seem, after all Milbank could be said to 
embody Schelling and Hegel’s own logic within his proposal, Hegel’s affirmation that, for 
instance: ‘otherness is not something different outside it, but its own moment…something is in 
itself the other of itself,’1100 appears to be very close to what Milbank is here suggesting. 
However, Milbank is well aware of the risks of his theological positions and is consistent in his 
attempts to avoid these conclusions in realizing the implications of his theological logic. Milbank 
categorically rejects suggestions of Gnostic pantheism, however not by denying that they are the 
logical conclusions of his theological reasoning as may have been expected, but by appealing to 
the mystery of paradox (by simultaneously affirming both the conclusion of his position and its 
negation – something very close to Bulgakov’s antinomical methodology): 
Between God and creation then, there is no between. To suppose so would be idolatry. On the 
other hand, if the created order univocally enjoys its own existence which sufficiently possesses 
existence as finite being, then there is after all, by the working of an inexorable dialectic, a third 
term, namely ‘being,’ invoked as lying between God and the creation and thereby threatening 
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idolatrously to include them both. To avoid this outcome one must rather say that all created 
being borrows its being from God who alone fully ‘is’ or is ‘to be.’1101    
However, this divine act of ‘donating existence’ does little to ease the theological and 
ontological tensions which Milbank’s Sophiology has generated; as what is donated appears to 
be nothing else but God’s own self –seemingly only confirming that creation is indeed a 
duplicated aspect of God’s own being: 
By an unforeclosed and mysteriously harmonious dialectic (unlike that of Hegel), what shares in 
God through its very unlikeness to God can only do so because it is also precisely like, indeed 
identical with the Godhead in its hidden heart. If nullity shares in being, then at bottom created 
things are God in some sense and God is in some sense created.1102 
Therefore, Milbank can only affirm the paradoxical nature of participation and Sophiological 
mediation, as he notes:  
To avoid at this point either acosmism or pantheism…the best we can do is to affirm both these 
further strange impossibilities at once. Sophia is creation in God; Sophia is also God in creation. 
There is not one Sophia, hovering onto-theologically between God and creation; there are two 
Sophias on two sides of the chasm, yet somehow their deep-beyond-deep affinity renders them 
after all but one.1103 
In order to affirm these paradoxical positions, Milbank is forced to abandon the ‘principle of 
non-contradiction,’ which – by doing so - he hopes to be able to affirm both the logical 
conclusion of his theological reasoning (that God and the world, are at base identical), and its 
negation (that God always ontologically exceeds the world), and after the pattern of Bulgakov’s 
antinomical method, uphold both truths simultaneously without a final synthesis. He attempts to 
mediate and express this antinomy/paradox, via the figure of Wisdom who is claimed to be both 
God in the world and the world in God.  For Milbank, ‘paradox’ is the most theologically sound 
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 Ibid, p.65. This is by no means an isolated instant confined to Milbank’s Sophiology. When appealing to the 
thought of Eckhart , Milbank argues that: ‘to ensure that God is not trumped by esse, one must indeed face up 
more radically to the aporias of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo: if this doctrine insists that God is the plentitude 
of being and that all created being derives from God, then in some sense the ground of created being must be 
uncreated’ (John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory :Beyond Secular Reason (second edition), Oxford, Blackwell, 
2006, p.XXVI). Similarly, ‘Eckhart therefore claims that, while the relation of creature to Creator remains always 
analogical, that nonetheless the relation of the soul to God in its ground is univocal. Since there Is a horizontal 
‘univocity’ between the Persons of the Trinity who are equal in being…within whose dynamic the souls is 
ultimately included’ (Ibid, p.XXVII).  
1103
 Milbank, Sophiology and Theurgy, p.65. 
 
 
305 
strategy for avoiding  German dialectical ‘tragic gnosis’1104 and the agonistic narratives that it 
can often invite between God and the world, in this sense he is very close to Bulgakov and his 
post-Hegelian ‘antinomical way,’ for both seemingly accept the logic of oppositional thought, 
yet reject any synthesizing mediation: ‘the alternative…is paradox – which one can also name 
‘analogy,’ ‘real relation,’ ‘realism’ (regarding universals), or (after William Desmond) the 
‘metaxological.’’1105 Similarly, ‘the ‘paradoxical’ outlook does not require to be ‘completed’ by 
a dialectical one.’1106  According to Milbank, the appeal to paradox is a necessary radicalization 
of Aquinas’ understanding of analogy invoked to combat the ‘Scotist’ reading and subsequent 
rejection of it. He believes that this was initially carried out by Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, as 
he states:  
Eckhart and Cusanus, in defending analogy against the Scotist charge that it violated the 
principle of non-contradiction, conceded the point while arguing that the logic of infinity and of 
infinite/finite relations requires this violation. In doing so the in effect admitted that an 
analogical logic is also a paradoxical logic.1107    
However, Milbank is keen to defend his understanding of paradox and Sophiology (within his 
commitment to ontological participation) and distinguish it from mere nonsense or a careless 
mistake in reasoning. To do so, he appeals to a meta-logic, deeply influenced by Nicholas of 
Cusa that logically disregards the principle of non-contradiction by appealing to the infinite: 
Can we really accept that we all the time see (or sense with all the senses) what we cannot 
possibly think? Yes, we can, if we reflexively think through the difference between the finite and 
the infinite, and yet the inter-involvement of the two. One finite thing cannot be its opposite, nor 
can one finite thing both be and not be another finite at the same time, in the same place, and in 
the same respect. If, however, we suppose that there “is” an infinite, then this logic no longer 
applies. For it is a logic which transcendentally supposes the notion of “limit,” of “delimination,” 
else it cannot operate. But in the infinite there is no presupposed limit – therefore one way to 
speak of the infinite is to say that here all opposites coincide, all differences are also similarities, 
and vice versa. One can think the absolute simple infinite only as paradox.1108    
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One can find an almost identical method of reasoning in Nicholas of Cusa’s De Docta 
Ignorantia: 
I call “maximum” that beyond which there can be nothing greater. Fullness, of course, is fitting 
and proper to what is one. Thus, unity, which is also being, coincides with maximumness, and if 
such a unity is completely free from all relation and contraction, it is clear that because it is 
absolute maximumness, nothing is opposed to it. Accordingly, the maximum is the absolute one 
that is all things, and all things are in this maximum, for it is the maximum. And because the 
maximum has no opposite, the minimum coincides with it as well, and therefore the maximum is 
also in all things.1109  
And again: 
Oppositions…apply only to those things that admit a greater and a lesser, and they apply in 
different ways, but never to the absolutely maximum, for it is above all opposition. Therefore, 
because the absolutely maximum is absolutely and actually all that can be, and it is without 
opposition to such an extent that the minimum coincides with the maximum, it is above all 
affirmation and all negation. It both is and is not all that is conceived to be, and it both is and is 
not all that is conceived not to be. But it is a “this” in such a way that it is all things, and it is all 
things in such a way that it is none of them, and it is a “this” maximally in such a way that it is 
also a “this” minimally.1110   
Building on these insights, Milbank further suggests that there can be no formal distinction 
between the finite and the infinite: 
We cannot conceive of any bounds to the finite as such: we must assume that the finite “goes on 
forever” and, moreover, that it does so as much microscopically as macroscopically. This leads 
us to question whether there truly are any strictly finite things without qualification, outside the 
sphere of logical supposition.1111 
And similarly, even if one were to imagine an ‘independent’ finitude, this could only be possible 
if it were the product of a descent of the infinite: ‘if, nevertheless, something besides God 
impossibly exists, then this is because God in himself is an ecstatic, generating God who goes 
beyond God.’1112  
    Therefore, it is clear that Milbank is proposing a theological method that is very closely 
related to Bulgakov’s ‘antinomism’ (which was discussed in Chapter V), when constructing his 
                                                             
1109
 Nicholas of Cusa, ‘On Learned Ignorance, I:III,’ in: H. Lawrence Bond, Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual 
Writings, New York, Paulist Press, 1997, p.89. 
1110
 Ibid, I:IV, p.92. 
1111
 Milbank, The Double Glory, p.167. 
1112
 Ibid, p.191. 
 
 
307 
Sophiology. However, whereas Bulgakov seemed to require an abandonment of ‘traditional’ 
epistemological principles for an ascetic or kenotic acceptance of an encountered revelatory truth 
on faith, Milbank attempts to provide a ‘reasonable’ foundation for his acceptance of paradox 
and dismissal of the principle of non-contradiction. For, once we have accepted the reality of the 
infinite (and Milbank believes there are good reasons for doing so; the seemingly infinite 
possibilities of finitude itself for instance), which is utterly unbounded and never comprised of 
any sort of limit, the principle of non-contradiction can simply not be sustained. For a 
contradiction to occur, there must be a definitive boundary where particulars are opposed to each 
other, yet this is precisely what appears to be amiss within the infinite itself, which would further 
imply that no contradiction could possibly occur ‘here.’ Thus, to claim that creation is both 
simultaneously God and other to God, although seemingly impossible to ‘comprehend’ from our 
finite perspective, can be accepted as truth in light that all contradictions coincide within the 
infinite, where they are resolved. Although Milbank’s ‘paradoxical way’ has made some 
significant developments to Bulgakov’s antinomism, there still appears to be several latent 
tensions within his suggestions.  
Firstly, at an initial glance, Milbank’s notion of the infinite (grounded in Cusa’s thought), which 
is so central to his theological logic, appears to be notably disengaged from modern 
mathematical and scientific theories of infinity, many of which reject Cusa’s conception of 
infinity. Perhaps, the most significant philosophical exploration of modern mathematical theories 
of infinity has been conducted by Alain Badiou, notably in his engagement with Georg Cantor 
(1845-1918). Utilizing Cantor’s proposals, Badiou argues that infinity as a merely negative 
concept, used to mark out a finite boundary for the world and function as an attribute of the One 
(God) in which the former participates in the latter, is simply unsustainable in light of modern 
mathematics. According to Badiou, there is no one single infinity, but rather infinite multiples 
patterned on set theory. Infinity: 
Is not the negative name of the supreme-being, the sign of an exception in which a hierarchical 
punctuality is distinguished that is thinkable as the being-of-the-one…it is evident to what degree 
Cantor’s oeuvre completes and accomplishes the historical Galilean gesture: there at the very 
point where, in Greek and then in Greco-Christian thought, an essential appropriation of being as 
finite was based – infinity being the ontic attribute of the divine difference – it is on the contrary 
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of being as such and of it alone that infinity is from this point on predicated, in the form of the 
notion of an ‘infinite set.’1113 
Prior to Cantor, infinity functioned as a purely limiting concept within knowledge, it was always 
out of reach epistemologically. However, as Badiou illustrates:  
The mathematical ontologization of the infinite separates it absolutely from the one, which is not. 
If pure multiples are what must be recognized as infinite, it is ruled out that there be some one-
infinity. There will necessarily be some infinite multiples. But what is more profound still is that 
there is no longer any guarantee that we will be able to recognize a simple concept of the 
infinite-multiple, for if such a concept were legitimate, the multiples appropriate to it would, in 
some manner, be supreme, being no ‘less multiple’ than others. In this case infinity would lead 
us back to the supremely-being, in the mode of a halting point which would be assigned to the 
thought of the pure multiple, given that there would be nothing beyond the infinite multiples. 
Therefore, what must be expected instead is that there be infinite multiples which can be 
differentiated from each other to infinity.1114        
    In other places, Milbank does engage with Badiou’s understanding of infinity and 
acknowledges the challenges it poses to his theology. However, Milbank argues that Badiou has 
condensed the theological conception of infinity into a strict dialectical ‘Scotist’ distinction 
between the finite and the infinite. Whereas, according to Milbank’s reading of Aquinas for 
instance, the infinite never functions in this way, but rather includes finitude’s participation 
within the infinite. Thus, Badiou’s thesis on the immanence of infinity is based on a ‘decision’ as 
convincing as any other. Milbank does not feel compelled to accept Badiou’s notion of the 
infinite nor his critiques of the theological infinite that Milbank relies upon here.1115    
However, there are further implications, for if one were to actually accept Milbank’s contention, 
then there would appear to be no communicable framework from which truth could be 
distinguished from falsity. Could Milbank’s principle be invoked solely to affirm the truth of 
Christian revelation? It would appear possible in principle that one could just as legitimately 
affirm that squared circles, although from our finite perspective, appear to be mutually exclusive 
and therefore contradictory, may ultimately be perfectly compatible within an unbounded 
infinity. Presumably, Milbank would want to draw a clear distinction between the paradoxes that 
he upholds and the mere mistakes or contradictions like the one just outlined. Yet, how could 
such a distinction be made, when both options appear possible from Milbank’s suggestions? 
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How could we decide when to apply the principle of non-contradiction and when to ignore it? 
There appears to be no other reason than Milbank’s own preference. If truth claims are only 
regulated and constructed within a particular discourse based on choice, one runs the risk of 
permanently grounding truth in personal (even if communally personal, including a given state or 
government) motivations of power. 1116 
    Furthermore, despite Milbank insisting on his distance from German dialectical thought, as we 
have already identified in chapter V, antinomical, metaxalogical, and now paradoxical reasoning, 
all appear to be much closer to Gnostic wisdom dialectic than to biblical wisdom theology’s 
insistence on original harmony between God and creation. After all, as we have consistently 
shown throughout this thesis, any theology that begins by thinking of God and creation as 
ontological opposites, inevitably must find some form of mediation to ‘bridge’ this ontological 
incongruence, which more often than not ends in total identity. Thus, like Bulgakov, and 
Schelling and Hegel before him, Milbank seems to dialectically affirm that what at first appears 
to be different is in fact ultimately identical. Therefore, in the case of Milbank, what first appears 
to be incompatible is demonstrated to be identical when viewed from the ‘infinite’ perspective: 
‘for at the depths we are identical with God.’1117However, to avoid this kind of dialectic, which 
can propound Gnostic Wisdom theology (as seen in chapter II) one need only refuse to 
acknowledge the necessity of thinking God and the world as opposites in the first place; the 
premise of all dialectical reasoning begins where biblical Wisdom theology sees no original 
problem. For, whether one ‘begins’ theologically from a Barthian insistence on the revelation of 
Christ or from a creation theology, the outcome will be the same: God and the world are not 
ontologically opposed; to be God does not exclude creation and vice versa. Rahner exemplifies 
this point excellently when stating that:  
If immediacy to God is not to be an absolute contradiction right from the start, it cannot depend 
on the fact that what is not God absolutely disappears when God draws near. As God he does not 
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have to find a place by having something else which is not him make room. For at least the 
presence of God as the transcendental ground and horizon of everything which exists and 
everything which knows (and this is a presence of God, an immediacy to him) takes place 
precisely in and through the presence of the finite existence.1118               
    As we have noted, the theological challenge which Milbank is attempting to address is how to 
account for an authentic finite existence that is not God. Despite Milbank’s rigorous attempts to 
do this, it would seem, at least to some, unsuccessful. If one is not convinced that a genuine 
finite/created existence is theologically accounted for, then it would appear that we are left with a 
fundamental ontological monism that is not unrelated to the founding Valentinian wisdom 
presupposition, which is in contrast to the biblical concept of Wisdom. As noted, throughout the 
archaeological shifts of the positions that have informed Milbank’s Sophiology, the primary 
commitment to a fundamental monism has consistently and historically generated the ‘problem 
of finitude’ and otherness, which then must be dialectically accounted for and explained; yet, 
given the fact that it should not be at all, must then be synthetically negated in order to be 
reunited to complete the original monism. From our previous analyses, we have witnessed how 
the figure of Wisdom is called into the equation to account for this opprobrious otherness – 
typically through a metaphysical fall narrative – that is then eschatologically reunited to the 
monistic Absolute. We are able to identify this transition almost immediately in Milbank’s 
Sophiology, as soon as the problem of finitude emerges: 
The heart of creation, Sophia, is somehow dragged downwards…Thus Bulgakov declared that 
“Sophia – primordial humanity – as the soul of the world” may realize the dark side of its being 
in exercising a blind and chaotic will. So there is, as the Christian Gnostics intimated, albeit in a 
heterodox mode, also a fallen Sophia to be constantly sought out and recovered through art, 
through good science, through the contemplation of nature – for there is something here not 
merely to be redeemed, but also a lost spark of beauty presently trapped under the spell of evil, 
that is yet for the moment missing from the plentitude of beauty as such.1119      
However, Milbank does attempt to avoid the Valentinian implications inherent to Russian 
Sophiology by making several subtle alterations to their proposal. Firstly, although he does 
explicitly acknowledge a metaphysical fall narrative, he attempts to suggest that fallen Sophia is 
not recuperated through the history of creation, but instead argues that the fall is eternally 
resolved (a position that is very close to Schelling’s theogony): 
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The eternal Adam is only the universal human hypostasizing power. The fall of man impairs this 
essence, but by rights this should lead to absolute extinction for both human essence and human 
hypostases. It only does not do so because, in some sense, when Sophia falls to become the 
sinister “Achamoth” according to Bulgakov, the heavenly Sophia is “impossibly” affected, and 
God cannot suffer, even for a hypothetical “instance,” a loss to his glory. It is as if he only 
maintains his aseity, which of course he cannot not do, through the retrieval of languished 
glory.1120    
Milbank further reiterates this point by suggesting that the historical Incarnation of Jesus of 
Nazareth is a formality, given that the fallen-Sophia/ eternal humanity is immediately restored 
from all eternity, and therefore descends with Christ in his Incarnation to present the ideal 
humanity which has already been realized in God: ‘through all eternity the essence is 
immediately restored. So much is this the case that, when God as the divine Son descends in the 
Incarnation, so also does the eternal humanity.’1121 However, Milbank here appears to challenge 
the biblical insistence on the historical tangibility of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is the 
revelation of knowledge of an ontological fact that has occurred from all eternity. Although this 
may initially imply clear Gnostic overtones, in the background is Milbank’s adoption of de 
Lubac’s insistence on transcendental knowledge. For instance:  
God, Moses says, made man in his image…And so one cannot say that this knowledge, at its 
root, is a human acquisition, it is an “image,” and “imprint,” a “seal.” It is the mark of God upon 
us. We do not construct it, we do not borrow it from elsewhere; it is in us…it is our very 
selves…It comes before the operation of will and intellect, presupposed by consciousness 
itself.1122 
Milbank echoes this sentiment in a radicalized format: ‘the most interior reality of created things 
simply is God, and humans as reflective have conscious access to this interiority.’1123 Thus, the 
implication of Milbank’s position to have access to originary gnosis of the divine is perhaps 
more appropriately understood as an indication of his commitment to transcendental knowledge 
of the divine through a doctrine of creation that has been informed by his close early reading of 
de Lubac. Milbank is clearly aware of the implications of his position, and seeks to clarify it by 
suggesting that the historical incarnation does indeed mark the final restitution of the fallen 
Sophia: 
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The eternal divine humanity, or human essence, or Adam-Kadmon – at once the first and the 
second Adam spoken of by Paul – is itself eternally saved and united with God entirely because 
of the unique descent of the Logos at one specific point in human history. Here alone occurs the 
event of the final finding and retrieving of the lost and fallen Sophia.1124    
This gives a slightly different emphasis on the narrative itself, to the extent that history then 
becomes the necessary forum for Sophia’s ‘recovery;’ history itself becomes the teleological 
process by which finitude is negated and absorbed back into the monistic whole. 
However, whichever option Milbank were to select, there is very little difference between them 
both, given the fact that creation is God insofar as creation is an integral aspect of the intra-
Trinitarian life of the Godhead itself, the ‘comprehending other;’ whether this drama is played 
out and resolved within history or is eternally restored, amounts to the same thing, as in both 
instances God and the world appear to be a part of one fundamental process of God’s emerging 
self-awareness, and that is the case whether one ‘finitzes’ God or eternalizes the world,  and it is 
precisely in this respect that Milbank upholds that ‘from all eternity God has always been the 
God-man and the Russians are right: the theanthropic exceeds even the theological.’1125 In order 
to fully grasp this issue it is necessary to briefly revisit a theme highlighted earlier, namely 
Milbank’s theological insistence on the primacy of the angelic and human spiritual creation over 
material creation and the implications this commitment has for Darwinian theory.  
    As Solovyov and Bulgakov realized before Milbank, an appeal to a metaphysical fall can 
permit the theological insistence on the primacy of angelic and human spiritual form while also 
accounting for the apparent barbarism of natural selection as being a product of a fall as opposed 
to the manner in which the divine creative act is realized, bringing good out of a necessary evil. 
Within Milbank’s Sophiology he does entertain this Russian and ultimately Gnostic position, as 
we have just seen. However, elsewhere he does offer alternatives. In his essay Life, or Gift and 
Glissando: Evolution, Vitalism and Transcendence (20), Milbank argues that orthodox 
Darwinian theory and proponents of the ‘creation by design’ Christians both hold in common a 
misconception of the divine, ultimately as a being among other beings acting in a manner that 
forces one to choose natural selection or divine causation; both compete on the same plane 
within this conception of God. However, after Milbank spends some time unpacking and 
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challenging this conception, he then proposes that the evolutionary process be understood 
teleologically as one directed by the essential form of a given species which individuals are 
called to realize in their existence:  
One must still think of the living individual as in some sense instantiating a formal essence. But 
this is further to imply that, as for Aristotle, specific form itself (however mysteriously) 
“explains” in an ultimate and unsurpassable fashion. Moreover, since the nature of living form is 
to grow and to reproduce within certain regular and yet not entirely theoretically delimitable 
parameters…then this form is inherently “teleological” in the sense that its collective nature as 
internally moving and self-replicating across time…is participated in by individual living 
organisms, who in this non-intentional sense “aim towards” their pre-defined fulfillment and 
flourishing.1126 
Within this article, Milbank does not share the Russian distaste for the price of the teleological 
product of evolution and has a much less pessimistic view that does not require a theodicy. He 
does not require a fall to account for the ontological formal angelic and human primacy. And, 
moreover, a properly non-dialectical or analogical conception of God does not forbid the 
coincidence of the creator and creation within this dynamic process of collaboration.   
    Therefore, we have seen that Milbank uses the concept of Wisdom (deeply indebted to 
Bulgakov here) in this instance to ground a paradoxical relationship between God and creation, 
one that both upholds their identity while affirming their distinction. We noted that Milbank 
struggled to account for a distinct ontological difference between God and creation to the extent 
that we argued that it fell into a monistic ontology. Milbank then adopted notions from the 
Gnostic concept of Sophia to account for the distinction between God and the world, most 
notably in a metaphysical fall narrative (which he appeared to have sourced from Bulgakov). 
Within this portion of Milbank’s Sophiology, it is clear that he is more closely indebted to the 
Gnostic concept of Wisdom adopting both a founding monism and a metaphysical fall narrative. 
We shall now explore Milbank’s Christology and eschatology in the context of his Sophiology.  
 
Sophiology in Milbank’s Theurgy, Theosis, and Christology. 
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Although, as we have just noted, Milbank does explore alternative ways of engaging with 
modern Darwinian theory and emphasizing the formal priority of the human and angelic 
creations, however, within his Sophiology – following Solovyov and Bulgakov (and the Idealist 
tradition before them) – he does appeal to a metaphysical fall to account for the nature of the 
current state of the relationship between the world and God. Having made this move, his 
Sophiology must now account for how the original monism is to be restored. He elucidates the 
nature of the interaction between God and the fallen world, which is constantly moving towards 
the ‘recovery’ of fallen Sophia, typified in Milbank’s conception of deification and the 
incarnation. Milbank’s favored mode of engaging with such an interaction between God and the 
world is through the concept of theurgy.1127 Theurgy is a Neoplatonic principle that offers a 
framework for conceiving of the interaction between divinity and created reality, which itself has 
certain ontological presuppositions which become important for Milbank’s conception of 
deification.  
    We can already conclude from the above positions that, for Milbank, God and the world are 
ontologically bound together from all eternity through the paradoxical figure of Sophia. Yet this 
relationship has been disturbed (as it is contradicted by our current mode of existence and 
explained through a metaphysical fall narrative) and must now be healed. Before outlining the 
nature of this ‘healing process,’ Milbank criticizes Church Fathers and theologians who have 
conceived of an ontology that would debar the type of ontological ‘reunion’ between God and 
the fallen world that Milbank wishes to uphold.  He categorically rejects Gregory of Nyssa’s 
conception of ‘epektasis’ and positions which he believes are products of it, namely the Palamite 
distinction between God’s essence and his energies, and its more modern reformulation and 
adoption in Vladimir Lossky’s theology. In each case, these theologians wish to uphold the 
Creator/creature distinction even ‘after’ its eschatological redemption. Milbank remains cautious 
of such suggestions, as it would seem to forbid his attempt to account for a complete ontological 
reunion between God and the fallen creation, which was once paradoxically contained within a 
single unity. Thus, he suggests that: 
To suppose that there is even a formal division between essence and energies risks two things: 
first of all, it risks supposing that deification is merely an irradiation by the light of the divine 
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energies, lying in this sought of idolatrous ‘between,’ or false mediation, with the final divine 
darkness reserved. Secondly, it risks a contrasting of the divine darkness with the divine dazzling 
and overwhelming light, such that one is supposed, rather in the manner of Vladimir Lossky, 
once and for all to exceed the cataphatic, and as it were finally to access God in a sheerly 
negative mode by abandoning all images and their anticipations and plunging super-theoretically 
into the absolute night.1128 
Milbank believes that, by attempting to uphold the divine difference, even within the creature’s 
deified union with God, would have ‘positivized the negative.’1129 Milbank proposes that these  
positions were anticipated in ‘Gregory of Nyssa’s almost proto-Scotist view that God is most of 
all uncircumscribed positive infinity, to which there corresponds, on the part of finite spirits, an 
‘endless epectasic progress.’’1130  In contrast to these positions, Milbank attempts to appeal to 
Pseudo-Dionysius and the Neoplatonist Iamblichus, whom he both believes to have laid greater 
stress on a deeper unity between God and creation. Thus he states:  
He [Dionysius] more construed God as the coincidence of bounded and unbounded, with a 
corresponding stress that mystical access to God has supereminently to exceed both the 
cataphatic and the apophatic…In contrast to Gregory of Nyssa, this liturgical entering-in is not 
exceeded by an epectasic ‘desire to see’ which at once holds God at a slightly greater distance 
and also considers him ontologically in more absolutely negative terms. Instead Moses, by 
plunging into the night, is absolutely and finally united with the One in which finite and infinite 
coincide.1131     
The purpose of theurgy is therefore to rediscover the creature’s ‘lost’ ontological congruence 
with the divine and to ‘solicit’ the response of divinity:  
the liturgical magical procedure of theurgy, by achieving an attunement with the divine, allows 
us more to receive the ‘excellent gift of the gods’ and ‘the divine care which has been denied 
us’…Thus while prayer and invocation does not, indeed, change the minds of the gods, it is not 
simply a disguised mode of self-therapy because it permits us, through achieving the right 
topological, bodily and spiritual dispositions, to receive more fully the divine flow of grace.1132  
The role of theurgy within Milbank’s Sophiology appears to be very close to the ‘recuperation’ 
narratives that we earlier identified within Russian Sophiology and Schelling’s ‘Philosophy of 
Mythology.’ In the former cases, the eschatological re-union of the lost divine principle or 
Sophia, was achieved by the teleological movement of history that stage by stage slowly 
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‘prepared itself’ for the divine descent of the incarnation where the ‘re-union’ would be 
completed. Like Bulgakov before him, Milbank insists that Mary represents the highest point of 
Creation’s receptiveness to the divine, as the highest point of theurgic interaction. Therefore, 
Milbank echoes Bulgakov in upholding the necessity of Mariology for the realization of Christ’s 
incarnation; Mary becomes the requisite for the descent of the Logos: 
Bulgakov acknowledged that Christ is only incarnate through the Church by means of the person 
of Mary, and only personally expressive in human time through the always already begun 
receptivity of the Church. In this way he faintly pointed to the radicalism of the surely logical 
view that the Bride is collectively and eschatologically the equal of the Bridegroom. Given his 
sexual ontology of the eminent ‘maleness’ of the Son-Logos and the eminent femaleness of the 
Spirit-Donum that is a crucial part of his vitalism and which I broadly endorse, this suggests also 
gender equality.1133 
However, when viewed from the perspective of fallen Sophia’s teleological movement towards 
her eschatological re-union with the original monistic whole, the need for the ‘immaculate 
conception’ simply does not arise, as God through Sophia, and human history, has graciously 
been moving towards this point of the fittingness of creation to receive Christ in the incarnation: 
Since the fiat is not merely the opening occasion for the Incarnation, but also relationally 
constitutive of the Incarnation, that Mary must already be the presence of the Church, yet as such 
must be from the outset of her life so composed that her orientation to the supernatural is also the 
beginning of the actual birth of the Logos within her.1134    
Hence, this can only occur because of the fact that God is constantly becoming human: 
The ascent of deification is impossible unless God constantly descends to us – meeting 
liturgically with our acts in time, which are our modes of being in time…We can become God, 
because God is constantly becoming us. Here again there cannot be mediation, yet there must be 
mediation in the sense of something that abides simultaneously on both sides of an absolute rift, 
held together by an ineffable attunement.1135   
    Once the fallen creation/Sophia has readied herself for the divine descent, the historical 
incarnation marks the ‘final finding and retrieving of the lost and fallen Sophia.’1136 It is 
therefore not surprising that Milbank is forced to re-conceive the traditional Chalcedonian 
Christology of ‘two natures united hypostatically in one person’ simply because there is too 
much distinction between divinity and humanity in this schema, within which Milbank’s 
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conception of complete ontological identity cannot be realized. According to Milbank, a 
‘hypostatic unity’ alone ‘suggests that he [Jesus] is in one aspect (the personal) the God-Man or 
incarnate, but in another aspect (the natural), he is not.’1137 At this point, Milbank invokes the 
figure of Sophia as a mediatory principle between the person of Christ and his two natures in 
order to uphold a deeper unity between the two natures. Sophia is able to perform this role 
precisely because she is not ontologically distinct from God or creation, although fallen Sophia is 
separated from God in the mode of her existence; at base there is no ontological distinction 
between a human nature and a divine nature within Sophia: 
The two characterizing powers are at bottom one, since the uncreated and created Sophia are 
more fundamentally one in ‘foundation and content’ according to Bulgakov – given that God is 
the all and the creation itself is ‘nothing but’ the outgoing of God, even though God is in himself 
mysteriously the self-exceeding. They differ only as to their ‘conditions’ of respectively of 
eternal glory and finite becoming and for this reason the two conditions can come together in the 
Incarnation not just actually on the basis of the one divine hypostasis, but also transcendentally 
on the traditional basis of the more fundamental unity and tendency to unity of the two essences 
taken as the two Sophias or objective characterizing powers.1138    
The incarnation therefore inaugurates the eschatological ‘recuperation’ of Sophia which can only 
be fully completed when absolute identity is restored. It appears that Milbank has had to modify 
an orthodox Chalcedonian Christology, to what – for all intents and purposes – is a monophysite 
Christology to account for this narrative. Although Milbank, like Bulgakov before him, still 
maintains the language of ‘two Sophias’ it appears clear that Sophia (God and the world) are 
one, simply modally distinguished in their respective states of being. However, as we have 
already pointed out in the previous chapter, a modal distinction does not appear to be enough to 
uphold the radical ontological difference between the Creator and the creation; especially when 
this modal distinction is not meant to be the case, but has rather occurred through the 
transcendental fall of Sophia, which is precisely what is to be negated in the Incarnation, where 
the monistic totality is resumed. Thus, Brandon Gallaher is surely correct in labeling Milbank’s 
Sophiological Christology ‘a strange form of monophysite Christology.’1139  
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    Therefore, having documented the recovery of the fallen Sophia, which has culminated in the 
incarnation of Christ, Milbank must now elucidate the effect this has on the rest of creation and 
the ‘future’ of the world within this dynamic.  
    Following Bulgakov and Schelling, Milbank suggests that the incarnation of Christ must 
necessarily presuppose the ‘involvement’ of the Trinity. If the Son, as substantive relationship, is 
incarnate in human history, then the Father and the Holy Spirit must also be, in some sense, 
‘incarnate.’ In order to elucidate this point, Milbank divides history into three epochs each 
corresponding to one Person of the Trinity: the past, or Israel, is the time of the Father, the 
present the time of the Son, and the future the time of the Spirit and the Church:  
The Father must in some fashion be ‘incarnated’ as the voice of human memory, especially as 
the memory of Israel? After all, if Christ is sinless, then this memory now becomes 
retrospectively perfected. By retrospection , the temporal source that is Israel becomes one with 
the eternal paternal source…And one can also say, with Bulgakov this time, that the Church in 
its eschatological totality is collectively personified by the Holy Spirit.1140     
    Therefore, the Church, as the epoch of the Spirit, is the gradual ‘growing into’ the identity 
between God and the world that Christ represents with the unity of the ‘two’ Sophias. According 
to Milbank, even matter is properly taken up into this relationship insofar as it has a certain 
kingship with the essence or Sophia of God, which Milbank suggests should be conceived as the 
‘matter of God:’ ‘the play of the divine essence through the Trinitarian relations is therefore in a 
sense eminently matter, and this coincides with the sense that Sophia is eminently a female 
womb.’1141 It is for this reason that Milbank contends that humanity is properly called a 
microcosm of the universe and the image of God, as opposed to angels and other spiritual beings 
for instance, as we possess this image only as spiritual/material beings.1142 
    Therefore, we have discussed Milbank’s theories of theurgy, Christology and deification in 
relation to his Sophiology. We noted its comparisons to Bulgakov’s concept of Wisdom. 
Milbank appeared to follow the general teleological movement of the fallen Sophia throughout 
history ascending towards God as God descends to creation, as outlined in Valentinian, 
Schellingian and Bulgakovian thought. Within the Christology of the biblical Wisdom tradition, 
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we noted that Christ’s humanity and divinity were always distinguished. Although Wisdom 
‘mediates’ between God and the world (and this role was later ascribed to Christ) it also upholds 
ontological distinction. However, within the Valentinian Wisdom Christology, we noted a 
monophysite position, which maintained that fallen Sophia (humanity) and divine Sophia 
(Christ) are ultimately one and the same Sophia, this pattern was adopted by Bulgakov and is 
here seemingly taken on by Milbank. Furthermore, Milbank’s vision of deification appears to be 
more closely indebted to the Gnostic Valentinian tradition than to that of the biblical one, for the 
reason that it follows the Valentinian narrative cycle of identity, fall, and recuperation.   
 
Valentinian Wisdom, Biblical Wisdom and Milbank’s Sophiology: A Comparative Outline   
As we have already noted above, Milbank’s first purpose for producing a Sophiology was to 
provide a ‘Trinitarian ontology’ that was able to identify and subsequently account for a 
‘paradoxical’ form of mediation within God’s own mode of relating to God’s ‘self’ which he 
could then utilize to ground the ‘paradoxical’ relationship between God and the world, which 
simultaneously upheld their mutual identity and their difference. By conceptualizing God’s 
essence as the figure of Sophia, Milbank believed that he had succeeded in providing such a 
Trinitarian ontology. Milbank astutely identifies the Kantian ‘problem of the comprehending 
other’ in Bulgakov’s Trinitarian Sophiology, and works hard to distance his positions from the 
conflict ridden theogonies apparent in Schelling, Hegel, and Russian Sophiology, that this 
dynamic can often invite. Whereas in Bulgakov’s proposals, the ‘comprehending other’ was the 
second Person of the Trinity which turned out to be completely synonymous with the world 
itself, Milbank attempts to confine this ‘process’ exclusively to the immanent life of the Trinity, 
thus initially avoiding the pantheistic and monistic implications of Bulgakov’s Sophiology. 
Therefore, Being must be manifested and comprehended by an other in order for it to be in any 
true sense. According to Milbank, the Father is by being comprehended by God’s self as the Son, 
which occurs through the act itself which is accomplished in the Spirit. Here, ‘otherness’ 
inherently includes ontological compatibility and identity between that which is and that which 
comprehends, and furthermore even requires it. Sophia is the figure that embodies and expresses 
this relationship within Milbank’s paradoxical Trinitarian ontology. Initially, Milbank’s 
adjustments appear to have avoided the issue of monism and pantheism within Bulgakov’s 
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Sophiology which prevent him from facing the ‘problem of finitude’ and the subsequent Gnostic 
narratives that seek to respond to this issue. However, Milbank still needs to account for 
creation’s participation within this Trinitarian ontology. 
    When attempting to identify the ‘place’ of creation within this Trinitarian ontology, Milbank 
notes that, due to the ubiquity of the Trinitarian ‘process’ itself, the creation must somehow 
reside within it, or alternatively, God goes outside God’s self when relating to his own existence, 
and this ‘movement’ is the reality of the world as such. In many respects, Milbank must reach 
this conclusion, for if a finite world could be accounted for ‘outside’ of God, then he would be 
simply supporting the theological narrative that he holds accountable for grounding the existence 
of ‘secularity,’ which is precisely what he is trying to undermine by insisting on the world’s 
essential place within his Trinitarian ontology. However, as we have seen, by adopting this 
method, Milbank inevitably implies a fundamental ontological monism, which threatens to 
collapse into a latent pantheism or ascosmism and, ironically, reinforce a radical form of atheistic 
secularity. In order to avoid both these positions, Milbank has to somehow paradoxically affirm 
both the identity of the world and God and their difference simultaneously. He does this by 
abandoning the principle of non-contradiction and affirming the paradoxical mediation achieved 
through the figure of Wisdom who is both divine and creaturely, thus upholding their unity 
within an ontological distinction by making the world an integral part of God’s self-
comprehension. However, as we have seen above, rather than affirming difference within 
identity, Milbank’s notion of the infinite appears to simply confirm the monistic core of his 
ontology. This ideal ontological state of identity is then contradicted by the reality of finitude 
itself which is clearly not ontologically identical to God, where it supposedly ought to be. This 
reflexively introduces the Valentinian ‘problem of finitude’ which we have identified in chapter 
II, and traced throughout our chronology, to its presence in Milbank’s Sophiology. Now, 
Milbank is forced to embody a form of dialectical reasoning that he suggests is in fact 
paradoxical. However, either way, in both instances, God and the world are conceived to be in 
opposition to each other, an opposition which must be subsequently explained and then negated. 
As we have also seen in chapter II and in the respective narratives that have formed the core of 
this investigation, the ‘problem of finitude’ is addressed via a metaphysical fall narrative that 
explains why and how the world is apart from God, and this is precisely what we see in 
Milbank’s Sophiology. Sophia exercises a ‘blind will’ that results in her alienation from the 
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original and harmonious whole; resulting in the duplication of Sophia – ‘fallen Sophia’ or 
Achamoth, trapped in the finite world, and her heavenly counterpart the ideal of what her 
existence ought to be. This duplication should not be the case and must be dialectically negated 
to reinstall the harmony of the whole. Although Milbank attempts to avoid the overt Gnostic 
implications of his narrative by suggesting that Sophia’s fall is immediately resolved within 
God’s eternity, and therefore maintain that the creative act is independent of this conflict 
resolution within the divine, the facticity of the world’s history seems to undermine this attempt. 
For, it is precisely the historical finite world that needs to be readopted within the infinite whole, 
and this is exactly what Milbank attempts to achieve within his Christology and eschatology.  
    The fallen Sophia is constantly moving towards her re-inauguration with the monistic totality 
that she is currently separated from, and this process occurs through history itself. History is 
nothing more but the teleological drive to negate the consequences of the ontological alienation 
which have resulted from the fall. For Milbank, this occurs through ‘theurgy’ where human and 
divine interaction becomes attuned. Milbank, following Bulgakov, contends that the 
divine/human collaboration reaches its highest point in the figure of Mary where ‘her orientation 
to the supernatural is also the beginning of the actual birth of the Logos within her.’1143 Mary 
represents the pinnacle of human history insofar as she embodies the ‘readiness’ for the fallen 
Sophia to receive her heavenly counterpart and negate the effects of the fall. Therefore, history is 
a divine/human movement, where the heavenly and the fallen Sophias are constantly seeking 
each other, until a complete union is possible. For Milbank, this union takes place in the 
Incarnation of Christ: ‘here alone occurs the event of the final finding and retrieving of the lost 
and fallen Sophia.’1144 However, as we have already noted, Milbank envisages this union, not so 
much as an hypostatic communion of two ontologically distinct natures, but as an essential union 
between ‘two’ essences that are at base one: ‘the two characterizing powers are at bottom one, 
since the uncreated and created Sophia are more fundamentally one in ‘foundation and 
content.’’1145 However, if these two essences are already ontologically united and are identical, 
why must an incarnation occur at all within Milbank’s Sophiology? Even though the essences are 
identical, they are modally alienated from each other as a result of the fall, therefore Milbank’s 
                                                             
1143
 Milbank, Sophiology and Theurgy, p.83. 
1144
 Ibid, p.79. 
1145
 Ibid, p.81 (my emphasis). 
 
 
322 
narrative requires a ‘re-union’ to take place, a recovery of something lost, the negation of the 
original negation of the totality, which completes the narrative. This is precisely why Milbank 
requires a monophysite Christology, and a doctrine of deification that excludes any possibility of 
ontological difference existing between God and creation, these must be in place in order to 
complete the narrative, to uphold the original monistic whole. After the incarnation, the Spirit 
draws the world into the communion of the Church and deifies creation resulting in its total 
participation in the totality.  
    Therefore, it should now be clear to what extent some aspects of Milbank’s Sophiology have 
clearly been informed by the concept of Wisdom produced within Valentinian Gnosticism which 
was outlined in chapter II. Although Milbank also borrows from the biblical concept of Wisdom, 
and we can see this most chiefly in his Trinitarian theology, which was outlined above. 
Furthermore, at points where the Valentinian concept of Sophia would appear to suggest itself in 
Milbank’s proposals, we attempted to unpack other possible discussions that could be said to 
underpin his proposals. For instance, in Milbank’s Christology, a Gnostic context did suggest 
itself, however, this theme was perhaps better understood against the background of Milbank’s 
commitment to transcendental knowledge (borrowed and elaborated on from de Lubac). 
However, despite this fact it is still the contention here that Milbank’s Sophiology remains more 
closely indebted to the Valentinian concept of Wisdom outlined in chapter II, for five 
predominant arguments:   
1) Milbank’s Sophiology commences with an ontological monism of the infinite that is akin 
to the ‘founding Valentinian presuppostion’ of Valentinian Gnosticism. This same 
position was generated in post-Kantian idealism, and embraced by Schelling, Solovyov, 
and Bulgakov, which appears to be the source of Milbank’s position.  
2) This ontological monism is then contradicted by the reality of a finite world, that should 
not be insofar as it is ‘independent’ of the whole, this reflexively generates ‘the problem 
of finitude’ which was identified in chapter II, and was shown to be one of the regulative 
tenets of Valentian mythology. This firstly requires that the current alienated state of 
finitude be explained: why is it the case when it ought not to be so? We have seen the 
problem of finitude emerge in Fichte’s Idealism, and then again in Schelling, Solovyov 
and Bulgakov, and now in Milbank himself. 
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3) The alienated state of finitude is explained by appealing to a metaphysical/transcendental 
fall, that is neither an historical fall or a narrative based on the Genesis myth. In this case, 
the fall involves an aspect of the divine alienating itself from its own existence. The 
Valentinian concept of Wisdom in distinction from its biblical counterpart, is always 
accompanied by this myth. As we have already noted, we identified this narrative 
structure in Schelling’s theogony, which provided the apparatus for Solovyov and 
Bulgakov’s own versions of the same narrative, only they both adopted the figure of 
Wisdom to express their positions. It is quite clear that Milbank adopts Sophia in almost 
an identical manner; to narrate a metaphysical fall that explains the alienated existence of 
finitude. However, we must note that in other areas of Milbank’s theology he rejects this 
myth as outlined above.  
4) Thus, having explained why and how the problem of finitude exists, and that it ought not 
to do so, Milbank must then attempt to negate this original negation in order to restore the 
original monism that has been disrupted by Sophia’s fall. Therefore, within the 
Valentinian concept of Wisdom, God and the world are considered to be ontologically 
identical in their foundation or essence, but modally alienated from each other in their 
current existence. Thus, God and the world are conceived to be in opposition, when they 
ought not to be (the opposition between the fallen Sophia and the heavenly Sophia). 
Thus, this modal alienation must be negated, which occurs within the incarnation of 
Christ. According to Milbank’s Sophiology, the incarnation marks the point at which the 
alienated Sophias are reunited modally. After all, they were never ontologically distinct 
in their foundation, only in their mode of existence, which is brought into mutual 
harmony in the being of Christ; the fallen Sophia and the heavenly Sophia reunited. 
Before this is able to take place, the fallen Sophia must teleologically prepare herself for 
this reunion through the ‘process’ of the world’s history, we have identified this pattern 
in Schelling, Solovyov, and Bulgakov, and it now appears to be clearly apparent in 
Milbank’s Sophiology.  The doctrine of the ‘incarnation’ as the historical point where the 
reunion takes place marks the dissolution of the modal alienation, and the beginning of 
the recovery of the monistic whole. We have seen this in Schelling’s Philosophy of 
Revelation, Solovyov’s Lectures on Divine-Humanity and Russia and the Universal 
Church, Bulgakov’s dogmatic trilogies, and now clearly in Milbank’s own Sophiology, 
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all of which seem to be intimately informed by the concept of Wisdom apparent in 
Valentinian thought.  
5) The eschatological portion of Valentinian wisdom theology always results in the 
dissolution of the duplicity of Sophia, and the re-absorption of the finite into the infinite 
whole. In the case of Schelling and Solovyov, this is what occurred, however, in the 
instances of Bulgakov and Milbank after him, the more conventional orthodox doctrine 
of deification was invoked. However, the basic outcome remains the same even here, 
what was once modally separated is now wholly unified without ontological distinction, 
which we have clearly identified in Milbank’s Sophiological conception of deification.  
Having critically discussed one aspect of modern British wisdom theology in John Milbank’s 
Sophiology and discovered it to be more closely indebted to Valentinian Gnosticism, we shall 
now evaluate Paul Fiddes’ wisdom theology and critically compare it to John Milbank’s, seeing 
whether it perhaps offers an alternative that is more deeply rooted in the biblical concept of 
Wisdom.   
Wisdom Theology in Paul Fiddes 
Fiddes’ Theology in Context 
Paul Stuart Fiddes (b.1947) is a leading British theologian and ordained minister within the 
Baptist tradition. Having received his initial education at Drayton Manor Grammar School in 
West London, in 1965 he attended St. Peter’s College, Oxford to study philosophy, politics and 
economics. However, he soon changed his discipline to English language and literature and 
theology. He then subsequently studied for his doctorate, which he completed in 1976 entitled 
The Hiddenness of Wisdom in the Old Testament and Later Judaism. His most recent publication 
on Wisdom theology draws heavily on this dissertation. He then took up a post-doctoral research 
post at the Eberhard Karl’s University of Tübingen, where he studied under Jürgen Moltmann 
and Eberhard Jüngel; both of whom would exert a great deal of influence over Fiddes’ later 
theology. Fiddes has held a variety of academic positions throughout his professional career. 
From 1972-75 he was junior research fellow in Old Testament and Hebrew in Regent’s college 
Oxford, where he later became tutor in Christian doctrine in 1975. In 1989 Fiddes was appointed 
principal of Regent’s college and was later made Professor of Systematic Theology in Oxford in 
2002. He is currently principal Emeritus at Regent’s college. Fiddes has authored a wide range of 
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books and articles. Perhaps, his most significant publications would include The Creative 
Suffering of God (1988), Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement 
(1989) (Keith Ward describes these as ‘modern classics’1146), Participating in God: A Pastoral 
Doctrine of the Trinity (2000) and most recently, Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew 
Wisdom and Christian Doctrine in a Late-Modern Context (2013). 
    The Creative Suffering of God is Fiddes’ most comprehensive attempt to defend and outline a 
doctrine of divine passibility. Drawing heavily on the 20th century German Protestant tradition 
(Barth, Moltmann and Jüngel) and process theology (sourced principally from the philosophical 
ideas of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) who attempted to ontologize change by denying 
ontological reality to substance, which implied that God becomes with the world), Fiddes rejects 
the doctrine of God which he identifies as being classically theist; a God who is impassible; a 
God, which Fiddes argues, is detached and irrelevant to a finite world, especially a finite world 
that suffers such a myriad of evils. According to Fiddes, within classical theism, the world is 
unnecessary to God, insofar as God receives, ontologically speaking, nothing back from creation 
that would add to or change his existence. For Fiddes, God is ontologically bound up with the 
becoming of the world,1147 God allows, and indeed desires the world to change God’s being. It is 
important to note that Fiddes is aware of how close these suggestions come to Hegelianism, yet 
is keen to distinguish his theological proposal from such positions by claiming that God chooses 
to limit himself, it is an act of God’s will to compassionately and patiently become with the 
world. Thus, becoming with the world is not an ontological necessity for God imposed upon him, 
but rather a freely determined act of God made out of his love for creation. This proposal is 
heavily indebted to Barth, Moltmann and Jüngel, all of whom adopt this same stance. This act of 
sacrificial love is revelatory of God’s Triune nature, in which God is eternally for the other. 
These themes of the volunteered mutability of God, the grounding of this act in God’s loving 
Triune nature, and the task of theology (liberal Protestant task) to make God relevant in the 
world, accompany Fiddes throughout his theological publications and indeed form an essential 
part of his later wisdom theology.  
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 Keith Ward, ‘Freedom, Necessity and suffering in God’, p.134. 
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 Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.65. 
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    Past Event and Present Salvation again evidences Fiddes’ commitment to interpreting 
Christian doctrine in a way that makes it intelligible within a modern context. Here, he is 
particularly keen to explore the significance of the ‘past’ event of Christ’s passion and atonement 
for Christian believers in the present. Fiddes first proposes that if a doctrine of the atonement is 
to have any significant theological bearing, then the universal predicament of sin must be 
acknowledged. Fiddes suggests that three particular criteria of sin are universally applicable to 
humanity: estrangement, loss of potential and rebellion. Having provided ample evidence from 
history to support this contention, Fiddes then engages with the traditional images of atonement. 
Firstly, he addresses the notion of sacrifice. Here, Fiddes argues that Christ’s unique sacrifice of 
himself provides the basis for a Christian Eucharistic sacrifice of praise and worship. He then 
evaluates the role of justice. At this point, Fiddes draws on his doctrine of divine suffering to 
note that the cross is the deepest expression of God’s identification with human suffering and 
evil, which he perceives as an historical event shaping the intra-triune life of God. He then turns 
to the notion of victory, where the event of Christ’s overcoming of death and hell on the cross 
provides the possibility for humanity to overcome its own tribulations, drawing strength from 
Christ’s identification with our own sinful and suffering condition. Finally, Fiddes acknowledges 
the moral implication of this doctrine, suggesting that as we encounter love and forgiveness in 
Christ’s passion and resurrection, we are called to participate in these events and allow Christ to 
shape the lives of others through our own responses to these experiences. Fiddes clearly builds 
on two significant themes from his earlier work on the Creative Suffering of God, namely the 
centrality of divine suffering and the evangelical call to proclaim the Gospel and Christian 
doctrine in a manner that is intelligible within a modern context. 
    One of the most significant features of Participating in God is the Trinitarian ontology that 
Fiddes outlines in this work, which will be a model utilized and expanded upon in his wisdom 
theology. When discussing the notion of Personhood within the Trinity, Fiddes is careful to 
distinguish its use in this context from modern emphases on the subject being an individual 
subjective center of consciousness. Instead, building on the Augustinian theme of ‘subsistent 
relations,’ Fiddes contends that the three Persons within the divine Trinity should be entirely 
understood as relations and not as persons having relationships. He claims:  
Relations in God are real and ‘beingful’ as anything which is created or uncreated, and that there 
ground of existence is in themselves. If we use the term hypostasis as the fathers did for a 
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distinct reality which has being, then the relations are hypostases. There are no persons at the end 
of relation, but the persons are simply the relations.1148    
Furthermore, Fiddes adopts the Barthian terminology of God as an ‘event’ and conceives of 
these triune subsistent relations as three movements of relationship within the event of God, 
which draws creation into this relational dynamic as active participator within the event of God. 
Creation can realize this through acts of prayer and worship, where the world actively communes 
with God from within the relationships that he is. Fiddes conceives that the ultimate invitation to 
this participation is within the incarnation, where Christ draws humanity into his relationship to 
the Father through the Spirit.  
    The three themes of divine mutability, mediation of Christian doctrine through contemporary 
culture, and a relational Trinitarian ontology play an important role in Fiddes’ most recent 
significant work: Seeing the World and Knowing God, where he proposes his wisdom theology 
at length, which we shall discuss in detail below.  
    Fiddes has an exceedingly wide range of influences on his theology. Fiddes maintains a keen 
interest in biblical scholarship which always effects his theological proposals. Furthermore, as 
already noted, Process theology plays a major role in his theological thinking. Theologians that 
have proven sympathetic to this strain of philosophy have also had an impact on Fiddes, most 
notably, Moltmann, Jüngel, and Barth. Fiddes has a broad breadth of interest in literature and 
modern philosophy and contemporary science. He is a theologian deeply engaged in the culture 
in which he inhabits. Thus, he engages with everything from postmodern philosophy (especially 
Derrida), to feminist thought (Luce Irigaray  and Julia Kristeva), and contemporary quantum 
physics. Much of these influences will be discussed in the assessment of Fiddes’ wisdom 
theology which we shall now discuss. 
The Concept of Wisdom in Seeing the World and Knowing God       
Why Wisdom? 
The theological purpose of Seeing the World and Knowing God is outlined by Fiddes in his 
introduction to the book, where he states: ‘my intention is to develop a wisdom-theology for the 
age in which we are living, connecting with the mood of our late-modern world, and drawing 
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upon the wisdom literature of Ancient Israel, inter-testamental Judaism, and early 
Christianity.’1149 Fiddes’ decision to embark on a wisdom-theology is by no means arbitrary; 
continuing to display his commitment to mediating Christian doctrine through modern culture, 
he believes that there is a major theme that relates biblical wisdom texts to the cultural climate of 
late-modernity, namely both search for ‘wisdom’ and ‘have in common an interest in – perhaps 
even an anxiety about – the relation between the self and the world, as well as in the possibility 
of finding traces of an ultimate reality that transcends the self and yet is embodied in the 
interaction.’1150 Therefore, contemporary thought evidences a struggle to relate the self to the 
world and vice versa and even doubts whether such a relation can exist, given that the very 
existence of the subject itself is rejected in many modern psychological and philosophical 
discourses. According to Fiddes, biblical wisdom theology struggled with this very same 
question, ultimately proposing a theological response that conceives of God and the world, the 
world and the subject as harmoniously united, however not without evidencing concerns over 
these themes that have been voiced in more recent times. It is this biblical proposal that Fiddes 
believes can offer something significant to the questions circulating in late-modernity, offering 
perhaps a different alternative to many of the current responses. In order for us to be able to 
assess Fiddes’ wisdom theology, and especially how he utilizes the biblical concept of Wisdom 
outlined in chapter II, addressing similar issues that Milbank faced, we must first engage with 
Fiddes’ reading of late-modernity – the discussion, from in which, he proposes his wisdom 
theology.   
The Self and the World in a Late-Modern Context 
According to Fiddes, there were three forms of the ‘self-world’ relationship that were prevalent 
in modernity: ‘three attempts to negotiate the relation of subject to object.’1151 The first 
conceives the world as an object detached from the subject; the second perceives the world as an 
object that expresses the subject and in the third the world, as object, is considered a threat to the 
subject. Fiddes suggests that postmodernity can be characterized by its rejection of these three 
models. 
                                                             
1149
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    The first model of a self as detached and ultimate master of the world has its genesis in the 
thought of Descartes and Kant. Fiddes suggests that, in his search for epistemological certainty, 
Descartes was forced to abandon the world as represented by the mind as ultimately unreliable. 
Instead, he found certainty in the process of thinking itself. Ultimately, this radical turn to the 
self is given ‘formative expression in Descartes’ distinction between the res cogitans and the res 
extensans, a fundamental dualism between the cognitive self and its physical embodiment and 
environment.’1152 This can result, and has, according to philosophers such as Hannah Arendt, in a 
distrust of the world and a total retreat into the subject. 
    In many respects, Kant continues to propagate this position when he subordinates reality to 
what can be known by a human subject. Thus the existence of the world is bound to the workings 
of human reason. Fiddes states that ‘Kant, we may say, contributes to a modern mindset in which 
the self is seen as being both detached from nature and the controller of physical nature.’1153  
This theme of subjective detachment from and mastery over the world is given theological 
expression in Schleiermacher’s category of ‘feeling’ as a form of knowing; and this is 
characterized by a feeling of absolute dependence; firstly, dependency on the world and then 
ultimately on God for the subject’s individual being. However, Fiddes argues that ‘despite 
dependence on the world, the result of this account of the subject is actually to extend the gap set 
up between subject and the world initiated by Descartes and continued by Kant. The world is not 
given attention in its own right, but only indirectly as the content of one’s own self- 
consciousness.’1154  
    Fiddes then explores the origins of his second model of the subject-object relationship existing 
within modernity: the self as an expression of the world. This form is developed to its greatest 
extent in the philosophy of Hegel.  Fiddes remarks that: ‘with Hegel we do…take the step of 
conceiving God as absolute mind coming to self-consciousness through relation to the world;’1155 
which has implications for human subjectivity: ‘the idealist account of the universe means that 
an interior subjectivity is necessarily integrated into external objectivity of physical, cultural, and 
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social contexts.’1156 Fiddes notes the theological significance of Hegelian philosophy, suggesting 
that it dealt the first major blow to divine immutability by conceiving of God as kenotic self-
emptying into the other of the world whilst maintaining distinction within unity from the created 
order. Yet most importantly, Hegel appears to have overcome the divide between subject and 
object. However, rehearsing the classic theological critique of Hegel, first outlined by Schelling 
(as outlined in chapter IV), and which has proven so influential in the contemporary reception of 
Hegel, Fiddes argues that ‘the objectivity of the world is nothing other than an expression of the 
subject, of a mind which is self-aware. It is doubtful then whether the world and even other 
persons are really ‘alien’ and ‘strange’ to the journeying mind at all. ‘Others’ are seen to be 
simply ‘more of the same.’1157   
    Lastly, Fiddes outlines his third model: the world as a threat to the self. Jean-Paul Satre is 
taken as the exemplar of this approach. Fiddes suggests that Satre argues that the self is a project 
created by individual choice as an exercise of freedom (being-in-itself). However, the objectivity 
of the world is perceived as a boundary to the exercise of freedom, thus creating an absurd 
contradiction, in which the subject must simply choose to be. Satre then suggests that the subject 
is also a ‘being-for-others’ in which he argues that the subject depends on other subjects for its 
own constitution: ‘we are at the mercy of others insofar as their consciousness of our self 
effectively determines our being.’1158 Therefore, the objectivity of the subject’s surroundings is 
necessary to the development of the subject, but is equally seen as a limiting and threatening 
presence to the individual. Therefore the three main models of the subject-object relationship 
developed within modernity fail to unite and harmonize subject and object despite a desire to. 
This legacy is inherited by postmodernity, which prompts several reactionary responses which 
Fiddes characterizes in four modes: immersion in the world, a hermeneutic of suspicion, 
openness of meaning, and the impact of the sublime. It is important to note that Fiddes, unlike 
Milbank, does not wish to challenge the foundations of postmodernity, nor categorize it as a 
series of theological confusions and failures, but, rather accepts its legitimacy as a late-modern 
paradigm of thought and attempt to tease out commonalities between this paradigm and a 
theology that draws substantially on the  Jewish-Christian wisdom tradition. 
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    Now turning to the first postmodern model of subject-object relations: immersion in the world; 
for Fiddes, this is epitomized within the tradition of phenomenology, specifically in the thought 
of Edmund Husserl. According to the latter, there is no subjective encounter with the objectivity 
of the world that is not already bound up with the manner (including hopes, desires and so forth) 
in which the subject engages with the world; Husserl calls this ‘intentionality’. Therefore: ‘the 
attitude taken towards the object is inseparable from it, so that consciousness is always 
‘consciousness of,’ and the object is always ‘perceived as.’1159 Building on this 
phenomenological insight, Levinas states the case even more strongly, noting that ‘there is no 
objectivity that would be indifferent to the very existence of a subjectivity.’1160 Before Levinas, 
Heidegger had also categorized the self as that which is comprised of its Befindlichket.  
    Fiddes is influenced by this phenomenological model of the subject-object relation, to the 
extent that his wisdom theology will seek to affirm that there is no gap between the ‘observing 
mind of the wise and the observed world; moreover there is no gap to ‘mind’ between God and 
the world, no ontological abyss that has to be bridged for God to be present and active in the 
world.’1161 Despite these sympathies, Fiddes remains non-committal to a total assimilation of this 
view point, arguing that this approach, taken to its logical conclusion, could ‘reduce the reality of 
the world to the consciousness itself, or at least subordinate it.’1162 Husserl ‘brackets’ out the 
ontological question of the actual existence of the phenomena intentionally perceived by the 
subject, to focus entirely on the ‘intentional object’; Fiddes shares Derrida’s concerns that this 
could result in a transcendental ego utterly detached from the world – affirming a radical form of 
idealism. However, on the opposite end of the spectrum, it is just as possible, within the 
phenomenological proposal, to conceive of the self as ‘de-centered construct within the system 
of signs which constitutes corporate life.’1163 A self entirely produced by its shifting and non-
substantial environment; a self that doesn’t really exist. Fiddes suggests that this position is 
represented by Foucault, but is not shared by thinkers such as Levinas, Derrida, and Kristeva. 
Therefore, Fiddes accepts certain crucial insights from this proposal of ‘immersion in the world,’ 
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yet rejects its extreme variations. He accepts the late-modern contention that the self is 
necessarily bound up with the world. 
    Fiddes then explores the second characteristic of late-modern thought: a hermeneutic of 
suspicion. He suggests that the philosophical foundations of this mood are rooted in Nietzsche, 
whose astute and radical suspicions of universal moral values and thought-forms were heavily 
criticized for concealing the interests of certain social groups, in dynamic power games, designed 
to promote individual interest as universal value. More recently, Fiddes proposes that Lyotard 
has adopted this Nietzschean theme contending that ‘grand-narratives are nothing other than a 
self-presentation of the subject that develops them, and represent the desire to dominate 
others.’1164 Although Fiddes accepts that some meta-narratives can indeed be abusive and self-
interested projections, he argues with David Bentley Hart that particular narratives, such as 
Nazism, can only be judged as morally unacceptable from the vantage point of a meta-narrative. 
Christianity itself must presuppose a metanarrative and a metaphysics to the extent that it 
proposes a ‘comprehensive, conceptual account of reality which exceeds a merely empirical 
analysis of the physical world.’1165 This metaphysics is rooted in a Trinitarian ontology for 
Fiddes, which we shall see later. The main challenge to any theological metanarrative, including 
the wisdom narrative that Fiddes will propose, is to ‘present a metanarrative in a way that the 
hearer will be convinced is not dominating, abusive of local narratives, or a rhetoric of power 
projected by the corporate ‘self’ of the Christian institution.’1166 
    Fiddes’ third category is ‘the openness of meaning.’ This mood emerges as a critical response 
to the structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure and is commonly referred to as poststructuralism. 
For Suassure ‘the meaning of words and phrases comes from their relation to each other, and 
particularly their difference from each other.’1167 Suassure imagined the written text to be a 
contained world in which meaning could be construed only by studying it as an interrelated 
network of signs. Derrida extends this contention, pointing out that the extension of difference 
between signs can be infinite as all signs always differ from each other. Therefore, archetypal 
meaning is always deferred and postponed. Derrida calls this différance. Due to the fact that 
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structuralism searches for an overall meaning within a text implied by the signs adhering there 
in, Derrida undermines this approach to the extent that no meaning can ever be captured within 
the infinite extension of deferment. Derrida’s approach not only challenged structuralism, but all 
metanarratives built on the foundation of a ‘transcendental signifier’ such as God, reason and the 
Oedipus complex. Some have taken Derrida’s position to imply an ultimate nihilism, which 
Fiddes is keen to reject. However, he does accept that there can be no totalizing reading of a 
particular text in which one permitted reading is upheld. According to Fiddes, the Jewish-
Christian wisdom tradition, like Derrida, undermines such a proposal; arguing instead for a rich 
diversity of different meanings in a particular text. Thus, there is a meeting point on this issue: ‘I 
intend to argue that there is a commonality between the hermeneutics of a sacred text and all 
texts, but even a Christian approach to Scripture which is sophianic…shows that there is a basic 
sympathy with postmodern insights into openness of meaning.’1168   
    The final category that Fiddes explores is the ‘challenge of the sublime.’ Kant is the first 
philosopher to draw a clear distinction between what is beautiful and what is sublime. Beauty is 
agreeable insofar as the understanding and imagination are harmonized, whereas the sublime 
represents a conflict between reason and imagination, which is excited when the subject is faced 
with the immeasurable or the awe inspiring (the multitudes of stars in the night sky or of the vast 
expanse of an ocean). On such occasions, the imagination cannot fathom that which it looks 
upon, which causes it distress at its own limitations, however simultaneously, reason believes 
that such events should be fathomable, which draws attention to humanity’s intellectual capacity 
to transcend the purely sensible and provokes a sense of negative pleasure. This ought, produced 
by reason, bares clear resemblances to the categorical imperative, which is also an experience of 
the sublime revealing humanity’s ultimate freedom over the objective world. According to 
Fiddes, postmodern thought adopts a notion of the sublime that runs contrary to Kant’s own 
understanding; experiencing the sublime as a destructive theme; the experience of nothingness 
undermining all positive representation and objective reason. Such themes are epitomized by 
Lyotard, Deleuze and Derrida in Fiddes’ view. However, while some theologians have attempted 
to combat this reading of the sublime, Fiddes suggests that ‘the sublime offers common ground 
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for theology and thinkers of the late-modern world to explore a sense of transcendence.’1169 The 
postmodern sublime offers theology a way of ‘liberating’ the transcendence of God by 
demonstrating that God cannot be enclosed with any particular system, but interrupts such 
systems and requires an ongoing plurality of discourses to do justice to this transcendence. 
    What we have briefly outlined above is the primary context in which Fiddes will seek to 
construct his wisdom theology, in which he will be attempting to provide a theological model, 
that takes account of these four moods of late-modernity, of the self-world relationship, drawn 
from the biblical wisdom tradition.  
Wisdom and the Concept of the Self   
Building on his earlier analysis of ‘immersion in the world,’ Fiddes contends that the 
‘destruction of the self’ in postmodernity, whilst being supported by thinkers such as Deleuze, is 
not endorsed by Derrida. Although Derrida certainly dismisses the subject as a stable center of 
identity, he does not give up the idea completely; thus, Fiddes adopts Derrida as a partner in 
dialogue as he seeks to propose a theological understanding of the self that resists its modern 
representation and which is ultimately grounded in the wisdom tradition. To construct this self- 
Fiddes visits the Hebraic wisdom text of Job and especially this text as read by Levinas and 
Ricoeur.  According to Fiddes, one of the key themes to emerge out of the book of Job is Job’s 
sense of persecution and accusation, by his friends and ultimately by God himself. Levinas 
adopts this theme to argue that the subject is in existence only insofar as it is called into being 
through ethical responsibility to the other. ‘The origin of the free subject lies in responsibility to 
the other who is infinitely different to the self, making a demand which is always prevenient, 
overturning all structures of being and totality with a force like the sublime…what Job portrays 
as the accusation of the divine Other…is in fact the demand upon us of all others in the 
world.’1170 Therefore, Levinas’ reading of Job proposes a self that is immersed in the other, to 
the extent that it is only insofar as it is for the other; to the extent that its free subjectivity has 
been summoned forth through responsibility to the divine Other.  
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    Similarly, Ricoeur advocates a parallel version of the subject to that proposed by Levinas, 
stating that the subject is not a Cartesian static substance, but a fluctuating reality produced by its 
engagement with its world through narrative and history; as these change, so does the subject. 
According to Fiddes, ‘as Ricoeur develops it; fundamental to the reflexiveness of the subject is 
knowing oneself by way of the other…Ricoeur thus finds a different picture of the self from the 
‘little island’ of an isolated cogito. With its story-like quality, the ipse comes to a mediated self-
awareness through powerful symbols in culture…and through relation with the other.’1171 Fiddes 
thus concludes, with the mood of late-modernity, loosely supported by biblical references to Job, 
that the subject must be perceived as constructed through immersion in the otherness of the 
world:  
I will be using the words subject and self basically in Ricoeur’s sense. The subject…is a 
self…only in the Ricoeurian sense of oneself…that is a subject with a narrative history, always 
mediated to itself through reflection on signs, symbols, other persons, and objects in the world. 
With Ricoeur…Derrida, Levinas, and other late-modern thinkers…I maintain that a stable and 
self sufficient self which can be observed empirically by the subject is an illusion.1172  
It is this conception of the self that will be the corner stone of Fiddes’ wisdom theology: ‘in 
making a wisdom theology for today, I shall be exploring the way that the self participates in the 
divine Other through immersion into the contingent details of the world.’1173 Participation in the 
divine (a key aspect of Fiddes’ wisdom theology), which is akin to responsibility to finite others, 
occurs most vividly when the self is conceived through the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, as 
we shall see shortly.  
    Fiddes’ conception of the self is greatly indebted to postmodern thought on subjectivity. That 
being said, Wisdom was discovered – within chapter I of this thesis – to be neither pure object 
nor pure subject, but rather a personification; something approaching the personal, as well as 
being a description of an objective reality. Fiddes appears to borrow as much from the biblical 
concept of Wisdom as he does from recent philosophy when constructing his notion of the self. 
Furthermore, within the Valentinian concept of Wisdom, a stable divine core was proposed that 
inhered within certain humans, giving rise to a fixed subjectivity. Such a conception of the self is 
neither found in Fiddes’ proposals or in Milbank’s.   
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Wisdom and the Concept of the World 
Having proposed his understanding of the self, Fiddes now turns his attention to constructing an 
image of the world that is in sync with the mood of late-modernity. Following the insights of 
Hannah Arendt, Fiddes notes that the subject conceived in modernity as master over objectivity 
has resulted in a feeling of alienation from the world. The world is perceived as a threat to the 
subject, its diversity and complexity is overwhelming, and in a bid to keep this at bay, modernity 
retreated into the security of the mind to exercise control over the world. ‘The earth-world has 
been badly upset by alienation, so that humankind has lost a sense of being at home within it.’1174 
According to Fiddes, Arendt offers an image of the world that could be taken up within his 
wisdom theology due to its similarities to ancient wisdom texts; Arendt:  
alerts us to the context of late-modern thought which finds the world to be full of contingent 
things which…elude investigation by the rational mind when it is thought to reign supreme in the 
world. If the human self tries to control or dominate the earth, then the earth’s natural self-
concealment and resistance to investigation will be accentuated. Her sense of the elusiveness of 
the world has remarkable resonances with the outlook of ancient wisdom.1175  
Fiddes reads the ‘sentence literature’ of Proverbs as simultaneously affirming that while the 
world is something which can be investigated, understood and passed down through tradition by 
the wise, it also admits a ‘limit of understanding. “Three things are too wonderful for me, four I 
do not understand.” The wise then are aware of the incalculabilities that arise out of the very 
material they are dealing with.’1176 The world is both open and inexhaustible.  
    Within the book of Proverbs, God or Yahweh, as Fiddes points out, is often evoked when 
human wisdom reaches its limit, when transcendence must be acknowledged, due to the vast 
expanse of the world that cannot be fully grasped. Fiddes is aware that this could simply be a 
crude positing of the God of the gaps, however he argues that there is more to it than that. ‘Sheol 
and Abaddon are never satisfied and human eyes are never satisfied’ (Prov 27:20). The world is 
ever elusive and the human thirst for discovery is never exhausted. The sheer overwhelming 
expanse and hiddenness of the world conjures up humility at this limitation, a humility that is 
phrased as a humility before God within Proverbs. God is posited as one that can see everything, 
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God’s wisdom encompasses the world in a manner that humanity’s cannot. Fiddes summarizes 
this point: 
We have found that the limitation of the wisdom method arises out of the very material which 
wisdom concerns itself with, so we can picture the limit not as a boundary beyond which God 
resides, but as a boundlessness of the human personality and the natural world. Wisdom is 
limited by the scope of the material – its diversity, multiplicity, and complexity that can never be 
fully grasped by human minds. The transcendence of God…does not consist in God’s dwelling 
beyond a boundary located between two spheres of reality; rather, God is at home in the 
boundless expanse of the world in a way that we are not.1177 
Fiddes then goes on to  outline this unique approach of biblical wisdom as opposed to that which 
is found in Egyptian parallels, he also finds further confirmation of this approach in the rest of 
the literature of Proverbs. Fiddes borrows Arendt’s contention that the world is inexhaustibly 
complex and, when faced with this limit, the subject views the world as a hostile place which 
results in its alienation from the latter. Fiddes finds this same inexhaustibility of the world in the 
biblical wisdom book of Proverbs, however here, his is matched with a humility before God who 
marks this transcendent limit of human knowledge and also provides a telos for the insatiable 
human thirst for knowledge that ends in communion with God and also with the world, which is 
no longer seen as a hostile threat to the subject. 
    Fiddes continues to explore the theme of the complexity of the world in the wisdom literature 
and in late-modernity, here focusing on modern scientific discourses. Although postmodernity 
has remained markedly suspicious of scientific discourses (due to its tendencies to impose 
metanarratives), Fiddes suggests the contemporary science has much to offer a wisdom theology 
for today: ‘theology can hardly talk about the world in our age without at least attempting to 
connect with the way that science sees the world, since this is such a shaping force in our 
culture.’1178 According to Fiddes, science offers a parallel reading of the world to that offered in 
the ancient wisdom texts, namely that the world can be investigated but such an investigation 
will inevitably come up against limitations due to the complexity of the cosmos. He highlights a 
variety of different ways that modern science affirms the complexity of the world, the first being 
complexity arising from elusive conditions. This can occur on both the macroscopic and 
microscopic levels. In both instances science affirms that complexity arises from the lack of 
                                                             
1177
 Ibid, p.110. 
1178
 Ibid, p.131. 
 
 
338 
clarity surrounding initial causes of given phenomena in the world. Thus, Fiddes offers the 
example of the phenomenon of a hurricane, potentially being traced back to an event of 
apparently little significance, like a butterfly flapping its wings. Chaotic events on the 
macroscopic level only appear to be indeterminate. On the microscopic level, Fiddes offers the 
examples from human biology: ‘heart fibrillation and epileptic fits, which appear random, can be 
seen as the reaction of sensitive systems – whether the body’s mechanical pump or its electrical 
circuits – to tiny initial disturbances.’1179 Thus, complexity is a product of initial causes being 
hidden or masked from the investigator. 
    A second type of complexity in the world, which Fiddes considers, is a legitimate notion of 
uncertainty and indeterminacy. He refers to the quantum world, where sub-atomic particles obey 
no clear pre-described rules: ‘the motion of an electron has a wave function which has the 
potential either for position or momentum, but not both simultaneously. It is a world in which 
possibilities are no less real than actualities.’1180 
    The third mode of the world’s complexity is labelled by Fiddes as complexity arising from 
interaction. This can be understood to affirm that the interaction of existences (in every sense) 
produces unexpected outcomes and different levels of complexity. Fiddes again takes an 
example from quantum physics: ‘it seems that in some way the act of measuring, and so the 
intervention of consciousness, contributes to the nature of the particle which before this exists in 
a potential state.’1181 Fiddes’ fourth scientific model of complexity is essentially an extension of 
the third, complexity arising out of different possibilities, like that which we just saw in the 
example taken from quantum physics.  
    According to Fiddes, contemporary science discovers the complexity of the world to be an 
awakening to human epistemological limitation, in a very similar manner to the way in which the 
ancient wisdom tradition confirmed. It is within this framework of the complexity of the world 
that Fiddes will produce his complex model of the triune God. Although Fiddes’ entire approach 
to wisdom theology, engaging with the culture within which it is situated – not only its own – but 
sometimes quite diverging cultures – bears witness to the concept of biblical Wisdom outlined in 
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chapter I; here, where Wisdom is so willing borrowed from its cultural surroundings in order to 
communicate itself to the world and indeed to its own community, provides clear evidence of 
this biblical continuity (especially in Fiddes’ discussion of the scientific construction of the 
world and how this has impacted on his concept of God). This style is in stark contrast to the 
Gnostic wisdom theology outlined in chapter II, where Wisdom was accessed by a privilege few 
and was enlightening rather than learning from cultures around itself. Fiddes’ commitment to the 
biblical ethos of the wisdom tradition can be contrasted to Milbank’s approach within his 
Sophiology. To take just one comparison, note how in the above rendition of Milbank’s 
suggestions, he willing imposes the notion of paradox in order to affirm his ontological 
conclusion, that is extracted from contemporary epistemological categories accepted by wider 
communities outside of the theological world. Whilst this is certainly not a quirk of Gnosticism, 
it is clearly distinct from the biblical wisdom ethos embodies by Fiddes at this point.   
Wisdom and the Concept of God: Complex Trinity 
Fiddes sees this modern scientific insight of the complexity of the world affirmed within modern 
linguistics; especially within the philosophy of Derrida, where the world is perceived as a 
relation of complex signs within language that perpetually point beyond themselves. Fiddes 
suggests that Wisdom continually transgresses ‘the distinctions between subject and object, and 
in itself expresses the immersion of the self into the world.’1182 It is therefore within the 
complexity of the world revealed by modern science and linguistics that ‘talk about God 
becomes appropriate.’1183 The wisdom literature reveals that God possesses Wisdom from all 
eternity. And, according to Fiddes: ‘if this affirmation is to have any power of analogy with what 
human beings know as wisdom, God must be always committed to the signs of the material 
world, always involved in its text as God’s context…Indeed God must be deeply immersed in the 
time and history in which signs exist.’1184 It is this very conviction that prompts Fiddes to revisit 
arguments outlined in his Creative Suffering of God, where he rejects the notion of an immutably 
simple God found in traditional theism. Fiddes is adamant that his wisdom theology must 
propose a God who is complex and related to the world, if God is to have any meaning in a late-
modern context. Fiddes is aware that in order for God to be God, and not just another finite 
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thing. It must be maintained philosophically that God is both pure act and self-existent. 
However, he does not believe that this necessarily entails that God cannot be internally complex 
whereby: ‘such complexity would allow us to conceive of God as exhibiting infinity, not in 
excluding the finite, but including it as part of the divine being.’1185 Furthermore, following 
Barth, Fiddes argues that a voluntaristic conception of God, as one who freely chooses what God 
is to be, does not debar aseity. After all, God could simply choose to be affected by the world 
and this would not compromise his divinity, for Fiddes.  
    Fiddes is here working from within a foundational theological prejudice (if it may be labelled 
as such) that believes that ‘traditional’ affirmations of divine simplicity exclude ‘interaction’ 
with the finite world and posit a God who is above and beyond the world in a way that renders 
God superfluous. In order to rectify this theological failure, it is the task of modern theologians 
to relate God to the world by challenging the premises of traditional theism, justifying this 
approach by claiming that is a more truthful rendition of biblical narrative and revelation. Fiddes 
is mindful of the theological implications of such an approach, attempting to avoid transforming 
God into another finite thing. However, with what success Fiddes achieves this must be 
considered questionable. Firstly, the presupposition that traditional theistic conceptions of God 
as simple being, render God unrelated to a complex finite world have been challenged, most 
famously by Herbert McCabe. According to McCabe, God’s ‘ability’ to relate to the world 
should not be founded on a shared property of complexity (however distinguished these two 
types of complexity are proposed to be) as this would inevitably imply that God relates to the 
world in a limited and constrained manner as other finite things relate to the world. In McCabe’s 
logic, it is precisely because God is simple (not complex like finite beings) that God can relate to 
the world as God, in an unlimited and unconstrained way: ‘if the creator is the reason for 
everything that is, there can be no actual being which does not have the creator as its center 
holding it in being. In our compassion we, in our feeble way, are seeking to be what God is all 
the time: united with and within the life of our friend.’1186 Furthermore, the argument that God 
chooses to relate to the world as another finite thing would appear to bear little theological 
relevance in light of the previous argument. For even if it be granted that it is not a challenge to 
the God which is pure act that he could choose to be in a manner that is consistent with finite 
                                                             
1185
 Ibid, p.148. 
1186
 Herbert McCabe, God Matters, London, Continuum, 2005, pp.44‐45. 
 
 
341 
being (which is perhaps philosophically and logically questionable), it simply appears 
unnecessary, given that God already relates to the world, in his simplicity, in the most intimate 
form by which nothing could be gained by relating to the world as another finite thing. The 
purpose of Fiddes’ argument appears to be aimed at ensuring that there is a place for a complex 
world within the divine being, yet this seems to be already accounted for within a ‘traditional’ 
doctrine of divine simplicity, which as McCabe elegantly expounds, is already inherent within 
the biblical narrative of creation.1187 Fiddes’ commitment to a complex God moving and 
developing with history appears similar to the model of God’s interaction with the world outlined 
in Valentinian wisdom theology in the second chapter. Both appear to be somewhat mythological 
in nature. Although Fiddes is clearly more careful to guard against the type of myths inherent in 
Gnosticism, it seems difficult to deny that there is a mythical quality to a God changing and 
developing within history. Furthermore, the concreteness of the historical incarnation of Christ 
could be challenged within Fiddes’ complex God ontology, as God is already, in a sense, a part 
of history. His incarnation then has already and is continually occurring. This is also another 
feature of Gnostic theology, although Fiddes is eager to maintain a unique incarnation. 
    It was earlier argued that Milbank fell into a similar narrative pattern, however this was not 
because he maintained a concept of God that was incongruent to traditional theism, but rather 
because he was unable to distinguish the creaturely Sophia from the divine Sophia.  
    Within the biblical concept of Wisdom God is transcendent in his immanence to creation and 
is immanent to creation precisely because he relates to the world as simple transcendent divinity. 
By abiding to this insight, the mythical elements of Gnostic thought can be avoided. 
Furthermore, the historical incarnation of Christ can be more radically affirmed within such a 
conception of God, given the fact that God is not excluded from the world in his simplicity. He 
can relate to the world in Christ precisely without giving up his divinity. In Fiddes’ system, one 
appears to have to uphold that God (in the traditionally theistic sense) cannot be incarnate as he 
is but must change. However, to affirm this point is to seemingly deny the historical incarnation. 
However, if it is only the concept of God that must be changed and God then becomes a complex 
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being that is then able to relate to the world, seems only to further deny the reality of the 
incarnation, as the fact that another complex finite thing can relate to another of its own kind 
does not seem to encapture the miracle of the incarnation.     
    Fiddes’ Trinitarian theology, the cornerstone of his wisdom theology, is directly related to his 
understanding of a complex God. Within his Trinitarian thought, Fiddes makes use of the 
traditional language of hypostases affirming that this category must be entirely subsumed under 
the notion of relation: ‘I urge that hypostases (which are not distinct beings) should not even be 
understood as subjects or agents, but as relations which are as real as any subjects who have 
relations.’1188  He uses the patristic term perichoresis to indicate the nature of the inter-
penetration of the relations.  
    For Fiddes, ‘talk about God as Trinity begins from encounter with God in the world.’1189 It is 
only possible to experience the triune relations through the complex relations existing within the 
world: ‘we can only experience divine relations in and through the multiple relations we find in 
the world, whether human or in the wider scene of nature.’1190 Fiddes argues that the complexity 
of the world is a direct product of the complexity of the triune relations of difference cohering in 
love in God. From a world in which chance exists and uncertainty (according to quantum 
theory), it can be inferred that God is willing to patiently bear with creation as it grows and 
develops with God. The world is not coerced by divine power, but attracted by divine love: ‘if 
we think of this from the perspective of God as Trinity, we can say that in creation God makes 
room for created beings to indwell the fellowship of divine life, and that in redemption God 
draws them ever more deeply into God’s own communion of relationships.’1191  
The Concept of Wisdom in Fiddes’ Thought 
Fiddes remarks that ‘seeing’ has been one of the most prevalent images of the human and divine 
subject. However, drawing on scholarship from Derrida, he affirms that it has also been one of 
the most oppressive images of subjectivity; one that is characterized by its capacity to control. In 
relation to the biblical figure of Wisdom, Fiddes notes that at first glance Wisdom is presented: 
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‘as a female figure who is active on a cosmic scene and who makes herself available to human 
beings; significantly, she is also some kind of supreme observer of the world.’1192 Fiddes quotes 
Prov 8:22 and Sir 24:1-22 in support of this observation. Fiddes further notes that scholars such 
as Bultmann have attempted to deduce an original Gnostic or oriental myth (a fallen Wisdom 
searching for a home on earth) that has been adapted within the Jewish tradition and has 
produced texts such as Prov 8. However, Fiddes elucidates much of the scholarship that was 
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis to conclude that, whilst there are similarities, there is 
no substantial evidence to support that the Hebraic figure of Wisdom is a product of such 
mythology. Fiddes concludes that Lady Wisdom is a personification of Yahweh’s wisdom, with 
the added addition that the movement of Wisdom across the world mimics the movement of the 
sun. Fiddes states: ‘in terms of the poetic form of Proverbs 8 there seems then no reason to deny 
that Lady Wisdom appears here as a personified attribute of God. She is indeed the way that God 
deals with the world. Fiddes then disputes that the Wisdom myth is at play in Ben Sira, opting 
instead to concur with the analysis in chapter I of this thesis that, within Sirach, Wisdom 
becomes historically present within the Jewish culture and community: ‘dwelling in Jerusalem is 
a metaphor for becoming even more accessible to readers of the Torah.’1193 The figure of 
Wisdom is further developed in the Wisdom of Solomon, where Wisdom takes on the creative 
capacity of God and has a special relationship with humanity (as seen from the exegesis in 
chapter I), Fiddes notes that: ‘Wisdom shares in the generous creativity of God, giving rise to 
endless delights of diversity. She does not offer a flight from the many to the alone, but a journey 
into the manifold aspects of the world which she knows intimately, both because she surveys 
them and because she pervades them.’1194 In conclusion Fiddes states that: 
In the face of the endlessness and elusiveness of the world, the personification of wisdom is a 
way of inviting human beings into a personal relationship with a wisdom which is both divine 
and human…living in tune with wisdom will enable the wise person to enter into the phenomena 
of the world, and – although there is no possibility of mastering it entirely – to live with it and 
flourish within it.1195 
    Thus seeing the world through wisdom is to participate in God’s own wisdom. It is 
simultaneously a human and divine activity: seeing the world in wisdom is akin to knowing God: 
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‘observing the world cannot be separated from knowing God. Seeing the world, the viewing self 
finds itself being drawn into a communion of life with wisdom, and so shares in a divine 
movement of seeing.’1196 In order to affirm this position Fiddes must again take issue with 
scholastic theology, as Aquinas in particular maintained (according to Fiddes) that seeing the 
world with God can only be an eschatological hope, in which it is a supremely intellectual 
participation:  
Direct participation of the created in the uncreated remains for Aquinas only an eschatological 
hope, and this itself is a distinctly intellectual vision, depending on a view of the mind as the 
aspect of humanity that most resembles God. Moreover, this is an account which unfortunately, 
hardly requires a Trinitarian theology.1197 
Fiddes juxtaposes this notion to that offered within the wisdom literature. Whilst Aquinas does 
uphold an intellectual knowing through God in the eschaton (offering an exegesis of 1 
Corinthians 13: 12), this does not appear to stifle an harmonious participation of creation in 
divinity from the very act of creation, that must in some sense presuppose the type of 
communion that God calls humanity into at the eschaton.1198 Fiddes is eager to point out that 
seeing the world through God’s wisdom is not a form of cosmic mediation, this would imply a 
‘totalizing metanarrative’ for Fiddes, and moreover such mediation is not required, given the fact 
that wisdom is already inherent to the world:  
Wisdom does not in any way bridge a gap between transcendence and immanence, between 
creator and created. Rather, we have seen that the spirit of wisdom which stands over against the 
world, as its observer is also the same spirit which is within the world, holding all things 
together. We might say that wisdom flows forth from God so that human beings can participate 
in that same flowing movement.1199 
One will notice the apparent distinction here between Milbank’s use of the figure of Wisdom and 
Fiddes’. Milbank categorizes Wisdom’s role in theology as a form of ‘impossible mediation.’ 
The conclusion that Milbank appears to reach is not that dissimilar from the point that Fiddes is 
making here. Wisdom is both divine and created, it is impossible insofar as it is utterly 
paradoxical for Milbank. However the need for paradox and antinomy within Milbank’s 
Sophiological mediation is to uphold a distinction between God and the world, where both are 
                                                             
1196
 Ibid. 
1197
 Ibid, p.205. 
1198
 See: Summa Contra Gentiles Bk II:XV. 
1199
 Fiddes, Seeing the World and knowing God, p.211. 
 
 
345 
affirmed and distinguished without either collapsing one into the other or creating a dualistic 
separation. A critical reader of Fiddes might suggest that he does not face the same need for 
mediation within participation because he does not hold onto a clear and definitive distinction 
between God and the world (at least in any traditional theological sense), to the extent that both 
are complex beings. Thus, Fiddes does not need to vouchsafe transcendence within participation 
for God, which Milbank required. Perhaps greater demand should be placed on Fiddes to 
distinguish between God and the world. As Milbank attempted to show, this does not need to 
imply a distant and dualistic conception of God and the world.  
   Fiddes’ conception of seeing the world in wisdom is thoroughly committed to the historical 
reading of signs in the world which God is as much a part of as creation, and has a similarity to 
the modern scientific mood.  
    One should also note the extent to which Fiddes adheres to the biblical concept of Wisdom as 
a personification of God’s relationship to the world. Humanity participates in God through 
Wisdom.   
The Place of Wisdom: Participation in God 
Fiddes proposes that, within modernity, presence has been equated with being to devastating 
effect. Presence represents a totalizing imposition in which difference and locality are subsumed. 
In response to these threats, philosophers such as Derrida have invoked difference and insisted 
on a place of ‘no-place’; a chora (borrowing the phrase from Plato). However, Fiddes is keen to 
acknowledge the sensitivities of late-modernity, whilst still proposing a place of presence in 
which God can be found: 
These desires for a healthy presence and a satisfying place in the world find their fulfillment, I 
want to argue, in a relationship with God. Further, despite Derrida’s objections to a ‘hyper-
essential Trinity’, I want to maintain that it is the image of the triune God that actually resolves 
problems of both presence and place. To explore these theological issues I turn to some passages 
from Israel’s wisdom literature which present wisdom as being hidden, and which – in doing so 
– reflect on the ‘place’ of wisdom.1200  
The key to excavating this ‘place’ is to look at the Hebrew responses to the question of ‘where is 
wisdom to be found?’ According to Fiddes the place of wisdom ‘is not literally a place at all. 
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Like the chora, it disturbs neat human schemes of control of the world, yet unlike the 
philosopher’s chora this ‘no place’ points towards a real presence of God who is hidden, but not 
absent, and not inaccessible.’1201 Fiddes claims that: 
There is no single place which wisdom inhabits and which human ingenuity could possess. But 
equally, wisdom is not secluded in a place that only God knows. Divine wisdom is not absolutely 
transcendent, not totally other from us; God’s wisdom is not like a divine agent who dwells 
remotely in a place in heaven. We can exercise wisdom in tune with God: this is implied in Job 
28, and in Ben Sira 1…alongside the riddle of wisdom’s place, we discern the shadowy outline 
of Lady Wisdom who invites us to communion with her.1202 
In further attempting to elaborate on this notion of a ‘no place’ that is still in some sense a place 
where God can be encountered, Fiddes rejects any notion of paradox. As we have already seen, 
within Milbank’s Sophiology, paradox was the crucial concept evoked to prevent total pantheism 
or complete acosmism; Sophia paradoxically upheld both divine immanence and divine 
transcendence. According to Fiddes, paradox does not need to be adopted within his Sophiology 
on the grounds that wisdom designates a place in which God is present yet hidden in a self-
limiting or kenotic act. God and creation are not competing for the same place; wisdom’s 
divinity is not at the expense of her humanity; God is present in the place of humanity, precisely 
because he has withdrawn and hidden himself creating a space within himself for humanity: 
Rather than resorting to a paradoxical language of God who is present in absence, I suggest that 
we should be speaking about a hidden presence of God. In thinking about a God who is present 
but who veils or conceals God’s-self in humility, we might begin to see how we too can be 
present without oppressing others. Following the paradigm of Job 28 we should look for ways of 
expressing a space in which we can walk humbly with God’s own wisdom, rather than striving to 
grasp a place where we can simply be secure.1203  
Thus, Fiddes believes that this approach to wisdom theology allows one to uphold an ethics of 
mutuality, where competition appears to be quelled. He explores a number of models which 
maintain the hidden presence of God; including the Kabalistic notion of divine withdrawal, the 
medieval mystical idea of encountering God within the soul and the Levinasian notion of 
experiencing God in the place between a subject and alterity. According to Fiddes, the best way 
of accounting for these three themes and affirming them together is to put them into a framework 
of participation within the triune God.  
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    We have already discussed Fiddes’ Trinitarian wisdom theology and noted that its 
distinguishing feature was to insist on subsistent relations without relating subjects. Building on 
this idea, Fiddes argues that: ‘only a view of divine hypostasis as relation sustains the image of 
‘no-place.’’1204 In his attempt to locate creation within God and grant God’s hidden presence 
within creation, Fiddes maintains that: 
Only the idea of divine hypostases as personal relations is an adequate image for the immersion 
of the whole created universe into God, remembering of course two things. The first is that all 
language for the mystery of God is analogy and metaphor, and we are looking for the least 
inadequate language available. The second is that talk of God as an interweaving of relationships 
is language of participation: it does not attempt objective knowledge of God, but describes what 
it is like to engage in God.1205 
How does such a model fit this requirement? Fiddes proposes that:  
If we are to experience the world as a place for which we long, a place where we are at home 
despite its inexhaustibility and multiplicity, we must learn to live in tune with God’s wisdom, 
and so stand in a place which is not literally a place. This is best understood, I am urging, as 
‘situated’ in the space created between the movements of relationship in God. The symbol of the 
Trinity announces that God has opened up an interval between the interweaving movements of 
giving and receiving which make up God’s own being. The universe exists in this space, which is 
formed by relationships, and its inhabitants are called to enter more deeply into it.1206 
    Therefore, we have seen to what extent Fiddes’ concept of wisdom, based on his biblical 
exegesis, affirms that the figure represents a place that is saturated with God’s presence whilst 
remaining hidden in a non-oppressive way, which meets the demands of the late-modern mood 
(suspicious of presence as it is). This hidden place in wisdom was further revelatory of the space 
created for the world in the intra-divine relationships of the Trinity. The world exists within the 
space created out of love within God’s relationships. From the exegetical analysis in chapter I, 
we can clearly see to what extent Fiddes’ concept of wisdom, as that which conveys God’s 
immanence and transcendence to the world, is clearly indebted and sourced from the biblical 
account of Wisdom. This can be contrasted with Milbank’s paradoxical conception of Wisdom in 
which he had recourse to a ‘fall of Sophia’ myth to account for Wisdom’s place within creation 
and within heaven, so common to the Gnostic narrative as seen in chapter II and traced 
throughout some of the major developments in Western philosophy and Eastern theology. 
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Fiddes’ Trinitarian expansion of this wisdom theme appears to be attuned to the sensitivities of 
the biblical concept of wisdom even if they do go beyond them.   
Reading the World Through Wisdom 
The late-modern mood, typified by Derridean philosophy, suggests – according to Fiddes – that 
the world is made up of a never ending flow of signs each deferring meaning to another sign in a 
seemingly infinite process. This position would imply that God cannot be discerned within the 
world of signs, if God is supposed to designate some ultimate meaning above the world of 
signification. Fiddes’ task is to discern God within the world of signs without extracting God 
from this same process: 
Our project to discover how an elusive world might witness to a God who is the author of its 
signs thus inevitably includes the puzzle of the human self. How can we bring together the 
theological perception that earthly signs are crammed full of the glory of God, with the semiotic 
perception that signs –together with the self as interpreter and embodiment of signs – are fragile 
and prone to vanish?1207  
For Fiddes, the most successful way of reading God from the signs of the world is through the 
figure of Wisdom: 
If God is the final (though collaborative) author of the text of the world, and is present in the text 
in a hidden way, it is emphatic participation in the movement of the triune God that actually 
enables us to interpret the signs of the world. The wise of old tell us through the image of Lady 
Wisdom, an observer like the sun, that to see things properly human interpreters must see as God 
sees…self-conscious minds can measure, but only because everything is being measured by 
God…to participate in the measuring of God (Job 28:25) means sharing in the eternal relations 
of the Trinity, since the love between the Father and the Son in the fellowship of the Spirit is ‘the 
measure of all things.’ All interpretation enters into the rhythms of the divine life.1208 
Therefore, Fiddes conceives of the world as part of the self-communication of God in an other, 
the place of the world and the way in which the world must be read is through its place within 
the divine relations of God, God is within this space as a hidden presence, which requires a 
kenotic act. According to Fiddes, the very ‘structure’ of the Trinity is kenotic insofar as the 
relations are for each other. Fiddes follows this theme through to its logical conclusions and 
affirms (in a manner very typical of Bulgakov’s thought and Milbank’s Sophiology) that the 
world is in some sense equi-eternal with God, to the extent that God has never not desired its 
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existence: ‘the affirmation of the eternal will and desire of God provides a strong theological 
foundation for the idea that the material universe coexists eternally with God, though of course 
this does not apply to any particular form it takes.’1209 Like Bulgakov before him, Fiddes then 
reconceived of the classical doctrine of creation ex nihilo, stating that: ‘creation is ex nihilo, but 
only in the sense that it is ultimately ‘from nothing except’ God’s will and love, not in the sense 
that there ever ‘was nothing except’ God.’1210  
   Therefore we have seen the extent to which Fiddes perceives the world as a text authored by 
God and therefore revelatory of his hidden presence conceptualized through the figure of 
Wisdom. The notion that the world and all cultures adhering within it, is revelatory of God is a 
typical component of the biblical figure of Wisdom. The world was created through and in God’s 
Wisdom and is therefore present to God and revelatory of his being, yet it is also indicative of his 
transcendence (hiddeness) in this very presence insofar as this presence cannot fully encapsulate 
God’s dynamic relational divine life; ideas pertaining to the biblical concept of Wisdom outlined 
in chapter I. However, the Bulgakovian idea that world is equi-eternal with God does not appear 
to be sourced from the biblical concept of Wisdom that maintains that the world is created. We 
shall now explore Fiddes’ reading of localized Wisdom; Wisdom condensed into particular 
historical and cultural forms. 
Localized Wisdom 
‘The unsearchable and immeasurable quality of wisdom is now transferred to Torah.’1211 This 
remark follows Fiddes’ exegesis of Sirach and is in concordance with the exegetical analysis of 
this same book in chapter Iof this thesis. Fiddes continues: ‘Torah is not portrayed as a cosmic 
mediator, bridging heaven and earth, but as a unique condensation of wisdom, the vastness of 
wisdom contracted to a span.’1212 This claim, that wisdom has been condensed and uniquely 
expressed within a given culture, raises challenges as to how this culture then relates to other 
traditions; does it claim superiority, will it degrade neighboring discourses, is this just another 
totalizing metanarrative? These are the questions that such a claim provokes in late-modernity. 
However, in response to these issues, Fiddes remarks that:  
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The cannon of Scripture does create such a requirement [to engage with Scripture], but it is not 
an obligation to accept the words of the writers of Scripture as correct or infallible: it is to enter 
into relation with them. It is to stand where they stand, to attempt to enter with empathy into their 
‘otherness’, and to hear the word of God in company with them.1213  
The marking off of a canon or the localizing of Wisdom, does not lead to an isolated body of 
truth disengaged with the rest of the world but, rather:  
The enclosure of a certain body of material by a community should not result in reading it in 
exclusion from other texts, but always in reading it in relation to others. The notion of a cannon 
obliges us to, not only to explore the material so marked off, but to bring it into conjunction with 
other territories.1214  
Fiddes here appears to be drawing on the ‘wisdom theology’ of David Ford. Ford argues that a 
sapiential approach to scripture inherently demands that it engage with all culture through a 
universal relationship to wisdom. The outcome of this engagement cannot be determined a priori 
but is unpredictable in nature. What upholds the fruitful nature of this interaction is the faith that 
all culture is in some sense related to a ‘common’ wisdom: 
Nothing can be ruled out as unrelated to scripture and its understanding – no people, history, 
culture, event, institution, sphere of knowledge or religion. How they might figure in the process 
of the Spirit leading into all truth is not predictable…The confidence is that the Word is already 
involved with them.1215   
This reading of Wisdom is very akin to the concept of Wisdom outlined in chapter I of this 
thesis. Wisdom is inherently required to engage with surrounding cultures and societies; 
furthermore, the localization of Wisdom in the Torah for instance (as seen in Sirach) did not 
appear to dissociate the Wisdom tradition from neighboring cultures (as we later saw in the 
Wisdom of Solomon). Fiddes appears to be committed to this biblical trend of Wisdom that we 
analyzed previously. Within the Gnostic tradition, we saw an elitist ideology that believed itself 
to be legitimized from the mythical and metaphysical origins of those who ‘were in the know’ 
and encouraged a very different approach to surrounding cultures, one that seemed to be in 
contradiction to the biblical Wisdom narrative. Following the biblical trend, Fiddes further 
attempts to contract Wisdom, this time in the figure of Christ – after the pattern of the Early 
Christian authors. 
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Fiddes’ Wisdom Christology: Wisdom contracted in Christ 
Fiddes contends that ‘the New Testament presents Christ as the wisdom of God, replacing the 
Torah in this function. No longer a book but a person, a bodily text, is the key to the universe (1 
Cor. 2:6-10, Col. 1:15-17 with 2:2-4).’1216 Within the New Testament concept of Wisdom, 
‘Christ is wisdom contracted to a span.’1217 Fiddes quoted John’s Prologue in support of this 
position, which we have already concluded is an expression of Wisdom theology in Chapter I. 
Christ as the embodiment of Wisdom offers access to participate in the divine life of the Trinity; 
it draws creation and individual persons into this Triune relationship: ‘Christ in his body in the 
world…offers access into the infinite diversity of the triune life of God.’1218 Fiddes, however, 
remains concerned about feminist critiques of this localization of Wisdom within a male body. 
Although he maintains that this particular localization of Wisdom does not exclude the presence 
of God in the world through all bodies.  
   As Fiddes tries to further develop this localization of Wisdom in Christ, he suggests that the 
language of the Chalcedonian Christology of ‘two natures’ should be abandoned, as its technical 
philosophical prejudices appear outdated within late-modernity. In its place, Fiddes offers a 
schema that emphasizes the attunement of Jesus’ human relationship to God the Father, that is so 
perfectly attuned to God’s love, that it passes over into the divine relationship between God the 
Son and God the Father: ‘Jesus Christ is thus so perfectly attuned to the love, wisdom, and glory 
of God that he can be called wisdom itself. But this is not because he is indwelt by some divine 
wisdom principle. Wisdom is not a divine nature to be added onto a human nature. The 
relationship of this human son with the one whom he calls Father exactly fits over the 
relationship in God which is like that between a father and a son.’1219 This Christological model 
undoubtedly raises some difficulties that must be briefly addressed. Firstly, the New Testament 
wisdom writings – both Johanine and Pauline – appear to uphold that Wisdom in God (as the 
Son) ‘descends’ and becomes incarnate. There is no explicit mention of a human attuning 
himself with God through wisdom to the extent that it passes over into a divine relationship. 
Neither however, does Fiddes’ model appear to fit anything that was discerned within the 
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Gnostic conception of Wisdom. This appears to be a unique contribution of Fiddes himself. This 
approach to Christology appears to fit into Fiddes’ larger commitments to a ‘complex God.’ 
Fiddes’ resistance to traditional theism with its apophatic commitment to a God who is distinctly 
and infinitely other than the world, not being characterized with any finite limitation, would 
appear to permit a Christology where the divine and human are not definitively distinguished, 
given the fact that these boundaries are already transgressed from the beginning. And the crux of 
Fiddes’ argument rests on the fact that he believes that God has freely chosen to transgress these 
boundaries himself, to patiently come to be with the world, participating in history and its 
suffering. Fiddes further draws out this point in his discussion of Solovyov’s and Bulgakov’s 
Sophiology, in which he maintains that God purposefully limits himself.  As we have already 
discussed within this chapter, although this ontology would not satisfy the traditional theist for 
good reasons, it appears to be congruent with Fiddes’ wider argument. Perhaps the more 
poignant critique to raise here is the extent to which it diverges so markedly from the biblical 
concept of Wisdom Christology.   
    The purpose of Fiddes’ wisdom theology was to propose a theology that could make sense 
within a ‘late-modern’ context. Fiddes believes that the figure of Wisdom allows him to achieve 
this goal. His own conclusion is worth quoting at length to quantify what Fiddes believes he has 
offered to the theological community: 
Wisdom affirms the life of the body; it is concerned with observation of the world as it is, the 
recording of patterns of events, and the deduction of guidelines for living from this immersion 
into practical experience. Wisdom is the art of reading the signs of the world. It exercises this 
skill, not in an attempt to dominate, but in a humility which is aware of the complexity which 
undermines neat formulas, and which is open to being disturbed. The wise know that some 
aspects of the world will always escape explanation and assimilation into harmony. But through 
this very process of observation there is the possibility of being attuned to a wisdom which 
invites relationship, emphatic involvement, and a whole way of life. Personified as Lady 
Wisdom, to be open to her journey through the world is to find oneself in a place which is not a 
literal place but where one can participate in God’s own wisdom. One can know God only 
through seeing the world. Taking up this Hebrew idea into a Christian wisdom theology, the ‘no-
place’ of wisdom opens into a wide ‘space’ in which we can participate more fully in the 
rhythms of the triune God. Thus the movement of wisdom through the world is revealed to have 
the depth of relational movements of self-giving and other-receiving in love.1220 
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Throughout our assessment of Fiddes’ wisdom theology we have critically compared it both to 
the Gnostic and biblical concepts of Wisdom outlined in chapters I and II as well as to Milbank’s 
Sophiology. We shall now briefly make explicit those elements of his thought that more clearly 
rectify perceived Gnostic tendencies in Milbank’s Sophiology, whilst further offering our own 
brief suggestions. 
Fiddes’ Wisdom Theology and the Biblical Concept of Wisdom: Supplementing Milbank 
The first major point to draw attention to is the similarities that Fiddes’ wisdom theology bares to 
the biblical concept of Wisdom outlined in chapter I and its disparity, on most occasions, to the 
Gnostic Sophia.  We shall now explore several themes that confirm this conclusion. 
Firstly, unlike Milbank - who sourced his Sophiology from the theological proposals of Russian 
Sophiology – Fiddes bases his wisdom theology very closely on the biblical wisdom texts. In 
doing this, Fiddes avoids many of the Gnostic themes prevalent in Milbank’s suggestions that 
appeared to arise exclusively from his borrowings from Russian theology and German 
philosophy.  
    For Fiddes, following the biblical tradition, Wisdom is a personification of God’s relationship 
to the world. It is not a paradoxical ontology, in which God and creation are both affirmed within 
the same principle, but rather a harmonious elucidation of God’s transcendent (hidden) presence 
to creation in his immanence.  
     Furthermore, Fiddes constructs a theological conception of the self in collaboration with both 
the late-modern mood and the biblical wisdom tradition. As we saw in chapter I, the figure of 
Wisdom is neither a pure objective reality nor an isolated subject. But hovers somewhere 
between the two. Fiddes proposes that the human subject must be conceived in a similar way, 
which avoids a competitive dominating relationship with the world and a nihilistic rejection of 
subjective identity. The self proposed by Fiddes finds its identity in relating to the world through 
God as we shall see shortly. This approach again differs from Milbank to the extent that it draws 
exclusively from the biblical tradition in sympathy with the late-modern context. Whereas 
Milbank proposed an ontology that was critical and abstracted from the late-modern mood, 
Fiddes’ proposals appear to be more theologically constructive insofar as there is a clear dialogue 
established between the wider community and the theological community.   
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    This tendency to engage and borrow from surrounding cultures was shown to be an 
indispensable tendency within the biblical wisdom tradition. The biblical concept of Wisdom 
was constructed out of the circumstances that the Hebrew community found itself in during its 
exile. It liberally borrowed and engaged with Oriental culture and Hellenized ideas in order to 
construct its concepts. Fiddes appears to embody this trait throughout his wisdom theology, 
constantly engaging with his surrounding culture: philosophical, scientific and theological.   
    Fiddes adopts a natural theology that is deeply indebted to the biblical wisdom tradition. 
According to the analysis in chapter I, the world was created in and through Wisdom. Therefore, 
the entirety of the world must witness to God in some sense – this is perhaps why those adhering 
to this tradition actively seek wisdom in neighboring traditions. Such a creation theology 
necessarily encourages ecumenical and interfaith dialogue. This was seen in Chapter I, when the 
Jewish writers entered into dialogue with Egyptian theology and Greek philosophy. This has also 
been discovered in Fiddes’ thought. In contradiction to this tendency, Gnostic wisdom theology 
considered itself to be superior to the world and its diverse discourses, to the extent in which it 
believed that it was the only true representation of the original divinity. 
    Whereas Milbank, after the pattern of Solovyov and Bulgakov, broke with the biblical concept 
of Wisdom insofar as it was localized/incarnated first within the Torah and then ultimately 
within Jesus Christ, in preference of  a metaphysical Wisdom as a cosmic mediator, Fiddes 
follows the logic of the biblical development of Wisdom to include these localizations. Although 
Fiddes seeks to insist on the historical incarnation of Christ, we argued that certain tendencies in 
his thought, that resulted in him proposing a complex God, could jeopardize the ultimate reality 
of the incarnation, however this could easily be rectified by adhering to a traditional theistic 
concept of God.        
    Fiddes also upheld that the world participates in God through Wisdom, which was shown to be 
a crucial tenet of the biblical concept of Wisdom; although Fiddes elaborates this theme to locate 
it within a properly Trinitarian idiom.  
Summative Remarks 
Within this chapter we have explored two major proponents of wisdom theology within 
contemporary British theology; namely, Milbank’s Sophiology and Fiddes’ wisdom theology. 
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Having critically analyzed both on their own merit, in relation to each other and in comparison to 
the two concepts of Wisdom outlined in chapters I and II (both biblical and Valentinian) it was 
argued that Milbank’s Sophiology bore clear evidence that the Gnostic concept of Wisdom had 
emerged within modern theology. Although other prevalent themes informed the construction of 
Milbank’s Sophiological suggestions, there were clearly strong indications of the Valentinian 
narrative, most notably in its resistance to a clearly defined historical incarnation, an emphasis on 
the salvific effect of knowledge, and its tendencies to branch into mythology. Fiddes’ wisdom 
theology was demonstrated to be a clear continuation of the biblical wisdom tradition and his 
concept of Wisdom was directly indebted to the biblical concept outlined in chapter I. Fiddes’ 
wisdom suggestions were not without their own difficulties, which were discussed above, yet 
overall it could be seen as providing a correction to some of the Gnostic tendencies within 
Milbank’s Sophiology. The fact that Milbank’s Sophiology was sourced from an historical 
lineage that was archaeologically discovered to be directly related to the ancient Gnostic 
tradition (Russian Sophiology and German idealism) indicates that Gnosticism has had a 
significant influence on modern systems of thought. We have demonstrated its influence in 
modern philosophical and theological discourses that traverse different periods of history. The 
fact that Fiddes’ wisdom theology is not sourced from this lineage and provides no clear 
evidence of Gnostic theology is further indicative of this conclusion. This thesis set out with the 
intention of discovering whether ancient Gnosticism played any significant role in the 
development of modern systems of thought, by focusing this question through the lens of a 
particular theological theme; namely Sophiology, it should now hopefully be clear to the reader 
the extent to which this claim is verified through the study of this thesis.  
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General Summation  
The specific arguments of this thesis have been summarized and concluded throughout the 
development of the arguments themselves; pausing to reflect and conclude at every juncture 
within the thesis. In order to prevent unnecessary repetition, only the major findings of this thesis 
shall briefly be highlighted along with a short consideration of further possibilities for this 
research.    
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate, broadly utilizing Foucault’s archaeological 
methodology, the influence of Gnosticism on modern systems of thought through the theological 
theme of Sophiology (the reasons that this discourse were adopted for this task were outlined 
comprehensively within the introduction). Firstly, the thesis produced a concept of the biblical 
Wisdom figure as a distinct unity of discourse within an authoritative ennuciative filed through 
extensive biblical scholarship. This same process was carried out for the Valentinian concept of 
Wisdom. After critically comparing them and noting similarities and distinctions, it was 
concluded that two definitively separate unities of discourse and concepts of Wisdom could be 
distinguished and outlined and that these could be named biblical and Valentinian respectively. It 
was necessary to propose these models in order to analyze later discourses that may emerge from 
similar patterns or circumstances or even propose similar concepts as those found within the two 
unities of discourse just mentioned. 
    Following the insights of Baur, Voegelin and O’Regan, this thesis then sought to identify the 
historical, cultural and philosophical setting which permitted a particular discourse on wisdom to 
emerge within modernity. By closely investigating the development of post-Kantian idealism, it 
was discovered that a very particular set of philosophical problems emerged within this discourse 
that could be identified to patterns within the Gnostic discourse that produced their particular 
concept of Wisdom. These philosophical questions did produce a rudimentary Gnostic narrative 
within Fichte’s Jena philosophy. Although these discourses are historically disparate, the 
archaeological method of the thesis enabled this fruitful comparison.  
    The thesis then traced these archaeologically shifted ‘Valentinian’ philosophical problems into 
their next historical manifestation in the philosophy of Schelling. Adopting and answering these 
issues, it was shown that Schelling produced a philosophy that was archaeologically concluded 
 
 
357 
to be a modification of earlier Gnostic discourses on Wisdom. Not only had Schelling engaged 
with those problems that produced a particular discourse on Wisdom within the second century, 
but going further than Fichte, he actually adopted their concepts in order to give expression to his 
own philosophical thought. 
    From these two chapters alone, the central argument of the thesis (that Valentinian Gnosticism 
has played a significant role in the construction of certain important modern systems of thought) 
could be confirmed. Yet our archaeological journey did not stop there. 
    In further following the historical development of this particular discourse, we were led to the 
20th century Russian theologians: Solovyov and Bulgakov, both of whom adopted and transposed 
Schellingian philosophy into theology more comprehensively than any other theologians to date. 
In doing so, many of the Gnostic patterns of thought identified in Schelling became apparent 
within the theological systems of these two theologians. Both Solovyov and Bulgakov expressed 
this theology through the figure of Wisdom. The major question that this chapter sought to 
explore, utilizing the research in chapters I and II, was just which concept of Wisdom were they 
proposing. Through extensive study of their respective theologies it was concluded that both 
theologians had produced Valentian concepts of Wisdom that could clearly be distinguished 
from its biblical counterpart. The significance of these findings were that Russian Sophiology, 
was in many respects, the model that introduced wisdom theology to modern British theology, 
which we went on to discuss in the final chapter of the thesis. 
     We studied the wisdom theologies of both Milbank and Fiddes as they were considered to 
have produced the most comprehensive instances of contemporary wisdom theology. We began 
by critically engaging with Milbank’s Sophiology, where we noted a plethora of levels of 
influences and questions that Milbank was attempting to respond to; both biblical, philosophical, 
political and cultural. Despite the extensiveness of Milbank’s range, we did detect a distinctly 
Gnostic influence on his Sophiology and that it resembled the Valentinian concept of Wisdom 
more closely than it did the biblical figure of Wisdom. The predominant argument for this was 
because Milbank had sourced his concept of Wisdom from Russian Sophiology. This conclusion 
gave further credence to the accuracy of the archaeological findings of the previous chapters. 
Therefore, although Milbank’s wisdom theology cannot be encapsulated entirely within the 
Gnostic discourse, given the fact of the range of other influences on his thought that were 
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discussed in chapter VI, nevertheless an influence of Gnosticism could easily be discerned, 
therefore corroborating the principal argument of this thesis that contended that Gnosticism has 
influenced modern systems of thought, both philosophical and theological. However, we then 
attempted to contour these Gnostic tendencies within Milbank’s concept of Wisdom by 
supplementing his suggestions with the wisdom theology of Fiddes, which after close analysis 
was considered to be archaeologically related to the biblical concept of Wisdom. This appeared 
to be a step worth taking given the potential that wisdom theology has to engage with modern 
scientific discourses and cultural theories in a constructive way, as Fiddes demonstrated. 
Furthermore, biblical wisdom theology has always proven itself to be obliged to engage with 
surrounding cultures and ideas which seems to offer the study of theology a significant place 
within the modern world. Areas of Fiddes’ thought were critically modified and compared to 
those of Milbank’s, but overall his concept of Wisdom was concluded to be a significant 
adaption of the biblical concept that could supplement Milbank’s Sophiology at points when it 
slipped into the Gnostic lineage.               
    The only thing left to briefly discuss is some of the implications that this thesis has for further 
scholarship within this field. One of the major discoveries within this study was the extent to 
which German idealism is influenced by Gnostic mythology (especially Schellingian thought). 
Therefore, its influential relationship to theology may need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, 
Sophiology was just one of the significant lens through which this study could have been 
conducted. Many other theologies are heavily indebted to the German philosophical tradition and 
could perhaps offer potential avenues of inquiry to see whether Gnostic mythology could 
illuminate these discourses. Two significant theologians of the twentieth century suggest 
themselves, namely Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar in particular.  
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